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Introduction  
A. Introducing the Theme of Jus Post Bellum 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht once opined that “if international law is, in some ways, at the 
vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps, even more conspicuously, at the 
vanishing point of international law.”1  Lauterpacht was not arguing that there was no 
law to apply—something antithetical to his approach.2  Rather, he was suggesting that 
there was work to do.  He makes this observation after a stunning list of problems that 
require clarification,3 suggesting that the lawyer must “do his duty regardless of 
                                                 
1 Lauterpacht, H, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, British Year Book of 
International Law 29 (1952) 360,  381-2. 
2 See generally, Lauterpacht, Hersch.  Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, (1933); "Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International 
Community’(1959)." BYIL 35: 124;  Lauterpacht, Hersch. "The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable 
Disputes in International Law." Economica 24 (1928): 277-317.  The title of the present work, 
“The Function of Jus Post Bellum in International Law” is in part a homage Lauterpacht’s 
historic work, The Function of Law in the International Community.  It was based on an earlier 
1928 work in Economica in which Lauterpacht argues against the doctrine of non-justiciable 
disputes in international law and expanded into a general exploration into the principal issues of 
the philosophy of international law.  Lauterpacht suggested “a hypothesis which, by courageously 
breaking with the traditions of a past period, incorporates the rational and ethical postulate, which 
is gradually becoming a fact, of an international community of interests and functions.”  
Lauterpacht, Hersch.  Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
(1933), p. 422.  This hypothesis, that an international community of interests and functions exists, 
informs this work. 
3 The list is 36 lines long.  Lauterpacht, H, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 
British Year Book of International Law 29 (1952) 360,  381. 
Introduction  
    Introducing the Theme of Jus Post Bellum 
 
2 
 
dialectical doubts—though with a feeling of humility[.]”4  What is that duty? To 
“expound the various aspects of the law of war.”5 
One might continue the observation—if the laws regulating war are at the vanishing point 
of international law, the laws regulating the transition from war to peace are at the 
vanishing point of laws regulating war.  The transition to peace is at the frontier of efforts 
to govern human conduct, both at the global and local level.  As an armed conflict 
concludes, the victor’s comparative strength is often at its apogee, and the opposing side 
may be at its most desperate.  How can either side be constrained by law under these 
challenging circumstances?   
Characterizing the transition to peace as a phenomenon at the frontier of law only hints at 
the rich, complex nature of this difficult area.  The transition to peace is often a period of 
intense instability and complex legal interplay and flux.  New states, constitutions, inter-
state agreements and peacekeeping agreements may come into existence, crimes may or 
may not be amnestied, old institutions may lose their legal existence and lawgivers of the 
ancien régime may lose their role as a source of law.  The causes of the conflict, the 
conflict itself, and actions taken within the conflict may be the subject of legal action as 
the transition to peace moves forward.    
 
                                                 
4 Lauterpacht, H, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, British Year Book of 
International Law 29 (1952) 360,  381.  Referring to lawyers generically as male was common in 
1952. 
5 ibid 382. 
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B. Problematization 
This study focuses on legal and normative principles of the transition from armed conflict 
to peace, often called jus post bellum.  Jus post bellum is self-consciously named in 
relation to its sister terms, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, terms that have been 
exhaustively developed and theorized since they were coined in the early-1900s, a subject 
that will be discussed in detail below.  Jus post bellum, in contrast, is comparatively 
under-developed.  For jus post bellum, there is no foundational treaty text equivalent to 
the Hague Regulations of 18996 or 19077  or the  Geneva Conventions of 19498 for jus in 
bello or Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter9 for jus ad bellum. It is a phrase 
frequently used without definition, or with little understanding that others may use the 
term to mean something else.  It is almost never used with anything approaching a full 
exposition of the intellectual history upon which it is built.  Before the scholarship in 
                                                 
6 Short title: Hague Declaration (1899); International Peace Conference 1899,  Declaration (IV,3) 
concerning Expanding Bullets. The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, (entry into force 4 September 
1900). 
7 Short title: Hague Regulations (1907); International Conferences (The Hague), Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
8 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (“GCI”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
(“GCII”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
(“GCIII”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287 (“GCIV”). 
9 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
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recent years, the laws and principles that constitute the jus post bellum were rarely 
expounded.  This study helps to consolidate a firmer theoretical grounding for the term, 
as well as a clearer intellectual history and analysis of its content.  Jus post bellum, like 
jus gentium or jus civile, is best understood as by definition primarily a system or body of 
law and related principles. 
While this is primarily a work of legal analysis, given the deep roots of jus post bellum 
analysed in Chapter 1, normative aspects will also be considered.  Larry May’s work on 
the normative principles of jus post bellum is noteworthy.  May advocates that six 
normative principles of jus post bellum be recognized: rebuilding, retribution, 
reconciliation, restitution, reparation, and proportionality.10 Given the normative content 
of his work, he rightly suggests that the addressee of these principles are not only 
political leaders but average citizens.11  The goal of May’s conception of jus post bellum 
is the same as the hybrid functional approach outlined in this work,12 namely, one that 
emphasizes the functional aspects of jus post bellum (establishing a just and lasting 
peace) while nonetheless rooting it in a general timeline of transition from armed conflict 
to peace.13  As May and Elizabeth Edenberg put it: 
                                                 
10 See e.g. May, Larry. "Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War." European Journal 
of International Law 24.1 (2013): 315-333, p. 316. 
11 ibid 318-9. 
12 See particularly ch. 3. 
13 May, Larry. "Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War." European Journal of 
International Law 24.1 (2013): 315-333, p. 320. 
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It is not merely peace that is at issue, but a just peace, where mutual 
respect and the rule of law are key considerations.  […]  The jus post 
bellum literature focuses, as one might expect, on the achieving of peace.  
[…]  While jus post bellum theorists want a just peace, not merely any 
peaceful settlement of hostilities, they focus on the stopping of 
hostilities.14  Jus post bellum principles all are aimed at securing a just and 
lasting peace at the end of war or armed conflict.  Discussion of these 
principles has been standard fare in the Just War Tradition for several 
thousand years, even if jus post bellum principles are not usually given the 
status afford to jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles.15 
This work principally reflects on the historic meaning of normative principles that inform 
contemporary law and practice in Chapter 1, Past —The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum.  
Recognition that the application of law in this area has, as May and Edenberg state, the 
aim of a just and lasting peace (and is not neutral with the application to these normative 
goals) is necessary for understanding and development of jus post bellum.   
Another way to frame the normative emphasis on a “just and sustainable peace” so often 
referenced in the literature of jus post bellum is to tie it to concepts form peace studies 
such as Johan Galtung’s “positive peace” being differentiated from a mere “negative” 
peace,16 without a just resolution of the causes of the war and conduct within the war.  
                                                 
14 May, L. and Edenberg, E. (2013) ‘Introduction’, in May, L. and Edenberg, E. (eds.) Jus Post 
Bellum and Transitional Justice:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
15 ibid. 2-3. 
16 The concepts of “negative” and “positive” peace were developed by Johan Galtung in his 
seminal 1964 article: Galtung, J. (1965).  An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4.  For 
more on Galtung’s work on structural analysis of peace, see also Galtung, J. (1969).  Violence, 
Peace and Peace Research.  Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167-191.  Galtung, J. (1981).  
Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace.  Journal of Peace Research, 17 (2), 183-199.  
Galtung, J. (1985).  Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses.  
Journal of Peace Research, 22 (2), 141-158.  Galtung, J. (1990).  Cultural Violence. Journal of 
Peace Research, 27 (3), 291-305. 
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The specific nature of what constitutes a “just” peace depends in large part on what the 
causes of the war and conduct of the war were.  The fundamental aspect of what is “just” 
with respect to a “just and sustainable” peace is that jus post bellum is not simply focused 
on peace at any price with respect to justice; it rejects for example the goal of a 
sustainable peace founded on annexation, the denial of self-determination, rewarding 
aggression, denying the responsibility of trusteeship, violation of laws of occupation or 
human rights, or complete impunity for international criminal law violations.  Attention 
should be paid not only to the justice demanded under international law but the particular 
priorities of those who will live in the constructed peace.17  Legal scholars interested in 
jus post bellum cannot shy away from principles, including normative principles, that 
inevitably arise in discussions of jus post bellum.18 
For international lawyers the transition to peace may be at the frontier, or the vanishing 
point.  For those surviving armed conflict and that must live in the society created by the 
                                                 
17 For more on subjective and objective public reasoning in the area of distributive justice, the 
foremost scholar on the subject may be Amartya Sen.  See e.g. Sen, Amartya Kumar. Collective 
choice and social welfare. Vol. 11. Elsevier, 2014; Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Harvard 
University Press, 2011 (particularly Part IV); Sen, Amartya. Development as freedom. Oxford 
Paperbacks, 2001.  For those particularly interested in a philosophical approach to the evaluation 
of post-conflict justice, the works of Larry May on the subject are recommended, particularly 
May, Larry. "Grotius and Contingent Pacifism." Studies in the History of Ethics (2006): 1-24; 
May, Larry. "Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War." European Journal of 
International Law 24.1 (2013): 315-333; May, Larry. “Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia.” 
Eds. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S Easterday and Jens Iverson. Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations (OUP 2014) 15–25; May, Larry. After war ends: a philosophical 
perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2012.  
18 For an example of an approach to define the principles of just peace from an international 
studies perspective, see Williams, Robert E., and Dan Caldwell. "Jus Post Bellum: Just war 
theory and the principles of just peace." International Studies Perspectives 7.4 (2006): 309-320. 
Introduction  
    Problematization 
 
7 
 
peace, the possibilities and risks inherent in creating a potentially novel social structure 
with new rules and power relations is not at the edge but at the center of their reality.  
There is a chance of creating a new moment that is in a sense “pre-constitutional”—
indeed peace agreements and similar documents often serve a constitutional function.  
One might argue that this period when the new core of a future society or relationship 
between states can be formed is, perhaps, controlled purely by non-legal forces, that it is 
the outcome solely of the use of force.  But upon reflection, most jurists will reject that 
notion, adopting instead the notion espoused by Lauterpacht, that where there are 
questions, there is work to do in determining the international law that applies to the 
transition to peace.  
Without answering the type of questions described above, there is an increasing gap 
between the references to jus post bellum and providing a coherent, well thought out 
theoretical and historical basis for the concept.  By exploring definitional aspects of jus 
post bellum, including its relationship to jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and related concepts 
such as transitional justice and international criminal law, this work will seek to provide a 
coherent view of how scholars consider the term, closing the gap between the varied 
definitions scholars use for the term (when a definition is supplied at all).  There is an 
unfortunate tendency by some scholars to treat jus post bellum, transitional justice, and 
post-conflict justice as interchangeable—this idea or assumption of interchangeability is a 
tendency this work argues against.  By exploring the historical roots of jus post bellum 
within the just war tradition, it will address the gap between scholars such as Grégory 
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Lewkowicz19 who insist that there are no such roots and the many authors who think such 
roots exist.  With these foundations laid, the thesis will address the gap implicit in the 
uncertain question of the potential of jus post bellum. 
C. Research aims 
This thesis has three overarching objectives.  First, the thesis will evaluate the history of 
jus post bellum avant la lettre, tracing important writings on the transition to peace from 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant to more modern jurists and scholars.  Second, it explores 
definitional aspects of jus post bellum, including current its relationship to sister terms 
and related fields.  Third, it will explore the current state and possibilities for future 
development of the law and normative principles that apply to the transition to peace.  Jus 
post bellum has received an increasing amount of attention in recent years, but remains 
comparatively20 under-theorized, and frequently referenced without realizing that many 
authors be talking past each other, meaning different things while using the same term.  
The author’s hope for the thesis is not only to help clarify the debate over the term, but 
also to move the consensus towards a hybrid functional (rather than temporal) approach 
to jus post bellum, that is, to define an approach to this area of law that focuses on the 
goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace (with an awareness of temporal context) 
rather than a mere discussion of law that applies during early peace.   
                                                 
19 Lewkowicz, Grégory. "Jus Post Bellum: vieille antienne ou nouvelle branche du droit? Sur le 
mythe de l’origine vénérable du Jus Post Bellum." Revue belge de droit international 1 (2011). 
20 As compared to the last century’s theorization of jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 
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In addition to the positive objectives identified above, it may be helpful to identify at the 
outset what this work argues against.  Throughout the thesis, explicitly or implicitly, the 
suggestion that jus post bellum does not exist is rebuffed, as is the idea that it has no 
content.  In the introduction and conclusion to Chapter 1 (Past – The Deep Roots of Jus 
Post Bellum) the claim that the just war tradition is devoid of discussion of the subject 
matter of jus post bellum or that discussing the just war tradition is meritless is 
specifically rejected.  Chapter 2 situates jus post bellum with its sister terms, jus in bello 
and jus ad bellum.  The particular content and contours of jus post bellum are explored in 
Chapter 3 (Three theories of Jus Post Bellum) and Chapter 4 (Present – An Exploration 
of Contemporary Usage).  Chapter 4 also specifically rejects the idea that transitional 
justice, post-conflict international criminal law and jus post bellum are interchangeable 
ideas.  Chapter 5 provides a closer examination of jus post bellum in international and 
non-international armed conflict.  Chapter 6 examines the contemporary legal content of 
jus post bellum.  More generally, the thrust of this work is not to argue for the use of the 
term jus post bellum, although there are reasons to do so, but rather to examine the law 
and normative principles of the transition to peace regardless of the terminology used. 
D. Research questions 
It is not enough to simply invoke the existence of jus post bellum, as many scholars and 
practitioners do.  Rather, it is helpful to, first, test the existence and meaning of jus post 
bellum and second, examine the added value of jus post bellum.  The overarching 
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research question is to identify the function and content of jus post bellum.  More 
specifically, the primary research questions discussed in this work are:  
1) What are the historical roots of jus post bellum and how does this impact 
present day conceptualizations of jus post bellum?   
2) To what extent do sister terms shape the contours of jus post bellum?  
3) What is the present day function of jus post bellum?   
4) To what extent do competitive notions such as transitional justice shape the 
contours of jus post bellum?  
5) How does jus post bellum operate in international and non-international armed 
conflict? 
6) What is the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum? 
7) How should jus post bellum evolve as a concept?   
For maximum clarity, each research question is paired with a chapter.  Research question 
1 (historical roots) is addressed in Chapter 1 (Past — The Deep Roots of Jus Post 
Bellum).  Research question 2 (Sister terms) is addressed in Chapter 2 (Exploration of 
Sister Terms).  Research question 3 (function) is addressed in Chapter 3 (Three theories 
of jus post bellum).  Research question 4 (competitive notions) is addressed in Chapter 4 
(Present — An Exploration of Contemporary Usage).  Research question 5 is addressed 
in Chapter 5 (Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International 
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Armed Conflict).  Research questions 6 and 7 are addressed in Chapter 6 (Contemporary 
Legal Content of Jus Post Bellum).  
E. Explanation of Structure 
This work is structured in six chapters.  The first four chapters form Part I, the theoretical 
foundation for the thesis.  Chapter 1 establishes the existence and use of jus post bellum 
within the just war tradition, ranging from Augustine of Hippo to Immanuel Kant.  
Chapter 2, Exploration of Sister Terms roots the discussion of jus in bello in the “sister 
terms” jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  One of the main concepts this work seeks to 
introduce and reinforce is outlined in Chapter 3, Three Theories of Jus Post Bellum.  
Chapter 4, Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage, has two major sections.  
The first section reviews contemporary scholarship, evaluating the functional/temporal 
definitional dichotomy.  The second section contrasts jus post bellum and transitional 
justice.21   
Part II builds upon the foundation of Part I, covering in two chapters the substance and 
future of jus post bellum.  The question of why jus post bellum is useful for both 
International Armed Conflict and Non-International Armed Conflict and how it applies in 
each is explored in Chapter 5, Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-
                                                 
21 This sub-chapter builds upon Iverson, Jens. "Contrasting the Normative and Historical 
Foundations of Transitional Justice and Jus Post Bellum: Outlining the Matrix of Definitions in 
Comparative Perspective”: 80-101." Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations. New 
York: OUP (2014); and Iverson, Jens. "Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum and International 
Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics." International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 7.3 (2013): 413-433. 
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International Armed Conflict.   Chapter 6 surveys the contemporary legal content of jus 
post bellum with an eye towards some areas (such as the Responsibility to Protect) that 
are more lex ferenda22 than lex lata.23  The work concludes with a review of the 
substance of jus post bellum, an appraisal of the research aims and suggestions for further 
research.  
F. Propositions 
The following propositions are presented as a numbered list, not strictly orthogonal with 
the structure of this work, but bringing forth certain major points that are referenced 
throughout.   
1.  “Jus post bellum” is a useful and meaningful term, best used to examine and 
structure the laws and principles applicable to the effort to transition from an 
armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.  While meaningful, the phrase “jus 
post bellum” is not always used consistently by various authors.  This plurality in 
intended meaning comes from the newness of the term, the complexity of the 
problem, and the relative under-theorization of the concept.  Despite the newness 
of the term, the concept has deep roots.24 
                                                 
22 Law as it should be. 
23 Law as it exists. 
24 See generally Part I. 
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2. The function of jus post bellum is the successful transition from armed conflict to 
a just and sustainable peace.   A hybrid functional approach to jus post bellum is 
superior to a primarily temporal approach to jus post bellum in terms of 
coherence, efficacy and scholarly depth.25   
a. The simplest but least useful theorization of the jus ad bellum/jus in 
bello/jus post bellum tripartite division is that these areas cover the 
beginning, middle, and end of armed conflict.  This might be called a 
“temporal” tripartite division.  It might be thought of as a “horizontal” 
approach, where jus ad bellum covers the moment of entry into armed 
conflict, the jus in bello covers the period during armed conflict, and jus 
post bellum covers the period after armed conflict.   
b. With a hybrid functional conception, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus 
post bellum can overlap temporally, but differ in terms of function.  While 
the emphasis of application may change over time, with jus ad bellum 
taking the lead during peace, jus in bello taking the leading during periods 
of armed conflict, and jus post bellum playing a role during the transition 
to peace, their definition is rooted more in their function than in their 
sequence.   
                                                 
25 See generally ch. 2, 3. 
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3. The concerns and laws of jus post bellum, like those of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, predate the terms themselves. A review of the works of Augustine and his 
peers, the Institutes of Justinian, the Decretals of Gregory IX, Thomas Aquinas, 
Baldus de Ubaldis, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, 
Petrus Gudelinus, Hugo Grotius, Christian Wolff, Emer de Vattel, and Immanuel 
Kant demonstrate that the issue of the transition from armed conflict to peace is of 
enduring importance.26   
a. The writings of international jurists regarding the successful transition 
from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace is deeply rooted in the 
same just war tradition that informs contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello.    
b. The legal and normative tradition regarding the transition to peace has 
been under-examined in part due to the retrospective application of the 
terms of the twentieth century (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) to 
encompass the entirety of thinking about armed conflict.  This reductive 
pattern of thinking poorly serves contemporary understanding of these 
important works.   
c. It is a fair criticism to note that there are limits to the import of a tradition 
primarily based in Europe.  A truly comprehensive, encyclopaedic 
                                                 
26 See generally ch. 1. 
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approach to the history of legal and normative thinking regarding the 
transition from armed conflict to peace would be of great value, but is 
beyond the scope of this work.  While not universal, there remains a good 
deal of value in analyzing a discrete tradition that has been largely 
historically rooted in Europe, given its impact on contemporary law and 
practice.   
d. It is far from useless to discuss the ancient traditions of normative and 
legal thinking on the justice of war and peace, and indeed failure to 
reevaluate and consider the traditions that gave rise to contemporary 
international law is to doom oneself to a curious form of self-imposed 
blindness—not only to the beneficial analysis of past authors, but also to 
their errors (such as using jus post bellum as a general license to violate 
other norms).   
4. While jus post bellum’s function in aiming to establish a just and sustainable 
peace is in many ways more complex than the function of jus ad bellum or jus in 
bello, it is no less coherent in its basic aims.27   
a. The transition to peace is often a period of intense instability and complex 
legal interplay and flux.  New states, constitutions, inter-state agreements 
and peacekeeping agreements may come into existence, crimes may or 
                                                 
27 See generally ch. 2, 5. 
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may not be amnestied, old institutions may lose their legal existence and 
lawgivers of the ancien régime may lose their role as a source of law.  The 
causes of the conflict, the conflict itself, and actions taken within the 
conflict may be the subject of legal action as the transition to peace moves 
forward.    
b. One benefit of including jus post bellum as part of a trichotomy rather than 
limiting analysis of armed conflict and peace to the jus ad bellum/jus in 
bello trichotomy is it encourages a reevaluation of the coherence and 
purpose of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well. 
5. Jus post bellum’s sister terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello extensively shape the 
contours of jus post bellum, helping jurists take a comprehensive view of the 
challenges of armed conflict and the transition to peace.28 
6. Transitional justice is clearly distinguishable from jus post bellum.  Transitional 
justice, properly understood, is a conception of justice associated with periods of 
political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes. 29  Jus post bellum is rooted in transition from 
armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.30 
                                                 
28 See generally ch. 2, 5. 
29 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” 69. 
30 See generally, ch. 4. 
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a. While jus post bellum is substantively broader than Transitional Justice in 
many respects, jus post bellum is also clearly inapplicable in certain 
scenarios where Transitional Justice is applicable.  Similarly, one can 
imagine a change in regime in which no significant human rights 
violations were perpetrated by the previous regime, deposed by armed 
conflict. Armed conflicts can happen without massive human rights 
violations.  Additionally, armed conflicts occur without regime change. In 
these instances, Transitional Justice would tend not to apply, but jus post 
bellum would. 
b. Similarly, Transitional Justice and jus post bellum are both distinguishable 
from post-conflict justice.  Transitional Justice does not require armed 
conflict, while post-conflict justice obviously does.  Jus post bellum is 
broader than post-conflict justice, although clearly can include it. 
7. A review of the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum provides a clear 
indication of the need for jus post bellum.  Procedural fairness is generally 
necessary for peace to succeed.  Territorial disputes must be resolved, and 
aggression condemned.  No longer is it acceptable and commonplace to 
exterminate or enslave the defeated population. The prohibition on the annexation 
of territory is central not only in determining the legality of particular post-
conflict settlement, but also in underpinning the entire order of stable and pacific 
interstate relations.  The possibility of holding individuals to account must be 
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available, and the possibility of freeing a post-conflict state from odious state 
must be considered.31 
8. Jus post bellum should push back against the prohibition on transformative 
occupation in certain situations.32 
9. Jus post bellum addresses an issue of vital concern for the international 
community and for post-conflict societies.  Relapse into armed conflict is too 
frequent in modern history,33  with devastating results.  Jus post bellum should be 
developed to help all participants manage the complex process of ending armed 
conflict and developing early peace as successful as possible.34 
The promise of peace lies not only in the cessation of the suffering of war but also in 
the wide variety of forms that peace can take.  Navigating the path to a just and 
sustainable peace is notoriously difficult.  There is work to be done on this frontier.  
Before looking at the laws and norms that apply and could apply to the transition to 
peace, it may help to take a step back and think generally about how to approach law 
and norms with respect to armed conflict in general. 
                                                 
31 See generally ch. 6.   
32 See ch. 6. 
33 From 1945-2009, 57 percent of all countries that suffered from one civil war experienced at 
least one subsequent conflict.   UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, vol. 4, 2009.  Barbara F. 
Walter, Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace, World Development 
Report Background Paper, 2010, World Bank, p. 1. 
34 Passim. 
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G. Conceptual framework: Introducing the law and principles regarding 
armed conflict and the transition to peace 
How should the law and principles regarding armed conflict be approached?  At least 
since the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello were invented in the early 20th century,35 
there has been a strenuous emphasis on the distinction between two sets of legal and 
normative questions regarding armed conflict.  The law applicable to armed conflict is 
typically divided into two parts, the first governing resort to force (jus ad bellum), and the 
second the conduct within the conflict (jus in bello).  While imperfect, the laws restricting 
aggressive war (jus ad bellum) and codifying war crimes and other international 
humanitarian law violations (jus in bello) have matured considerably since the Second 
World War.  In contrast, transitions out of armed conflict are less regulated and 
frequently fail.  The post-conflict pause in violence often collapses into renewed armed 
conflict, or persists as a mere “negative” peace,36 without a just resolution of the causes 
                                                 
35 See Robert Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello” (1997) 37 
International Review of the Red Cross 553; see also Carsten Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Discipline(s)” (2008) 23 American University International Law Review 311, 312. 
36 The concepts of “negative” and “positive” peace were developed by Johan Galtung in his 
seminal 1964 article: Galtung, J. (1965).  An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4.  For 
more on Galtung’s work on structural analysis of peace, see also Galtung, J. (1969).  Violence, 
Peace and Peace Research.  Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167-191.  Galtung, J. (1981).  
Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace.  Journal of Peace Research, 17 (2), 183-199.  
Galtung, J. (1985).  Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses.  
Journal of Peace Research, 22 (2), 141-158.  Galtung, J. (1990).  Cultural Violence. Journal of 
Peace Research, 27 (3), 291-305. 
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of the war and conduct within the war.  From 1945-2009, 57 percent of all countries that 
suffered from one civil war experienced at least one subsequent conflict.37 
There has been a push in recent years to approach the law that governs the use of force 
not as a dichotomy, but as a trichotomy.  But adding jus post bellum to jus in bello and 
jus ad bellum has proven difficult, much as rebuilding a viable post-conflict society is 
more complicated than a general prohibition on armed conflict.  To find the legal core of 
jus post bellum, one cannot simply reference a single document such as the prohibition on 
aggressive war in the Charter of the United Nations38 or a set of treaties governing 
conduct in war such as the Geneva Conventions of 194939 and their additional 
protocols.40  Rather, the law that governs the transition to peace is contingent and cross-
                                                 
37 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, vol. 4, 2009.  Barbara F. Walter, Conflict Relapse and 
the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace, World Development Report Background Paper, 2010, 
World Bank, p. 1. 
38 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI; see in 
particular Articles 2 and 51. 
39 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (“GCI”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
(“GCII”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
(“GCIII”); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287 (“GCIV”). 
40 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (“API”); International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 
UNTS 609 (“APII”); and to a minimal degree International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
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cutting.  Different laws may apply to each transition, and the applicable laws in any 
particular transition will be drawn from legal areas often considered separately.  For 
example, transitions to peace occur in the context of conflict exclusively between states 
and also in conflicts involving non-state actors, with the involvement of the United 
Nations Security Council or without its involvement, with the dissolution of states or the 
creation of them, with a military victory for those with criminal culpability or without 
that difficulty.   
Why make the distinction between two or three different areas of regulation and norms 
relating to armed conflict? Why not one unified theory of the justice of war?   Why not a 
highly atomized field with each sub-element of the current two or three areas treated as 
one of scores of separate areas (e.g. why think of jus in bello protections for those hors de 
combat, civilians, prisoners of war, and weapons law under one umbrella term)?  The 
terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello were coined in large part to protect one set of 
concerns (governed by jus in bello) from another (governed by jus ad bellum).  Again, jus 
ad bellum regulates recourse to the use of force.  Jus in bello regulates the conduct of the 
armed conflict, seeking to limit the damage caused by war without resort to adjudicating 
the justice of the conflict as a whole.41   
                                                                                                                                                 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption 
of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005 (“APIII”). 
41 See, e.g., François Bugnion, Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and non-international armed conflicts, 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, T. M. C. Asser Press, vol. VI, 2003, pp. 167-198 
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There are extremely good reasons to make this distinction between jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello, beyond any qualitative difference that allows for the creation of a convenient 
typology.  Chief amongst these reasons is to protect jus in bello from jus ad bellum—that 
is, to prevent the asserted justice of one’s cause42 in war from being an excuse for one’s 
conduct.  Without a strict distinction between questions of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, 
the regulations of jus in bello tend to crumble under the emotional force of jus ad bellum 
claims, leaving the humanitarian concerns at the heart of jus in bello wholly unprotected.   
Since the terms jus in bello and jus ad bellum became commonplace, this distinction has 
been the starting point for answering the question of how the law and principles regarding 
armed conflict should be approached.  First, one determined if a particular question 
related to the laws and norms of entering into armed conflict.  If that was not the concern 
but it still related to armed conflict, the question was generally determined to be one 
within the body of laws and norms known as jus in bello.  Thus, jus in bello grew to 
cover many diverse wartime and peacetime concerns, as long as they were not reducible 
to jus ad bellum.   
H. Addressees of jus post bellum 
Additional information regarding the addressees of jus post bellum will become clearer 
throughout this work, particularly in Chapter 2 (Exploration of Sister Terms) and Chapter 
6 (on the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum).  Introducing the range of 
addressees at the outset, however, may help to clarify the concept somewhat.    
                                                 
42 Or the injustice of one’s opponent’s cause. 
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Discussing addressees can be unexpectedly complicated.43  Even in the simple case of 
domestic law, there can be debate as to whether the addressee is the nationals of that state 
or the government officials and agencies. 44  Classical commandments such as “do not 
murder” directly address all persons, but typical modern domestic legislation often more 
directly regulates the state apparatus that may arrest, try, and punish (alleged) 
murderers.45   
To take an example closer to the subject of this work, consider the question of the 
addressees of jus ad bellum.  The standard response as to the addressees of jus ad bellum, 
is simple: states are the addressees, because jus ad bellum involves international armed 
conflicts, which are between states.  On further reflection, scholars and practitioners 
might consider that the United Nations is also regulated and in a sense a source of 
specific regulation of jus ad bellum, in the form of one its organs, the United Nations 
Security Council.46  The issue of which organ or subsidiary organ of the United Nations 
                                                 
43 For a foundational work on the modern complexity of this issue (without emphasising the 
terminology “addressee”) Kelsen, Hans. Pure theory of law. Univ of California Press, 1967.  .  
44  For more on this general issue, see e.g. Stevenson, Drury. "To Whom Is the Law Addressed?." 
Yale Law & Policy Review 21.1 (2003): 105-167; Stevenson, Drury D. "Kelsen’s View of the 
Addressee of the Law: Primary and Secondary Norms." Hans Kelsen in America-Selective 
Affinities and the Mysteries of Academic Influence. Springer International Publishing, 2016. 297-
317; Stevenson, Drury D., Kelsen's View of the Addressee of the Law: Primary and Secondary 
Norms (June 21, 2014). Kelsen in America Interdisciplinary Conference hosted by Valparaiso 
University School of Law at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, June 27 – 28, 2014.  
45  Stevenson, Drury D., Kelsen's View of the Addressee of the Law: Primary and Secondary 
Norms (June 21, 2014). Kelsen in America Interdisciplinary Conference hosted by Valparaiso 
University School of Law at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, June 27 – 28, 2014.  
46 See e.g., United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
Article 51. 
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is addressed by jus ad bellum is further complicated by the trend towards more “robust” 
peacekeeping mandates,47 historic examples such as the Uniting for Peace Resolution,48 
or the role of the Secretary General; and if the term “addressee” is not limited to 
restrictive regulation but also the possibility of license or facilitation.  Addressees of jus 
ad bellum arguably also go beyond states when one looks at the role of collective self-
defence organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for example 
organized armed groups that play a role in internationalized armed conflicts.  While some 
may argue that jus ad bellum only regulates the act of aggression and not the crime of 
aggression, given that the act is a constituent part of the crime, those “in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State”49 
who may be liable to be convicted of the crime of aggression may consider themselves at 
least indirectly addressed by jus ad bellum.  To ask “who are the addressees of jus ad 
bellum” is thus an imprecise question, allowing a general answer such as “generally 
                                                 
47 I.e., with greater authorization to use force, in particular to protect civilians.  See e.g. Tardy, 
Thierry. "A critique of robust peacekeeping in contemporary peace operations." International 
Peacekeeping 18.2 (2011): 152-167; Terrie, Jim. "The use of force in UN peacekeeping: The 
experience of MONUC." African Security Studies 18.1 (2009): 21-34; Ocran, T. Modibo. "The 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping." BC Int'l Comp. L. 
Rev. 25 (2002): 1. 
48 UN General Assembly, Uniting for peace, 3 November 1950, A/RES/377; for more on the 
Resolution see e.g. White, Nigel D. "The relationship between the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in matters of international peace and security." The Oxford Handbook of the 
Use of Force in International Law. 2015; Johnson, Larry D. "“Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still 
Serve Any Useful Purpose?" American Journal of International Law 108 (2014): 106-115; 
Carswell, Andrew J. "Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace 
Resolution." Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2013).  
49 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (last amended 
2010) Article 8 bis. 
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states” but requiring a specific legal question applied to a precise fact pattern to provide 
an answer as to who is addressed by which specific legal provision.  Noting the need for 
precision when amplifying a question such as “who are the addressees of jus ad bellum” 
in no way suggests that jus ad bellum has no meaning in terms of legal responsibility, it 
merely suggests the need for clarity. 
Jus in bello is a more complex body of law than jus ad bellum in many respects, 
regulating a great diversity of conduct within armed conflict and occupation as opposed 
to largely prohibiting conduct (albeit with notable exceptions).  The potential addressees 
of jus in bello grow as one includes non-international armed conflict in the phenomena 
addressed.  Nonetheless, a general answer to the question “who are the addressees of jus 
in bello” can be ventured: generally belligerent states, and also in non-international 
armed conflict organized armed groups, although properly conceived a wider array of 
actors from the International Committee of the Red Cross to local humanitarian groups to 
intergovernmental organizations are also regulated.  A more precise question is needed 
for a more specific answer, but that in no way lessens the importance, coherence, or 
validity of jus in bello. 
Jus post bellum is more complicated still, involving what is in many respects a more 
complex set of challenges (ending conflict and building a positive peace, not restricting 
force and protecting the vulnerable).  Most importantly with respect to the question of 
“who are the addressees of jus post bellum”, many questions of jus post bellum properly 
conceived involve a greater diversity of potential actors.  That said, it is worth describing 
Introduction  
    Addressees of jus post bellum 
 
26 
 
at the outset some general answers to the question of the addressees of jus post bellum.  
The general summation might be “usually states, sometimes other parties to peace 
agreements and international organizations,” but of course specifying the particular law 
applied and factual scenario clarifies the answer.  
With respect to jus post bellum and the regulation of the procedural fairness of peace 
treaties between states emerging from international armed conflict, the addressees are 
primarily states, although for example depositories may also be involved.  More generally 
peace processes (including the crafting of peace agreements) may have a distinctive self-
determination role bound to questions of state legitimacy and human rights protections 
that may involve both governments and organized armed groups. 50   Peace agreements 
often have a hybrid international/domestic legal status and may create obligations that 
may need to be interpreted from both a treaty or contract law framework and a 
constitutional law framework; and distinctive types of third-party delegation,51 but 
primarily can be said to address those entities who are party to the agreements.   
Jus post Bellum is informed by The Responsibility to Protect doctrine,52  particularly the 
Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild as part of this doctrine.  
                                                 
50 See generally Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex 
Pacificatoria (Oxford University Press 2008). 
51 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 407; see 
also Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
52 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(International Development Research Centre 2001) 39–45; see also United Nations Secretary 
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These responsibilities lie primarily on the territorial state, but secondarily to the 
international community as a whole.   
Certain specific legal restrictions that are part of jus post bellum apply to governments 
due to their state-based nature.  The prohibition of annexation as a forbidden conclusion 
to an armed conflict is addressed to states.  The prohibition of the threat of the use of 
force as guaranteed by the Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties53 
with respect to fairness in peace treaties applies to states, as do other areas of treaty law.  
Similarly, the duty to extradite or refer for prosecution (aut dedere aut judicare) certain 
criminal violations bind states or state actors, limiting their ability to grant amnesties or 
to simply refrain from acting.  This is in tension with the duty of states in non-
international armed conflicts a duty to “endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty 
to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty 
for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained,”54 
                                                                                                                                                 
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 
65–7; UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, paras 138–9; United Nations General Assembly, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 
(12 January 2009) para. 48. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 52. 
54 Art. 6(5) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (signed 12 Dec. 
1977, entered into force 7 Dec. 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. 
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arguably limiting this type of amnesty to conduct other than, for example, genocide,55 
torture,56 destruction of cultural property, 57 and terrorism.58  When a question of law in 
the transition from armed conflict to peace relies on the law of state succession or 
occupation, these laws are also primarily addressed to states.   
The addressee of a question of jus post bellum with respect to the right to self-
determination is more complex.  Self-determination has historically been the goal of 
many armed groups, and may be a necessary part of a just and sustainable peace.  The 
right to self-determination is a peremptory norm. 59  Under Additional Protocol II it is 
made clear that an “International Armed Conflict” “include[s] armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
                                                 
55 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, (Entry into force: 12 January 1951) United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 78, p. 277.   
56 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, (Entry into force 26 June 1987) United Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
57 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954 (Entry into force: 7 
August 1956). 
58 United Nations, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 
1970, (Entry into force: 14 October 1971) UN Treaty Series 1973; UN General 
Assembly, International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17 November 1979, (Entry 
into force: 3 June 1983) No. 21931; UN General Assembly, International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 December 1997, (Entry into force: 23 May 2001) No. 
37517; UN General Assembly, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, 9 December 1999, (Entry into force: 10 April 2002) No. 38349. 
59 International Law Commission. "Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries." Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its 53rd session (2001), Commentary on Article 26, paragraph 5, p. 85.   
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régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination[.]”60  The primary addressee of 
these norms are states, but other groups such as international organizations may also be 
regulated.61  Similarly, human rights law, when applied in the context of the transition 
from armed conflict to peace with an aim towards establishing a just and sustainable 
peace, is primarily addressed to states but is increasingly applied to international 
organizations and non-state actors as well.  The law of International Territorial 
Administration, as indicated by the term, historically is addressed to international 
organizations, albeit with impacts on other entities.  
While the obligation to extradite or refer for prosecution may apply only to states, the 
scope of international criminal responsibility and its impact on the transition from armed 
conflict to peace regulates more than states.  A central theory behind international 
criminal responsibility (thus saving most prosecutions from challenges regarding legality) 
is that conduct can be criminalized regardless of domestic law.  This addresses states by 
limiting the effectiveness of state decriminalization, amnesty, or inaction.  The 
application of international criminal law, regardless of whether this occurs in 
international, hybrid, or domestic fora, can play an important role in building a just and 
sustainable peace.  It is addressed primarily to individuals, but also to others subject to 
the authority of court or tribunal, as well as the court or tribunal itself. 
                                                 
60 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Article 1. 
61 See e.g. Emerson, Rupert. "Self-determination." Am. J. Int'l L. 65 (1971): 459 (on obligation to 
support self-determination efforts). 
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If state debt can be discharged during the transition from armed conflict to peace due to 
its “odious” nature, the law regulating the discharge or validity of such debt is 
addressable both to the state debtor and the creditor, whether that creditor is a 
governmental, intergovernmental, or non-governmental entity. 
 
I. Method and Approach 
As the different Parts of this work have different objectives, they correspondingly have 
different methodologies and approaches.  These are explained in more detail in each 
section as appropriate, but an initial review may be helpful at the outset.   
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the methodologies used in this thesis is contained 
in the annex.  The term “jus post bellum” is used by a vast number of scholars in 
accelerating stream of scholarship.  These writing are by no means limited to public 
international law—in fact, in the author’s experience, in a good research library system 
there will often be more titles on jus post bellum outside of the law library than within it.  
In order to map out the scope and contours of the broader literature on the subject, 
quantitative and sampling methods were used (described further in the annex) to code and 
track trends in the literature.  While different methodological choices could be employed 
to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced evaluation of sets of publications on a 
subject, the author hopes that the basic approach of including coding and statistical 
analysis of the literature will become more widespread in a period of higher rates of 
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publication and publication availability, particularly when the discussion over an 
emerging term lacks a desired level of shared definition and approach by scholars. 
The methodology for each chapter is explained in part by its goal.  The objective of 
Chapter 1 is to help support aspects of Proposition 1 (“Despite the newness of the term, 
the concept has deep roots”) and Proposition 3 (“the issue of the transition from armed 
conflict to peace is of enduring importance”) and help answer Research Question 1 
(“What are the historical roots of jus post bellum”) by highlighting a genealogy of 
thinking regarding the law and principles regarding the transition from armed conflict to 
a just and sustainable peace.  Accordingly, Chapter 1, Past — The Deep Roots of Jus Post 
Bellum surveys a selection of leading authors in the just war tradition to elucidate their 
writings on the law and norms pertaining to the transition from war to peace.   
The goal of Chapter 2 is to address Research Question 2 (“To what extent do sister terms 
shape the contours of jus post bellum?”)  Chapter 2, Exploration of Sister Terms, is 
largely an objective62 introduction to the basic jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum 
trichotomy.  It includes both very traditional methods such as literature review and close 
readings of important legal and historical texts, particularly treaties, but also what is 
increasingly called in the Humanities the varied methodology and tools of the “digital 
                                                 
62 The author has tried to be transparent as to his views, particularly with respect to jus post 
bellum having a laudable function, he nonetheless has tried to be objective throughout this work. 
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Humanities.”63  This combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses helps address 
the open-ended but still relatively focused second research question, allowing support for 
Proposition 4 (on the greater comparative complexity but similar comparative coherence 
of jus ad bellum with respect to its sister terms) and Proposition 5 (sister terms 
extensively shape jus post bellum, and together they allow a more comprehensive 
approach). 
In Chapter 3, Three Theories of Jus Post Bellum, the approach is more theoretical, 
making an argument that jus post bellum could and should be conceptualized in a 
primarily functional (rather than temporal) manner, but that a hybrid approach that 
emphasizes the functional goals while maintaining an awareness of temporal context is 
the best synthesis of competing approaches.  The methodology of this section builds upon 
the statistical approach in the Annex with a more qualitative approach, both to help map 
the contours of current scholarship and to propose a synthesis between what may be 
described as unwittingly rival camps.  The objective of this chapter is to support 
Proposition 2, that jus post bellum has a discrete function (“the successful transition from 
armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace”) and that a hybrid functional approach is 
superior to a primarily temporal approach.  It answers Research Question 3 (“What is the 
present day function of jus post bellum.”) 
                                                 
63 Patrik Svensson, The Landscape of Digital Humanities, Digital Humanities Quarterly, 2010 
Volume 4 Number 1, available at http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/4/1/000080/000080.html 
last visited 16 July 2014. 
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The ambition of Chapter 4 is to answer Research Question 4 (“To what extent do 
competitive notions such as transitional justice shape the contours of jus post bellum?”) 
and to support Proposition 5 (“Transitional justice is clearly distinguishable from jus post 
bellum.”)  Chapter 4, Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage, begins with an 
analysis of the scholarship on jus post bellum, identifying and quantifying trends in the 
way jus post bellum is discussed.  This is many ways an expansion of Chapter 3’s 
theoretical framework and preliminary analysis.  Chapter 4 continues with a detailed 
discussion of the difference between jus post bellum and Transitional Justice, contrasting 
the two along a variety of dimensions, and ultimately making persuasive argument about 
the better conception of each term.   
Chapter 5, Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed 
Conflict, takes a largely textual approach, relying heavily on treaties and historical 
writings, and provides an introduction to the substantive law of jus post bellum.  It seeks 
to clarify how jus post bellum operates in international and non-international armed 
conflict (Research Question 5.)   
Chapter 6 reviews the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum.  Doing so provides 
a clear indication of the need for jus post bellum, as well as providing substance and legal 
granularity to the term (Proposition 7).  The approach here relies chiefly on reference to 
and analysis of primary legal texts, in order to answer Research Question 6 (“What is the 
contemporary legal content of jus post bellum”) and where relevant Research Question 7 
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(“How should jus post bellum evolve as a concept?”).  The work concludes with an 
appraisal of the research aims in this thesis.
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1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum 
A. Introduction 
To discuss jus post bellum is inevitably in part to discuss the Just War Tradition.  This 
tradition holds that questions regarding the morality and legality of war are worth 
answering and require close examination to properly answer.  Consider, in contrast, 
Realism, which holds either prescriptively that these question are not worth answering or 
are not answerable, or descriptively that whatever one’s answer to these question, they 
have no bearing on what states actually do.  Or from another perspective, consider 
Pacifism, which holds that the questions of the morality of war are worth answering but 
do not require close examination to properly answer in any particular instance, because 
regardless of the conditions, the answer is always going to be against violence—against 
fighting of armed conflict in general, against any permitted methods of waging war, and 
always in favor of armed conflict’s termination.1 
Brian Orend considers James Turner Johnson to be the authoritative historian of the Just 
War Tradition.2 Johnson’s early volume Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: 
Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-17403 is a good starting point to introduce the 
                                                 
1 For more on this division between Just War Theory, Realism, and Pacifism see Orend, Brian. 
The morality of war. Broadview Press, 2013. 
2 See Orend, Brian. The morality of war. Broadview Press, 2013. 
3 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975). 
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basic historical framework for the tradition.  Johnson posits that there before about 1500 
C.E., the classic just war doctrine did not really exist.4  This means that to speak of the 
“just war tradition” without further qualification or explanation with respect to Aristotle, 
Cicero, Augustine, or the theologians or canonists of the High Middle Ages (pre-1500) is 
misleading.  Not that there was no writing on the moral and legal questions of war before 
that point, but rather, it had not resolved itself into a single tradition. 5  Before around 
1500 C.E., there were two traditions, a religious (theological and canonical) tradition 
focused on the right to make war (i.e., jus ad bellum) and a secular, chivalrous code 
focused exclusively on allowable methods of fighting (i.e. the Law of Arms, or jus in 
bello).6  Jus in bello in medieval Europe was defined primarily by the knights’ chivalric 
code.7  The principal divide in the late Middle Ages regarding war doctrine was between 
two approaches to jus ad bellum particularly with respect to war for religion (bellum 
sacrum): the approach that took war for religion to be the most just kind of war 
imaginable, and another that ruled out religious justifications for war and emphasized 
only natural-law (mainly political) just causes for war.8  
                                                 
4 ibid. 8. 
5 ibid 8. 
6 ibid 8. 
7 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), p. 47 
8 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975), pp. 8-9. 
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It is a fair criticism to note that there are limits to the import of a tradition primarily based 
in Europe.  A truly comprehensive, encyclopaedic approach to the history of legal and 
normative thinking regarding the transition from armed conflict to peace would be of 
great value, but is beyond the scope of this work.  While not universal, there remains a 
good deal of value in analyzing a discrete tradition that has been largely rooted in Europe.  
A critique that a particular analysis is Eurocentric holds particular weight if the analysis 
is blithely unaware of its bias or selectivity.  The following analysis is fully aware of the 
selectivity employed, and acknowledges its limitations, while insisting on its continued 
value. 
Over time, there were three positions that went by the name “just war doctrine.”9  The 
first, the medieval just war doctrine, was itself the product of at least two distinct 
traditions, religious and secular.10 Within those two broader traditions, the religious 
tradition included the canon law after Gratian and the theological tradition (to which 
Thomas Aquinas made a vital contribution), and the secular tradition included the 
renewed work of civil lawyers to understand and make current the concepts of Roman 
law, and the influence of the chivalric codes.11  One can see the separate roots combining 
in the idea of non-combatant immunity for example: for the church this derives from the 
                                                 
9 ibid 29. 
10 i 8-9, 29. 
11 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), pp. 79, 122. 
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right of the (often religious) noncombatant, for the knight this derives from the 
magnanimity of the knight and his obligations under the chivalric code.12 
The second, post-Reformation holy war doctrine, applied the term “just war” to the 
doctrine generally described by Roland Bainton13 and others as a “crusade.”14 Medieval 
Christian “just war” also did not apply to infidels or heretics the restrictions on warfare 
they applied to themselves,15 but the context changed to actively justify war post-
Reformation.  The third “just war” is the modern “just war doctrine” which emerged in 
the 1500s and 1600s, developing into secular international law.16  Modern attempts to 
limit war have, in part, their origin in the demise of “Christendom” and the rise of the 
sovereign state—in the attempts by scholars such as Francisco de Victoria and Hugo 
Grotius to ground the already existing limits on war in universal, natural law.17  The first 
                                                 
12 ibid 138-9. 
13 Bainton, Roland H., Christian attitudes toward war and peace: a historical survey and critical 
re-evaluation. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008.  In short, Bainton asserted that  Christian thought 
began primarily in a pacifist mode, then developed the medieval just war doctrine, then developed 
the idea of holy war and crusade.  This work was originally published in 1960. 
14 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975),  p. 29. 
15 ibid 149. 
16 ibid 29. 
17 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), p. 149. 
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(medieval) doctrine spawned both the second holy war doctrine and the third secular 
tradition.18   
For those focused exclusively on the secular international law doctrine, it is worth noting 
the role of the medieval as the parent to the secular doctrine, and the arguable 
incomprehensibility of such modern developments as the “Responsibility to Protect” 
doctrine without reference to the grander, richer, Just War Tradition.  The rhetoric, mind-
set, and accusations of “crusade” are also not without contemporary relevance.  In all, a 
broader intellectual history is necessary for a fully formed theory of jus post bellum and 
its place in the Just War Tradition. 
The pre-Christian influence analyzed in this work is limited, because its influence is 
limited.  Take the Roman practice limiting warfare of demanding redress formally 
through a repetio rerum.19  This diplomatic document would list the wrongs allegedly 
done and the conduct needed to satisfy Rome.  After thirty-three days, if satisfaction had 
not been obtained, the next step was legal authorization in the name of the Senate and the 
people of Rome.  Only then would the fetial priests issue a formal declaration of war, and 
military measures could commence.  While of potential interest when discussing later 
methods of addressing abrogations of a peace treaty, the particulars role of fetial priests 
did not outlast Rome.   
                                                 
18 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975),  p. 29. 
19 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), pp. 153-4. 
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In contrast, Cicero’s Republic was a source for Augustine and others20, who was the 
foundation for Aquinas, who laid the foundation for the theological strain of law that was 
fundamental to the medieval just war tradition.  The continuity of the modern tradition on 
the restraint of war and its growth out of medieval just war thought became evident in the 
decades between World War I and World War II.  Studies such as Alfred Vanderpol’s La 
Doctrine scholastique du droit de guerre,21 James Brown Scott’s The Spanish Origin of 
International Law,22 John Eppstein’s The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations,23 the 
Carnegie Institute series Classics of International Law, and Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral 
Man and Immoral Society24 were all important in rediscovering and making the 
connections between medieval just war thought and contemporary law clear.25 
It is worth noting that there have been specific challenges against the existence of any 
historical pedigree to the concepts now referenced as jus post bellum.  Most notably, 
Grégory Lewkowicz contributed an article to an issue of the Revue belge de droit 
                                                 
20 ibid 154. 
21 Vanderpol, Alfred, and Emile Chénon. La doctrine scolastique du droit de guerre. A. Pedone, 
1919. 
22 Scott, James Brown. The Spanish Origin of International law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law 
of Nations. Oxford University Press, 1934. 
23 Eppstein, John. The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 
2012.  Originally published: Washington, D.C.: Published for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace by the Catholic Association for International Peace, 1935. 
24 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1932). 
25 See more generally The Contribution of the Medieval Canon Lawyers to the Formation of 
International Law, James Muldoon, Traditio, Vol. 28, (1972), pp. 483-497. 
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international focused on jus post bellum critiquing existing references to the historical 
development of the subject.26  In part, Lewkowicz could be taken to argue that further 
development of this area of scholarship is needed.  Lewkowicz goes further, however, 
arguing that by disagreeing with a few selected examples of basing jus post bellum on 
historical sources, “il n’existe pas dans cette tradition de droit de la transition du conflit 
à la paix.”27  This is an extremely broad claim, one which would require a more 
exhaustive study that Lewkowicz provides, and it is one which the following section 
should certainly complicate.   
In Law and the Jus Post Bellum Robert Cryer sounds a somewhat different note of 
caution than Lewkowicz.28  He seems to be arguing that it is not defensible for jus post 
bellum scholars (he primarily cites Brian Orend and Carsten Stahn) to reference the just 
war tradition to discuss jus post bellum, if jus post bellum is taken to be the area of law 
that applies to the post-conflict phase (what will be discussed in Chapter 3 infra  as a 
temporal approach).  But, as Cryer seems aware, other conceptions of jus post bellum 
(such as they hybrid functional approach discussed in Chapter 3 infra) emphasize laws 
and principles that have an explicit normative goal (achieving a just and sustainable 
peace) in mind.  If this is what is meant by jus post bellum, then it becomes clear not only 
                                                 
26 Lewkowicz, Grégory. "Jus Post Bellum: vieille antienne ou nouvelle branche du droit? Sur le 
mythe de l’origine vénérable du Jus Post Bellum." Revue belge de droit international 1 (2011). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Cryer, Robert. "Law and the Jus Post Bellum", Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International 
Law. Ed. Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. pp. 223-249, p. 226 ff (see generally the section Jus Post Bellum: Historically 
Defensible?). 
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that the just war tradition cannot be understood without reference to its treatment of the 
transition to peace, but that contemporary thinking on the transition to peace benefits 
from an awareness of how the problem has been conceptualized historically. 
The legal and normative tradition regarding the transition to peace has been under-
examined in part due to the retrospective application of the terms of the twentieth century 
(jus ad bellum and jus in bello) to encompass the entirety of thinking about armed 
conflict.  This reductive pattern of thinking poorly serves contemporary understanding of 
these important works.  While the following authors did not use the term jus post bellum 
just as generally they did not use the terms jus ad bellum or jus in bello, the 
understanding of these concepts is enriched by looking at the substance of the works with 
an eye towards understanding how the difficult problems of our present moment were 
dealt with in the past. 
A note on the methodology and structure of this chapter—each of these authors have 
earned hundreds of years of secondary writing.  Each could merit a lifetime of study.  The 
purpose of this chapter is not to summarize their work or impact, but to trace to the 
source some of the most important writings on what might be called  jus post bellum 
avant la lettre to provide an inevitably partial genealogy of a venerable line of thought.   
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B. Historical Development 
1. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) 
a) Introduction 
The influence of Aurelius Augustinus, more commonly known as St. Augustine of Hippo 
(hereafter “Augustine”) on western religion and philosophy is profound, pervasive, and 
enduring.  He played a pivotal role in in merging Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian 
religion.  His writings were cited as deeply authoritative not only in early philosophy but 
in the medieval (e.g. Aquinas and Gratian) and modern (e.g. Descartes and Malebranche) 
periods. He was a North African Bishop and Doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, 
living and teaching mainly in Thagaste (now in Algeria) and Carthage (now in Tunisia) 
with a brief but important period in Milan, where he was baptised, became a professor of 
rhetoric, and developed what would later be called a Neoplatonic framework that would 
organize his later writings.  He was enamoured of Latin classical works, particularly 
Cicero and Virgil. 
Several important elements come out when Augustine’s writings are examined with an 
eye towards discovering thoughts on the transition to peace.  First, war is seen as evil, 
even when just.  Second, war has purposes that may or may not be fulfilled by the 
transition to peace.  Third, Augustine is primarily concerned with the effect on the 
individual, not the state—and his concern is not death or suffering per se, but vice, and is 
brutal and fatalist by modern standards.  Fourth, the transition to peace is not always 
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better than war—he is concerned about achieving a just peace.  He describes a positive 
peace like a body with harmonious appetites.  Fifth, mercy must guide war and allow a 
successful transition to peace. 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Augustine is credited with deriving the original principles in much of Christian thought, 
including Christian thought about war.  He did not provide the formulas or lists of criteria 
commonly referred to when discussing the just war tradition, but he provided the 
authority to which others such as Aquinas and Gratian would later refer.29   
The following passage from Ad Bonifacium is repeated by both Aquinas and Gratian: 
For Peace is not sought in order to the kindling of war, but war is 
waged in order that peace may be obtained.  Therefore, even in waging 
war, cherish the spirit of the peacemaker, that, by conquering those 
whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of 
peace.30 
For Aquinas, in Summa Theologica, this statement by Augustine is authority for the 
criterion of right intention in what we would now call the jus ad bellum.  Aquinas defines 
the concept of right intention in part in the negative, using Augustine’s words: “the desire 
for harming, the cruelty of avenging, an unruly and implacable animosity, the rage of 
                                                 
29 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975), p. 27. 
30 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II/II, Quest. SL, Art. 1; CJC, Decretum, Quaest. I, Can. III; 
Augustine, Ad Bonifacium, CLXXXIX.  Referenced in Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, 
and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University 
Press 1975), p. 40. 
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rebellion, the lust of domination and the like—these are the things which are to be 
blamed in war.”31 So for Aquinas, as he creates the rules for what makes a just war, the 
key thing to derive from the earlier passage (“For Peace…”) has to do with the right to 
wage war in general—without the right intention, a potential party to an armed conflict 
(the sovereign) lacks the right to wage war.  That is, it has to do with what is normally 
described as jus ad bellum.   
For Gratian, the focus is different.  Instead, he uses this same passage to discuss not the 
sovereign but the general question of whether Christians may without sin participate in 
war.32 This does not fit neatly within jus ad bellum or jus in bello.  Unlike jus ad bellum 
considerations, it is not addressed to the sovereign.  Unlike jus in bello the concern is not 
directly the conduct within and armed conflict but the intent behind overall participation.  
This helps to demonstrate that the just war tradition does not always neatly divide into the 
modern jus ad bellum/jus in bello dichotomy. 
Returning to the original passage from Augustine, one can find the type of principle that 
lies at the root of jus post bellum—the obligation during armed conflict and afterwards to 
                                                 
31 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II/II, Quest. XI, Art. 1.) Referenced in Johnson, James Turner, 
Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, 
(Princeton University Press 1975), p. 40.  Also translated as: “What is the evil in war?  … The 
real evils in war are love of violence (nocendi cupiditas), revengeful cruelty (ulciscendi 
crudelitas), fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power (libido 
dominandi) and such like. (Against Faustus, Augustine, 887:301) AUGUSTINE City of God, De 
libero arbitrio, Against Faustus, and Commentary on the First Letter of John, Book XV, p. 595. 
32 CJC, Decretum, Quaest. I, Can. IV.  Referenced in Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, 
and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University 
Press 1975), p. 40. 
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preserve the possibility of a transition to a just and sustainable peace.  “Therefore, even in 
waging war, cherish the spirit of the peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you 
attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace.”33  When does this obligation 
apply?  Both during armed conflict (“in waging war”) and plausibly afterwards during 
early peace (“conquering those whom you attack”/ “lead them back to the advantages of 
peace”).   This is precisely the time span discussed in the theoretical discussion supra.  
More importantly, it plays the functional role emphasized by the theoretical discussion 
infra.  One waging war is obliged to make choices that may lead the opposing party to 
see the advantages of peace, and not return to war.  This means avoiding “the desire for 
harming, the cruelty of avenging, an unruly and implacable animosity, the rage of 
rebellion, the lust of domination and the like.”34 
The nature of the peace following war, whether it is just or unjust, is of interest to 
Augustine. This appears to be true more due to the inner morality of the individuals 
involved than the external effects—for Augustine, peace is a natural goal, but a corrupted 
nature seeks an unjust peace.35  Augustine’s concern to minimize the evils of war can be 
characterized as an ethics of personal virtues (concerned with how to be good) rather than 
                                                 
33 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II/II, Quest. SL, Art. 1; CJC, Decretum, Quaest. I, Can. III; 
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Press 1975), p. 40. 
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Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, 
(Princeton University Press 1975), p. 40. 
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an ethics of principles (concerned with how people can live together to each other’s 
benefit).36  This approach seems to be widespread amongst contemporaries.  See for 
example, Aphrahat’s Demonstration V “Of Wars”, which refers to the internal effect as 
the most important aspect of wars.37 
Augustine says “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the 
power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme 
authority.”38 Augustine’s vision is ultimately not one of pure self-defence, or a state of 
anarchy and war of all against all, but rather one in which there is a system of 
international peace and authority, and those who violate that peace and authority can be 
rightly punished.  In a sense, Chapter 7 authorization under the UN Charter for acts not 
clearly characterized as self-defense echo this ancient conception.  It is modern, but in a 
sense deeply conservative, again strongly biased in favor of the status quo. 
                                                 
36 The Elements of St. Augustine's Just War Theory, John Langan, The Journal of Religious 
Ethics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring, 1984), p. 32. 
37 Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers: Series II, Volume XIII, Ephraim the Syrian and Aphrahat, 
Select Demonstrations of Aphrahat, Demonstration V “Of Wars”, Phillip Schaff et al..  For more 
on Aphrahat, writing in 337, see Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers: Series II, Volume XIII, 
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In City of God, (Book XIX, Ch. 7 “Of the Diversity of Languages, by Which the 
Intercourse of Men is Prevented; And of the Misery of Wars, Even of Those Called 
Just.”) discusses the evil and suffering of war, even just war. 39   
But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the 
rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for 
if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be 
delivered from all wars. For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which 
compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though 
it gave rise to no war, would still be matter of grief to man because it is man’s 
wrong-doing. Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great 
evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one 
either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable 
plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling. 40 
Augustine is not in love with war.  Even a just war is terrible,41 and the misery that they 
cause must be acknowledged, at the risk of dehumanization. 
In Against Faustus, Augustine describes an explanation for war that will be widely 
discussed by subsequent authors, such as Aquinas.   
Now, if this explanation suffices to satisfy human obstinacy and perverse 
misinterpretation of right actions of the vast difference between the 
indulgence of passion and presumption on the part of men, and obedience to 
the command of God, who knows what to permit or to order, and also the 
                                                 
39 Augustine 1950 The City of God, tr. Marcus Dods.  New York: Modern Library, Book XIX, 
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40 ibid. 
41 For more on the horrors of civil war, what today might be called non-international armed 
conflict, see e.g., Augustine 1950 The City of God, tr. Marcus Dods.  New York: Modern Library, 
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time and the persons, and the due action or suffering in each case, the account 
of the wars of Moses will not excite surprise or abhorrence, for in wars 
carried on by divine command, he showed not ferocity but obedience; and 
God in giving the command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, 
giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed warning.  
What is the evil in war?  Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, 
that others may live in peaceful subjection?  This is mere cowardly dislike, 
not any religious feeling.  The real evils in war are love of violence, 
revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust 
of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force 
is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful 
authority, good men undertake wars, when they find themselves in such a 
position as regards the conduct of human affairs, that right conduct requires 
them to act, or to make others act in this way.42   
This is an exceedingly interesting passage.  It is putting forward the inverse of what 
Kenneth Waltz put forward in Man, the State, and War:43 instead of arguing that war 
happens because of the faults of individuals (what Waltz puts forward as a “first frame” 
analysis) Augustine is asserting that war is evil because it makes individuals faulty, that 
is, sinful. 
To Augustine, God commands wars for 1) “retribution” and 2) “warning those who 
needed warning.” In other words, just deserts and deterrence, two of the cornerstones 
justifying criminal law.  These are arguably well tied to jus post bellum – if the purpose 
of the war is retribution, as the transition from war to peace proceeds one would ask 
whether and to what degree that purpose has been fulfilled.  If it is deterrence (general or 
                                                 
42 Nicene and Post-Nice Fathers: First Series: Volume IV: Against Faustus, Edited by Philip 
Schaff, p. 300-301, para. 74. 
43 Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Man, the State, and War: a theoretical analysis. Columbia University 
Press, 2001. 
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specific) one would ask whether and to what degree the unwanted conduct is deterred.  In 
a modern context, if the purpose of engaging in armed conflict is in response to 
aggression, one might question whether a peace agreement that effectively rewards 
aggression was just.  Later in the passage, participation in war is justified because of 
“public safety”, another classic justification of criminal law and governmental use of 
force outside of criminal law. 
The passage also discusses the evil of war, not from a consequentialist view (suffering, 
violence) and more from a perspective of human virtues (“The real evils in war are love 
of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust 
of power”) – these are the evils in war and also the evil conduct war is meant to punish 
and deter.  It also discusses the ethics of serving in the military, basically blessing it 
because striking, wounding, or disabling people in war, when authorized by law, and 
when not carried out from a soldiers vengeance but to defend the public safety. 
In City of God, (Book III, Ch. 28 “Of the Victory of Sylla, the Avenger of the Cruelties of 
Marius.”) Augustine uses Roman history to emphasize the importance of a just peace. 44  
After surrender, he discusses mass murder, gruesome torture, and injustice after a 
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victory.45  The peacetime atrocities seem to derive from the fact that “when hostilities 
were finished, hostility survived.”46  
These things were done in peace when the war was over, not that victory 
might be more speedily obtained, but that, after being obtained, it might not 
be thought lightly of. Peace vied with war in cruelty, and surpassed it: for 
while war overthrew armed hosts, peace slew the defenceless. War gave 
liberty to him who was attacked, to strike if he could; peace granted to the 
survivors not life, but an unresisting death. 47 
Augustine favors peace, as the natural order, over war—but he is not pushing for peace at 
any cost.48  While he is well-aware of the evils of war, he is also wary, based on the 
lessons of history, of peace that leaves innocent people defenseless and subject to 
collective punishment for wrongs, perceived or actual, during the previous conflict.  
Similarly, in Book XXI, Ch. 15, Augustine emphasizes the need for a just peace, 
preferring a hard conflict to a peace “under the dominion of vice:” 
Better, I say, is war with the hope of peace everlasting than captivity without 
any thought of deliverance. We long, indeed, for the cessation of this war, 
and, kindled by the flame of divine love, we burn for entrance on that well-
ordered peace in which whatever is inferior is forever subordinated to what is 
above it. But if (which God forbid) there had been no hope of so blessed a 
consummation, we should still have preferred to endure the hardness of this 
                                                 
45 ibid, Book III, Ch. 28 “Of the Victory of Sylla, the Avenger of the Cruelties of Marius.” 
46 ibid, Book III, Ch. 28. 
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48 See, e.g., Nicene and Post-Nice Fathers: First Series: Volume IV: Against Faustus, Edited by 
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conflict, rather than, by our non-resistance, to yield ourselves to the dominion 
of vice. 49 
In contrast, in Book III, Ch. 19, Augustine describes the possibility of a war being so 
protracted that the victors, at the end, were more liked the conquered than conquerors. 
As to the second Punic war, it were tedious to recount the disasters it brought 
on both the nations engaged in so protracted and shifting a war, that (by the 
acknowledgment even of those writers who have made it their object not so 
much to narrate the wars as to eulogize the dominion of Rome) the people 
who remained victorious were less like conquerors than conquered. 50   
So how does one build peace, according to Augustine?  Not through monuments, 
apparently.  In The City of God, Book III, Ch. 25, “Of the Temple of Concord, Which 
Was Erected by a Decree of the Senate on the Scene of These Seditions and Massacres”, 
Augustine derides the idea that a temple of concord, built on the site of massacres, will 
create peace.  What will create peace?  In part, he suggests something akin to a protean 
version of the democratic peace hypothesis: 
The wicked war with the wicked; the good also war with the wicked. But 
with the good, good men, or at least perfectly good men, cannot war; though, 
while only going on towards perfection, they war to this extent, that every 
good man resists others in those points in which he resists himself.51 
Augustine suggests that “good men” do not go to war with other “good men.”  He further 
seems to indicate that there are degrees of goodness, and as they approach perfection, the 
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likelihood of war goes down.  This is surprisingly reminiscent of the idea that as the 
democratic level of a dyad of states increases, the likelihood of armed conflict in a given 
year decreases, that is, the democratic peace hypothesis. 52  It is also similar to Kenneth 
Waltz’s “first frame” (peace-making through change in individuals) in Man, the State, 
and War:53 
Of course, Augustine’s vision of an omnipotent God controlling all that occurs is at odds 
with a human-centered vision of war.  In City of God,54 (Book V, Ch. 22 “The Durations 
and Issues of War Depend on the Will of God.”) Augustine discusses evils of long-
continued wars, but in the same register one might talk about “natural evils,” like an 
earthquake.   
Let them, therefore, who have read history recollect what long-continued 
wars, having various issues and entailing woeful slaughter, were waged by 
the ancient Romans, in accordance with the general truth that the earth, like 
the tempestuous deep, is subject to agitations from tempests—tempests of 
such evils, in various degrees[.]55 
For Augustine, the duration of wars is determined by the God. 
                                                 
52 Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–
1986." American Political Science Review 87.03 (1993): 624-638; Russett, Bruce. Grasping the 
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton University Press, 1994; 
Russett, Bruce, et al. "The Democratic Peace." International Security (1995): 164-184.. 
53 Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Man, the State, and War: a theoretical analysis. Columbia University 
Press, 2001. 
54 Augustine 1950 The City of God, tr. Marcus Dods.  New York: Modern Library 
55 ibid, Book V, Ch. 22. 
1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum  
    Historical Development 
 
55 
 
Thus also the durations of wars are determined by Him as He may see meet, 
according to His righteous will, and pleasure, and mercy, to afflict or to 
console the human race, so that they are sometimes of longer, sometimes of 
shorter duration. 56 
This also undercuts the humanitarianism within the idea of Christian reluctance towards 
violence, as well as the underdeveloped state of the laws of war during biblical times.  In 
The Church History of Eusebius, Book IV, Ch. 6, Augustine describes the law of war 
allowing an occupied country to be reduced to complete subjection.57  He describes the 
indiscriminate killing of thousands of men, women, and children without describing it as 
a violation of those laws. 58 
AS the rebellion of the Jews at this time grew much more serious, Rufus, 
governor of Judea, after an auxiliary force had been sent him by the emperor, 
using their madness as a pretext, proceeded against them without mercy, and 
destroyed indiscriminately thousands of men and women and children, and in 
accordance with the laws of war reduced their country to a state of complete 
subjection. 59 
But in the end, Augustine’s vision of peace is as an underlying order—one that allows the 
possible existence of war.  For Augustine, there is a universal peace which the law of 
nature preserves through all disturbances.  Peace is not synonymous with equality or 
universal joy—some may be justly miserable in a well-ordered peace.  In a chapter 
                                                 
56 ibid, Book V, Ch. 22. 
57 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II, Volume I, Church History of Eusebius, Book IV, 
Ch. 6, Philip Schaff et al. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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comparing international peace to the peace of a well-proportioned body, with harmonious 
appetites, Augustine describes peace as follows: 
The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution 
which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, 
though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, 
but are severed from that tranquillity of order in which there is no 
disturbance, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly 
miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. […]As, then, 
there may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind 
of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war without 
some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to 
wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other. 60 
In his letter to Darius, Augustine calls conflict prevention more glorious than war 
making.  The goal of good people is peace, even if good men fight. 
But it is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men 
with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war. For 
those who fight, if they are good men, doubtless seek for peace; nevertheless 
it is through blood. Your mission, however, is to prevent the shedding of 
blood. 61 
Augustine’s love for peace and distaste for war was not universally shared.  For example, 
Theodoretus, Bishop of Cyrus, makes the striking claim that war brings more blessings 
than peace because of the effects on inner nature.62   
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These wars and the victory of the church had been predicted by the Lord, and 
the event teaches us that war brings us more blessing than peace. Peace 
makes us delicate, easy and cowardly. War whets our courage and makes us 
despise this present world as passing away. But these are observations which 
we have often made in other writings.63 
Contrast this with St Jerome: 
We must seek peace if we are to avoid war. And it is not enough merely to 
seek it; when we have found it and when it flees before us we must pursue it 
with all our energies. For “it passeth all understanding;” it is the habitation of 
God. As the psalmist says, “in peace also is his habitation.” The pursuing of 
peace is a fine metaphor and may be compared with the apostle’s words, 
“pursuing hospitality.” It is not enough, he means, for us to invite guests with 
our lips; we should be as eager to detain them as though they were robbers 
carrying off our savings.64 
A final note on Augustine is worth review, regarding his ideas on peace as the ultimate 
goal, even during war—demanding mercy due to the vanquished or captive: 
Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a 
necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity 
and preserve them in peace. For peace is not sought in order to the kindling of 
war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained. Therefore, even in 
waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that, by conquering those 
whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace; for our 
Lord says: “Blessed are the peacemakers; for they shall be called the children 
of God.” If, however, peace among men be so sweet as procuring temporal 
safety, how much sweeter is that peace with God which procures for men the 
eternal felicity of the angels! Let necessity, therefore, and not your will, slay 
the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used towards him who 
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rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or the captive, especially 
in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared.65 
c) Conclusion 
As described above, several critical elements of Augustine’s thought must be 
remembered as the work later scholars are considered.  Even a just war is an evil.  For a 
war to be just, it must have a purpose, and the purposes of war may not be fulfilled by the 
transition to peace.  It is possible to evaluate the justice of war and the subsequent peace 
based mainly on the effect on the individual rather than the state.  The transition to peace 
is not always better than continued warfare.  Ultimately, mercy must guide the conduct of 
war and allow a successful transition to peace. 
2. Institutes of Justinian (533) 
a) Introduction 
While Caesar Flavius Justinian (Justinian I) is credited as the author, in fact he was the 
sponsor of the text.  The work was authored collectively, supervised by Tribonian.66  The 
Institutes of Justinian are the core of a larger work known as the Corpus Juris Civilis, a 
codification of Roman law.  The Institutes (or Pandects, roughly akin to encyclopedia, 
and signifying comprehensiveness) of Justinian is largely based upon the Institutes of 
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Gaius,67 a celebrated Roman jurist who wrote from 130-180 A.D, but also upon Marcian, 
Forentinus, Ulpian, and Paul.68  It was intended as a textbook for new law students, but 
were essentially binding as law.  Properly translated, the name of the Institutes 
(Institutiones) would be closer to “basic principles”.69  Justinian also called this work 
“Elementa”, providing the sense of basic principles on which to grow.70  It is essentially 
an anthology of excerpts of classical jurists.  These excerpts were generally at least three 
hundred years old when Justinian’s commission compiled the Institutes.71 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
The main text of the Institutes of Justinian is not principally concerned with the law of 
war and peace generally or the transition to peace specifically, the work itself is framed in 
the context of war, peace, conquest, and justice.  From the preamble: 
The imperial majesty should be armed with laws as well as glorified with 
arms, that there may be good government in times both of war and of 
peace, and the ruler of Rome may not only be victorious over his enemies, 
but may show himself as scrupulously regardful of justice as triumphant 
over his conquered foes. 
With deepest application and forethought, and by the blessing of God, we 
have attained both of these objects. The barbarian nations which we have 
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subjugated know our valour, Africa and other provinces without number 
being once more, after so long an interval, reduced beneath the sway of 
Rome by victories granted by Heaven, and themselves bearing witness to 
our dominion. All peoples too are ruled by laws which we have either 
enacted or arranged.72 
Law and justice applied not only to Romans during peacetime.  Rather, at least implicitly, 
government could be good or bad during war, Caesar could be judged as just or unjust 
with respect to defeated people; and dominion and promulgation of law after war is a 
chief result of war.  The result of war, however, is not necessarily just.   
From Book I, Title II: 
But the law of nations is common to the whole human race; for nations 
have settled certain things for themselves as occasion and the necessities 
of human life required. For instance, wars arose, and then followed 
captivity and slavery, which are contrary to the law of nature; for by the 
law of nature all men from the beginning were born free.73 
This famous passage, describing the law of nations as common to the whole human race, 
based in natural law but directed towards human ends, dwells directly on one of the 
profound issues that arose in early history in the wake of armed conflict, the problem of 
captivity and slavery.  These are contrary to the law of nature, but not barred by the law 
of nations.  The issue of captivity arises repeatedly in the Institutes of Justinian.   
Book I, Title III “Of the Law of Persons” states: 
Slavery is an institution of the law of nations, against nature subjecting 
one man to the dominion of another. 
3 The name 'slave' is derived from the practice of generals to order the 
preservation and sale of captives, instead of killing them; hence they are 
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also called mancipia, because they are taken from the enemy by the strong 
hand. 
4 Slaves are either born so, their mothers being slaves themselves; or they 
become so, and this either by the law of nations, that is to say by capture 
in war, or by the civil law, as when a free man, over twenty years of age, 
collusively allows himself to be sold in order that he may share the 
purchase money. 74 
This possibility of capture and enslavement during war and recovery during the transition 
to peace touched on many areas of the law, including family law.  As stated in Title XII 
“Of the Modes in which Paternal Power is Extinguished”: “A captive who is recovered 
after a victory over the enemy is deemed to have returned by postliminium” 75—that is, 
he will recover all of his former rights including paternal power over his children through 
the fiction that the captive has never been absent.  Postliminium could serve as a 
restoration of the status quo ante in the aftermath of war, or simply the successful escape 
from captivity.76 Capture of people was an extension of the capture of things from the 
enemy by the law nations: “Things again which we capture from the enemy at once 
become ours by the law of nations, so that by this rule even free men become our slaves, 
though, if they escape from our power and return to their own people, they recover their 
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previous condition.”77  Captivity and return also influenced the disposition of property in 
wills.78 
c) Conclusion 
While the focus of the Institutes of Justinian is neither war nor peace, the legal effects of 
the transition to peace are integrated into the rationale of many issues.  Because this work 
is largely compilations of earlier statements from Roman jurists, the treatment of the 
transition to peace reflects hundreds of years of past practice and law.  The Institutes of 
Justinian became the core of Roman civil law for hundreds of years after its publication.  
While it had a limited influence on the development of medieval law and thought, it has 
proven influential in certain legal traditions over time. 
3. Raymond of Penafort (1175-1275) (Decretals of Gregory IX) 
a) Introduction 
Raymond of Penafort was an older contemporary of Thomas Aquinas.  Raymond 
compiled the Decretals of Gregory IX providing the basis for canon law for hundreds of 
years thereafter.79  Raymond was ordered by Pope Gregory IX to take the expansive body 
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of papal rulings (Compilationes antiquae) and tighten it into a definitive Book of 
Decretals. 80  More to the point for jus post bellum, Raymond also composed the Summa 
de poenitentia [Summa de casibus poentitentialis], which has sections specifically 
relating to the conduct of war. 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Raymond lists five conditions, all of which are necessary, for a war to be just: 
1. The person making war must be a layman and not an ecclesiastic, 
since the latter may not draw blood. 
2. The object must be to recover goods or defend one’s country. 
3.  The cause must be to obtain peace after all other means have failed. 
4.  The intention must include no hatred, vengefulness, nor cupidity and 
must be to obtain justice. 
5.  The authority may come from the church, when the war is of the 
faith, but otherwise it proceeds from the order of the prince.81 
Of particular note for jus post bellum are points three and four.  While this list would 
ordinarily and simply be categorized as a precursor to Aquinas requirements for waging a 
just war in terms of jus ad bellum, points three and four oblige a party to an armed 
conflict to use the armed conflict to “obtain peace after all other means have failed.”  The 
                                                 
80 Kuttner, Stephan. "Raymond of Peñafort as Editor: The Decretales and Constitutiones of 
Gregory IX." Bull. Medieval Canon L. 12 (1982). 
81 Summ. Ram., Lib. II, tit. V. 12; Vanderpol, Alfred, and Emile Chénon. La doctrine scolastique 
du droit de guerre. A. Pedone, 1919., p. 55; Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the 
Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 
1975), p. 49. 
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only way this can make sense (waging war to obtain peace) is if the peace obtained is of a 
different quality than the alternative, specifically, a more just peace.  This is clarified in 
the next point, stating that the intent must be to obtain justice.  Further, a party to the 
armed conflict must avoid the intents that make the transition to a just and sustainable 
peace difficult: hatred, vengefulness, or cupidity. 
c) Conclusion 
Raymond sets the stage for Aquinas’s important contributions to jus post bellum thinking.  
The goal of war is to obtain a just peace after all other means have failed, and to avoid 
war making with intentions that make it difficult to sustain that peace.  
4. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
a) Introduction 
Thomas Aquinas (St. Thomas, hereafter “Aquinas”) wrote at a moment when the Latin 
West came into contact with the ideas of Greek, Jewish, and Arabian philosophers, 
including Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, Avicebron, Maimonides, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Themistius, Philoponus, Simplicius and Proclus.82  Aquinas continued the 
contemplative orientation of Augustine but with a practical approach received from 
                                                 
82 Anton C. Pegis, Introduction, in Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas:, Volume 1, Anton C. 
Pegis ed., Hackett Publishing 1997, p. xxxv. 
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Aristotle.83  His Summa Theologica thus develops moral theology as applied to human 
action in a manner and breadth that was unequalled at the time. 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Aquinas’s summary analysis of the law and normative principles of warfare is found in 
Question 40 of the Secunda Secundae in the Summa Theologica.84  Aquinas begins, as is 
his custom throughout much of the Summa Theologica, with Objections to the questions 
posed.  He poses four questions: 
(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? 
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? 
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? 
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days? 
Of these, the first is of the most interest to jus post bellum.  He makes four objections to 
the idea that it is sinful to wage war.  Of those, two are of particular interest: 
Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But 
war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat. 5:39): "But I say to 
you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not revenging yourselves, my 
dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful. 
                                                 
83 Jean-Pierre Torrel, Thomas Aquinas (1224/1225-1274), Thomism. In Encyclopedia of the 
Middle Ages, (Vauchez André ed., James Clarke & Co. 2002) 
84 Question 40, Of War (Four Articles), Secunda Secundae in the Summa Theologica.  Available 
as Aquinas, Thomas. "Summa theologica. 3 vols." Trans. By the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers 48 (1947).  See The Elements of St. 
Augustine's Just War Theory, John Langan, The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(Spring, 1984). 
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Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But 
war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin. 
Peace is seen as a natural, good, virtuous thing.  So why should the violation of that peace 
ever be just?  Aquinas answers that three things are necessary for a war to be just: 
authority, just cause, and rightful intention.  With respect to authority, he argues: 
First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be 
waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, 
because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. 
Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the 
people, which has to be done in wartime. […] Hence it is said to those who 
are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the 
hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 
75): "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the 
power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold 
the supreme authority."85 
Aquinas, quoting Augustine, espouses the idea of a natural order conducive to peace.  
War, bellum, is not a conflict between private individuals, duellum, but something 
commanded by the sovereign.  Authority is important, at least in part, not simply because 
it is a requisite to a just war, but because it is conducive to peace.  What are those with 
authority to do with that authority?  To rescue the poor and deliver the needy from the 
hand of the sinner, presumably creating a link between the existence of poverty and need 
and a sin, an injustice.  A major point of authority as a requisite for just war then is not 
only because it is conducive to the natural order of peace, but a just peace, where the poor 
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are rescued and the needy delivered, and where the common weal is defended.86  This 
may seem to be a particularly modern focus not just on justice, but on distributive or 
transformational justice.87  In fact, it is an ancient concern. 
Aquinas also requires a just cause for any war to be considered just: 
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, 
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. 
Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is 
wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has 
to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its 
subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."88 
Again, Aquinas leans on Augustine for authority, but derives a more general principle.  
The last point in the list, to “restore what [the nation or state attacked] has seized unjustly 
is perhaps most interesting to a modern audience, as it describes most clearly the desired 
state of peace after war, something like the status quo ante.  Particularly in the case of 
territory acquired through aggression, the territory must be returned to the aggrieved 
sovereign for a just peace to return.  This ties in with the original requirement given by 
Aquinas, that of authority—as without authority (usually given by just war scholars, but 
not by Aquinas here as “right authority) there can be no just return of that what has been 
seized unjustly from that authority.  Then, as now, jus ad bellum places a positive value 
on the international status quo and a negative value on actions and powers that challenges 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 See e.g. Mani, Rama. Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War. Polity, 2002. 
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and destabilizes that status quo.  The obverse of this is a tendency of jus post bellum to 
emphasize, as a default position, a return to the status quo ante.  This is not without its 
difficulties.  The status quo ante, after all, was the situation that generated the conflict.   
Larry May, for example, asserts that total justice should not be demanded, but that it 
should be tempered by the principle of Meionexia (something akin to moderation in one’s 
demands for justice). 89   It is uncertain May would go so far as to advocate that territory 
taken by aggressors not be disgorged and returned to the original sovereign. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for the analysis of jus post bellum, Aquinas asserts 
that “it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention”.90  Again, 
Aquinas relies on Augustine as a source to make a generalizable principle: “Hence 
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst 
for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and 
such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."91 And again, citing Augustine 
(erroneously),92 Aquinas states “True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are 
waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing 
peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”  While peace is not the only 
                                                 
89 See e.g., Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia, in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, edited by Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson (Oxford University 
Press 2014); Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Approach (Cambridge University 
Press 2012). 
90 Question 40, Of War (Four Articles), Secunda Secundae in the Summa Theologica.   
91 Ibid. 
92 These words cannot be found in Augustine’s works, but can be found in Can. Apud. Caus. 
xxiii, qu. 1. 
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right intent listed, it is the first listed.  As analyzed regarding Augustine supra, Aquinas 
can be read as saying that wars waged with the right intent to be in a sense “peaceful,” 
perhaps in that they are not waged with the type of intent that make return to a just and 
sustainable peace difficult or impossible. 
Aquinas makes a specific Reply to Objection 2, which is essentially the Christian pacifist 
objection based on Matthew 5:39: "But I say to you not to resist evil".  He suggests, using 
Augustine as authority,93 that this approach: 
should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey 
them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. 
Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the 
common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence 
Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish 
with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their 
will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for 
him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of 
sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal 
enemy.94 
This is interesting to those interested in jus post bellum, both as a call to what Larry May 
has suggested using the Aristotelian concept of Meionexia,95 and as a direct response to 
Christian concern for (even) those who cause harm.  Aquinas is not saying that the idea 
                                                 
93 Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19 
94 Question 40, Of War (Four Articles), Secunda Secundae in the Summa Theologica.   
95 See e.g., Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia, in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, edited by Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson (Oxford University 
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of “turning the other cheek”96 is irrelevant, but that indeed sometimes resistance and even 
self-defence should be refrained from.  This is remarkable for those taking the mistaken 
approach that the Just War doctrine is essentially a simple apologia for war making.  
This, in a sense, mirrors Larry May’s idea of Meionexia,97 that total justice should not be 
demanded, in the service of something other than deontological (just deserts) justice.   
In addition, the passages above suggest that the reason why pacifism is not obligatory is 
due to concern for those with whom one fights.  For Augustine and Aquinas, one punishes 
with “kindly severity”98 and vanquishes for the good of one’s enemy.  In a sense, 
Aquinas is performing a slight-of-hand, dividing the enemy into two entities, with the 
real war being fought against the “evil will”99 and “guilty impunity”100 of the opponent, 
not the opponent per se.  This may seem self-deluding, but it has potentially interest 
regarding jus post bellum.  Again, this would militate against the kind of war and warfare 
that would make improbable a successful transition to a just and sustainable peace.  
While it is too much to expect that the opposing side would truly accept that the intent of 
war was “kindly”, this type of framing may none the less restrain those adopting it and 
                                                 
96 The full Matthew 5:39 is as follows: “But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps 
you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also.” (New International Version). 
97 See e.g., Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia, in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, edited by Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson (Oxford University 
Press 2014); Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Approach (Cambridge University 
Press 2012). 
98 Question 40, Of War (Four Articles), Secunda Secundae in the Summa Theologica.   
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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make the framework both for prosecuting the war and transitioning to peace more 
restrained. 
With respect to Objection 3, Aquinas is even more to the point.  He states, again relying 
on Augustine: 
Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they 
are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not 
to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34).101 Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. 
clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that 
we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may 
vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of 
peace."102 
Again, we have an interesting entanglement of what might later be called jus ad bellum, 
jus in bello, and jus post bellum.  Right intent is required for a war to be just, and is 
typically categorized as a jus ad bellum criterion.  But that intent is shown in a specific 
way, according to Augustine (and highlighted by Aquinas), to conduct war in a fashion 
that does not foreclose the prosperity of peace-not an evil peace, but a prosperous, just 
peace.  
c) Conclusion 
Aquinas’ contribution to just war thinking was profound and well-acknowledged.  Less 
well-acknowledged is his contribution specifically to the law and normative principles of 
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the transition from armed conflict to peace.  Following Augustine’s lead, he espouses the 
idea of a natural order conducive to peace. 103  Right authority is important, not merely 
for its own sake, but because it is conducive to peace. 104  That peace should be a just 
peace, where the poor are rescued and the needy delivered.105  The right intent should be 
securing peace, punishing evil-doers, and uplifting the good. 106   Aquinas answers the 
argument for pacifism, not by an absolute demand for rights-based self-defence, but due 
to concern for the enemy, who has fallen into sinful conduct. 107  The ultimate goal of a 
prosperous peace controls not only post-conflict behaviour but the warring itself. 108 
5. Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400) 
a) Introduction 
Baldus de Ubaldis109 was a student of Bartolus of Sassoferrato (d. 1352)110 and Federicus 
Petrucci.111  Bartolus and Baldus were both pre-eminent jurists of the late Middle 
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109 For more on Baldus de Ubaldis, see Canning, Joseph. The Political Thought of Baldus de 
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Ages.112  Bartolus also taught Johannes (Giovanni) de Ligano, who wrote an early, 
perhaps the first tract to focus exclusively on the law of war in 1360, Tractatus de bello, 
de represaliis et de duello.113  This work was mostly influential through vulgarizations 
(translations from Latin), particularly in L’Arbre des Batailles by Honoré Bonnet.  
Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello adds little to reflections on jus post bellum, 
mostly echoing Augustine with statements like “The end of war, then, is the peace and 
tranquillity of the world.” 114 Amongst other accomplishments, Baldus and Bartolus 
provided a legal foundation for the modern conception of the state.115  The conception of 
a state that transcended the position and prerogatives of the ruler and recognized the 
people’s sovereignty was necessary for a more permanent conception of peace.  Baldus 
wrote on the Digest, the Codex Iustinianus, including the last three books (Tres libri), the 
Institutes, the Decretales of Pope Gregory IX, the Liber feudorum, and Liber de pace 
                                                                                                                                                 
110 Magnus Ryan, Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Free Cities. The Alexander Prize Lecture, 
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constantiae, a commentary of the Peace of Constance of 1183.116  This last work will be 
the focus here, as it has the greatest relevance to jus post bellum. 117 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
In Liber de pace constantiae118 when Ubaldis writes:  “Imperator vult istam pacem esse 
perpetua.… quia Imperator facit hanc pacem nomine sedis non nomine proprio ... et 
Imperium non moritur”119 Baldus is distinguishing between peace agreements (such as 
the Treaty of Constanz) and a private contract that a ruler might enter into.  Under this 
understanding of the state and the methods the state has for transitioning from armed 
conflict to peace (peace agreements), the peace agreement can be the basis for a lasting 
peace, binding on successive rulers.  He pioneered the idea of dignitas or Royal Dignity, 
which “referred chiefly to the singularity of the royal office, to the sovereignty vested in 
the king by the people, and resting in the king alone.” 120   Royal Dignity was not 
                                                 
116 Baldus de Ubaldis, Petrus, The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, (Stanley 
N. Katz ed.), Oxford University Press, 2009.   
117 For contextualization of Baldus de Ubaldis as a predecessor to later scholars, see Lesaffer, 
Randall. "A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties." Vattel's International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384, 356. 
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fol. 76, as cited in Wahl, J. A. "Baldus de Ubaldis and the Foundations of the Nation-State." 
Manuscripta 21.2 (1977):80, 81. 
119 Very roughly translated: “Because the emperor, who wants this peace to be permanent, makes 
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something that touched the king alone, but rather his entire government.121  Immortality 
was a characteristic of Dignitas—like a species or like the phoenix, the natural body of 
the king might die but the king’s “public body” could not.122  This idea of what would 
now be called a legal person or an international legal personality is a critical foundation 
for later developments in jus post bellum—most obviously for peace treaties that resolve 
international armed conflict, but also for non-international armed conflicts resolved by 
peace agreements to which a state is a party.  Contracts made by the king must be 
honoured by his successors because such contracts were governed by natural law—and 
no prince was above natural law or divine law, nor free to disregard the public welfare.123  
The law of was only somewhat distinguishable from general contract law at this point.124 
Personal crimes of the king could not be imputed to a successor, however, as that would 
affect the dignitas of the king.125  This is interesting from the perspective of individual 
criminal responsibility of heads of government and heads of state, important jus post 
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bellum issues.  It is in tension with the idea of the king not only animating ius or justice 
(iustum animatum)126 but the king as the law (nota quod lex est princeps).127 
c) Conclusion 
Baldus plays an important part in establishing that peace treaties and peace agreements 
could and should endure.  Without the idea that such agreements could be permanent, 
outlasting the king, a key foundation of jus post bellum would be lacking.  Baldus 
manages to lay this foundation without sacrificing the idea that kings should be 
individual responsible for their personal crimes. 
6. Francisco de Vitoria (1492 – 1546) 
a) Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of James Brown Scott in the 1920s128 and 1930s,129 the 
Spanish neo-scholastics of Francisco de Vitoria (or Victoria) and Francisco Suarez have 
been recognized as the principal point of origin for the modern doctrine of the law of 
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nations.130  Vitoria had a wide influence, both in his time and thereafter.  The New Laws 
of the Indies of 1542 relied heavily on his works De Indis and De Jure Belli.131  These 
theologians are the best known members of the “School of Salamanca” or the “second 
scholastic,” building on Aquinas to address new issues.132  Vitoria was a theologian, not a 
lawyer—a Professor of Theology in the University of Salamanca.133  Vitoria moved away 
from Aquinas styling of ius gentium as purely a natural law phenomenon as opposed to 
one also based on agreements between humans, what would now be called positive 
law.134   That said, Vitoria relied heavily on natural law, and held to Thomas Aquinas’s 
belief that natural law could be known through reason, not revelation.135  Using this 
approach, he legitimized the Spanish conquest of the Indies not based on arguments that 
indigenous inhabitants of the Americas were heathen or allegedly irrational, but because 
                                                 
130 Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between 
Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 224. 
131 Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200-1740, (Princeton University Press 1975), p. 158 
132 Annabel Brett, Francisco De Vitoria (1483–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
133 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), pp. 94-95. 
134 Annabel Brett, Francisco De Vitoria (1483–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
135 Johnson, James Turner, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry, (Princeton University Press 1981), p. 76. 
1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum  
    Historical Development 
 
78 
 
of the alleged violation of the ius communicandi, the right of communication.136  
Strikingly, he held that “Difference of religion is not a cause of just war”137 and that a 
just war may only be waged for causes provided in natural law.138   
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
(1) Peace as the aim of armed conflict—and the 
problems that can cause 
Like Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria relies on Augustine as weighty authority.  With regards to 
the aim of armed conflict, Vitoria states: 
If after recourse to all other measures, the Spaniards are unable to obtain 
safety as regards the native Indians, save by seizing their cities and 
reducing them to subjection, they may lawfully proceed to these 
extremities. The proof lies in the fact that "peace and safety are the end 
and aim of war," as St. Augustine says, writing to Boniface. 139 
Vitoria continues: 
And since it is now lawful for the Spaniards, as has been said, to wage 
defensive war or even if necessary offensive war, therefore, everything 
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necessary to secure the end and aim of war, namely, the obtaining of 
safety and peace, is lawful140 
This absolutist language demonstrates an old difficulty with jus post bellum—the aim of 
transitioning to a sustainable peace, instead of restricting practice in bello, can be used to 
serve as an unlimited license. 
Post bellum concerns can also undermine ad bello restrictions.  Again relying ultimately 
on Augustine, Vitoria states on the issue of whether Christians may make war at all: 
A sixth proof is that, as St. Augustine says (De verbo Domini and Ad 
Bonifacium), the end and aim of war is the peace and security of the State. 
But there can be no security in the State unless enemies are made to desist 
from wrong by the fear of war, for the situation with regard to war would 
be glaringly unfair, if all that a State could do when enemies attack it 
unjustly was to ward off the attack and if they could not follow this up by 
further steps.141 
Similarly, he states shortly thereafter: 
Not only are the things just named allowable, but a prince may go even 
further in a just war and do whatever is necessary in order to obtain peace 
and security from the enemy; for example, destroy an enemy's fortress and 
even build one on enemy soil, if this be necessary in order to avert a 
dangerous attack of the enemy. This is proved by the fact that, as said 
above, the end and aim of war is peace and security. Therefore a 
belligerent may do everything requisite to obtain peace and security. 
Further, tranquillity and peace are reckoned among the desirable things of 
mankind and so the utmost material prosperity does not produce a state of 
happiness if there be no security there. Therefore it is lawful to employ all 
appropriate measures against enemies who are plundering and disturbing 
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the tranquillity of the State. […] This shows that even when victory has 
been won and redress obtained, the enemy may be made to give hostages, 
ships, arms, and other things, when this is genuinely necessary for keeping 
the enemy in his duty and preventing him from becoming dangerous 
again.142 
(2) Post-conflict justice 
Vitoria also directly addresses issues of post-conflict justice. 
It is lawful for a prince, after gaining the victory in a just war and after 
retaking property, and even after the establishment of peace and security, 
to avenge the wrongs done to him by the enemy and to take measures 
against the enemy and punish them for these wrongs.143 
Again, linking the aims of peace to potential over-reach, even post bellum: 
Not only is all this permissible, but even after victory has been won and 
redress obtained and peace and safety been secured, it is lawful to avenge 
the wrong received from the enemy and to take measures against him and 
exact punishment from him for the wrongs he has done. […] It is, 
therefore, certain that princes can punish enemies who have done a wrong 
to their State and that after a war has been duly and justly undertaken the 
enemy are just as much within the jurisdiction of the prince who 
undertakes it as if he were their proper judge. Confirmation hereof is 
furnished by the fact that in reality peace and tranquillity, which are the 
end and aim of war, can not be had unless evils and damages be visited on 
the enemy in order to deter them from the like conduct in the future. […] 
Moreover, shame and disgrace are not wiped away from a State merely by 
its rout of Its enemies, but also by its visiting severe punishment and 
castigation on them. Now, among the things which a prince is bound to 
defend and preserve for his State are its honor and authority.” 144 
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Vitoria does, however, restrict some post-conflict measures: 
Merely by way of avenging a wrong it is not always lawful to kill all the 
guilty. […] We ought, then, to take into account the nature of the wrong 
done by the enemy and of the damage they have caused and of their other 
offenses, and from that standpoint to move to our revenge and 
punishment, without any cruelty and inhumanity. In this connection 
Cicero says (Offices, bk. 2) that the punishment which we inflict on the 
guilty must be such as equity and humanity allow. And Sallust says: "Our 
ancestors, the most religious of men, took naught from those they 
conquered save what was authorized by the nature of their offenses.” 145 
Similarly: 
[I]t would involve the ruin of mankind and of Christianity if the victor 
always slew all his enemies, and the world would soon be reduced to 
solitude, and wars would not be waged for the public good, but to the utter 
ruin of the public. The measure of the punishment, then, must be 
proportionate to the offense, and vengeance ought to go no further, and 
herein account must be taken of the consideration that, as said above, 
subjects are not bound, and ought not, to scrutinize the causes of a war, 
but can follow their prince to it in reliance on his authority and on public 
counsels. Hence in the majority of cases, although the war be unjust on the 
other side, yet the troops engaged in it and who defend or attack cities are 
innocent on both sides. And therefore after their defeat, when no further 
danger is present, I think that they may not be killed, not only not all of 
them, but not even one of them, if the presumption is that they entered on 
the strife in good faith. 146 
This idea, that individuals can enter into strife in good faith, even if there side is not just, 
is one of Vitoria’s most influential ideas in the just war tradition.  For example, the 
                                                 
145 Ibid 182. 
146 Ibid 182. 
1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum  
    Historical Development 
 
82 
 
English jurist Fulbecke takes the same approach on this subject, sometimes called 
“invincible ignorance” as Vitoria.147 
(3) An integrated view of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
and jus ad bellum 
Vitoria does not view the legal authority to make war and secure peace as separate 
domains, but rather, relying on Augustine, views them as an integrated whole.  
A prince has the same authority in this respect as the State has. This is the 
opinion of St. Augustine (Contra Faustum): "The natural order, best 
adapted to secure the peace of mankind, requires that the authority to 
make war and the advisability of it should be in the hands of the sovereign 
prince." Reason supports this, for the prince only holds his position by the 
election of the State. Therefore he is its representative and wields its 
authority; aye, and where there are already lawful princes in a State, all 
authority is in their hands and without them nothing of a public nature can 
be done either in war or in peace.”148 
Vitoria also connects the just cause of war to the nature of the domestic regime, well 
before there was any thought of a “democratic peace.”  He extend this not just to the 
overall just cause of war (a jus ad bellum concern with important effects on jus post 
bellum) but to the rules of war (a jus in bello concern). 
Neither the personal glory of the prince nor any other advantage to him is 
a just cause of war. […] [W]ere a prince to misuse his subjects by 
compelling them to go soldiering and to contribute money for his 
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campaigns, not for the public good, but for his own private gain, this 
would be to make slaves of them.149 
The connection between jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum also extends to 
the question of acquiring territory as a fine, or mulct, during war and after war. 
It is also lawful, in return for a wrong received and by way of punishment, 
that is, in revenge, to mulct the enemy of a part of his territory in 
proportion to the character of the wrong, or even on this ground to seize a 
fortress or town. This, however, must be done within due limits, as already 
said, and not as utterly far as our strength and armed force enable us to go 
in seizing and storming. And if necessity and the principle of war require 
the seizure of the larger part of the enemy's land, and the capture of 
numerous cities, they ought to be restored when the strife is adjusted and 
the war is over, only so much being retained as is just, in way of 
compensation for damages caused and expenses incurred and of 
vengeance for wrongs done, and with due regard for equity and humanity, 
seeing that punishment ought to be proportionate to the fault.150 
(4) Post bellum tribute 
Distinctly post bellum is the question of a lawful tribute imposed on conquered enemies.  
Vitoria thinks this is decidedly lawful, stating:  “Whether it is lawful to impose a tribute 
on conquered enemies. My answer is that it is undoubtedly lawful, not only in order to 
recoup damages, but also as a punishment and by way of revenge.”151 
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(5) Post bellum regime change 
Also distinctly post bellum is the question of deposing the princes of conquered enemies.  
Vitoria thinks this can be lawful, but it must be proportionate. 
Whether it is lawful to depose the princes of the enemy and appoint new 
ones or keep the princedom for oneself. First proposition: This is not 
unqualifiedly permissible, nor for any and every cause of just war, as 
appears from what has been said. For punishment should not exceed the 
degree and nature of the offense. Nay, punishments should be awarded 
restrictively, and rewards extensively. This is not a rule of human law 
only, but also of natural and divine law. Therefore, even assuming that the 
enemy's offense is a sufficient cause of war, it will not always suffice to 
justify the overthrow of the enemy's sovereignty and the deposition of 
lawful and natural princes; for these would be utterly savage and 
inhumane measures.152 
When is it acceptable to change the enemy regime?  It can be due to the power of the just 
cause (jus ad bellum) of the war, but it is especially true when it is necessary to achieve a 
sustainable peace (a jus post bellum concern). 
It is undeniable that there may sometimes arise sufficient and lawful 
causes for effecting a change of princes or for seizing a sovereignty; and 
this may be either because of the number and aggravated quality of the 
damages and wrongs which have been wrought or, especially, when 
security and peace can not otherwise be had of the enemy and grave 
danger from them would threaten the State if this were not done. This is 
obvious, for if the seizure of a city is lawful for good cause, as has been 
said, it follows that the removal of its prince is also lawful. And the same 
holds good of a province and the prince of a province, if proportionately 
graver cause arise. 
Note, however, with regard to Doubts VI to IX, that sometimes, nay, 
frequently, not only subjects, but princes, too, who in reality have no just 
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cause of war, may nevertheless be waging war in good faith, with such 
good faith, I say, as to free them from fault; as, for instance, if the war is 
made after a careful examination and in accordance with the opinion of 
learned and upright men. And since no one who has not committed a fault 
should be punished, in that case, although the victor may recoup himself 
for things that have been taken from him and for any expenses of the war, 
yet, just as it is unlawful to go on killing after victory in the war has been 
won, so the victor ought not to make seizures or exactions in temporal 
matters beyond the limits of just satisfaction, seeing that anything beyond 
these limits could only be justified as a punishment, such as could not be 
visited on the innocent.153 
Vitoria summarizes his canons of warfare as follows: 
60. All this can be summarized in a few canons or rules of warfare. First 
canon: Assuming that a prince has authority to make war, he should first 
of all not go seeking occasions and causes of war, but should, if possible, 
live in peace with all men, as St. Paul enjoins on us (Romans, ch. 12). 
Moreover, he should reflect that others are his neighbors, whom we are 
bound to love as ourselves, and that we all have one common Lord, before 
whose tribunal we shall have to render our account. For it is the extreme 
of savagery to seek for and rejoice in grounds for killing and destroying 
men whom God has created and for whom Christ died. But only under 
compulsion and reluctantly should he come to the necessity of war. 
Second canon: When war for a just cause has broken out, it must not be 
waged so as to ruin the people against whom it is directed, but only so as 
to obtain one's rights and the defense of one's country and in order that 
from that war peace and security may in time result.” 154 
In short, avoid war when possible and only with proper authority, and wage war so as to 
achieve lasting peace and security.  Vitoria again takes an integrated approach to jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. 
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c) Conclusion 
Vitoria covers a wide field of material that relates to jus post bellum.  Critical subject 
areas include: first, peace as the aim of armed conflict; second, post-conflict justice; third, 
an integrated view of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum; and fourth, post 
bellum regime change.  Together, Vitoria’s writings amount to a new foundation for jus 
post bellum. 
7. Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) 
a) Introduction 
As mentioned previously, Since the pioneering work of James Brown Scott in the 
1920s155 and 1930s,156 the Spanish neo-scholastics of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco 
Suarez have been recognized as the principal point of origin for the modern doctrine of 
the law of nations.157  These theologians are the best known members of the “School of 
Salamanca” or the “second scholastic,” building on Aquinas to address new issues.158  
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Like Vitoria, Francisco Suarez emphasized the positive law nature of ius gentium, based 
not on natural law but on custom.159   
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
If James Brown Scott was correct that Francisco de Vitoria was the founder of 
international law, Francisco Suarez was the philosopher, and Hugo Grotius was the 
organizer160—what did the philosopher have to say about the transition from armed 
conflict to peace?  Suarez is noteworthy in large part due to his systematic commentary 
on the writings of Aquinas.161 
Scholars often cite the primary contribution of Suarez to the just war tradition is the 
emphasis on what would now be called jus in bello, the importance of the means of 
warfare.162  To understand Suarez’s approach to the transition to peace, one must focus 
first on jus ad bellum factors, specifically on just cause.  Suarez did not consider 
aggressive war to be necessarily evil, rather he argued that it might be right and necessary 
if punishment was merited.163  He did not consider it a problem that sovereigns would be 
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judges in their own case, both at the outset, during, and after war—because there is no 
other option.164   
Suarez also emphasizes the role of charity with regards to the pursuing a just cause with 
an eye towards the post-conflict situation.165  Even if a war is just, or a demand for 
payment is just, if “the debtor incurs very serious losses in consequence, while the 
property in question is not in great degree necessary to the creditor”.166  Suarez also 
condemns disproportionate risk of post-war loss and peril for the realm of a justly 
aggrieved prince: 
[I]f one prince begins a war upon another, even with just cause, while 
exposing his own realm to disproportionate loss and peril, then he will be 
sinning not only against charity, but also against the justice due to his own 
state.  The reason for this assertion is as follows: a prince is bound in 
justice to have greater regard for the common good of his state than for his 
own good; otherwise, he will become a tyrant.167 
Suarez was also interested in the probability of a successful post bellum result as a 
condition of starting a war.168  He disagreed with Cardinal Thomas de Vio (known as 
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Cajetan) that “for a war to be just, the sovereign ought to be so sure of the degree of his 
power, that he is morally certain of victory.” 169 Suarez does not think this condition of 
certitude is absolutely essential, because it is almost impossible to realize, because it can 
lead to undue hesitancy, and also because it effectively discriminates against weaker 
sovereigns (vis a vis stronger sovereigns). 170  
c) Conclusion 
Suarez’s view of the law of war necessarily informed his writings dealing with the 
transition to peace.  He does not condemn aggressive war necessarily171 but insists on the 
role of charity with regards to pursuing a just cause, due to the need for a sustainable 
post-conflict peace.172  The likelihood of a just peace must be evaluated before beginning 
a war,173 but certainty of outcome is not required.174 
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8. Alberico Gentili (1552- 1608) 
a) Introduction 
It is not unreasonable to trace the key origins of modern international legal thought to 
Alberico Gentili.175  His application of the concept of sovereignty is strikingly modern, 
and his development of jurisprudence separate from the church was a pivotal 
contribution.176  Working shortly before Hugo Grotius, he was a Professor of Civil Law 
in Oxford, bringing a history-infused Italian outlook to his efforts to describe the law.  
Nonetheless, he draws heavily on earlier scholars for authority and understanding, again 
demonstrating the deep conceptual roots of his subject matter. 177 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Gentili’s most famous work, and his most important work with respect to jus post bellum 
and the just war tradition in general, is De Iure Belli Libri Tres.178  Gentili first published 
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his thoughts on the law of war in 1589 under the title De Jure Belli Commentationes 
Tres.  De Iure Belli Libri Tres (three books on the law of war), an expanded version of 
De Jure Belli Commentationes Tres was first published in 1598.  The third of the three 
books that make up this work is of particular interest.  The three books roughly match the 
contemporary jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum framework in widespread use 
today.  Before reviewing that third book, however, some initial stops in the first and the 
end of the second book are warranted. 
Book I, Chapter XXIV deals with “Whether war is handed on to future generations.”179  
This is framed as a question of what would now be called jus ad bellum, the 
transmissibility of just cause against “successors and posterity” or as Gentili puts it: “is it 
lawful to make against successors and posterity a war which it would have been lawful to 
make against their predecessors?” 180   In modern conceptions of armed conflict as an 
interaction between socially and legally constructed entities, not natural persons, this 
question is not normally asked.  The idea of the natural persons inheriting the sins of their 
predecessors is not the framework a modern public international lawyer normally asks, 
and indeed for the secular-oriented Gentili shows the pressure of religious thinking at the 
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time.  If the answer given was no, then this would serve as a structural check on war’s 
recurrence.  Unfortunately, perhaps, the answer given by Gentili (and, in a sense, by 
current law) is that biological succession from one generation to the next is not itself a 
check on grievances between sovereigns.  Gentili rationalizes this on normative and legal 
terms by pointing out that positive inheritances may also be undeserved, but are 
nonetheless not seen as immoral or unlawful. 181  On the other hand, he stands against 
those who would not make binding agreements been sovereigns on public matters endure 
past the deaths of those who made the oaths—the framework for lasting peace and 
enduring treaties. 182   Again, this question would not arise today, but that is because 
Gentili and others established the framework that is now (usually) used without question 
or reflection. 
In Book II, Chapter XII “Of Truces” strongly argues that the mere cessation of violence 
caused by truces does not amount to peace.183  While truces may be long (he cites truces 
lasting 100 years) and the land can seem at peace during truces, they are not permanent.  
Truces “do not interrupt hostility, but only bring hostile acts to an end.”184  The subject of 
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the nature of truces, whether they amount to a third state between peace and war, is hotly 
debated, and Gentili notes this debate without being overly committed to any side. 185 
In Book III, Chapter I “On Peace and the End of War”, Gentili enters into what could be 
called jus post bellum proper.  The opening paragraph is worth noting in full: 
Up to this point we have discussed the laws of both of beginning and of 
carrying on war.  Hence but one point still remains; namely, to tell of the 
rules for bringing war to an end.  And indeed the end of war for which all 
ought to strive is peace.  ‘War should be entered upon in such a way’, says 
Cicero, ‘that its aim should seem to be nothing else than peace.’  
Augustine also and the Canons declare that ‘peace should be one’s desire, 
war a necessity.  For peace is not sought in order to arouse war; but war is 
waged in order to win peace’.  Therefore victory is the end of the general’s 
art, says Aristotle, when the victory is characterized by honour and by 
justice, which is peace.186 
Gentili is integrating the transition from war as part of the overall law of war.  He cites 
Cicero, Aristotle, Augustine, and Canon Law to insist that this transition to peace infuses 
the entire enterprise of armed conflict, from its overall goals to the general’s art of 
achieving victory with honour and justice. 
Gentili is interested in the definition of pax, citing Festus and Ulpian for the etymology 
deriving the term from agreement (pactio), and Isidore who derives compact (pactum) 
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from peace (pax).187  Peace agreements put an end to war, or prevent its occurrence.188  
Gentili ultimately defines peace as follows: 
But peace is define in a general way of Augustine as ‘ordered harmony’; 
and order is the proper distribution of things, which in the opinion of our 
own jurists and others is the nature of justice.  We therefore define peace 
here as the orderly settlement of war.  Baldus calls it a complete cessation 
of discord, declaring that peace cannot exist while war remains.  This is 
true, and we shall maintain that view later at some length.  But our 
definition also contains this point, and besides has the provision about 
justice, which is what we seek in this cessation of war, along with order 
and the assignment of his own to each man. 189 
This definition of peace, insisting on not only justice but distributional justice, and that 
the goal is not only to end a conflict but to prevent its occurrence, seems strikingly 
contemporary.  Here is a foundation for an insistence on not just “negative” peace but a 
just and sustainable peace as the goal of the third part of the just war tradition, jus post 
bellum. 
Gentili continues: 
And as to this order or right distribution we shall now speak, saying that it 
is brought about by the victor alone, or by both sides together; and that 
both sides commonly consider, not only the past, but also the future, and 
indeed ought to do so.  This is taught by Homer, that father of all wisdom, 
and is observed by the great authority Plutarch.  Also our own omniscient 
and all-defining Baldus set it forth in his Responses.  The past has an eye 
to vengeance, the future to a permanent establishment of peace; nay, the 
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past also has regard to this permanence, as will appear from what follows.  
But the two topics must be considered separately.190 
The future-oriented nature of the function of jus post bellum has ancient roots.  It is not, 
however, free to ignore the past, but must resolve past grievances to secure a just peace. 
This leads Gentili to Book III, Chapter II “Of the Vengeance of the Victor.”191  This 
chapter is not actually celebrating vengeance,192 but rather is a treatment of post-conflict 
justice.  Citing Baldus, Gentili states: 
[I]t is not fitting for a judge to give his attention to establishing peace until 
the faults which led to war are punished; so in this subject we must first 
provide for a just penalty, in order that when all the roots of war have, so 
to say, been cut away, peace may acquire greater firmness. 193 
Gentili here connects the justice of a peace to its sustainability.  The promise of post-
conflict justice is necessary for war’s cessation: “There would never be peace, and war 
would be to the death and contrary to nature, if the will of the victor controlled 
everything and the vanquished could lose everything.” 194   
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Gentili is not only considered about negative repercussions for the vanquished in war, but 
to the potentially pernicious effects of victory on the victor.  Following Augustine, he is 
concerned with the effect of war on internal character, not only external results: 
[O]ne should ask the question, not what the victor is able to do and what 
victory may demand, but what befits the character of the victor, as well as 
that of the vanquished; but in the case of the victor in particular, it should 
be considered what becomes him and also the nature of the war which is 
being carried on.  But everything must be directed towards the true 
purpose of victory, which is the blessing of peace.  ‘Lead those whom you 
defeat to the advantages of the peace brought about by their defeat’, says 
Augustine.195 
Gentili does not think post-conflict justice requires an equal approach to “cultivated 
peoples” and “barbarians” or “uncivilized nations,” holding that “with barbarians 
violence is more potent that kindness.”196  Similarly, haughty or proud defeated peoples 
should be treated with harshness, according to Gentili.197  That said, Gentili insists that 
“the penalty ought never to exceed the deserts of the offender, but it ought to be 
determined according to the measure of each offence.  The punishment, too, ought to fall 
upon the one by whom the crime is committed.”198  Here is the seed of principles dear to 
modern post-conflict justice: proportionality of punishment and individual criminal 
responsibility.  He continues arguing for a bar on unnatural punishment:  
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Punishments which any respect for Nature would forbid should have no 
place here.  We leave to others the special discussion of those penalties 
which are forbidden by the civil law, and which seem to me to be 
forbidden by respect for Nature, such as the cutting off of both hands and 
feet.199 
He continues barring cruel punishment, citing Baldus for the idea that “nothing which is 
cruel is just.”200  He ties these restrictions on punishment to the goal of achieving a 
sustainable peace: “It is such conduct [cruel or disfiguring punishment] which keeps a 
war which is finished from being permanently at an end, and this conduct Augustine 
censures at great length.”201 
In Book III, Chapter III “Of the Expenses and Losses Due to War”, Gentili analyses the 
difficult issue of war reparations.  He compares the issue to legal disputes in which: 
[T]he loser must refund the costs to the victor, not only in civil but also in 
criminal cases, if he did not have a just cause; this is especially true in case 
the plaintiff is defeated […] But if the loser appears to have had ground 
for litigation, he is not condemned.202 
Gentili argues that the law regarding the transition to peace is “subject to a special 
law”—specifically including: 
[T]hat the goods of private individuals, for the sake of peace, may be 
given away by the state or the sovereign.  And it is common doctrine that 
                                                 
199 Ibid. 
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201 Ibid 296. 
202 Ibid 298 (Of the Expenses and Losses Due to War). 
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the wrongs and losses of subjects may for the reason be remitted by their 
sovereign, and that the subjects in their turn may never make complaint, 
either in a civil or a criminal suit.203 
The sovereign in turn is bound to restore goods taken from his or her subjects in 
accordance with the law of nations and the demands of peace, but unjustly according to 
domestic law.204  Citing Baldus, Gentili raises the issue of waiving public rights before 
individuals, and the idea that agreements between sovereigns should not disadvantage 
particular private individuals, but be general205—but in the end comes out against 
pursuing reparation for violations of the law of war after the peace is made and the terms 
of peace agreed upon.206 
Gentili’s remarks “On Exacting Tribute and Lands from the Vanquished”207 are part 
reasonable justification for taxation, part apology for empire.  While Gentili endorses the 
right of conquest and jus victoriae, including exacting tribute and lands, the right of the 
victor is not unlimited.  He states “property may be taken from the enemy, provided that 
in so doing justice and equity are observed.  The victor will not make everything his own 
which force and his victory make it possible to seize.”208 In “Of Despoiling the 
                                                 
203 Ibid 300. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid 302. 
207 Ibid 303 (On Exacting Tribute and Lands from the Vanquished). 
208 Ibid 305. 
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Conquered of Their Ornaments”209 Gentili limits looting religious objects “only if the 
gods themselves were destroyed when their statues were lost.  For it is not permitted the 
victors in dealing with the conquered to violate the laws of God or of Nature.” 210 His 
preference to the general looting he finds the laws permits is “to show respect to 
moderation and honour, and to refrain from doing what is permitted by the laws.”211  But 
while  “it is always proper to consider the reason for making war and to bring all the 
actions of the war into harmony with it, so far as possible”212 things which are not sacred 
may undoubtedly be seized by the victor, according to Gentili.213  After much debate, 
Gentili comes out against executing captive leaders of the enemy, and restricts perpetual 
imprisonment of enemy leaders if the victor has other means to achieve a sustainable 
peace.214 In a chapter likely to be abhorrent to the modern reader but reflective of state 
practice at the time, he comes out forcefully in favour of the legality of slavery in the law 
of nations215 but points out the custom of postliminium in which a slave, including those 
captured in war, one may be freed by escaping and returning home during wartime.  He 
generally treats the capture of slaves as a matter of chattel, but holds that “an enemy may 
                                                 
209 Ibid 310, Of Despoiling the Conquered of Their Ornaments (Book III, Chapter VI). 
210 Ibid 311. 
211 Ibid 313. 
212 Ibid 315, Of the Destruction and Sacking of Cities (Book III, Chapter VII). 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid 327, Of the Captive Leaders of the Enemy (Book III, Chapter VIII). 
215 Ibid 328, Of Slaves (Book III, Chapter IX). 
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not be held captive perpetually and must not be sold.” 216  He dismisses religious 
arguments against slavery with this strikingly secular analysis: “For in divine affairs man 
is nothing; and in establishing the law between God and man, which is religion, he has no 
weight; but it is not so in human affairs nor in establishing human law.”217  While much 
of Gentili’s writings evince a much greater concern with religious teachings and history 
than would be the norm in later years or today, it is this clear effort to divide religion 
from human law that is so striking for Gentili at the time, compared to the religious 
scholars opining on the law of war before him. 
Book III, Chapter X “On Changing One’s Condition”218 regards what Immanuel Kant 
might have called changing the constitution of a people, or what might be called today 
“transformative occupation” or perhaps just the form of local government in an empire.  
Gentili has no compunction about the right of the victor to change local governments: 
“[I]t is just for the vanquished to be forced to adopt the government of the conquerors; or 
if they do not yield, it is right to crush them.”219  For forced changes in religion, however, 
Gentili is sceptical except for “those who are enslaved to a perverse religion” when “their 
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religion made the conquest less decisive.”220  Generally, Gentili finds forcible changes to 
religious practice not to be helpful to consolidate the peace.221   
Nor should unnecessary changes to custom be imposed.  Gentili states there are many 
instances:  
[I]in which natural justice is offended and with respect to which the victor 
has no rights.  These are all things which furnish a natural cause for war, 
and the purpose is, that the victor may not propose to the vanquished to 
undertake things which offer a natural cause for making war.222 
He gives the example of forced prostitution as a condition of peace that would lead to 
future war, as it violated honour and natural law.223  Disarmament of the conquered, 
however, is legal and routine.224  While the victor may set up memorials of his victory, it 
is inexpedient to do so as they may prompt rebellion.225 
Perhaps the most crucial series of chapters in De Iure Belli Libri Tres with respect to jus 
post bellum begins with Book III, Chapter XIII: “On Insuring Peace for the Future.”226  
Gentili begins by reiterating the importance of future orientation, saying that punishment 
                                                 
220 Ibid 342, On Change of Religion and Other Conditions. 
221 Ibid. 
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224 Ibid 347 On Change of Religion and Other Conditions. 
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(ultio) fulfils both the desire for solace for injury and also for security for the future.227  
He states that “the victor should grant a peace of such a kind as to be lasting, since it is 
the nature of peace to be permanent.”228  What specifically makes a peace lasting?  Citing 
Augustine, Gentili notes compassion and restraint on anger in punishment as critical.229  
From Epictetus’s definition of peace as “liberty combined with tranquillity”230 Gentili 
derives the “one enduring principle, namely justice”231 for creating a lasting peace.  He 
discounts marriage,232 oaths,233 and temporary strength over the conquered234 as 
unreliable foundations for peace if justice is absent.  That said, in the peace which the 
victors grant to the conquered, “[e]verything is in the hands of the victor, save for such 
exceptions as are suggested by the laws of nature”235 including keeping women 
hostages.236 
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Gentili makes a distinction between peace granted to the conquered and the settling of 
war by both belligerents, a subject he takes up in Chapter XIV, “On the Law of 
Agreements.”237  Citing Baldus, Gentili emphasizes the aim of a permanent quiet, and 
more colourfully citing Hippocrates, compares injustice in the peace agreement and its 
effect on peace to what remains after a crisis “since in diseases it is what remains after 
the crisis that usually causes death.”238 Echoing Baldus, Gentili asks: 
But shall we also say that a war which springs from a former one is the 
same war, as if it came from a root which has been left in the ground?  
That certainly is not peace which does not do away with all controversy; a 
disease is not cured unless the root is destroyed.239 
Gentili inveighs against subtlety, deception, and exceptions in peace treaties, saying that 
fine points of law are not suited for trustworthiness.240  No exception is made to the 
binding nature of a peace treaty due to fear or duress, since (citing Baldus) Gentili points 
out that fear is natural after victory, and “hence one must keep his agreement who makes 
one because he is conquered in war; and the same thing applies to the agreements of 
prisoners of war.”241  That said, Gentili carves out exception for those subject to unjust 
force and fear while imprisoned,242 fraud,243 or unforeseeable change of circumstances.244  
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He argues for a framework in which to evaluate potentially conflicting obligations from 
multiple peace treaties and treaties of alliance, starting with feudal obligations,245 
restricting aiding both sides in a conflict,246 aiding just causes,247 aiding the party with 
the prior claim,248 to avoid providing aid when in doubt as to conflicting claims,249 and to 
favour an ally waging defensive war over one waging offensive war.250  Gentili argues 
for making peace treaties (but not alliances) with non-Christian sovereigns251 and places 
arms control squarely into his Book III analysis regarding the transition to peace.252 
c) Conclusion 
In De Iure Belli Libri Tres we find a tri-partite hybrid functional approach to the just war 
tradition that is in many respects strikingly contemporary.  The first of three books covers 
                                                                                                                                                 
243 Ibid 365. 
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245 Ibid 390, Of Friendship and Alliance. 
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not the start of war, but the overall justice and theory of entering into war.253  The second 
book covers the more detailed practice of fighting war.254  The third book covers not the 
period after war, but the ending of war and the practice of crafting a new era of peace.255  
For skeptics of the pedigree of this hybrid functional approach to jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and jus post bellum (re-)reading Gentili may be useful. 
                                                 
253 The subjects in the first book include the following chapter titles, allowing the reader to make 
a relatively speedy evaluation of the contents of the volume: I. Of International Law as applied to 
War; II. The Definition of War; III. War is waged by Sovereigns; IV. Brigands do not wage War; 
V. It is Just to wage War; VI. That War may be waged Justly by Both Sides; VII. Of the Causes 
of War; VIII. Of Divine Causes for making War; IX. Whether it is Just to wage War for the sake 
of Religion; X. Whether a Sovereign may justly resort to War to maintain Religion; among his 
Subjects; XI. Should Subjects war against their Sovereign because of Religion?; XII. Whether 
there are Natural Causes for making War; XIII. Of Necessary Defence; XIV. Of Defence on 
Grounds of Expediency; XV. Of Defence for the sake of Honour; XVI. On Defending the 
Subjects of Another against their Sovereign; XVII. Those who make War of Necessity; XVIII. 
Those who make War from Motives of Expediency; XIX. Of Natural Reasons for making War; 
XX. Of Human Reasons for making War; XXI. Of the Misdeeds of Private Individuals; XXII. On 
not Reviving Old Causes for War; XXIII. Of the Overthrow of Kingdoms; XXIV. Whether War 
is handed on to Future Generations; XXV. Of an Honourable Reason for waging War. 
254 The subjects in the second book include the following chapter titles, allowing the reader to 
make a relatively speedy evaluation of the contents of the volume: I. Of Declaring War; II. When 
War is Not Declared; III. Of Craft and Strategy; IV. Of Deception by Words; V. Of Falsehoods; 
VI. Of Poisoning; VII. Of Arms and Counterfeit Arms; VIII. Of Scaevola, Judith, and Similar 
Cases; IX. Of Zopyrus and other Deserters; X. Of the Compacts of Leaders; XI. Of Agreements 
by the Soldiers; XII. Of Truces; XIII. When a Truce is Violated; XIV. Of Safe-conduct; XV. Of 
the Exchange and Liberation of Prisoners; XVI. Of Captives: that they are not to be Slain; XVII. 
Of Those who Surrender to the Enemy; XVIII. Of Cruelty towards Prisoners and Captives; XIX. 
Of Hostages; XX. Of Suppliants; XXI. Of Women and Children; XXII. Of Farmers, Traders, 
Pilgrims, and the Like; XXIII. Of Devastation and Fires; XXIV. Of the Burial of the Slain. 
255 See supra. 
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9. Petrus Gudelinus (1550-1619) 
a) Introduction 
Petrus Gudelinus’s work De jure pacis commentaris,256 was published posthumously in 
1620.257  He builds on Baldus de Ubaldis and Bartolus of Sassoferrato, and likely 
influenced Hugo Grotius.258  Like Baldus de Ubaldis, he was not interested in parsing the 
peace treaty he was analysing, the Peace of Constanz, article by article—rather he would 
comment on the phenomenon of peace treaties in general.259  
 
                                                 
256 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius, in quo praecipuae de hoc jure quaestionis 
distinctis capitibus eleganter pertractantur, Louvain, 1620.  References initially from Randall 
Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law and 
Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651.  The 1628 Louvain edition was titled De jure pacis commentaries 
ad constitutionem Frederici de pace Constantiense.  References here are from the edition in 
Opera Omnia (Collected works), Antwerp, 1685.   
257 Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between 
Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 223. 
258 Ibid 224. 
259 Ibid 228.  For contextualization of Petrus Gudelinus as a predecessor to later scholars, see 
Lesaffer, Randall. "A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties." Vattel's International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384, 356-7. 
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b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
De jure pacis commentaris is only 14 pages in the Opera omnia260 and has twelve 
sections or capita.  The first section includes a section on methods and a definition of 
peace (description Pacis).261   He recognizes peace as having many definitions,262 but 
defines it specifically in contrast with war263 and as freedom in tranquillity264.  Peace was 
created by a treaty and was intended to be permanent, like a marriage.265 
The second section describes the right authority to make peace treaties, mirroring the 
classic requirement under Aquinas for proper authority and public declaration to make 
war, which would later be echoed by Grotius.266   Appealing to the authority of Bartolus 
                                                 
260 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius, in quo praecipuae de hoc jure quaestionis 
distinctis capitibus eleganter pertractantur, Louvain, 1620.  References initially from Randall 
Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law and 
Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651.  The 1628 Louvain edition was titled De jure pacis commentarius 
ad constitutionem Frederici de pace Constantiense.  References here are from the edition in 
Opera Omnia (Collected works), Antwerp, 1685.   
261 Petrus Gudelinus, Opera Omnia, p. 551. 
262 “Ut pluribus verbis Pacem definiam” Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera 
Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 1685, p. 551 
263 “bello contraria” Ibid. 551 
264 “pax est tranquilla libertas” Ibid.  
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid 552-3.   
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but ultimately disagreeing with him in substance, Gudelinus distinguishes between 
military truces (that could be made by generals) and proper peace treaties.267   
Section three discussed the contents of peace treaties going back as far as Livy and 
Athenian history, analogizing them with contracts between private parties that could have 
explicit and implicit sections.268   Two substantive components were always part of such 
peace treaties that would guide the transition to peace—the cessation of hostilities and 
agreements regarding conquered and seized objects.269  Gudelinus also describes amnesty 
as a standard part of treaties, including the Peace of Constanz, but does not include 
actions in compensation as part of the general practice of amnesty.270  
Section four discusses the post bellum restitution of goods and rights.271  Gudelinus is 
concerned not only with the need for peace treaties to specifically address the restitution 
of property, but also to explicitly address the release of prisoners of war.  By the second 
                                                 
267 Ibid 552. 
268 Ibid 553-4.  Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus 
between Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 232. 
269 Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between 
Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/0144036230853965, pp. 232-3. 
270 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, pp. 553-4.  Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus 
between Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 233. 
271 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, pp. 554-5.  Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus 
between Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 234. 
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paragraph, Gudelinus is addressing the ancient Roman doctrine of postliminium, whereby 
Roman soldiers captured by the enemy (intra praesidia) are regarded as legally dead, but 
that liberated soldiers reassumed their suspended civil and property rights.272  
(Postliminium is now used to refer to the right under international law, post-belligerent 
occupation, to invalidate acts such as transfers of property performed by the occupying 
belligerent in the occupied state’s territory.  Postliminium can be translated to mean “a 
return to one’s threshold.”  It is a critical element of the Institutes of Justinian’s treatment 
of the transition to peace.) 273 Gudelinus’s stance on this issue meant that the release of 
prisoners of war could not be assumed post bellum.  Rather, the solution to the problem 
of prisoners of war had to be specifically addressed after every conflict.  Prisoners of war 
held by a legitimate authority could be held for ransom, and other war booty could be 
legitimately held—but those that could not legitimately gain under the law of war (jure 
belli) could not legitimately gain in the transition to peace.274   The transition to peace did 
not operate identically with sovereigns and with pirates (piratis), robbers, (latronibus) or 
rebels (rebellibus).275  What would now be called non-international armed conflict (with 
rebels) was to some degree consigned to the realm of criminality (robbers and pirates), 
leaving the transition from international armed conflict in its own category.  That said, 
                                                 
272 Aaron X. Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in International Law, 2009, Oxford 
University Press. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, p. 555.   
275 Ibid 555.   
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loot and territories taken from rebels were considered legitimate prizes of war, and 
through peace treaties rebels could have property returned to them.276 
Section five builds upon section four, providing general rules for restitution clauses in 
peace treaties, while noting that treaties could provide for specific situations.  Private 
individuals could also be covered by restitution clauses, not just states.  Armed conflict 
was not a license for states to gain property—the rights of private parties could survive 
war.  Gudelinus distinguishes profits gained from estates during wartime and the goods 
themselves—during armed conflict an occupier could enjoy the profits of occupied goods. 
Rebels had no right to enjoy such profits, however.277 
Sections six and seven deal further with the difficult questions of costs, restitution, and 
indemnification with regards to private property in order to achieve the public good of 
peace.278  Gudelinus applies the equitable principle whereby all owners of cargo on a ship 
would compensate the owner of cargo that had been thrown overboard to save the ship to 
the problem of an individual who loses private property as part of a treaty.  Peace treaties 
                                                 
276 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
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may, in effect, violate the normal natural law protecting property rights for the greater 
collective good of building a lasting peace, but if the private party losing property is 
blameless, they should be compensated to the extent possible.  Section eight serves as a 
brief precursor to the limitations on occupying powers that now exist—limiting 
occupying powers from making enduring one-sided legal acts.279   
Section nine and ten are somewhat in tension with each other, with section nine 
minimizing the amount religious principles may be diminished by agreements with 
heretics (only in necessity) but emphasizing the sanctity and binding power of peace 
treaties in section ten.280  Of particular interest to jus post bellum scholars, Gudelinus 
links the laws of war to the rationale for obeying peace treaties—arguing that if it is 
required to keep faith with an enemy in wartime, this requirement of oath-keeping was 
even stronger in peacetime.  In section eleven, Gudelinus extends this requirement of 
fidelity to peace treaties to include not only treaties with other sovereigns, but to rebels.   
Section twelve emphasizes that peace treaties bind not only the individual, mortal 
sovereign, but also their successors.  Like Baldus, Gudelinus argues that treaties are not 
private, temporary affairs.  Gudelinus asserts that it is not the oath of the sovereign that 
binds the successor sovereign (which would be questionable) but the conventio, the 
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agreement itself.  This is a step from inter-sovereign agreements resembling temporary, 
private contracts to autonomous, permanent inter-state treaties and peace agreements 
more generally that is a foundation of the modern jus post bellum.281  
c) Conclusion 
In De jure pacis commentaris, Gudelinus takes peace seriously, not merely as a simple 
natural state but as a creation and an institution—something to be built and treasured, like 
marriage.282  He recognized important constituent parts of a constructed peace, including 
the cessation of hostilities,283  the distribution of284 and restitution285 for goods and rights, 
amnesty,286 and exchange of captives.287  He noted the difference between conflicts 
                                                 
281 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, pp. 563-4; Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus 
between Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/01440362308539651, pp. 241-2. 
282 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, p. 551. 
283 Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between 
Roman Law and Modern Practice, The Journal of Legal History, 23:3, 223-252, DOI: 
10.1080/0144036230853965, pp. 232-3. 
284 Randall Lesaffer (2002) An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between 
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10.1080/01440362308539651, p. 233. 
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between sovereigns and those involving rebels.288   This short work is important, not least 
due to its likely influence on Hugo Grotius. 
10. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
a) Introduction 
Hugo Grotius  was a wunderkind, writing Latin poetry as a child, entering university at 
eleven, receiving his doctorate in law at fifteen, publishing his first book289 and 
beginning practice as a lawyer in sixteen.  He received international acclaim in his 
lifetime.  He counted the Dutch East India Company as a client, which lead to his treatise 
De Iure Praedae, a chapter of which (Mare Liberum) was first published anonymously 
with a view to influencing the truce negotiations with Spain.290  His Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid (Introduction to Dutch Legal Learning)291 published in 
1620, proved influential in The Netherlands.  In 1625 he published his most famous 
                                                                                                                                                 
287 Aaron X. Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in International Law, 2009, Oxford 
University Press. 
288 Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius in Opera Omnia, (Collected works), Antwerp, 
1685, p. 555.   
289 Parallelon Rerum Publicarum de Moribus Ingenioque Populorum Atheniensium, Romanorum, 
Batavorum (1601-1603). 
290 Laurens Winkel, Grotius, Hugo in The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History 
(Stanley N Katz ed. Oxford University Press 2009). 
291 Grotius , Hugo . Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid. 1st ed. 1631. Latin version: 
J. van der Linden, Institutiones juris hollandici et belgici, 1835, edited by H. F. W. D. Fischer. 
Haarlem, Netherlands: H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1962. English translation: R. W. Lee, An 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1915 [5th ed. 1953]). 
Standard edition: Eduard M. Meijers, Folke Dovring, and H. F. W. D. Fischer (Leiden, 
Netherlands: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1952 [2d ed. 1965]). 
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work, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace).292  Peter Haggenmacher 
claimed that De jure belli ac pacis libre tres was not a general study on the law of nations 
but specifically focused on the laws of war.293  That said, it was a work that would prove 
influential in legal philosophy, private law,294 and international law.  If James Brown 
Scott was correct that Francisco de Vitoria was the founder of international law, 
Francisco Suarez was the philosopher, and Hugo Grotius was the organizer295—what did 
the organizer have to say about the transition from armed conflict to peace? 296   
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
When describing the structure of De jure belli ac pacis libre tres, Grotius summarizes the 
third book as follows: 
                                                 
292 Grotius , Hugo , Libri tres de jure belli ac pacis, in quibus ius naturae et gentium, item iuris 
publici praecipua explicantur, 1st ed. (Paris, 1625). English translation: Francis W. Kelsey, et al. 
(Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1925). Recent standard edition: Hugo Grotius , Libri tres de jure 
belli ac pacis, in quibus ius naturae et gentium, item iuris publici praecipua explicantur, edited 
by B. J. A. de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp, (Aalen, Germany: Scientia Verlag, 1993). 
293 Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste, Paris, 1983. 
294 Lauterpacht, Hersch. Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. London: 
Longmans, 1927. Reprints, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970, and Union, N.J.: Lawbook 
Exchange, 2002. 
295 James Brown Scott, The Catholic Conception of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria, 
founder of the modern law of nations; Francisco Suarez, founder of the modern philosophy of law 
in general and in particular of the law of nations; A critical examination and a justified 
appreciation, Washington, 1934, pp. 183-184. 
296 For contextualization of Hugo Grotius as a predecessor to later scholars, see Lesaffer, Randall. 
"A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace Treaties." Vattel's 
International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de Vattel vu du XXI e 
Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384, 354-8. 
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The third Book treats first of what is lawful in War; and then, having 
distinguished that which is done with bare Impunity, or which is even 
defended as lawful among foreign Nations, from that which is really 
blameless, descends to the several Kinds of Peace, and all Agreements 
made in war.297 
To use contemporary terminology, Book III addresses not only jus in bello, but also jus 
post bellum. 
Of particular interest is Book III, Chapter XX. “Concerning the publick Faith whereby 
War is finished; of Treaties of Peace, Lots, set Combats, Arbitrations, Surrenders, 
Hostages, and Pledges.”298  Early on in this chapter, Grotius describes the authority 
needed for peace treaties: “They who have Power to begin a War, have likewise Power to 
enter upon a Treaty to finish it[.]”299 
Grotius places limits on what may be agreed to in a peace treaty: 
Now let us see what Things are subject to such an Agreement. Most Kings 
in our Days, holding their Kingdoms not as patrimonial, but as 
usufructuary, have no Power by any Treaty to alienate the Sovereignty in 
Whole, or in Part: Yea, and before they come to the Government, at what 
Time the People are their Superiors; such Acts may [by] a fundamental 
Law, for the future be rendered absolutely void and null; so that even as to 
Damages and Interest, they shall be no ways binding. For it is probable, 
that Nations thought fit to ordain that in that Case, the other Party should 
have no Action against the King for Damages and Interest, since, if that 
took Place, the Goods of the Subjects might be seized, as answerable for 
                                                 
297 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, 
from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). Vol. 1.  
298 Ibid Vol. 3. 
299 Ibid Vol. 3., p. 1551. 
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the King’s Debt; and so the Precaution that might have been taken to 
hinder the Alienation of the Sovereignty, would become entirely 
useless.300 
Grotius is limiting the scope of the treaty making authority of government in most 
cases301 particularly in the case of alienating the goods of the country.  While the State 
may use the goods of private men to procure a peace, it must restore its subjects when it 
is able.302  The State is not obliged to make its nationals whole if they suffer damage 
from the war itself, however.303 
Grotius argues that peace treaties should be read in light of the stated reasons for going to 
war, and not for further gain or punishment:  
Wherefore where the Meaning of the Articles is ambiguous, it should be 
taken in this Sense, that he that has the Justice of the War on his Side, 
should obtain what he took up Arms for, and also recover his Costs and 
Damages, but not that he should get any Thing farther by way of 
Punishment, for that is odious. 304 
Grotius is generally conservative in his approach to changing the facts on the ground with 
peace treaties.  He cites Thucydides for the general principle “ἔχοντες ἃ ἔχουσι, That 
                                                 
300 Ibid Vol. 3, pp. 1553-4. 
301 He notes the possibility of absolute rulers to go beyond the power of sovereignty if they have 
property rights over the goods in their lands, as in the case of the Pharoah. 
302 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1556. 
303 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1557. 
304 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1558. 
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Things should remain as they are”305 unless specifically agreed to, including returning 
captives,306  restoring fugitives,307  or claiming property.308  If there is no clause dealing 
with damages from war, those damages should be considered forgiven.309  Similarly, the 
right to punishment for grievances that might make the peace incomplete should be 
considered forgiven.310  He sums up the overall function of peace agreements saying “it 
is humane to believe that those who make Peace intend sincerely to stifle the Seeds of 
War.” 311 
Grotius places particular duties on a conqueror, forbidding unjust action (especially 
extrajudicial execution and expropriation) and commending clemency, liberality, and a 
general pardon: 
But the Conqueror, that he may do nothing unjustly, ought first to take 
Care that no Man be killed, unless for some capital Crime; so also, that no 
Man’s Goods be taken away, unless by Way of just Punishment. And even 
by keeping within these Bounds, as far as his own Security will permit it, 
it is honourable (to a Conqueror) to shew Clemency and Liberality, and 
sometimes even necessary, by the Rules of Virtue, according as 
                                                 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1559. 
309 Ibid Vol. 3, pp. 1561-2. 
310 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1563. 
311 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1564. 
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Circumstances shall require. Admirable are the Conclusions of those Wars 
which are finished with a general Pardon[.]312 
c) Conclusion 
Grotius is not silent on the issue of the transition to peace.  Indeed, his ideas of transitions 
to peace that could build a pacific order were reflected in the Peace of Westphalia, and 
while not all that was in the Westphalia treaties matched Grotius’ ideas,313 in general 
Grotius’ theory and Westphalian practice matched.314  Give Grotius’ long fame, there is 
an overwhelming surfeit of secondary material on Grotius’ writing, yet his contribution to 
jus post bellum, when jus post bellum is conceived of as playing a particular function in 
the international community, to manage the transition to a just and sustainable peace, is 
under-recognized. 
11. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
a) Introduction 
Christian Wolff315 was trained both as a mathematician and philosopher.316  A prolific 
author, his works shifted over time from pure mathematics317 to ethical philosophy, never 
                                                 
312 Ibid Vol. 3, p. 1586. 
313 Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations”, Bull, 
Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds. Hugo Grotius and international relations. 
Oxford University Press, 1992,  p. 75. 
314 Ibid 77. 
315 Sometimes referenced as “Christian von Wolff” or in the Latin e.g. Instiutiones Juris Naturae 
et Gentium “Christiano L.B. de Wolff”.  See Wolff , Christian. Jus naturae methodo scientifico 
pertractatum. 8 vols. Leipzig, Germany: Prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1741–1748. 
This is Wolff 's main work, abridged as Institutiones juris naturae et gentium: In quibus ex ipsa 
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leaving his insistence on the application of logic to deduce natural laws through 
syllogisms.318  Wolff wrote Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum319 at the end 
of his career—the name of the work (roughly The Law of Nations According to the 
Scientific Method) is revealing both of his mathematical training and his faith that there 
was agreement between ethical duty, natural laws based on human behaviour, and 
positive laws.320 
b) Writings and relation to jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
Before discussing Wolff and jus post bellum, it may be worth noting his discussion of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello.  As noted previously, Robert Kolb tentatively credited Josef 
Kunz with coining the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bellum in their contemporary sense 
                                                                                                                                                 
hominis natura continuo nexu omnes obligationes et jura omnia deducuntur (Halle and 
Magdeburg, Germany, 1750).  Wolff saw Jus naturae as complimentary to his Jus gentium 
Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) Volume 
Two, p. 426. Translation by Francis J. Hemelt. 
316 Katz, Stanley N. The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, Wolff, Christian 
von. Oxford University Press, 2009. 
317 See e.g. Wolff, Christian. "Dissertatio algebraica de algorithmo infinitesimali differentiali 
quam gratioso indultu amplissimi philosophorum ordinis." (1704). 
318 Katz, Stanley N. The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, Wolff, Christian 
von. Oxford University Press, 2009. 
319 Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) 
Volume Two, p. 426. Translation by Francis J. Hemelt. 
320 For an interesting review of Wolff’s approach to mathematical method in areas outside 
mathematics, see Frängsmyr, Tore. "Christian Wolff's mathematical method and its impact on the 
eighteenth century." Journal of the History of Ideas 36.4 (1975): 653-668. 
1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum  
    Historical Development 
 
120 
 
in 1934.321  Stahn has identified the emergence of the terms in the 1920s,322 with 
Guiliano Enriques using the term jus ad bellum in 1928.323  That said, it is perhaps worth 
noting that the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello had been used before, even in 
relatively close proximity to each other.  For example, Christian Wolff, in the 1764 
edition of his Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum states: 
Since hostilities in war are due to the force by which we pursue our right in 
war, which consists either in collecting a debt or imposing a penalty, and 
therefore all our right in war is to be determined thereby, the right to destroy 
the property of an enemy is not to be determined otherwise, unless you should 
wish to assume a thing which can be assumed only in contravention of the law 
of nature, that there is absolutely no place left in war for justice, which orders 
us to give each one his right, and that right in war disappears in mere licence, 
to which none can be entitled.324 
The italicized text, “right in war” corresponds to the term “jus in bello” on page 300 of 
the original Latin text.  On the next page of the original text, Wolff asserts: 
The law of nature, which gives us a right to war, gives also a right against 
the property of enemies, as far as that is necessary in waging war; for 
otherwise the former right would be useless, if it were not allowable to 
claim the latter.325 
                                                 
321 Kolb, Robert, Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello, International Review of the 
Red Cross (1997), 561.   
322 Stahn, Carsten, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., 311, 
2007-2008, 312.  
323 See Enriques, Giuliano, Considerazioni sulla teoria della Guerra nel diritto Internazionale 
(Considerations on the Theory of War in International Law), 7 Rivista Di Diritto Internazionale 
(Journal of International Law) 172 (1928). 
324 Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) 
Volume Two, p. 426. Translation by Joseph H. Drake and Francis J. Hemelt. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
325 Ibid 427. (Emphasis supplied.) 
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The translated text “right to war” is in the original text: “jus ad bellum.”   
What does this tell us about the contemporary usage of the term?  Nothing definite, to be 
sure.  Reviewing the terms as they were used does not indicate any clear link to the 
current usage.  Nor is there any evidence that these terms, as used by Wolff, were 
identified by subsequent scholars.  It is unsurprising that those particular words should 
come together in a long book in Latin about international law.   
That said, this usage is still interesting with respect to the question of the normative and 
historical foundations of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and their sister term, jus post bellum.  
Wolff, in these passages seeking to determine the natural law pertaining to the right to 
destroy enemy property, appears to distinguish between justice during war326 and the 
right to go to war.327  He may not have been have meant exactly what contemporary 
scholars mean by these terms or concepts—again, hardly surprising given the 
development of international law over almost 250 years.  But it is also relatively clear 
that the general questions of right to war and right in war, whatever term was used, have 
a long genealogy.  
c) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
As for Wolff’s approach to jus post bellum, his main contribution is to build upon Grotius 
(see supra) and inspire Vattel (see infra), particularly on the matter of peace agreements.  
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Chapter VIII of Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum328  “Of Peace and the 
Treaty of Peace” spends two introductory paragraphs on the nature of peace329 before 
stating the duty “Of cultivating peace”: “Nations are bound by nature to cultivate peace 
with each other.”330  From this general precept and others, Wolff derives “How long a 
just war may be continued”331 (“until the enemy no longer opposes your righteous 
force”332).  This bold prescription for potentially endless war is softened by his analysis 
of the length of war  “How long in a doubtful case” (until compromise is accepted).333  
While Wolff discusses the possibility of war continuing until the other party has been 
completely conquered334 (what Lesaffer, following Gentili, references as ius victoriae)335 
most of Wolff’s chapter considers peace established through treaty (what Lesaffer, 
following Gentili, references as ius ad pacem).336   
                                                 
328 Ibid 486.  
329 Ibid 486, paras. 959, 960. 
330 Ibid 487, para. 961. 
331 Ibid 490, para. 969. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid 491, para. 970. 
334 Ibid. 492, para. 972. 
335 Lesaffer, Randall. "A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties." Vattel's International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384, 357. 
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The link between what we now might call jus ad bellum and jus post bellum is referenced, 
arguing in this chapter “Of Peace and the Treaty of Peace” that there is no right to continue an 
unjust war337 and that even a war that begins on a justifiable basis should be ended if the 
belligerent has “acquired his right” or if “in a doubtful case he should be unwilling to accept fair 
terms of peace.” 338  Wolff emphasises the need for compromise if every right is insisted upon, 
stating “Peace, then, cannot be made in such a way that the one to whom a right is due can 
acquire it completely.  […] [P]eace can be made only through a compromise.”339  Wolff 
prefigures May’s valuable contributions on Meionexia (detailed elsewhere), 340   making much the 
same point but without reference to Aristotle.   
Alongside proportionality, Wolff mentions the uses of an amnesty as part of a peace treaty (as 
understood at the time) whereby “all deeds are consigned to perpetual oblivion and everlasting 
silence.”341  The point of a treaty of peace is not to convict the other of wrong, he asserts that in 
every such treaty there is such an amnesty, “even if there should be no agreement for it.”342  His 
approach to such amnesty is consistent with his overall approach towards a peace agreement 
serving as a final settlement on the injustices of an armed conflict, whereby “things captured in 
                                                 
337 Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) 
Volume Two, p. 493. Translation by Joseph H. Drake and Francis J. Hemelt, para. 973. 
338 Ibid 493, para. 974. 
339 Ibid. 500, para. 986. 
340 See e.g., Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia, in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations, edited by Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson (Oxford 
University Press 2014); Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Approach (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). 
341 Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) 
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war may not be declared to have been wrongfully seized, but a compromise must be made on the 
terms which can be agreed upon; that which has been agreed upon is to be considered as law.”343  
Similarly losses in war are not recoverable unless there has been an agreement otherwise,344 nor 
debts or obligations unrelated to the war discharged.345 
Wolff is primarily concerned in this chapter with laws and principles concerning peace treaties 
between sovereigns, what would now be called International Armed Conflicts.  Wolff does note, 
however the possibility of what might now be called non-international armed conflicts, including 
rebellion (where subjects have an unjust cause)346 and civil war (where subjects have a just 
cause). 347  Of particular interest in terms of modern peace treaty law is Wolff’s practical 
assertion that “A treaty of peace is not invalid because it has been extorted by warlike force or by 
fear” because otherwise “it will always be possible to renew war[.]”348 
d) Conclusion 
Wolff continues the genealogy of jus post bellum avant la letter from Grotius to Vattel.  
He demonstrates how the general obligation of nations to cultivate peace with each 
other349  Like others before him, he notes that the absolute demands that might be 
                                                 
343 Ibid 503, para. 991.  See also  para. 996 on movable property. 
344 Ibid 504, para. 993. 
345 Ibid 504, para. 994. 
346 Ibid 513, para. 1010. 
347 Ibid 514, para. 1011. 
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1.  Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum  
    Historical Development 
 
125 
 
expected from the justifications for war must be tempered with compromise and admit 
the possibility of error and doubt in order to create the possibility of a successful peace 
treaty, and a sustainable peace. 350   He applies his analysis not only to what would now 
be called international armed conflicts, but recognizes that laws and principles apply to 
the resolution of what would now be called non-international armed conflicts as well. 351   
Finally, Wolff’s emphasis on the desired sustainability of peace is shown by his emphasis 
that even “A treaty of […] extorted by warlike force or by fear” is valid and binding.352 
 
12. Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) 
a) Introduction 
Vattel’s353 Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite 
et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains354 is a classic of international law.  
Emmanuelle Jouannet has gone so far as to consider Vattel a principal founder of modern 
                                                 
350 Ibid 500, para. 986. 
351 Ibid 513-14, para. 1010-11. 
352 Ibid 522-3, para. 1035. 
353 Vattel was christened “Emer.” Some authors have mistakenly given him a German name, 
“Emerich.”  See the Introduction for Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the 
Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early 
Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, edited and with an Introduction 
by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).  
354 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et 
aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains (1758), The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law 
of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early 
Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, edited and with an Introduction 
by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 
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international law.355  A follower of Christian Wolff, Vattel has had a profound and 
continuing impact on public international law.  With respect to jus post bellum, as in 
many areas, he took Wolff’s work and expanded it into a more comprehensive treatise on 
the transition to peace, paying particular attention to the law applicable to the formation 
and results of peace treaties. 
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Out of four books in Le Droit des Gens, Vattel devotes an entire volume to largely to the 
subject of the transition to peace: “Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies”.  This 
ultimate book in Le Droit des Gens begins with a definition of peace as the natural state 
of mankind, contra Hobbes.356  Sovereigns were not free to take the obligation of 
cultivating peace lightly, but were bound to it by a “double tie”—as an obligation both to 
the people and to foreign nations.357  This restricts the sovereign not only from 
“embarking in a war without necessity,” but also “persevering in it after the necessity has 
ceased to exist.”358   
                                                 
355 Jouannet, Emmanuelle. Emer de Vattel et l’ émergence doctrinale du droit international 
classique. Paris: A Pedone, 1998. 
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Souverains (1758), The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
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Vattel is applying his law “Of the Restoration of Peace” functionally, before peace starts 
and during war, not limited by time.  Many of the themes sounded by Vattel are, 
unsurprisingly, along the same lines of Wolff.  A sovereign “may carry on the operations 
of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to procure justice and safety”359—
showing that the object in mind is a peace both just and safe (and thus not unsustainable).  
The power to determine the conditions of peace, and “regulate the manner in which it is 
to be restored and supported,” is the same power to make war.360  The power of the king 
to alienate that which belongs to the state is limited, but if made with the nations consent 
cannot be invalidated.361  The sovereign may dispose of the property of individuals if 
necessary via eminent domain, but the state is bound to indemnify those who suffer as a 
result.362   
A treaty of peace is inevitably a compromise, in which the rules of strict and rigid justice 
are not observed; otherwise it would be impossible to ever make peace.363  A peace treaty 
extinguishes any grievance that gave rise to war, and creates a reciprocal obligation to 
preserve perpetual peace (at least with regards to that subject).364  Amnesty is implied in 
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all peace treaties, as peace should extinguish all subjects of discord.365  Peace treaties 
take effect as soon as possible.366  In case of doubt, any interpretation of the peace treaty 
should be read against the party who prescribed the terms of the treaty.367 
The best scholarship on Vattel with respect to the transition from armed conflict to peace 
was written by Randall Lesaffer in his contributions to two edited volumes (Vattel's 
International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de Vattel vu 
du XXI e Siècle and The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law).368  The 
author has no wish to be repetitive of Lessafer’s excellent summation, but would like to 
draw out certain highlights.  For a more comprehensive synopsis of the work of Vattel, 
including Wolff’s impact on Vattel, with respect to jus post bellum, the aforementioned 
works are recommended. 
First, in A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties,369 Lessafer places Vattel (along with his intellectual muse Christian Wolff) as 
                                                 
365 Ibid, Book IV, Chapter II, Section 20. 
366 Ibid, Book IV, Chapter II, Section 26. 
367 Ibid, Book IV, Chapter II, Section 32. 
368 For more on peace treaties in general, see e.g. Lesaffer, Randall. "The Westphalia peace 
treaties and the development of the tradition of great European peace settlements prior to 
1648." Grotiana 18 (1997); Lesaffer, Randall, ed. Peace treaties and international law in 
European history: from the late Middle Ages to World War One. Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
369 Lesaffer, Randall. "A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties." Vattel's International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384. 
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the leading voice on the law of peace treaties in the 17th and 18th centuries.370  Lesaffer 
notes that Wolff and Vattel both emphasised the need for compromise and a less-than-
maximalist approach to just claims in order to achieve peace. 371  Vattel emphasizes from 
the outset that there is an obligation on all nations to cultivate peace.372  Lessafer notes 
the underlying issues that Vattel identifies must be resolved by a peace treaty: disputes 
that led to war, the termination of the state of war, and the organization of and 
preservation of the peace.373  Like Wolff,374 Vattel considered an amnesty for all claims, 
civil and criminal, for actions during and because of the war to be an implicit part of 
every peace treaty—a common feature of peace treaties since the 15th century.375  In 
Vattel’s commentary on postliminium (see discussion on the Institutes of Justinian, 
Gentili, and Gudelinus supra) is limited, but he does insist that prisoners had to be 
released, even if not mandated by a peace treaty.376  
Like Wolff, Vattel argues that duress does not invalidate peace treaties, but he blurs the 
issues somewhat by claiming that in the case of an extremely oppressive peace imposed 
                                                 
370 Ibid 358. 
371 Ibid 363 
372 Ibid 366. 
373 Ibid 369. 
374 Wolff, Christian, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, Clarendon press (1934) 
Volume Two, p. 502. Translation by Joseph H. Drake and Francis J. Hemelt, para. 989. 
375 Lesaffer, Randall. "A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on Peacemaking and Peace 
Treaties." Vattel's International Law from a XXI st Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle. Brill, 2011. 353-384, 373. 
376 Ibid 375. 
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by a victor, the exception of duress did apply.377  Vattel was aware of the tension and 
possibility for abuse of this uncertain argument.  Should the peace treaty be breached, the 
injured party had the right to annul the treaty, ask for compensation, and if compensation 
was refused, resort to war.378 
Second, Lesaffer also integrates his analysis of Wolff and Vattel’s emphasis on the 
practical need to compromise in his concise over view of the impact of peace treaties on 
international law in Peace Treaties and the Formation of International Law. 379  Lesaffer 
emphasizes that Wolff and Vattel both found that basing the resolution of an armed 
conflict on the jus ad bellum question alone was impracticable, because determining jus 
ad bellum claims was usually impossible and because sovereigns would not subject 
themselves to other sovereign’s judgment on this matter.380  Lesaffer points to the overall 
effect of this approach and of state practice in Europe at the time, peace treaties from the 
1500s to the early 1900s did not demand compensation for the act of fighting an unjust 
war or restrictions on the military capacity of the unjust belligerent.381 
                                                 
377 Ibid 377. 
378 Ibid, 379. 
379 Lesaffer, Randall. "Peace treaties and the formation of international law." The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (2012): 71-94. 
380 Ibid 88. 
381 Ibid 
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c) Conclusion 
Vattel not only provided specific content to the law applicable to the transition to peace, 
but made it the foundation of diplomacy and further relations between states.  He 
considered this law necessary,382 immutable,383 and obligatory.384  Vattel was interested 
in making a profound and lasting contribution to analyzing the possibilities available to 
secure liberty against constant interruption by war.385  Like many of the authors listed 
above, he was a product of his time and circumstances—writing mostly in absolute 
monarchies, taking the feelings of their patrons into account.  Some of his views would 
be considered retrograde by modern standards, but his interest in establishing a means to 
achieve a just and sustainable peace addresses a problem that remains current, and 
pressing. 
13. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
a) Introduction 
Immanuel Kant’s contributions to thinking on the transition to peace and the tripartite 
conception of the law of armed conflict are relatively well known.  In Carsten Stahn’s 
                                                 
382 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Preface, Section 7. 
383 Ibid, Preface, Section 8. 
384 Ibid, Preface, Section 9. 
385 See the Introduction for Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of 
Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays 
on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, edited and with an Introduction by Béla 
Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 
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foundational essay on jus post bellum, he cites Kant as a conceptual founder of the 
idea.386  Like all of the authors above, Kant did not use the term “jus post bellum” but for 
modern purposes can be seen to be outlining the concept avant la lettre.  Kant was 
building on an Enlightenment tradition of an optimistic view of mankind that could 
construct a peaceful order for Europe.  This tradition includes William Penn’s suggestion 
of a European confederation in his Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of 
Europe (1693).387  Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en 
Europe (Fayard Utrecht 1713)388 imagined a federation of Christian states.  Kant builds 
on this tradition without positing a supranational entity as such.   
b) Writings and relation to jus post bellum 
Kant's vision of the possibility of perpetual peace was based partially on states sharing 
“republican” constitutions.  By “republican,” Kant was referring to certain basic elements 
core to what is thought of as “democratic today: liberty, equal treatment under the law, 
representative government, and separation of powers.389  Kant’s vision was thus very 
much a precursor of our modern conception of a democratic peace.  Kant’s ultimate hope 
                                                 
386 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’, ‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the Conception 
of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 (2006): 921-943. 
387 William Penn, The Political Writings of William Penn, introduction and annotations by 
Andrew R. Murphy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002). 
388 See Perkins, Merle L. The moral and political philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Vol. 24. 
Librairie Droz, 1959. 
389 See Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 1932, U.S. Library Association, Westwood 
Hills Press, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A;  Russett, Bruce. Grasping the democratic peace: 
Principles for a post-Cold War world. Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 4. 
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was not merely that single states be made free or peaceful, but that there could be a 
systematic effect on the international plane, what he called a “federation of free states.”390   
Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace Among States 391  is an essay filled with 
relevance to jus post bellum.  His goal was, as far as feasible, to propose a system that 
would have a particular function: to make a permanent transition to peace—and because 
he was first and foremost a moral philosopher, Kant would only support such a peace that 
was just.  He lists six preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states and three 
definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.  Each article will be addressed in 
turn. 
Kant’s first preliminary article was “No treaty of peace shall be esteemed valid, on which 
is tacitly reserved matter for future war.” 392   Kant connects jus post bellum to lex 
pacificatoria – connecting the validity of peace treaties to whether they comprehensively 
address the issues needed to establish a sustainable peace.  His second article stated “Any 
state, of whatever extent, shall never pass under the dominion of another state, whether 
by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.” 393  Here, Kant connects jus post bellum 
to the law of occupation and the prohibition against aggression.  His third article reads 
                                                 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid 67-109. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Ibid. 
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“Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be “totally abolished.” 394  Kant is 
connecting armed control and military expenditure to jus post bellum.  The fourth 
preliminary article holds that “National debts shall not be contracted with a view of 
maintaining the interest of the state abroad.” 395  Kant here connects the internal dynamics 
of empire and national finance to jus post bellum.  The fifth article states that “No state 
shall by force interfere with either the constitution or government of another state.” 396  
This principle connects jus post bellum to occupation law, the prohibition against 
aggression, and the need for self-determination.  Article six proclaims “A state shall not, 
during war, admit of hostilities of a nature that would render reciprocal confidence in a 
succeeding peace impossible: such as employing assassins (percussores), poisoners 
(venefici), violation of capitulations, secret instigation to rebellion (perduellio), etc.” 397  
This principle connects what would now be termed jus in bello norms (no unnecessary 
suffering/heinous means) to jus post bellum ends (permanent peace).   
In addition to the six preliminary articles listed above, Kant suggests three definitive 
articles.  Firstly, “The civil constitution of every state ought to be republican.”  Given his 
definition of republican, Kant was referring to certain basic elements core to what is 
thought of as “democratic” today: liberty, equal treatment under the law, representative 
                                                 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
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government, and separation of powers. 398   Secondly, “The public right ought to be 
founded upon a federation of free states.”  Kant here connects municipal law to the 
structure of the international system (including sovereignty) to jus post bellum.  Thirdly, 
“The cosmopolitical right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”  Kant is 
underlining the importance of the rights of foreigners to receive diplomatic protection.   
c) Conclusion 
Kant’s ideas of perpetual peace still haunt the international system.  While not yet 
achieved, they informed the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, 
and served as a precursor for the idea of a Democratic Peace.  While limited, admitting 
the validity at the time of the idea of conquest,399 he repudiated the flexibility of earlier 
thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel as “miserable comforters,”400 in 
reality he built upon a long tradition, reinforced it with new ethical imagination, and laid 
the foundation for future efforts. 
                                                 
398 Ibid;  Russett, Bruce. Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world. 
Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 4. 
399 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (The Philosophy of Law: An 
Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, originally 
published 1887, tr W. Hastie, The Lawbook Exchange 2002) 
400 Kant, Immanuel, The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920), Vol. 59, No. 5  (May 1897), pp. 111-
116, p. 114. 
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C. Conclusion 
While not encyclopaedic, it is worth emphasizing some of the highlights of the material 
reviewed above.  From Augustine we know that war has purposes that may or may not be 
fulfilled by the transition to peace  that the transition to peace is not always normatively 
better than continued war—and that, mercy must guide war and allow a successful 
transition to a just and sustainable peace.  From Aquinas we know that Right authority is 
important, not merely for its own sake, but because it is conducive to peace; that peace 
should be a just peace, where the poor are rescued and the needy delivered; that the right 
intent should be securing peace, punishing evil-doers, and uplifting the good; and that 
that the ultimate goal of a prosperous peace controls not only post-conflict behaviour but 
the warring itself.  Baldus de Ubaldis plays an important part in establishing that peace 
treaties and peace agreements could and should endure.  Without the idea that such 
agreements could be permanent, outlasting the king, a key foundation of jus post bellum 
would be lacking.  Baldus manages to lay this foundation without sacrificing the idea that 
kings should be individual responsible for their personal crimes.   
Francisco de Vitoria covers a wide field of material that relates to jus post bellum, 
including: first, peace as the aim of armed conflict; second, post-conflict justice; third, an 
integrated view of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum; and fourth, post bellum 
regime change.  Together, Vitoria’s writings amount to a new foundation for jus post 
bellum.  Francisco Suarez insists on the role of charity with regards to pursuing a just 
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cause, due to the need for a sustainable post-conflict peace, and it is form Suarez we have 
the idea that the likelihood of a just peace must be evaluated before beginning a war.   
In Albericio Gentili’s De Iure Belli Libri Tres we find a tri-partite hybrid functional 
approach to the just war tradition that is in many respects strikingly contemporary.  
Petrus Gudelinus likely influence Grotius with his writings on important constituent parts 
of a constructed peace, including the cessation of hostilities,  the distribution of and 
restitution for goods and rights, amnesty, and exchange of captives; and he noted the 
difference between conflicts between sovereigns and those involving rebels.  When 
describing the structure of De jure belli ac pacis libre tres, Grotius says that, in part, 
book III describes “the several Kinds of Peace, and all Agreements made in war.”  To use 
contemporary terminology, Book III addresses not only jus in bello, but also jus post 
bellum.   
Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel not only provided specific content to the law 
applicable to the transition to peace, but made it the foundation of diplomacy and further 
relations between states.  Vattel considered this law necessary, immutable, and 
obligatory.  Immanuel Kant’s ideas of perpetual peace still haunt the international system.  
While not yet achieved, they informed the creation of the League of Nations and the 
United Nations, and served as a precursor for the idea of a Democratic Peace.   
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To critics of jus post bellum who would state that “il n’existe pas dans cette tradition de 
droit de la transition du conflit à la paix”401 the above summary should serve as an 
adequate response.  For others, such as Robert Cryer, the note of caution regarding using 
venerable authors who “were working in a very different tradition”, it has merit as far as 
it goes in terms of making a legal argument in a court, for example.402  Unlike 
Lewkowicz, Cryer is not arguing that jus post bellum (avant la lettre) is not part of the 
just war tradition.   
Cryer is of course correct in his implication that if one were to simplistically assert that 
writings of past scholars constituted binding law today, one would be mistaken.  
However, neither Orend nor Stahn do so.  It is far from useless to discuss the ancient 
traditions of normative and legal thinking on the justice of war and peace, and indeed 
failure to reevaluate and consider the traditions that gave rise to contemporary 
international law is to doom oneself to a curious form of self-imposed blindness—not 
only to the beneficial analysis of past authors, but also to their errors (such as using jus 
post bellum as a general license to violate other norms).  Contemporary international law 
theorists and practitioners would be well served to be better grounded in the tradition they 
have inherited and may be invoking without even knowing it.  Cryer’s overall approach 
                                                 
401 Lewkowicz, Grégory. "Jus Post Bellum: vieille antienne ou nouvelle branche du droit? Sur le 
mythe de l’origine vénérable du Jus Post Bellum." Revue belge de droit international 1 (2011). 
402 Cryer, Robert. "Law and the Jus Post Bellum", Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International 
Law. Ed. Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. pp. 223-249, p. 226 ff (see generally the section Jus Post Bellum: Historically 
Defensible?). 
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of caution, on the other hand, is well placed.  This should not be a call to reject the utility 
of historical legal scholarship, but rather to expand and clarify the intellectual traditions 
that underpin the way lawyers approach their work.  While this chapter could be 
expanded into its own volume, there is current added value in taking a fresh look at 
classic works with the particular, coherent perspective of a hybrid functional approach to 
jus post bellum.   
Various approaches to the transition to peace are considered so natural as to be invisible 
today—that one needs a certain amount of authority to conclude a peace treaty or peace 
agreement, that a peace treaty has binding effect even after the natural person who agreed 
to it has died, that the victorious power should not be utterly unfettered in his treatment of 
those who lose a conflict.  One today may nod and say "of course"—but why does this 
seem natural today, whereas it required careful explanation earlier?  Precisely because a 
tradition so powerful as to become the intellectual water in which we swim has been 
developed by the very authors some would disregard. 
The preceding review of deep roots of jus post bellum is inevitably incomplete.  
Examinations of the writings of Grotius analyzed elsewhere in this work are not repeated 
here.  The ambition of this chapter is less an encyclopaedic recitation of the evolution of 
the concept than an exploration of the particular tradition from which jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello also derived.  There is a temptation to naturalize these terms: to assume they 
represent something unchanging and inherent.  Upon realization that they are of relatively 
recent coinage, one might have an overreaction in the other direction, assuming that the 
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fundamental issues addressed are purely contemporary.  The powerful legal and 
normative tradition that informs the development of these ideas is best approached 
carefully.  Contemporary jus post bellum is best addressed with awareness of its history, 
respect for experience and past scholarship, but without a false presumption of being 
bound by past moral or legal precepts if they do not meet contemporary standards of 
positive legal authority or the needs of those attempting the difficult task of constructing 
a positive peace. 
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2.  Exploration of Sister Terms 
Only with a basic understanding of the jus ad bellum/jus in bello dichotomy can an 
exploration of a jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum trichotomy properly begin.   
Before examining the suggestion that the jus ad bellum/jus in bello dichotomy be 
replaced with a jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum trichotomy, this section will 
further introduce and critically explore jus post bellum’s more established “sister terms,” 
jus in bello and jus ad bellum.  Each term will be described in more detail, and then the 
import for jus post bellum and the jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum trichotomy 
will be explored.   
A. Jus in bello 
Jus in bello addresses many issues.  Jus in bello now includes, inter alia, regulations 
protecting and regulating civilians, civilian objects, refugees,1 women,2 children,3 
military medical personnel, military religious personnel, military prisoners, civilian 
prisoners, surrendering combatants, incapacitated combatants, and members of the 
                                                 
1 E.g., Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I.    
2 E.g., GCIII, Arts 14, 16; GCIII, Art 25; GCIV, Art27; API, Art 76(2); APII, Art 4(2). 
3 E.g., Geneva Conventions; The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (2000), UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000 (UN General Assembly, 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000), an amendment to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3 (The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989. It entered into force on 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49.) 
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International Committee of the Red Cross.  It requires collecting and caring for the 
wounded and sick.4  Modern jus in bello regulates armed conflicts between states 
(“International Armed Conflicts”) and other conflicts (“Non-International Armed 
Conflicts”).  Jus in bello regulates active combat,5 and also law making and 
administration during and after belligerent occupation.6 (Belligerent occupation occurs 
during an International Armed Conflict when a territory is no longer under the control of 
the sovereign territorial state and is not part of the front line of active combat).7  It 
includes certain protections for armed forces on land,8 in the air,9 and at sea.10  It includes 
certain duties that may occur during peacetime, such as the duty to disseminate the texts 
of the Geneva Convention and educate the military and civilian populations in the 
principles of jus in bello11 and the duty to determine whether a new weapon, means or 
                                                 
4 E.g., Common Article III 
5 E.g., GC I/II, AP I/II. 
6 E.g., GC IV. 
7 See generally, Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd ed 2012 OUP); Yoram 
Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP 2009). 
8 E.g., GC I. 
9 E.g., AP I Article 42. 
10 E.g., GC II. 
11 E.g., GC I/II/III/IV, Arts. 47/48/127/144): 
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to 
disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their 
respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their 
programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles 
thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population. 
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method of warfare violates Additional Protocol I or any other applicable rule of 
International Law.12   
Jus in bello restricts not only the general conduct of combatants but also the specific 
means and methods of warfare, including weapons.  The use of exploding projectiles 
weighing less than 400 grams was prohibited in 1868,13 and bullets that flatten upon 
entering the human body were prohibited in 1899.14  Poison and poisoned weapons were 
banned in the 1907 Hague Regulations.15  The use of chemical weapons and 
bacteriological methods were banned in the 1925 Geneva Protocol,16 a ban updated by 
the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention17 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
                                                 
12 Art. 36 AP I 
13 Short title: Declaration of Saint Petersburg (1868); Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of 
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg, adopted 11 
December 1868, D.Schindler and J.Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nihjoff 
Publisher, 1988, p.102. 
14 Short title: Hague Declaration (1899); International Peace Conference 1899,  Declaration 
(IV,3) concerning Expanding Bullets. The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, (entry into force 4 
September 1900). 
15 Short title: Hague Regulations (1907); International Conferences (The Hague), Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
16 Short title: Geneva Protocol (1925); United Nations, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 
June 1925 (Entry into force: 8 February 1928). 
17 Short title: 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons  
and on their Destruction, 1015 UNTS 163 / [1977] ATS 23 / 11 ILM 309 (1972) , 10 April 1972 
(Entry into force: 26 March 1975). 
2.  Exploration of Sister Terms  
    Jus in bello 
 
144 
 
Convention18 (extending the prohibition beyond use to development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of biological and chemical weapons).  The 
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)19 and its Protocols regulate a 
number of weapons, including incendiary weapons,20 mines,21 booby traps,22 blinding 
laser weapons,23 explosive remnants of war,24 and munitions that create fragments not 
detectable by X-ray.25  Interestingly, the CCW is the first treaty to address the post-
                                                 
18 Short title: Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (1993); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction, 3 September 1992 (Entry into force: 29 April 1997); see also UN General 
Assembly, Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction: Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly, 17 December 2003, A/RES/58/52.  
19 Short title: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; United Nations, Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983; 
Registered No. 22495). 
20 Short title: Protocol III (1980) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). Geneva, 10 
October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983). 
21 Short title: Protocol II, as amended (1996), to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons; Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices. Geneva, 10 October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Short title: Protocol IV (1995) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 1995 (Entry into 
force: 30 July 1998). 
24 Short title: Protocol V (2003) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention), 28 November 2003 
(Entry into force: 12 November.2006). 
25 Short title: Protocol I (1980) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol on 
Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I). Geneva, 10 October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 
1983). 
2.  Exploration of Sister Terms  
    Jus in bello 
 
145 
 
conflict dangers of the explosive remnants of war.  The 1997 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction26 describes itself well, and was followed up logically by the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions.27  The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty28 regulating the 
international trade in conventional weapons entered into force 24 December 2014.   
These types of treaties, focused on weapons, are considered to be in the domain of jus in 
bello or, to use the more modern term (discussed infra) International Humanitarian Law. 
But not all regulations of weaponry are considered to be jus in bello. The regulation of 
nuclear weapons in terms of disarmament, non-proliferation, testing restriction, and 
nuclear-free zones are generally considered to be in a category of its own (or series of 
categories), with such nuclear weapons treaties not considered primarily as a subset of 
International Humanitarian Law,29 even though the International Court of Justice has 
concluded that their use would generally be contrary to the rules of International 
Humanitarian Law.30  The ICRC finds it difficult to envisage how nuclear weapons use 
                                                 
26 Short title: Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) (1997); 
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Entry into force: 1 March 1999). 
27 Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 30 
May 2008 (Entry into force: 1 August 2010). 
28 United Nations, Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April 2013 (Entry into force: 24 December 2014). 
29 Nystuen, Gro, Stuart Casey-Maslen, and Annie Golden Bersagel, eds. Nuclear Weapons Under 
International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2014, particularly Part V “International 
Disarmament Law.” 
30 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 
226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996. 
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could be compatible with International Humanitarian Law.31 Nonetheless, bilateral 
treaties such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (I and II) or multilateral treaties such as 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material32 are often considered 
outside of jus in bello.  Similarly, United Nations Security Council Resolutions on arms 
control33 or domestic restrictions on arms or defence34 (let alone small arms) are not 
generally considered part of jus in bello.  From expanding bullets to nuclear weapons, jus 
in bello serves a regulatory role with regards to weapons, but as shown with respect to 
nuclear weapons, United Nations Security Council Resolutions or domestic restrictions, 
jus in bello does not occupy the field with regard to weapons regulation. 
Does this broad body of law, jus in bello, cohere?  To the degree it does, why does it 
cohere?  The answer to this may be found in the terms used somewhat interchangeably to 
refer to the same body of law.  The term jus in bello is often used interchangeably in an 
English-language context with “the law of armed conflict,” “International Humanitarian 
Law” and analogous terms in other languages.  “Laws of war” is also sometimes used.  
                                                 
31 See Who will assist the victims of nuclear weapons? Statement by Peter Maurer, President of 
the ICRC, International conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Oslo, 4-5 
March 2013, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/13-03-04-
nuclear-weapons.htm,  last visited 18 August 2014. 
32 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 26 October 
1979, No. 24631, (Entry into force: 8 February 1987). 
33 For example, the restrictions on Iraq, Iran (July 2006 (1696), December 2006 (1737), March 
2007 (1747), March 2008 (1803), September 2008 (1835) and June 2010 (1929)), North Korea, or 
Syria. 
34 For example, the restrictions in Germany or Japan after the First World War, or domestically in 
Nicaragua or at times in Haiti. 
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While these non-Latin phrases have the considerable advantage for those not fluent in 
Latin of being comprehensible in a common tongue, but they have their own drawbacks.  
The term “International Humanitarian Law” emphasizes a particular normative value 
which can provide coherence to the many strands of jus in bello: humanitarianism, or the 
saving of lives and reducing of suffering.  
Before continuing further, a brief note on methodology and tools for the analysis of jus 
post bellum and related terms might be helpful.  This thesis includes both very traditional 
methods such as literature review and close readings of important legal and historical 
texts, but also what is increasingly called in the Humanities the varied methodology and 
tools of the “digital Humanities.”35  Each general category of methodology has its 
strengths and weaknesses, and may be most effective in combination.  A strength of using 
the tool of a digitized collection of millions of books and constructing a visual 
representation of the quantitative data derived from that collection (namely the frequency 
of works using a phrase as a percentage of the works published in that year) is the 
comprehensiveness of this approach.  While surely imperfect, it is also far more 
comprehensive an approach than could ever be attempted by a single researcher, or 
indeed by any team of researchers not using the tools of digitalization, optical character 
recognition, and automated linguistic analysis.  It also reduces questions of objectivity 
that might be present with traditional approaches.  That said, traditional approaches are 
                                                 
35 Patrik Svensson, The Landscape of Digital Humanities, Digital Humanities Quarterly, 2010 
Volume 4 Number 1, available at http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/4/1/000080/000080.html 
last visited 16 July 2014. 
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far superior with respect to actually reading and comprehending key works, deriving the 
meaning and influence of those works, and providing historical and intellectual context 
for the ideas expressed.   
These terms, “jus in bello,” “the law of armed conflict” and “International Humanitarian 
Law”, are all largely 20th century terms.  This is perhaps not surprising with respect to the 
use of the term “humanitarian,” which during the 19th century was often used 
contemptuously in the sense of sentimentality.36  This chart shows the usage of the terms 
as a percentage of all terms in an extremely large body of scanned work since 1500.37 
                                                 
36 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, (Oxford University Press 1973), p. 995 
37 The author recognizes that the graphical representations of historical data is not universally 
appreciated, but hopes for those who find it illuminating these graphs are of some use.  This data 
uses the unequalled dataset of millions of books digitized by Google.  A digitized book is usually 
a physical book that has been scanned, including the identification of  characters through optical 
character recognition.  Words are identified, and from those words two-word phrases (“bigrams”) 
three-word phrases (“trigrams”) and other phrases are identified and made viewable through 
Google’s “NGram viewer.”  The results are normalized by year, so the y axis represents a 
percentage of the books published in that year that have include the searched-for phrase.  If this 
were not done, the acceleration in the rate of publication would make the results more difficult to 
interpret meaningfully.  More information can be found at https://books.google.com/ngrams/info 
[last visited 27 June 2014] and http://googleresearch.blogspot.nl/2012/10/ngram-viewer-20.html 
[last visited 27 June 2014]. Unless otherwise noted, the 2012 English language dataset is used, 
comprising over 20 million works.  The original paper explaining the dataset used for these 
graphs is Jean-Baptiste Michel*, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew 
K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan 
Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman 
Aiden*. Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books. Science (Published 
online ahead of print: 12/16/2010).  Regarding point of speech tagging, see Yuri Lin, Jean-
Baptiste Michel, Erez Lieberman Aiden, Jon Orwant, William Brockman, Slav Petrov. Syntactic 
Annotations for the Google Books Ngram Corpus. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Computational Linguistics Volume 2: Demo Papers (ACL '12) (2012).   
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Caption: Frequency of the use of “jus in bello,” “the law of armed conflict” and 
“International Humanitarian Law” in millions of volumes published in English since 
1500.38 
Concentrating on usage since 1900, one gets the following picture: 
                                                 
38 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=jus+in+bello%2Claw+of+armed+conflict%2Cin
ternational+humanitarian+law&case_insensitive=on&year_start=1500&year_end=2008&corpus=
15&smoothing=0&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2Cjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%
3B%3Bjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJus%2
0in%20Bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJUS%20IN%20BELLO%3B%2Cc0%3B.t4%3B%2Claw%20
of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Blaw%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B
%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20Armed%20Conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLAW%20OF%20AR
MED%20CONFLICT%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B.t
4%3B%2Cinternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Binternational
%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3B%2
Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BINTERNATIONAL%
20HUMANITARIAN%20LAW%3B%2Cc0#t4%3B%2Cjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%2
Cs0%3B%3Bjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJ
us%20in%20Bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJUS%20IN%20BELLO%3B%2Cc0%3B.t4%3B%2Cla
w%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Blaw%20of%20armed%20confli
ct%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20Armed%20Conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLAW%20OF%
20ARMED%20CONFLICT%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0
%3B.t4%3B%2Cinternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Binterna
tional%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3
B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BINTERNATION
AL%20HUMANITARIAN%20LAW%3B%2Cc0  (Last viewed 9 May 2016).   N.B.  The long 
URL is provided here in case the algorithm changes, it should be able to be recreated with the 
embedded search terms. 
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Caption: Frequency of the use of “jus in bello,” “the law of armed conflict” and 
“International Humanitarian Law” in millions of volumes published in English since 
190039 
Similarly, if one were to focus on a more limited dataset that might reveal popular usage 
rather than all published materials, one sees a similar pattern.  The following chart shows 
the number of articles in the New York Times mentioning “law of war”, “law of armed 
conflict”, and “humanitarian law” since 1850. 
                                                 
39 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=jus+in+bello%2Claw+of+armed+conflict%2Cin
ternational+humanitarian+law&case_insensitive=on&year_start=1900&year_end=2008&corpus=
15&smoothing=0&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2Cjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%
3B%3Bjus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJus%20in%20bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJus%2
0in%20Bello%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BJUS%20IN%20BELLO%3B%2Cc0%3B.t4%3B%2Claw%20
of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Blaw%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B
%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20Armed%20Conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLAW%20OF%20AR
MED%20CONFLICT%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BLaw%20of%20armed%20conflict%3B%2Cc0%3B.t
4%3B%2Cinternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Binternational
%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3B%2
Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BINTERNATIONAL%
20HUMANITARIAN%20LAW%3B%2Cc0   (Last viewed 9 May 2016).   N.B.  The long URL 
is provided here in case the algorithm changes, it should be able to be recreated with the 
embedded search terms. 
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Caption: number of articles in the New York Times mentioning “law of war”, “law of 
armed conflict”, and “humanitarian law”.40 
In this New York Times dataset, there is almost no usage of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, or 
jus post bellum, but there are spikes in usage of “law of war” during the US Civil War, 
World War I, World War II, and since 2001.  There is a tremendous increase in usage of 
the phrase “humanitarian law” in the post-Cold War era, and particularly since 2010. 
A more telling graph in terms of interest in the subject as a whole may be found if the y-
axis is percentage of articles published instead of the absolute number: 
                                                 
40 
http://chronicle.nytlabs.com/?keyword=humanitarian%20law.law%20of%20war.law%20of%20ar
med%20conflict&format=count   (Last viewed 9 May 2016).    
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Caption: percent of total articles published by the New York Times in a given year 
mentioning “law of war”, “law of armed conflict”, and “humanitarian law”.41 
This shows, again, the great interest in the subject in the pages of the New York Times 
during the U.S. Civil War, World War I, World War II, and in the post-Cold War Era, 
with the interest now (expressed now more as “humanitarian law” than “law of war”) 
exceeding any period since the U.S. Civil War. 
The charts above show a few interesting trends.  First, the dominant term at present is 
clearly “international humanitarian law.”42  “International humanitarian law” is used 
approximately five times as much as “jus in bello” or “law of armed conflict.”  This 
seems to have happened due to a large increase in the use of the term since the mid-
                                                 
41 
http://chronicle.nytlabs.com/?keyword=humanitarian%20law.law%20of%20war.law%20of%20ar
med%20conflict&format=percent (Last viewed 9 May 2016).    
42 In the present discussion, all references to the terms “international humanitarian law”, “jus in 
bello”, and “law of armed conflict” are referring to their usage with major forms of capitalization 
combined into a single set of statistics, combining  for example uncapitalized (e.g.” jus in bello”,) 
first letter of each word capitalized (e.g. “Jus In Bello”), and all-caps (e.g. “JUS IN BELLO”).  
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1980s.  There seems to have been spikes in the use of “jus in bello” in the mid-1950s and 
early 1980s.  It is interesting to note this happened approximately five years after the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977.  There was a general 
increase in the use of the term “law of armed conflict” since the 1990s.  This is a term 
more frequently preferred by the military and is also the term favored in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.43  “Jus in bello” and the “law of armed conflict” are not in disuse; 
rather published references to “international humanitarian law” have shot upwards 
without necessarily being at the expense of these related terms.   
Of potential note in the development and conceptualization of this terminology are the 
major initiatives in the late 1960s and 1970s by the International Commission of Jurists 
and other NGOs.44  These launched a process that ultimately led to the rebranding of the 
law of war as international humanitarian law, and indeed the negotiation and adoption of 
the 1977 additional protocols.45  Twenty years after the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was promulgated, in 1968, the International Conference on Human Rights adopted 
Resolution XXIII on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts.46  This Resolution invited the 
                                                 
43 See, Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, p. 26;  
also personal communications with military lawyers. 
44 Milanovic, Marko, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (July 9, 2014). Theoretical Boundaries of 
Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Jens David Ohlin ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming, at 15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957 
45 Ibid. 
46 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 
22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968). 
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General Assembly of the UN to invite the Secretary-General of the UN to study “The 
need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible revision of 
existing Conventions”.47  As a result the Secretary-General produced two reports,48 the 
second of which dealt extensively with the derogation clauses of human rights treaties 
and the travaux of the ICCPR, and concluded that killing that is lawful under 
International Humanitarian Law would not be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life 
under Article 6 of the ICCPR.  This effort to integrate human rights law and international 
humanitarian law must be seen as a historically bounded and contingent process, not an 
absolute, ahistorical legal truth.  As Marko Milanovic puts it “The whole point of the 
integrationist project was that the newly rebranded IHL was somehow an extension of 
human rights to armed conflict, or an exceptional, specialized part of IHRL.”49 
While they may be synonyms or near synonyms, the terms evoke differing responses and 
allude to differing organizing principles.  If jus post bellum is to be understood in part in 
relation to jus in bello, jus in bello must also be understood in relation and to some degree 
in distinction from similar terms.  Why might one term be used over another?  What does 
the relative triumph of “international humanitarian law” say about differing organizing 
principles and their weight in the discourse about the regulation of armed conflict?  What 
                                                 
47 Ibid, para. 1.b. 
48 Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/7 720, 20 November 1969; Respect 
for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970. 
49 Milanovic, Marko, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (July 9, 2014). Theoretical Boundaries of 
Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Jens David Ohlin ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming, at 24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957 
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is jus post bellum in an age of “international humanitarian law” (rather than “jus in 
bello”)? 
The main point of jus in bello can be said to be its distinction from jus ad bellum, 
underlining the argument that regardless of the merits (or lack thereof) of the jus ad 
bellum justification for the resort to the use of armed force, the laws and principles 
known as jus in bello still apply.  Thus, discussions of jus in bello can be said to be 
inherently reinforcing the importance of neutral application of the laws between the 
parties (particularly in International Armed Conflicts, the traditional area of application 
for this field).   
The organizing principle of “international humanitarian law” is humanitarianism, or the 
saving of lives and reducing of suffering.  It did not emerge from the struggle of rights-
claimants, but from a sense of charity – inter arma caritas.50 The Martens Clause, in the 
Preamble to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is 
sometimes given credit as the point of entry into international law of the concept of a 
humanitarian law.51  As formulated in 1899, the Marten clause stated: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
                                                 
50 “In war, charity.”  Now the motto of the International Committee of the Red Cross.  See 40 Isr. 
L. Rev. 313 (2007) Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, The; Droege, Cordula. 
51 Meron, Theodor. "The Martens Clause, principles of humanity, and dictates of public 
conscience." American Journal of International Law (2000): 78-89; Johnson, James Turner, 
Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740, 
(Princeton University Press 1975), p. 262. 
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Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the 
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result 
from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.52 
The influence of the Martens Clause is broad and deep.53 “Humanitarian” groups such as 
national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies provide humanitarian services during natural 
and man-made catastrophes, during war and peace.  They are the first responders, and are 
given a central place in the narrative of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional 
protocols of 1977.  The International Committee of the Red Cross has developed the “egg 
                                                 
52 Hague Convention No. II of 1899 with Respect  to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
with annex of regulations, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.   
53 The Martens Clause was restated in slightly different versions in the Hague Convention of 
1907, (International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, 18 October 1907), the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 63, 
6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 62, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 
85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 142, 6 UST 
3316, 75 UNTS 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 158, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287), the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 
12, 1977, Art. 1(2), 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened 
for signature Dec. 12, 1977, pmbl., para. 4, 1125 UNTS 609), and the Preamble to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
pmbl., para. 5, 1342 UNTS 137.  It is paraphrased in Resolution XXIII of the of the Tehran 
Conference on Human Rights of 1968, and is cited or referred to in various military manuals such 
as the US  (DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 6 (Field Manual No. 27-10, 
1956); U.S. DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 1-7(b) (AFP No. 110-31, 1976)), the United Kingdom (UNITED 
KINGDOM WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART III OF THE MANUAL OF 
MILITARY LAW, paras. 2, 3, 5 (1958)), and Germany (FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT-MANUAL, para. 129 (ZAv 15/2, 1992).  
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model” which emerged from interagency discussions on protection.54 It posits three 
spheres of protective action from the point of violation: responsive action, remedial 
action, and environment-building action.55  Responsive action is closest to the victims of 
a violation—action that aims to stop, prevent, or alleviate the worst and most immediate 
effects of abuse.56  Remedial action is more restorative and is aimed at helping people 
recover and live with subsequent effects.57  Environment-building action focuses more on 
societal structures and norms that will prevent or limit current and future violations and 
abuses; it aims to consolidate political, social, cultural and institutional norms conducive 
to protection.58  This model recognizes that deprivation through impoverishment, 
dispossession, destitution, disease and sheer exhaustion are responsible for the majority 
of civilian deaths in war—that throughout the 1990s, “most civilians died from war rather 
than violently in war.”59 Humanitarian action tends to focus on responsive action.  
Remedial action is the traditional sphere of human rights work, although part of the 
expanding sphere of humanitarian groups.  Environment-building tends to be associated 
more with development and “rule of law” work.  It all centers on the victim and the 
                                                 
54 Giossi Caverzasio, Sylvie (2001) Strengthening Protection in War: a Search for Professional 
Standards. Geneva: ICRC. 
55 Hugo Slim Andrew Bonwick, Protection: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies 
(Overseas Development Institute, London, 2005),  p. 42. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 25. 
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pattern of abuse of that victim.  This pattern of abuse is not necessarily identical to the 
action of the organized armed group.  For such groups, fighting in an armed conflict is in 
a sense “normal” and legitimate as long as within regulated limits. 
 
Caption: “Egg model” of humanitarian response60 
The bulk of what is commonly referred to as “international humanitarian law” is codified 
in six treaties, namely the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional 
protocols of 1977.    The most authoritative contemporary definition of the term comes 
from the Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949: 
International humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict means 
international rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 43. 
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intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or 
non-international armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit 
the right of Parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of 
their choice or protect persons and properly that are, or may be, affected by 
conflict[.]61 
This definition emphasizes the unifying telos of humanitarianism around international 
humanitarian law.  It does not emphasize the distinction with jus ad bellum.  Again, it is 
the dominant term used for this area of law, showing a great increase in usage in recent 
decades.  
 
Caption: Graph of all works published in English from 1950 to 2008 using the phrase 
“international humanitarian law” regardless of capitalization62 
                                                 
61 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987, p. xxvii. 
62 
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=International+Humanitarian+Law&case_insensi
tive=on&year_start=1950&year_end=2014&corpus=15&smoothing=0&share=&direct_url=t4%3
B%2CInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Binternational%2
0humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3B%2Cc0
%3B%3BInternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BINTERNATIONAL%20H
UMANITARIAN%20LAW%3B%2Cc0#t4%3B%2CInternational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3
B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs1%3B%3Binternational%20humanitarian%20law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BIntern
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As mentioned previously, the “law of armed conflict” is the term that tends to be 
favoured by the armed forces themselves. In contrast with “international humanitarian 
law”, it evokes more the image of military manuals than manuals for groups working 
hand in glove (or yolk in egg-white) with human rights and development groups.  While 
it recognizes that there is law that applies to armed conflict (armed conflict is not beyond 
the law), it also implicitly recognizes that armed conflict can be legal (armed conflict is 
not inherently against the law).  It lacks the automatic emphasis on the distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello that “jus in bello” has within it.  While 
“international humanitarian law” is clearly a term of art with a relatively specific 
meaning for a specialist community, the “law of armed conflict” may be more 
immediately understood as a general matter by the general community.  It could, 
however, cause more confusion if it tends to blur the jus ad bellum/jus in bello 
distinction.  This might happen particularly if the “law of armed conflict” is used 
synonymously with the “law of war”63—a term even more apparently plain but possibly 
confusing.  The “law of war” has historically and currently been used to refer both to jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello concerns.  Since “armed conflict” is often thought of as 
synonymous with “war” among non-specialists, and there is a long history of trying to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ational%20Humanitarian%20Law%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BInternational%20humanitarian%20law%
3B%2Cc0%3B%3BINTERNATIONAL%20HUMANITARIAN%20LAW%3B%2Cc0 (Last 
viewed 9 May 2016).   N.B.  The long URL is provided here in case the algorithm changes, it 
should be able to be  recreated with the embedded search terms. 
63 See, Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, p. 26;  
also personal communications with military lawyers. 
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divide the application of the law into periods of “war” and “peace,”64 it may make sense 
for non-specialists to conflate the “law of armed conflict” with both jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello concerns. 
Jus in bello or international humanitarian law is not merely what Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
has called “the rules of warfare pendent bello”,65 that is, “during war” or more formally 
(1) While engaged in a formal war or (2) During the course of an armed conflict.66  It 
covers peacetime obligations as well, such as the duty to disseminate the texts of the 
Geneva Convention and educate the military and civilian populations in the principles of 
jus in bello67 and the duty to determine whether a new weapon, means or method of 
warfare violates Additional Protocol I or any other applicable rule of International Law.68  
                                                 
64 See e.g. Grotius, Hugo, and Jean Barbeyrac. The Rights of War and Peace, in Three Books: 
Wherein are Explained, the Law of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points Relating to 
Government. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1738. 
65 ‘The Limits Of The Operation Of The Law Of War', H. Lauterpacht, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206 
1953, p. 211.  See also, “The dispossession of the lawful government by the invader pendente 
bello is no more than an incident of military occupation.” Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of 
States in International Law, 53 Yale L.J. 385, 412 n.63 (1944). 
66 Guide to Latin in International Law, (OUP 2009 (print edition) 2011 (online edition) Aaron X. 
Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-
9780195369380-e-1581 last visited 5 August 2014. 
67 E.g., GC I/II/III/IV, Arts. 47/48/127/144): 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the 
text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in 
particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil 
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the 
entire population" 
68 Art. 36 AP I 
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The principle characteristic of jus in bello, historically, is the contrast it makes with jus 
ad bellum. 
B. Jus ad bellum 
What of jus ad bellum? The term “jus ad bellum” does not have the same competition for 
conceptual dominance as “jus in bello” does with “law of armed conflict” or  
“international humanitarian law.”  Many would say that the jus ad bellum became largely 
jus contra bellum on or before the establishment of the U.N. Charter (with self-defence 
and action under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter as notable exceptions to the general 
rule).69  Generally, as a matter of international law, resort to armed force is forbidden70 
unless it falls within two narrow exceptions, self-defence (individual or collective)71 or 
authorization by the Security Council pursuant to a resolution under Chapter 7 authority.  
War is no longer a legal regime in the way it was before the restrictions of the 20th 
century were developed.  Instead of war representing a separate legal regime 
diametrically opposed to and hermetically sealed from the regime of peace,72 war was 
described as a factual reality—armed conflict—regulated by various bodies of law.   
                                                 
69 See e.g. Kolb, Robert. "Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello."International 
Review of the Red Cross 37.320 (1997): 553-562; Sharma, Serena K. "The Legacy of Jus Contra 
Bellum: Echoes of Pacifism in Contemporary Just War Thought." Journal of Military Ethics 8.3 
(2009): 217-230; Dinstein, Yoram. "Comments on War." Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 27 (2003): 877. 
70 See Article 2 UN Charter, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1 153 
(entered into force 24 October 1945). 
71 See ibid, Article 51  
72 See Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations (2005), at 177-196. 
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One landmark academic source on this change in the nature of war is the article by 
Hersch Lauterpacht entitled The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War.73 Published 
in 1953 and building upon “Rules of War in an Unlawful War,”74 Lauterpacht reviews 
the effect that the change in the legal nature of war has on other areas of law.  He notes 
the “basic international obligation prohibiting recourse to war as an instrument of 
national policy”75 making some wars, wars of aggression, illegal.  He explains that: 
[A]s the result of some general international treaties of a legislative 
character adopted after the First and Second World Wars, the place of 
war in the system of international law has undergone a fundamental 
change.  This is so for the reason that, in consequence of the 
successive renunciation and prohibition of war in such instruments as 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and, in particular, the Pact of 
Paris and the Charter of the United Nations, war has ceased to be a 
right which sovereign States are entitled to exercise at their unfettered 
discretion. War undertaken in violation of these enactments is an 
unlawful and criminal—and not only an immoral—act.  The true 
nature of that change has been obscured, in the popular estimation by 
the repeated violations of these undertakings in the past and the 
widely felt danger of their being disregarded in the future.76  
Lauterpacht asserts that, before the Covenant of the League of Nations, the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the Charter of the United Nations, the justice or 
                                                 
73 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206 
(1953). 
74 Hersch Lauterpacht, “Rules of War in an Unlawful War,” Law and Politics in the World 
Community 89 (Lipsky, ed., 1953). 
75 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206 
(1953), at 206. 
76 Ibid 208. 
2.  Exploration of Sister Terms  
    Jus ad bellum 
 
164 
 
legality of a war was separate from the applicability of the rules of warfare.77  He cites 
Johann Kaspar Blutschli’s Das modern kriegsrecht der zivilisierten Staaten78 for this 
preposition, quoting the following assertion: “The law of war civilizes on a fully equal 
footing both the legal and illegal war.  It is only because it ignores that distinction that it 
is in the position to secure its general application”79   This quote does establish the that 
the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello was present avant la lettre.  
Blutschli was influential scholar and co-founder of the Institute of International Law who 
sought to replace religion and ethics with positive legal norms as sources of law. 80  His 
introduction to Das modern Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt,81 addressed to Francis Lieber, stated “[m]y codification can gain authority to 
the extent that today’s civilized world recognizes in it a timely and genuine expression of 
its legal consciousness, and to the extent that the powers that be heed public opinion.”82  
                                                 
77 Ibid 210. 
78 Johann Kaspar Blutschli, Das modern kriegsrecht der zivilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt (1866). 
79 Johann Kaspar Blutschli, Das modern kriegsrecht der zivilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt (1866) at 519, as cited by Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law 
of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206 (1953), at 210. 
80 For more on Blutschli, see e.g. Betsy Baker, The ‘Civilized Nation’ in the work of Johann 
Caspar Blutschli, in Kremer, Markus, and Hans-Richard Reuter, eds. Macht und Moral: 
politisches Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Vol. 31. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 2007 at 342. 
81 Johann Kaspar Blutschli, Das modern Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt (1868). 
82 Johann Kaspar Blutschli, Das modern Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt (1868), as cited in Betsy Baker, The ‘Civilized Nation’ in the work of Johann Caspar 
Blutschli, in Kremer, Markus, and Hans-Richard Reuter, eds. Macht und Moral: politisches 
Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Vol. 31. W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 2007 at 342. 
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Blutschli’s writings were ahead of his time, dealing in part with lex lata83 and in part with 
lex ferenda.84 
Is jus ad bellum a coherent body of law?  Jus ad bellum is often referenced with various 
translations into English, from a right to wage war or right to war, to justification for use 
of force, reasons for war, prevention of war, or simply “just war theory.”  In practice, as 
with jus in bello, some rules dealing with the legality and justifications for entering into 
and participating in armed conflict that could theoretically be considered part of jus ad 
bellum are not generally considered to be part of jus ad bellum.  While United Nations 
Security Council resolutions that authorize the use of force may be considered part of the 
modern jus ad bellum calculus (in evaluating whether there has been a violation of 
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter), restrictions on action, such as resolutions 
demanding a ceasefire,85 demanding withdrawal of forces,86 or otherwise forbidding the 
use of force87 are not generally considered to be part of jus ad bellum.88  Nor are General 
Assembly resolutions condemning or restricting participation in armed conflict generally 
considered part of jus ad bellum, although arguably the “Uniting for Peace” 
                                                 
83 Law as it exists. 
84 Law as it should be. 
85 E.g. UNSC Res. 1701 (2006). 
86 E.g. UNSC Res. 1559 (2004). 
87 E.g. UNSC Res. 688 (1991). 
88 See generally, Moore, John Norton. "Jus Ad Bellum Before the International Court of 
Justice."Va. J. Int'l L. 52 (2011): 903. 
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Resolution(s)89 have been considered part of jus ad bellum.  Treaty obligations may be 
considered as part of the jus ad bellum calculations (in order to determine what qualifies 
as collective self-defence) but those treaties themselves90 are not generally considered to 
be part of jus ad bellum.  Domestic law, even domestic law imposed as a result of 
international armed conflict with the objective of preventing further international armed 
conflict such as German and Japanese law, is not generally considered part of jus ad 
bellum.  While United Nations Security Council or General Assembly authorization for 
the use of armed force may be considered part of the jus ad bellum calculus, domestic 
judicial, parliamentary, and administrative decisions authorizing participation in an 
armed conflict are generally not considered part of jus ad bellum. 
The historical background of jus ad bellum as a normative, natural law, perhaps more so 
than jus in bello, retains a clear and resounding connection between positive law and 
normative principles.  Nowhere is this truer than with the controversial subject of 
humanitarian intervention, recently reframed as the “responsibility to protect.”   Jus ad 
bellum’s historical emphasis on such factors as just cause, right intention, final resort, 
legitimate authority, proportional means, and reasonable prospect are directly replicated 
in legal and normative debates regarding humanitarian intervention.  For those 
                                                 
89 ‘Uniting for Peace’ UNGA Res 377 (V) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/1775, 10.  Since 1950, 
ten emergency special sessions have been convened in accordance with the conditions stipulated 
in UNGA Resolution 377 (V).  Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, last accessed 19 August 2014. 
90 E.g. North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) 34 UNTS 
243. 
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advocating humanitarian intervention, lawyers ought to lead towards a world order that 
can prevent atrocity crimes—with the U.N. Security Council if possible, non-violently if 
possible, but without such authorization and with force if necessary.  This is not 
necessarily calling for radical change, but rather reflects frustration with the likely 
impossibility of any profound structural change under the current U.N. Charter without 
reinterpretation, perhaps echoing Edmund Burke’s maxim—“A state without the means 
of change is without the means of its conservation.”91  If international lawyers do not 
discover a way to change the international system to prevent atrocity crimes, it is a threat 
to the conservation of the international system itself, and an abdication of duty.  If the law 
of war is at the vanishing point of international law,92 unresolved issues of preventing 
atrocity crime and the massive loss of life, using force if necessary, is at the normative 
center of international relations and foreign policy.  Jus ad bellum has not, historically, 
been purely a legal domain.  Rather, it contains a strong normative component as part of 
its basic functioning.  This remains the case with current jus ad bellum debates. 
C. Import for jus post bellum and the trichotomy 
What are the implications for jus post bellum in this analysis?  The use of the term “jus 
post bellum” inherently references jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  On a surface level, this 
might reinforce the distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum and the importance 
of equal application of the laws of armed conflict.  On a deeper level, however, the term 
                                                 
91 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790. 
92 See Lauterpacht, H, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, British Year Book of 
International Law 29 (1952) 360,  381-2. 
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“jus post bellum” may create a tension with that organizing principle.  Some influential 
jus post bellum scholars such as Brian Orend have come out directly against the 
normative distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, holding that all is lost for a 
side, normatively, that is waging war wrongly in terms of jus ad bellum.93  Brian Orend 
remains in a small minority on this point.  Nonetheless, jus post bellum will often need to 
address both the legality and norms of each side fighting at all, as well as questions of 
regarding how they fought.  Peace agreements imposed by a victorious party may accuse 
the losing party both of aggression and war crimes.  While it is possible to address issues 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello while strictly maintaining the distinction between the 
two during the transition to peace, doing so will not always be straightforward or simple.   
As discussed infra in Chapter 3 (Three Theories of Jus Post Bellum), a hybrid functional 
theory of jus post bellum includes both peacemaking and post-conflict justice.  Post-
conflict justice is broader than criminal justice, resolving group and institutional claims 
and responsibilities, and many of the issues often dealt with under the rubric of 
“transitional justice.”  (Differentiating transitional justice  and jus post bellum is the 
subject of much of Chapter 4.B.) The process of peace making, what Christine Bell calls 
the lex pacificatoria,94 inherently has to choose whether and how to address issues of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello.  The question of whether the res, the thing that is being fought 
                                                 
93 See e.g. Orend, Brian. War and international justice: A Kantian perspective. Wilfrid Laurier 
Univ. Press, 2000; Orend, Brian. The morality of war. Broadview Press, 2013. 
94 See e.g. Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria 
(Oxford University Press 2008). 
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over, has been achieved, might be both part of the peace making process and post-conflict 
justice.  Questions regarding amnesty are vital for a successful transition to peace, but the 
underlying substance of alleged violations are not jus post bellum but either jus ad bellum 
or jus in bello: for violations of the law of armed conflict, (jus in bello) for the crime of 
aggression in international armed conflicts (jus ad bellum) or for treason in a non-
international armed conflict.  Amnesties may be given recognizing that there were 
violations of jus in bello but that accountability for those violations may not be judged to 
be worth pursuing given the wish to resolve issues that drove the war (jus ad bellum) and 
thus build a just and lasting peace (jus post bellum, although some would question the 
justice of such an arrangement).  Questions of right authority, a jus ad bellum concept, 
might come in to play with early negotiations as to who can sit around the peacemaking 
table, or whether peace negotiations happen at all.   
Even without the application of international criminal law during the transition to peace, 
the questions of why the war was fought and how the war was fought will almost 
inevitably be part of the transition to peace.  While in jus in bello analysis it is possible to 
both temporally and functionally separate the analysis from jus ad bello questions, in jus 
post bellum the analysis may overlap with jus in bello temporally and connect with jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello functionally. 
While these issues can be interrelated in practice, as described in the paragraphs supra, 
this makes conceptual clarity all the more important.  That does not mean that each 
concept cannot be somewhat complicated, problematic, or historically contingent, as 
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discussed in the sections supra.  The history of jus in bello would seem to include the 
prohibition of dum dum bullets95 and efforts to ban explosives dropped from hot air 
balloons, but not necessarily efforts to limit nuclear weapons.  Modern jus ad bellum is 
generally recognized to cover the United Nations Charter prohibition on the resort to 
armed force without Security Council authorization (excepting self-defence until that 
authorization is obtained) but is not generally discussed in terms of additional restrictions 
on the use of force, whether under international or domestic law.  Jus post bellum in 
practice is even more complicated, but that does not mean that it is not coherent or 
conceptually sound. 
                                                 
95 The language of the 1899 Hague Declaration is “bullets which expand or flatten easily in the 
human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is 
pierced with incisions.”  Short title: Hague Declaration (1899); International Peace Conference 
1899,  Declaration (IV,3) concerning Expanding Bullets. The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, 
(entry into force 4 September 1900). 
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3.  Three Approaches to Jus Post Bellum 
A. Introduction 
The distinction between the overall choice to use force (jus ad bellum) and the choice of 
conduct within armed conflict (jus in bellum) is important, but that distinction does not 
contain the entire universe of questions on the principles and law governing armed 
conflict.  In Parts B, C, and D, this chapter will outline the fundamental difference 
between taking a temporal approach or a functional approach to jus post bellum, and 
emphasizes the potential of taking a hybrid functional approach that emphasizes the 
functional aspects of jus post bellum while nonetheless rooting it in a general timeline of 
transition from armed conflict to peace.  In Part E, it will discuss the functioning of jus 
post bellum as a lex specialis, and in Part F will examine the intermingling of different 
aspects of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum, as well as the co-existence of 
these concepts with other bodies of law.  Part G will map the internal workings of a 
hybrid approach to jus post bellum.   
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B. Temporal Approach 
The simplest explanation of the jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum tripartite 
division is that these areas cover the beginning, middle, and end of armed conflict.  This 
might be called a “temporal” tripartite division.  It might be thought of as a “horizontal” 
approach, where jus ad bellum covers the moment of entry into armed conflict, the jus in 
bello covers the period during armed conflict, and jus post bellum covers the period after 
armed conflict. 
Moment of entry into armed 
conflict 
Armed conflict Post-armed conflict 
Jus ad bellum 
(laws/principles that apply 
at the start) 
Jus in bello 
(laws/principles that apply 
in the middle/during) 
Jus post bellum 
(laws/principles that apply 
at the end/after) 
Caption – temporal/horizontal conception of the tripartite ad bellum/in bello/post bellum 
division 
This conception of jus post bellum needs little theorization, only a set of assumptions—
most strikingly that the temporal boundaries of armed conflict can be clearly defined in 
all cases.  It harkens back to the older conception of armed conflict as its own domain of 
law.  Linguistically, it takes its cue not from “ad bellum” or really “in bello” but from 
“post bellum” with the “post” tied to the time of application of the law, not the desired 
end result.  The logical extension of this “post bellum” approach might be to rename jus 
ad bellum to “jus ante bello” and jus in bello to “jus durante bello,” and indeed to 
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rename jus ad bellum to “jus ad bello”.  The author does not recommend this renaming, 
or this approach. 
C. Functional Approach 
An alternative approach might emphasize the function each division played in addressing 
armed conflict.   
Function Jus ad bellum (whether force may be used at all) 
 
Jus in bello (how to fight humanely) 
 
Jus post bellum (how to transition to a just and sustainable peace) 
 
Caption – functional/vertical conception of the tripartite ad bellum/in bello/post bellum 
division. 
With the functional conception, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum can 
overlap temporally.  They are not fundamentally sequential concepts.  Rather, as 
indicated in the illustration above, they are defined by what they do, not when they do it.  
It is supported by recognition by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia that once the existence of an armed conflict has been established, 
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international humanitarian law continues to apply beyond the cessation of hostilities.1  
The UN Security Council has made similar findings regarding the territories occupied by 
Israel.2  Linguistically, this focuses on the “ad bellum” and “in bello” language and sees 
“post bellum” as the telos or desired end of the law, not a description of its time of 
application. 
D. Hybrid Approach 
After introducing a purely temporal and purely functional approach, one can also readily 
describe a hybrid approach, one that takes into account both time and function.  This 
approach is most helpfully framed with respect to the concept pioneered by Johan 
Galtung,3 central to Peace Studies, of “positive peace” (as opposed to “negative peace”).  
This approach would be temporally limited.  It would likely tend to begin with negative 
peace and ends with positive peace.  This approach would also be functionally specific.  
It is focussed on the construction of positive peace within the context of a negative peace.  
Negative Peace, in this understanding, is the mere absence of armed conflict, or as 
Galtung puts it “personal violence.”4  Positive Peace, in contrast, is the absence of what 
                                                 
1 Kunarac, IT-96-23-T, Judgment of 22 Feb. 2001, at para. 414. 
2 See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolution 592 (1986). See Alexander Orakhelashvili, The 
Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, 
or Convergence? Eur J Int Law (2008) 19 (1): 161-182 at 164 doi:10.1093/ejil/chm055 
3 See e.g. Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research” (1969) 6(3) Journal of Peace 
Research 167–91. 
4 Ibid 183. 
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Galtung calls “structural violence.”5  This imagines that the end of armed conflict is neat, 
and that attempts to address “structural violence” are necessarily subsequent to the end of 
armed conflict.   
 
Time 
period 
Pre armed conflict   
 Period of armed conflict  
 Period of transition 
to peace 
 
  Post-armed conflict 
Function Jus ad bellum (why/whether to use force at all) 
 
Jus in bello (how to fight humanely) 
 
  Jus post bellum 
(how to transition 
to a just and 
sustainable peace) 
 
 
Caption – hybrid conception of the tripartite ad bellum/in bello/post bellum division, with 
the density of application changing over time but not fundamentally defined by time 
period. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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The idea of “density of application” referenced in the caption of the chart supra 
(functional/vertical conception of the tripartite ad bellum/in bello/post bellum division), is 
intended to indicate the likely force and dominance of application of each area of law at 
any particular point in time.  It also is meant as a reminder of the often chaotic, partial, 
contingent, and reversible nature of the modern transition to peace.  Rather than a 
moment akin to the “eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month” that almost 
mythologically ended the First World War,6 modern transitions to peace may involve 
splintering non-governmental actors with varying approaches, relapses to organized 
armed violence, and variations over territory—that is, the answer to the existence of an 
armed conflict may vary over time, identity of the groups, and territory.  This is not to say 
that the divisions between the existence of armed conflict and peace are not relevant.  All 
three operate differently depending on whether there is a state of armed conflict or not, 
and many actions that can be legal during armed conflict are forbidden during peacetime 
(types of killing, detention) and there are protections that exist during armed conflict and 
occupation, for example, that may not exist post-armed conflict and occupation. The 
point of the chart above is to serve as a reminder that there are aspects of each which 
apply at various points.  
 
                                                 
6 For more on the final period of the First World War, see Persico, Joseph E. Eleventh Month, 
Eleventh Day, Eleventh Hour. Random House, 2005. 
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E. Lex Specialis and Lex Generalis 
The hybrid approach referenced above works well with the idea of clarifying and 
prioritizing legal claims through the idea that lex specialis will be applied in lieu of or to 
differently interpret lex generalis.  For example, under a hybrid approach, most 
battlefield decisions will be governed by jus in bello, but there may be situations where 
jus post bellum would constitute lex specialis.  This could occur for example when the 
possibility of the return to a just and sustainable peace may be radically changed by what 
might be otherwise legitimate conduct under jus in bello. 
Milanovic describes three conceptions of lex specialis: “as a rule of total displacement; as 
a rule of partial displacement or norm conflict resolution; and as a mere interpretive tool 
or rule of norm conflict avoidance. 7  This mechanism helps to resolve potential 
fragmentation and conflict between different areas of law.  Lex specialis as total 
displacement is a functional repetition of the classical divide between the law of war and 
the law of peace—a divide that applied to all of international law.8  This position has 
                                                 
7 Milanovic, Marko, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (July 9, 2014). Theoretical Boundaries of 
Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Jens David Ohlin ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming, at 24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957; see generally  Marko 
Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application Of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, And Policy 
(2011). 
8 Milanovic, Marko, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (July 9, 2014). Theoretical Boundaries of 
Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Jens David Ohlin ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming, at 24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957; see Stephen Neff, 
War and the Law of Nations: A General History (2005), at 178. 
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been rejected since the Second World War. 9   Lex specialis as partial displacement 
indicates that where a norm conflict is unavoidable, the conflict would be resolved by 
displacing or qualifying the lex generalis to the extent required to resolve the conflict.10  
This rests on the premise that states, when authoring laws, could not have intended to 
legislate hierarchically equal laws that are contradictory.  Lex specialis as interpretation 
does not try to resolve a norm conflict so much as avoid it, essentially an articulation of 
the principle that that in interpreting treaties one takes into account other relevant rules of 
international law between parties.11 
F. Interplay 
This interplay of what are normally seen as different bodies of law within specialist legal 
texts (on children, international criminal law, victims, persons with disabilities) should 
not threaten the coherence of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, rather it extends and clarifies both bodies of law on specific subjects (children, 
victims, persons with disabilities) and functionalities (the determination of international 
criminal responsibility before the International Criminal Court).  Hopefully, the 
                                                 
9 Art 3. ILC Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties, UN Doc. A/66/10, para. 
100 (the “existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of 
treaties: (a) as between States parties to the conflict; (b) as between a State party to the conflict 
and a State that is not.”); ibid para 101. 
10 Milanovic, Marko, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (July 9, 2014). THEORETICAL 
BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Jens David Ohlin ed., 
Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming, at 27. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957. 
11 Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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determination that aspects of jus post bellum can be found not within a discrete corpus of 
jus post bellum treaties but rather within existing legal thinking about the transition to 
peace will also not be seen as fatal for the legitimacy of jus post bellum as an 
intellectually coherent body of laws and principles.  Jus post bellum must not only be 
distinguished from jus in bello and jus ad bellum, it must also find its place alongside 
other coherent but related bodies of law such as human rights law, refugee/asylum law, 
environmental law, investment law, and property law. 
It might be helpful to imagine an act that implicated jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus 
post bellum at once, in order to explain the difference in application of each area of law 
and normative principles.  Imagine that the first act that began an armed conflict was a 
bombing campaign that used cluster munitions that left high levels of unexploded 
ordinance.  The question of whether resort to the use of force was legal at all is a jus ad 
bellum question, answerable by reference to the United Nations Charter, any relevant 
Security Council resolutions, and perhaps customary law regarding self-defence against 
an imminent attack.  In order to determine whether (or which) violations of jus in bello 
occurred, one would have to consider classic questions of targeting, proportionality, and 
military necessity, the applicability of both treaty (e.g. Geneva Convention IV, the 
relevant Additional Protocol, as well as potentially 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol on explosive remnants of war,12 and the 
                                                 
12 Protocol V (2003) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
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2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions13) and customary law.  The question of whether 
the act could also be restricted on the basis that it would make the transition to peace 
unjustifiably difficult pursuant to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
may also be considered a jus post bellum question,14 and the resolution of the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello violations may require jus post bellum practice in order to 
determine accountability for the act, and build a just and sustainable peace.   
The example above could be extended further to see how a single act could implicate 
multiple areas of law without necessarily confusing their application or resulting in legal 
fragmentation.  Environmental damage might violate environmental law.  The treatment 
of refugees created from the attack would be governed by refugee/asylum law.  The 
human rights of those affected by the attack, now and in the future, would implicate 
international human rights law under the approach taken by the Human Rights 
Committee with respect to human rights during armed conflict.15   
                                                 
13 Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) 
14 The CCW is the first treaty to address the post-conflict dangers of the explosive remnants of 
war.  http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/weapons/overview-weapons.htm 
15 See e.g., Schabas, William A. "Lex Specialis-Belt and Suspenders-the Parallel Operation of 
Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum." Isr. 
L. Rev. 40 (2007): 592; Droege, Cordula. "Interplay between International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, The." Isr. L. Rev. 40 
(2007): 310; Orakhelashvili, Alexander. "The interaction between human rights and humanitarian 
law: fragmentation, conflict, parallelism, or convergence?." European Journal of International 
Law 19.1 (2008): 161-182; Cassimatis, Anthony E. "International humanitarian law, international 
human rights law, and fragmentation of international law." International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 56.03 (2007): 623-639. 
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G. Hybrid approach to jus post bellum 
What does the hybrid approach to jus post bellum mean for jus post bellum itself, as 
opposed to how jus post bellum relates to jus ad bellum and jus in bello?  What would a 
hybrid jus post bellum look like, particularly in comparison with a temporal jus post 
bellum?  It helps to think of at least two large subcategories of jus post bellum: the law of 
ending the armed conflict (which may be termed jus terminatio16 or, following Christine 
Bell, lex pacificatoria17) and post-conflict justice and post-conflict peacebuilding.   
                                                 
16 The primary contemporary promoter and theorizer of this term is David Rodin.  See  Rodin, 
David. “Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the Liability of Soldiers 
for Crimes of Aggression.” Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to 
Peace.  Ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 53-62; 
Rodin, David. "Ending war." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03 (2011): 359-367; Rodin, 
David. "The War Trap: Dilemmas of jus terminatio." Ethics 125.3 (2015): 674-695.  (N.b. he 
does not use the term “jus terminationis”). 
17 See e.g. Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria 
(Oxford University Press 2008). 
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Under a temporal framework, these two would be neatly divided, as neatly as a 
hypothesized divide between war and peace.  Graphically, it might be depicted as 
follows: 
Armed conflict Post-armed conflict/early 
peace 
Stabilized peace 
Jus terminatio/lex 
pacificatoria 
(law/principles that applies 
before the armed conflict 
ends to the termination of 
armed conflict) 
Post-conflict justice and 
peacebuilding 
(law/principles that applies 
after the armed conflict 
ends during early peace.  
Many of the practices 
included under the rubric of 
“Transitional Justice” may 
happen here, primarily.) 
“normal law”/jus pacis 
 
(law that applies after the 
transition to peace is 
stabilized) 
Caption – temporal/horizontal conception of the tripartite division of jus post bellum 
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A more sophisticated hybrid approach might emphasize the function each subcomponent 
within jus post bellum played in addressing the transition to a just and sustainable peace.   
Armed conflict Post-armed conflict/early 
peace 
Stabilized peace 
Jus terminatio/lex pacificatoria 
(law/principles that applies primarily to the termination of 
armed conflict and laying the initial foundation of a just 
and sustainable peace.) 
 
 
Post-conflict justice and peacebuilding 
(law/principles that applies primarily to the building of 
peace and resolving justice issues from the armed conflict.  
Many of the practices included under the rubric of 
“Transitional Justice” may happen here, primarily.) 
 
 
“normal law” 
(law that applies to matters primarily unrelated to war ) 
 
Caption – hybrid conception of the jus post bellum, with the density of application likely 
to change over time but not fundamentally defined by time period. 
It is worth noting the change in language as well as the change in structure in the two 
charts above.  Under the temporal conception, jus terminatio/lex pacificatoria could be 
described as the “law and principles that apply before the armed conflict ends to the 
termination of armed conflict.”  Under the hybrid conception, jus terminatio/lex 
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pacificatoria could be described as the “law and principles that apply primarily to the 
termination of armed conflict and laying the initial foundation of a just and sustainable 
peace.”  The title is the same, but the definition switches from a temporal focus (defined 
by when it applies) to a functional focus (defined by what it does) applied with sensitivity 
as to the timeline of armed conflict (thus hybrid).  Under the hybrid approach, jus 
terminatio/lex pacificatoria applies to all stages of the negotiation and implementation of 
peace agreements, including initial framework discussions before any peace agreement is 
reached and implementation agreements after the armed conflict has technically ended.   
Under the temporal conception, post-conflict justice and peacebuilding could be 
described as the “law and principles that apply after the armed conflict ends and during 
early peace.”  Under the hybrid conception, post-conflict justice and peacebuilding could 
be described as the “law and principles that apply primarily to the building of peace and 
resolving justice issues from the armed conflict.”  Under either conception, many of the 
practices sometimes included under the rubric of “Transitional Justice” may happen as 
part of post-conflict justice, including criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations programs, gender justice programs, security system reform, “DDR” 
(disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), memorialization,18 vetting (also known 
as “lustration,” “screening,” “administrative justice,” and “purging”)19 and education.20  
                                                 
18 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
19 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (eds), Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public 
Employees in Transitional Societies (Social Science Research Council 2007). 
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(For more explaining the difference between Transitional Justice and jus post bellum, 
properly conceived, see Chapter 4.B, infra.) 
The hybrid approach to jus post bellum allows an exploration of the interaction between 
temporally overlapping jus terminatio/lex pacificatoria and post-conflict 
justice/peacebuilding efforts.  While criminal prosecutions, for example, typically happen 
after armed conflict has terminated, there is no requirement for that to occur,21 and indeed 
criminal prosecutions are sometimes justified on the basis that they will serve to build the 
peace through incapacitation and deterrence.22  Disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration may happen after the conflict has ended, but in certain countries such as 
Uganda, may be an ongoing effort even before the conflict is ended or pushed into other 
countries.  This hybrid approach allows the concept of jus post bellum to have a much 
greater utility, encouraging an exploration of the entire transformation from armed 
conflict to peace, in all its variety and complexity. 
It is important to note that this hybrid approach works whether jus post bellum is 
operating as a body of laws and principles, an interpretive tool, or as a framework.  As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See e.g. Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou, “Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching 
History in Societies emerging from Violent Conflict” (United States Institute for Peace 2006) 2 
(“History education should be understood as an integral but underutilized part of Transitional 
Justice and social reconstruction”). 
21 See, for example, the initial prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 
22 For an interesting compilation of material on the question of the effect of criminal prosecutions 
on peace, see Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace 
(2009)  http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf last visited 15 July 
2014. 
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body of laws and principles, jus post bellum includes all of the items evaluated infra in 
the chart of relevant laws and norms.   
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General/ 
Global 
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as 
applied to Peace Treaties/Customary Law of 
Treaties 
• Customary international law of state recognition 
• Customary international law of government 
recognition 
• Treaty and customary international law regarding 
amnesty and the responsibility to prosecute 
alleged perpetration of certain crimes 
• Recognition of states and governments by global 
international organizations 
•  
• UNSC Resolution 1325 
• Customary international 
law on post-conflict 
administration 
• Global judicial bodies 
jurisprudence relating to 
jus post bellum 
• Customary international 
law of occupation 
• Customary international 
law of state responsibility, 
particularly with regards to 
new states 
• Customary international 
law on reparations 
• Global peacekeeping 
norms 
Midrange/ 
Regional 
• Recognition of states and governments by 
regional international organizations 
• Multilateral negotiations regarding issues related 
to jus post bellum 
• Regional positions regarding amnesty and 
individual criminal responsibility (e.g. African 
Union positions on al Bashir) 
•  
• Regional judicial bodies 
jurisprudence relating to 
jus post bellum 
• Multilateral disarmament 
treaties, including 
verification 
• Regional peacekeeping 
efforts 
• Atypical “wars” (e.g. war 
on terror) 
 
Specific/ 
Local 
• Bilateral regarding issues related to jus post 
bellum Specific amnesties 
• Specific state recognition 
• Specific government recognition 
• Intrastate/domestic negotiations 
• Specific disarmament/ 
demobilization/ 
reintegration efforts, 
including verification 
• Domestic judicial bodies 
jurisprudence relating to 
jus post bellum 
• Particular reparation  
• State practice regarding 
state responsibility 
• State practice regarding 
occupation 
• Particular occupation 
• Specific peacekeeping 
 Procedural Mixed Substantive 
Caption: Schematic depiction of law and norms regarding the transition to peace  
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This schematic will be used as a useful guide, connective tissue and leitmotif in various 
points throughout the thesis.  It is not intended to be an exhaustive inventory, but rather to 
guide the reader through the diverse contents of jus post bellum as the issue is approached 
through a variety of perspectives.  As an interpretive tool, current laws can be interpreted 
with the goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace in mind.  As a framework, it can 
help order competing norms and laws to prioritize the successful transition to jus post 
bellum.   
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    The Existing Matrix of Definitions: A review of contemporary scholarship 
 
189 
 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage 
A. The Existing Matrix of Definitions: A review of contemporary scholarship  
1. Introduction 
What is “jus post bellum”?  Jus post bellum is often described in shorthand as “law after 
war” or “the law of transition from war to peace.”  This chapter addresses the question of 
jus post bellum’s meaning in scholarship.  Supplementing this empirical analysis, this 
chapter takes a comparative look specifically at the temporal dimension of jus post 
bellum, Transitional Justice, and International Criminal Law.  Together, these analyses 
provide a clearer picture of what “jus post bellum” means for those who use term.  The 
picture is not simple.  But without oversimplifying, it can be made more comprehensible.  
This chapter clarifies not only current usage, but also identifies the problems that scholars 
and practitioners are addressing when identifying laws and principles under the rubric of 
jus post bellum.   
In many respects, the definition of jus post bellum is clear.  To those familiar with the 
terms, jus post bellum is obviously tied to jus ad bellum and jus in bello, traditional 
categories of international law dealing with armed force and more broadly the norms of 
the just war tradition.  Jus ad bellum
1 seeks to limit resort to the use of force between states.  Jus in bello seeks to limit the 
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suffering caused by war.2  Again, jus post bellum is often described in shorthand as “law 
after war” or “the law of transition from war to peace.”  It is seen as completing the 
effort, begun with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, to apply law and norms to the difficult 
area of armed conflict. Jus post bellum can be clearly distinguished on a number of levels 
from similar terms such as “Transitional Justice.”  Transitional Justice can be usefully 
defined as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes.”3  The concept of Transitional Justice emerged organically from the intense 
focus on transitions to democracy from the 1970s through the 1990s.  The post-Cold War 
questions of transformative occupation, peacebuilding, and international territorial 
administration set the frame for jus post bellum.  The content of jus post bellum can be 
usefully plotted in a matrix, ranging from laws and norms that are more substantive to 
more procedural in nature, and from more local to more global. This matrix has already 
been employed in Chapter 3.H. to orient the reader, and should provide continuity in this 
section as well. 
In at least one key aspect, however, the definition of jus post bellum is unsettled.  That 
respect has to do with the relative importance or unimportance of fixing the definition by 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  Some prefer (or use as an equivalent) the term jus contra bellum, law against war/armed 
conflict. 
2  See e.g. IHL and other legal regimes – jus ad bellum and jus in bello available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-
bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm last viewed 17 October 2012. 
3  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Geneology, 16 Harvard Human Rights J., Spring 2003, 
p. 69  (internal citations omitted). 
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using a timeline with sharp divisions marking the end of armed conflict, which this 
chapter refers to as the “temporal aspect” or “temporal dimension” of jus post bellum.  
The temporal aspect of jus post bellum is not a mere technical concern.  When analyzed 
properly, the question “what is ‘jus post bellum’” ultimately brings us to the question: 
“Why use the term ‘jus post bellum?’”  It brings those interested in the subject of jus post 
bellum to the question of what, if anything, we are trying to accomplish. 
This work responds to these questions, albeit in a manner that seeks to open further 
avenues for research rather than close the questions with a “definitive” answer.  The short 
definitions given above, “law after war” or “the laws of transition from war to peace” 
turn out to contain important differences.  “Law after war” implies a timeline with a sharp 
division marking the end of war (or to use the more commonly used and more useful term 
for modern practitioners, armed conflict).  In contrast, the “laws of transition from armed 
conflict to peace” language does not depend on any clean division between periods of 
armed conflict and peace, sitting more comfortably with a status mixtus,4 or a period in 
which armed conflict starts and stops before resolving into a sustainable peace.  Without 
clarifying this divide, the status of critical subject areas (such as peace negotiations and 
agreements that can occur before peace is established, belligerent occupation, counter-
insurgency, and laws applying to non-state actors) remains unclear, as they may or may 
not fall under jus post bellum.   
                                                 
4  See Schwarzenberger, Georg, Jus pacis ac belli? Prolegomena to a sociology of 
International Law, 37 Am. J. Int’l L. 460 (1943), 470. 
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Identifying that jus post bellum does not have a single, consolidated definition but rather 
a matrix of definitions that have changed over time is a critical step if that matrix of 
definitions is to be properly analyzed.  What follows is an assessment of this matrix. The 
empirical section focuses on the temporal-functional dichotomy within the body of work 
addressing jus post bellum.  In addition to looking at usage from within the limited corpus 
of work using of one phrase (“jus post bellum”), it is helpful to look at usage from 
without—that is, in comparative perspective.  By looking at the scholarship on jus post 
bellum from the “inside” and the “outside”, empirically and comparatively, the definition 
of jus post bellum is clarified.   
2. Identifying the Definitional Dichotomy — Functional vs. 
Temporal 
This subject has been treated in more detail on a theoretical level supra.  Here, the 
methodology of evaluating contemporary scholarship is reviewed.  Emphasis on the 
functional-temporal dichotomy was not something arrived at a priori, as it were, but 
rather through observations of the literature by the author.  It appeared that there was a 
divide emerging without any clear awareness by legal scholars of that split.  The divide is 
between those who placed their primary definitional emphasis on the body of laws and 
norms bounded by time (a temporal emphasis) and those who placed their primary 
definitional emphasis on the body of laws and norms oriented around the function of 
transitioning from armed conflict to peace (a functional emphasis).  The author hoped to 
verify the existence of and clarify the nature of that divide.  The hybrid functional 
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approach outlined in this work supra, namely, one that emphasizes the functional aspects 
of jus post bellum (establishing a just and lasting peace) while nonetheless rooting it in a 
general timeline of transition from armed conflict to peace, is an attempt to recognize this 
dichotomy and to the degree possible achieve synthesis.   
An example may be helpful to dramatize the difference between the two approaches.  
Imagine a targeting decision during an armed conflict.  A military target is within or 
proximate to an important cultural site in a manner such that attacking the target would 
destroy the cultural site.  There is existing law on the legality of such an attack, but it is 
unclear whether jus post bellum would have anything to say about the question.  A 
temporal emphasis would clearly rule out jus post bellum playing a role.  Under a 
temporal emphasis, the armed conflict is ongoing, so jus post bellum has not begun.  A 
hybrid functional emphasis may allow jus post bellum to speak, even (or especially) if the 
temporal context is taken into account.  Specifically, if avoiding the destruction of the 
cultural site is particularly important for the process of eventually establishing a 
sustainable peace, then the norms of a functionally-focused jus post bellum are 
implicated.  While the normal application of jus in bello principles of proportionality and 
distinction might permit destruction of a cultural site in some instances, the simultaneous 
application of jus post bellum principles, either as a second-order method of 
interpretation (giving more substantive meaning to the principle of proportionality) or as 
a first-order application of discrete rules, might forbid the destruction of the site.   
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Proportionality in targeting is actually a notoriously difficult area to operationalize given 
that it involves a comparison between military advantage and the inherent value of 
protected persons and objects.  By emphasizing the weight given to protected objects if 
their preservation increases the likelihood of the eventual construction of a just and 
sustainable peace, legal certainty may be increased in targeting decisions that are of 
colorable illegality.  This does not necessarily create more legal uncertainty, given that it 
may move a marginal targeting decision from uncertain legality (given the 
amorphousness of jus in bello proportionality calculations) to fairly certain illegality, but 
it does potentially make the process of evaluating a target more complex. 
The unclear definition of jus post bellum might be described as its original sin.  Take the 
following quote from Brian Orend’s foundational essay, Jus Post Bellum. 
It seems, then, that just war theorists must consider the justice not only of the 
resort to war in the first place, and not only of the conduct within war, once it 
has begun, but also of the termination phase of the war, in terms of the cessation 
of hostilities and the move back from war to peace. It seems, in short, that we 
also need to detail a set of just war norms or rules for what we might call jus 
post bellum: justice after war.5 
On one hand, Orend refers to the termination phase of the war and the move back from 
war to peace.  On the other hand, he speaks of “justice after war,” which taken literally, 
would not obviously include the termination of phase of the war and the move back from 
war to peace.  This ambiguity has been there from the beginning. 
                                                 
5  Orend, Brian, Jus Post Bellum, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 31 No. 1, Spring 
2000, 117–137.  
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Many of the works analyzed for this chapter are only ambiguously categorizable as using 
a temporal or functional definition of jus post bellum.  Some are not categorizable one 
way or another.  No work represents a Weberian “ideal type” of self-consciously using a 
temporal or functional definition of jus post bellum.  Thus, it might be helpful to provide 
an ideal type of an article that exemplifies adopting one definition and rejecting another. 
The “ideal type” of a work adopting a temporal definition of jus post bellum would have 
the following characteristics.  It would discuss jus post bellum as “law after war” or 
something similar.  It would indicate that the term applied when, and only when, armed 
conflict had ceased.  It would effectively be discussing the law that applied during “early 
peace.”  There would be little or no emphasis on the function of the area of law.  The 
focus would be on what happens “after war/armed conflict,” or “in the aftermath of 
war/armed conflict.”  The areas of law and practice focused on in such an article would 
deal with implementing peace treaties and agreements6 during peacetime, but not the 
negotiation of peace agreements or the peace agreements themselves.  Peace-time 
peacebuilding would be emphasized, but not peacekeeping amidst intermittent conflict.  
Environmental law would not be subject to jus post bellum principles until after armed 
conflict had ended.  The law regarding belligerent occupation would not be subject to jus 
post bellum principles until after the armed conflict had ended.  Similarly, concerns 
regarding counter-insurgency in a status mixtus or intermittent conflict would not be 
                                                 
6  Hereinafter, this chapter will merely reference “peace agreements” instead of “peace 
treaties and peace agreements” under the rationale that peace treaties can be thought of as a 
specific subset of peace agreements, specifically those that relate to agreements between states. 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    The Existing Matrix of Definitions: A review of contemporary scholarship 
 
196 
 
addressed.  Law relating to non-state actors would only apply if the armed conflict had 
ceased. Such an article would not envisage jus post bellum dealing with the entire 
transition from armed conflict to a sustainable peace.   
The “ideal type” of a work adopting a functional definition of jus post bellum would have 
the following characteristics.  It would discuss jus post bellum as the body of law 
applying to the “transition to peace” or something similar. It would focus on whether the 
law was intended to or had an important role in transitioning from armed conflict to a 
sustainable peace.  It would include laws that applied during armed conflict if they played 
that function.   It may not include laws that happen to occur shortly after armed conflict 
ends if they do not focus on or contribute to the transition to a sustainable peace.  It 
would conceive of jus post bellum as including the entire process of negotiating, agreeing 
to, implementing, and modifying peace agreements.  Peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
would be included.  Environmental law and the protection of cultural goods could apply 
during armed conflict if they substantially related to the transition to a sustainable peace.  
The questions of belligerent occupation and the question of transformative occupation 
would be squarely addressed.  The work would explicitly consider jus post bellum in a 
status mixtus or a situation of intermittent conflict.  It could apply to law applying to non-
state actors if it was part of the law of transition to a just and sustainable peace.  It would 
not place primary emphasis on the moment of ending armed conflict. 
Both the temporal and functional approaches involve an analysis very cognizant of the 
passage of time.  While the functional approach is not as focused on fixing the moment 
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when war ends, it is still very focused on the forward progression of events—a transition 
towards a sustainable peace.  With the functional approach, the focus is forward looking, 
as with the post bellum being an aspiration of the jus, rather than a description of it.  The 
purpose or telos of the law—post bellum—is embedded in the name, under the functional 
approach.  It is unclear if the temporal approach has the same sort of internal purpose, 
although perhaps simply establishing the law during early peace is purpose enough.   
The works analyzed in this chapter provides real-world examples of what these 
definitions look like in practice.  They do not resemble exhaustive checklists, but they 
will provide meat for the theoretical bones provided by the above ideal types.  For 
example, take Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum by 
Kristen E. Boon (2009).7 This work indicates that there is no clear temporal division 
between war and peace.  Boon states “Yet with the exception of the law of belligerent 
occupation, neither jus ad bellum nor jus in bello provide much guidance on temporary 
interventions after war and before peace.”8  This understanding pushes against a simple 
temporal definition, starting with the end of armed conflict.  The focus is on the process 
of transitioning out of armed conflict into peace.   
The reason for the focus on the temporal-functional dichotomy is because it is not only 
one of the most important divides in the conception of jus post bellum, but also because it 
                                                 
7  Boon, Kristen E., Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum 
(June, 29 2009). Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 
2, 2008.  
8  Ibid 102.  
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is one of the least well understood.  There is no published literature squarely addressing 
the dichotomy, although it is hinted at through much of the literature, as evidenced by the 
empirical analysis below.  By addressing the dichotomy, the author addresses a number 
of problems: the problem the dichotomy holds to the discourse/interpretive community 
concerned with jus post bellum; the problem the dichotomy holds as a matter of law; and 
the problem the dichotomy holds for research. 
3. Problems of the Dichotomy 
a.  The problem as a discourse community or interpretive community 
Erik Borg contrasted the terms “discourse community” and “interpretive community” as 
follows: 
We do not generally use language to communicate with the world at large, but 
with individuals or groups of individuals.  As in life, for discussion and 
analysis in applied linguistics these groups are gathered into communities.  
One such grouping that is widely used to analyse written communication is 
discourse community.  John Swales, an influential analyst of written 
communication, described discourse communities as groups that have goals or 
purposes, and use communication to achieve these goals.  […] ‘Interpretive 
community’ (Fish 1980), on the other hand, refers not to a gathering of 
individuals, but to an open network of people who share ways of reading 
texts[…] [U]nlike an interpretive community, members of a discourse 
community actively share goals and communicate with other members to 
pursue those goals.9   
                                                 
9  Borg, Erik, Discourse Community, ELT Journal, Volume 57/4, October 2003, Oxford 
University Press, p. 398. 
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If people use multiple definitions of the same term, particularly without realizing it, the 
clarity of their communications lessens.  This is true in an interpretive community or a 
discourse community.  If asked (and the terms were defined), some groups scholars and 
practitioners using the term jus post bellum might categorize themselves as part of the 
interpretive community, others might call themselves part of a discourse community.  
The functional-temporal dichotomy is a particular problem for a discourse community.  If 
a discourse community cannot agree on fundamental aspects of the central concept of 
their community, not only will they be unable to communicate clearly, but they will also 
be unable to agree on the goals they should actively share. 
b.  The problem as law 
Ambiguity in definitions can be a problem with any interpretive community or discourse 
community.  The author suggests it is a particular problem when the community centers 
on legal issues.  From an normative point of view, legal ambiguity can mean an arbitrary 
and counter-normative application of law.10  From an analytical point of view, the 
ambiguity with respect to an area of law may prevent particular potentially legal rules 
from being recognized as law and thus objectively fail to be, objectively, law.11 
                                                 
10  See generally e.g., Schauer, Frederick F.,  Playing by the rules: a philosophical 
examination of rule-based decision-making in law and in life (1991) Oxford University Press. 
11  On the idea of the “rule of recognition,” see Hart, H.L.A., The concept of law, 1961, 
Oxford University Press. 
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c.  The problem for research 
What would be helpful for a researcher trying to map this definitional dichotomy would 
be a database containing sample sets of available research on the issue that have been 
analyzed to see how the term jus post bellum is used in contemporary literature.  As no 
such database existed, the author has created such a database.  The database contains both 
the actual research literature (the text of the articles) and metadata describing that 
literature.  The database was developed with the assistance of the Living Lab Project at 
Leiden University and is hosted online using a Virtual Research Environment platform.12  
More about the database will be explained in Annex A.   
There are, of course, potential opportunities for the practitioners or experts in a term with 
an amorphous definition.   One can look to the term “Transitional Justice” as an example 
of this phenomenon.  Transitional Justice practitioners have arguably been able to expand 
the portfolio of their work over time as their underlying concept became broader and less 
defined.  In fact, “Transitional Justice” has been redefined by some to include not only 
“the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by 
legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes,”13 but 
also “transitions from war to peace,” which is a fundamentally different concept—one 
which threatens to confuse Transitional Justice with jus post bellum, particularly if the 
                                                 
12  The database is currently hosted at 
https://vre.leidenuniv.nl/vre/jpb/definitions/default.aspx.  For full access, please see the author. 
13  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Geneology, 16 Harvard Human Rights J., Spring 2003, 
p. 69  (internal citations omitted). 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    The Existing Matrix of Definitions: A review of contemporary scholarship 
 
201 
 
contrast in temporal aspects remain unexamined.  There is as yet no published systematic 
analysis of the temporal aspect of Transitional Justice or jus post bellum, so clarifying 
this critical aspect remains crucial.  Accordingly, Part IV provides a systematic analysis 
of the temporal aspect of these two concepts, and tries to draw overall conclusions for the 
better understanding when two possible understandings are proffered. 
4. Importance  
As stated before, when analyzed properly, the question “what is ‘jus post bellum’” 
ultimately brings us to the question: “Why use the term ‘jus post bellum?’”  It brings 
those interested in the subject of jus post bellum to the question of what, if anything, we 
are trying to accomplish.  
It may be that we are merely attempting to describe what law applies at a certain time 
period during early peace.  An alternative effort would be to describe both the lex lata 
and the lex ferenda with respect to the function of establishing a sustainable peace.  If the 
underlying goal is to establish a sustainable peace after armed conflict, then ignoring or 
diminishing the laws that apply to efforts to establish a sustainable peace during armed 
conflict will leave an incomplete area of law.  It is possible, however, that in searching 
for completeness, clarity (or at least simplicity) will suffer. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
For a granular analysis of the works analysed, please see Annex A.  The summary results 
are as follows.  There has been a steady expansion of references to jus post bellum in a 
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variety of journals.  With the expansion of references, there has been an increase of 
ambiguity, not a consolidation around a consensus definition.  The trend in the less-
legally focused dataset (SSRN articles) is away from an emphasis on functional aspects 
and towards temporal aspects.  The overall trend is hard to discern, but for articles with 
more than a glancing reference to jus post bellum there seems to be an arc that went from 
a functional definition, towards, a temporal definition, and with a renewed legal interest 
back towards a more functional definition.  Whether a consensus will be achieved, and 
what that consensus might be, is as yet unclear.  Again, for a full analysis of the empirical 
data gathered, please see Annex A.   
The question asked influences the truth found.  By emphasizing the question of the goal 
of the discourse around the term “jus post bellum”, a functional definition may already be 
framed in a more flattering light.  A functional definition, giving jus post bellum a telos 
or ultimate object, naturally answers the question of the goal of jus post bellum discourse 
more clearly than a temporal definition.   
Another way to phrase the question is whether jus post bellum is essentially a nominal 
idea.  That is, is jus post bellum simply old wine in a new bottle, a new collection of old 
concepts, or a branding exercise?14  None of these ways of describing a nominal idea is 
inherently negative, but neither are they particularly inspiring.  Fundamentally, if the 
                                                 
14 Österdahl, Inger, and Esther Van Zadel. "What will jus post bellum mean? Of new wine and 
old bottles." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 14.2 (2009): 175-207. 
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transition from armed conflict to a sustainable peace is a worthwhile goal, then there is an 
opportunity cost if jus post bellum could focus explicitly on that goal but does not. 
There are a great number of terms used by scholars and practitioners that mean something 
along the lines of jus post bellum: including “post-conflict justice,” peacekeeping, or an 
(in the author’s opinion) overly broad definition of Transitional Justice.  The relatively 
obvious virtue of using the term jus post bellum is that it brings jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello to mind.  It invites those grappling with the difficulties of establishing a sustainable 
peace to integrate their conceptual framework into the larger just war tradition.  It invites 
those familiar with the law of armed conflict and norms on aggression to consider the 
return to peace from the beginning.   
It is worth responding to the suggestion that the entire body of law applying to the 
transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace in parts, with for example the part 
during armed conflict discussed under one rubric and the part in early peace under the 
rubric of jus post bellum.  This, for example, is the approach of David Rodin, who 
suggests the term jus terminatio (or Termination Law) for the law of ending armed 
conflict and suggests limiting the term of jus post bellum to the obligations of combatants 
after war.15  With respect, the author finds this approach lacking.  While it may be useful 
to discuss jus terminatio as part of a broader jus post bellum, dividing the law into the law 
                                                 
15  See Rodin, David. “Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the 
Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression.” Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition 
from Conflict to Peace.  Ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 
2008), 53-62; Rodin, David. "Ending war." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03 (2011): 359-367; 
Rodin, David. "The War Trap: Dilemmas of jus terminatio." Ethics 125.3 (2015): 674-695. 
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of ending armed conflict and the law of obligations of combatants after war does not 
cover the entire process of transition to a sustainable peace.  It does not work well with 
Christine Bell’s conception of a lex pacificatoria16 or law of peacemakers, which bridges 
the various types of peace agreements, including post-conflict implementation 
agreements.  Rodin’s lex terminatio would presumably stop in the midst of the lex 
pacificatoria, with a different framework for different peace agreements.  Rodin’s jus 
post bellum would not cover any law dealing with non-combatant obligations, for 
example.  It certainly would not help to inform the question of choices during armed 
conflict that would make a sustainable peace more difficult to achieve—as in the example 
of bombing a cultural monument occupied by an enemy force given earlier in this article.  
It is also worth responding to the argument that a hybrid functional approach lessens the 
clarity of the concept.  The temporal approach may appear at first glance to be clearer 
conceptually, a binary application—either on or off—depending on whether the armed 
conflict has ended or not .  In reality, because the reality of a status mixtus is messy, the 
apparent conceptual clarity of the temporal approach is likely to be illusory in practice.  
Particularly in the context of counter-insurgency, non-state actors, factions, and low-level 
conflicts, evaluating whether armed conflict has ended or not is neither simple, nor 
final—the transition to a sustainable peace can be uncertain and uneven over time and 
geography and across groups.  In addition to not necessarily being clearer to apply in 
practice, the temporal approach lessens the power of the concept and limits the problems 
                                                 
16  Bell, Christine, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, p. 407. 
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it can address.  The hybrid functional approach, focusing on the full process of transition 
to a sustainable peace, is more likely to comprehensively and successfully address the 
problems of that transition. 
B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice  
1. Introduction 
In the Introduction to this work and in Chapter 3 (Three Theories of Jus Post Bellum) 
supra, a hybrid functional approach to jus post bellum is propounded that serves the 
function of organizing the effort to transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable 
peace while retaining an awareness of temporal context.17  Functional subcomponents of 
this effort were identified as peacemaking or lex pacificatoria and post-conflict justice.  
A major component of post-conflict justice is international criminal law, but there are 
also aspects to post-conflict justice that are often described under the rubric of 
transitional justice.  Yet jus post bellum, and transitional justice are separate concepts.  
For the benefit of both ideas, it is extremely important to clarify the distinctions and 
interactions between them.   
Ninety years ago, even amongst the invisible college of international law scholars, the 
phrases “Transitional Justice” and “jus post bellum” would have been met with 
                                                 
17 This sub-chapter builds upon Iverson, Jens. "Contrasting the Normative and Historical 
Foundations of Transitional Justice and Jus Post Bellum: Outlining the Matrix of Definitions in 
Comparative Perspective”: 80-101." Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations. New 
York: OUP (2014); and Iverson, Jens. "Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum and International 
Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics. "International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 7.3 (2013): 413-433. 
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uncertainty. The terms were unknown. Perhaps more surprisingly, jus post bellum’s sister 
terms “jus ad bellum” and “jus in bello,” now enshrined as central and seemingly 
immovable pillars of the law of armed conflict, would also have prompted few knowing 
nods of recognition, only blank stares.18 Academic neoterisms—innovations in language 
such as a new word or term—can tell us something about the historical moment of their 
origin, and the tradition within which they emerge. The focus on jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello after the horrors of the First World War is hardly surprising. The concept of 
Transitional Justice emerged organically from the intense focus on transitions to 
democracy from the 1970s through the 1990s. The post-Cold War questions of 
transformative occupation, peacebuilding, and international territorial administration set 
the frame for jus post bellum.   
It is impossible to tell whether Transitional Justice and jus post bellum will seize the 
collective imagination of those who concern themselves with international law in an 
enduring manner, or whether these concepts will quickly fade. The longevity of a term 
depends largely on how that term may be used in unknowable, future contexts. But it also 
may depend at least in part on the internal coherence of the body of concepts referenced 
by the term, and whether this coherence is maintained over time by its practitioners and 
advocates. Those invested in the success of a philosophy underlying a term have the most 
                                                 
18 Robert Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello” (1997) 37 International 
Review of the Red Cross 553; Carsten Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)” 
(2008) 23 American University International Law Review 311, 312.  
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to gain from an effort to closely analyze the meanings of a term, and where necessary 
draw distinctions between related concepts. 
2. The Grotian Tradition 
Both Transitional Justice and jus post bellum are products not only of the decades in 
which they emerged, but also part of what Hersch Lauterpacht identified as “the Grotian 
tradition.”19 Both the specific historical moments and the wider tradition are examined 
below. 
In 1933, Hersch Lauterpacht famously described “The Function of Law in the 
International Community.” This work, which Martti Koskenniemi has described as the 
most important book in English in the twentieth century,20 concerned itself, inter alia, 
with whether international law was a comprehensive system, capable of settling disputes 
brought to international judicial fora. Lauterpacht forcefully argued for a conception of 
international law as a complete system, with the function and duty of international legal 
practitioners to settle disputes. For Lauterpacht, there existed a prohibition of judicial non 
liquet (in essence, a ruling that there was no law to apply to determine a dispute), 
admitting no exception.21 In the same way that a court, faced with a claim of property 
                                                 
19 Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” (1946) 23 British Year Book 
of International Law 1. 
20 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Function of Law in the International Community: 75 Years After” 
(2008) 79 British Year Book of International Law 353. 
21 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford University 
Press 1933) 134. 
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ownership, would have to make a determination as to that property claim regardless of 
the uncertainty surrounding the claim, the history of international judicial settlement 
provided “continuous proof”22 of the capacity of international law to address “so-called 
gaps.”23 
Lauterpacht’s argument is in contrast with, for example, Hans Morgenthau, from the 
perspective of international relations, with his contrast between political “tensions” not 
amenable to legal resolution and “disputes” that were amenable to legal resolution.24 
Lauterpacht’s perspective is also in contrast with the “Vienna School” of Hans Kelsen 
who essentially advocated a positivist model that limited the role of law in the 
international community.25 Lauterpacht’s work was both a conception of what 
international law was and a project to define what law should do—to extend the process 
of dispute settlement through law. The issue of whether gaps exist in the fabric of 
international law, and what approach should be taken if apparent lacunae are highlighted, 
remains an enduring problem. 
What was Lauterpacht’s goal in enshrining these goals as part of the Grotian tradition? 
The article The Grotian Tradition in International Law seeks to selectively praise Hugo 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Koskenniemi, “The Function of Law in the International Community: 75 Years After”. 
25 See e.g. Joseph Kunz, “The ‘Vienna School’ and International Law” (1933–34) 11 New York 
University Law Quarterly Review 370. 
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Grotius,26 not to bury him—it suggests that despite the flaws in argument and substance 
of De jure belli ac pacis (1625), Grotius’ enduring fame and influence is deserved 
because of the tradition he established. The tradition, as framed by Lauterpacht, appears 
to be a series of goals for international law. Unsurprisingly, these goals appear to be 
largely shared by Lauterpacht, although Lauterpacht may not have used the term “goals” 
but insisted that they were an accurate description of international law. Lauterpacht’s 
insistence on a complete system of international law, one that would broach no judicial 
non liquet, is strengthened by the idea that there is a tradition insisting on The Subjection 
of the Totality of International Relations to the Rule of Law27 and The Rejection of 
“Reason of State.”28 Should there have been areas of International Relations to which no 
laws could apply, perhaps due to an assertion of Raison d’État, the system of 
international law would clearly be incomplete, and rulings based on a finding of non 
liquet would clearly be expected. 
In a sense, both Transitional Justice and jus post bellum represent attempts to fill apparent 
lacunae. Transitional Justice practitioners, as a general rule, are committed to the “fight 
against impunity.” This impunity is seen as an unwanted gap. Transitional Justice seeks 
primarily to respond to the real-world gap in the universality of human rights as 
applied—a universality that is fundamental to the project of human rights. These rights 
                                                 
26 As Hugo de Groot is generally referred to by his Latin eponym, I will follow that practice in 
this chapter. 
27 Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” 19. 
28 Ibid 30. 
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are not derived from an individual’s status vis-à-vis a state but solely due to being human, 
as a result of shared humanity. An apparent gap in the universality of international human 
rights protections caused by a change in regime (perhaps with amnesties for previous 
regime officials) or by the mere existence of unpunished systematic or widespread human 
rights abuses may cry out to be addressed by Transitional Justice practitioners. 
Additionally, uncovering and establishing the truth of past human rights abuses may be 
seen as filling a historical lacuna, which itself may serve as a form of reparation for 
victims. The idea that there should always be a purposeful (legal and otherwise) response 
to human rights abuses is very much in line with Lauterpacht’s vision of the Grotian 
Tradition. 
Jus post bellum, on its face, appears to be responding to the need to complete the 
temporal story of the law of armed conflict—with jus ad bellum governing the beginning 
of armed conflict, just in bello governing the conflict itself, and jus post bellum governing 
its aftermath. While there is certainly power behind this simple depiction, a deeper 
understanding of the history of international law as it applies to law and peace reveals a 
more fundamental gap that jus post bellum can help to fill. Filling these lacunae is best 
understood with reference to what Lauterpacht called “The Grotian Tradition in 
International Law.”29 Lauterpacht identifies several features of the Grotian tradition that 
are potentially pertinent. He suggests that the Grotian tradition includes The Subjection of 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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the Totality of International Relations to the Rule of Law;30 The Rejection of “Reason of 
State”;31 The Distinction between Just and Unjust Wars;32 The Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual;33 and The Idea of Peace.34 By The Idea of Peace, 
Lauterpacht means Grotius’s strong preference for peace, and the lack of praise for war 
as somehow beneficial or strengthening in character.35 In particular, The Subjection of the 
Totality of International Relations to the Rule of Law and The Rejection of “Reason of 
State”; is relevant to the creation of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and eventually jus post 
bellum. These themes certainly echo Lauterpacht’s split from his teacher Hans Kelsen.36 
To use the term “jus post bellum” is itself to make an assertion, namely that a set of laws 
exists that applies to the transition to peace. Because the term is a recent arrival in 
contemporary legal discourse (see Chapter 4.B.8 below), the claim may seem 
controversial. One might ask how a body of law could have been constructed without, 
until recently, a name. Further, one might ask whether those using the term are really 
                                                 
30 Ibid 19. 
31 Ibid 30. 
32 Ibid 35. 
33 Ibid 43. 
34 Ibid 46. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Martti Koskenniemi, “Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law” (1997) 8 
European Journal of International Law 215, 217–18. 
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advocating restraints upon the peacemakers and erecting barriers to peace.37 After all, if 
this chapter claims that jus post bellum is a continuance and completion of the Grotian 
Tradition, and embedded in the Grotian Tradition is a strong preference for peace, then 
how can barriers to peace be appropriate? 
With respect to the first concern about the implausibility of a heretofore “nameless” body 
of law, the history of the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello stand as an answer. The 
concerns and laws of jus post bellum, like those of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, predate 
the terms themselves. For example, Brian Orend argues that the concept of jus post 
bellum should be credited to Immanuel Kant.38 Regardless of its provenance, it is 
important to note the relative humility of the concept. The term “jus post bellum” does 
not seek to displace jus ad bellum or jus in bello, but rather to complement them. It does 
not seek to supplant the separate frameworks of humanitarian law, human rights law, or 
international criminal law,39 and indeed to challenge the entire notion of public 
international law as traditionally understood,40 but simply to integrate the law applicable 
to a particular phenomenon, the transition to a sustainable peace, into a more coherent 
whole. 
                                                 
37 Eric De Brabandere, “The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of 
Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept” (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119. 
38 Brian Orend, War And International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press 2000) 57. 
39 See e.g. Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
40 Ibid. 
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With respect to the second concern regarding the possible drawbacks of clarifying and 
even extending the law applicable to the transition to a sustainable peace, one need only 
look to the atrocities that have historically followed military victory to understand the 
prima facie need for jus post bellum. No longer is it acceptable and commonplace to 
exterminate or enslave the defeated population. The prohibition on the annexation of 
territory is central not only in determining the legality of particular post-conflict 
settlement, but also in underpinning the entire order of stable and pacific interstate 
relations. An abhorrence of regulation and insistence on the “freedom” from law of those 
involved in the transition to a sustainable peace is effectively an application of the 
rationale of Raison d’État to the ending of conflict and the reestablishment of peace—to 
assert that a dispute regarding the legality of actions taken in the transition to a 
sustainable peace would be met with a judicial non liquet. This is not to say that there is a 
tight constraint in all circumstance or no role for discretion. There are many choices 
between equally legal options during the transition to sustainable peace. Regardless of 
one’s view as to the function of law in the international community, a vision of the 
reestablishment of peace as a law-free or law-poor zone is likely to result in an 
impoverished peace that does not tend to acceptably resolve the problems underlying the 
conflict or lay the foundation for a robust, positive peace. 
Perhaps more directly relevant for analysis of Lauterpacht’s claim of a Grotian Tradition 
are the works of Grotius himself.  In Grotius’s 1604 work, De iure praedae 
commentarius (Commentary on the law of prize and booty), Grotius plainly asks in the 
first sentence of Chapter 3: “De praeda igitur dicturis primum belli quaestio expedienda 
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est, possitne scilicet bellum aliquod justum esse.”41  (“Accordingly, before we enter into a 
discussion of prize and booty, we must dispose of a certain question regarding war, 
namely: Can any war be just?”)42  Grotius asks four questions:  
1) Is any war just?  
2) Is any war just for Christians?  
3) Is any war just for Christians, against Christians?  
4) Is any war just for Christians, against Christians, from the standpoint of all 
law?   
The first question helps to connection Grotius’s work to the contemporary questions of 
the legality of resorting to armed force, that is, jus ad bellum.  The remaining, 
Christianity-focused questions help to illustrate the difference between the context in 
which Grotius worked and the more secular world of contemporary law.   
The colorful history of this work, De iure praedae commentarius, in some ways echoes 
the “lost and found” nature of just war theory being downplayed by positivists who 
emphasized Raison d’État, only to be restored and translated into a modern context by 
those who wished to outlaw (or at least minimize) war in the late 19th and 20th centuries.  
De iure praedae commentarius was not published during Grotius’ lifetime, or indeed for 
                                                 
41 Grotius, Hugo, De iure praedae commentarius, Martinum Nijhoff, (written 1604-1608, 
published 1868), p. 31. 
42 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Jure Praedae Commentarius), 
eds. Gwladys L. Williams and W. H. Zeydel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), vol. 1: A 
Translation of the Original Manuscript of 1604 by Gwladys L. Williams, with the collaboration of 
Walter H. Zeydel, p. 51. 
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the two subsequent centuries, only reemerging in 1864, published in Latin in 1868 by 
Martinus Nijhoff, and finally being translated and publish in English in 1950.43   
Grotius’ fame and influence was not, of course, based on a work misplaced for so long 
but rather on the work that was well known even during his lifetime, particularly De iure 
belli ac pacis (“The Rights of War and Peace”).  In De iure belli ac pacis, Book I, 
Chapter 2, Grotius asks the same question: “Whether it is ever lawful to make War.”44  
This question is the starting point of the contemporary jus ad bellum discourse.  
Similarly, in De iure belli ac pacis, Book III, Grotius considers “what is allowable in 
War, and how far, and in what Circumstances it is so.”45  While his conception is far 
removed from contemporary law, perhaps exemplified most notoriously in his 
declaration in the title of Book III, Chapter 1, Section 2 that “In War all Things necessary 
to the End are lawful.”46  Notwithstanding this difference, the fact that these subjects 
were central to Grotius’ thinking and reputation shows their importance in the Grotian 
tradition. 
                                                 
43 Grotius, Hugo, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, Martine Julia van Ittersum (ed.), 
Liberty Fund (2006), p. xxiii; See also Van Ittersum, Martine Julia, Dating the manuscript of De 
Jure Praedae (1604–1608): What watermarks, foliation and quire divisions can tell us about 
Hugo Grotius’ development as a natural rights and natural law theorist, History of European 
Ideas, Vol. 35, Issue 2, June 2009, p. 125-193, ISSN 0191-6599, 
10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2009.01.004, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191659909000175. 
44 Grotius, Hugo, The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 
(2005). Vol. 1, p. 180 (emphasis removed). 
45 Ibid 1185. 
46 Ibid 1186 (emphasis removed). 
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3. Basic Definitions 
a. Transitional justice 
In Transitional Justice Genealogy,47 Ruti Teitel begins with a definition, stating, 
“Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods 
of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes.”48 This definition, adopted very carefully in a self-
reflective article by the individual often credited with coining the term, is a good place to 
start. 
The substantive emphasis of Transitional Justice is on justice for human rights 
violations.49 Temporally, the emphasis is on subjecting the acts that occurred during the 
predecessor regime to a toolbox of responses within the time period of the successor 
regime. The term contains an aspirational element—that a transition toward justice is 
possible in line with the political change in the wake of a change in regime. There is no 
assumption of armed conflict, nor is there a denial of the possibility of armed conflict. 
Armed conflict has only a potential, secondary importance in Transitional Justice—an 
importance derived not from the effects of armed conflict, nor the thing itself. These 
                                                 
47 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69; see 
also Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2000) 3. 
48 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy”. 
49 Sections of this chapter draw partly from Jens Iverson, “Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum, 
and International Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History, and Dynamics” (2013) 
International Journal of Transitional Justice. 
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potential effects, human rights violations and regime change, may each occur with or 
without armed conflict. The goals of Transitional Justice are fundamentally tied to the 
aspiration of transition, both toward justice for past violations and toward a cementing of 
a new political order that will prevent the old order, with its attendant human rights 
violations, from returning. 
b. Jus post bellum 
There is, as yet, no authoritative definition for jus post bellum, although many have been 
proffered. For the purposes of this chapter, for reasons that are explained supra, the term 
jus post bellum is defined as the body of legal norms that apply to the entire process of 
the transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.50 
Jus post bellum must be understood in the context of its sister terms, jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello. None of these terms make sense without armed conflict. They are concerned 
with the use of armed force as a matter of primary, central importance. Collectively, they 
seek to describe the constraints and rights regarding whether armed force may be used at 
all, the constraints and rights related to the use of armed force during armed conflict (how 
                                                 
50 See e.g. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (The Philosophy of 
Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, 
originally published 1887, tr. W. Hastie, The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (emphasis added) 214 
(“The Right of Nations in relation to the State of War may be divided into: 1. The Right of going 
to War; 2. Right during War; and 3. Right after War, the object of which is to constrain the 
nations mutually to pass from this state of war, and to found a common Constitution establishing 
Perpetual Peace.”) The definition of a “just and sustainable peace” is itself an extremely 
interesting research topic, involving what many have termed “positive peace” vs. “negative 
peace,” and definitions of sustainable peace not in terms of the relations of two states but in terms 
of the international system as a whole. 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
 
218 
 
it may be used), and the constraints and rights related to the transition from armed 
conflict to a sustainable peace. 
The substantive emphasis of jus post bellum is broader than human rights violations. It 
also clearly includes, inter alia, violations of the laws of armed conflict, the rights and 
privileges that spring from the laws of armed conflict, environmental law (including legal 
access to natural resources and regulating the toxic remnants of war), state responsibility 
outside of the realm of human rights, recognition of states and governments, laws and 
norms applicable to peace treaties and peace agreements, peacekeeping, occupation, and 
post-conflict peace building—laws that directly or through interpretation regulate and 
enable the transition to a just and sustainable peace. 
The conceptual foundations for jus post bellum (the third component of the just war 
tradition that, unlike jus ad bellum and jus in bello, applies to the transition from armed 
conflict to peace), like International Criminal Law, have deep historical roots, reaching 
back to the ancient just war tradition, but has re-emerged as a contemporary neoterism in 
recent decades in the context of peacebuilding and the end of the Cold War.   It represents 
an approach most likely to push conduct at the crucial period of transitioning from armed 
conflict to peace in the direction of a just and sustainable solution to the underlying 
problems that caused the conflict.    
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4. Contrasting the Content of Transitional Justice and Jus Post 
Bellum 
a. General contrast 
The basic definition of Transitional Justice provided in the Basic Definitions section 
above is not the only definition worth considering. Again, in Transitional Justice 
Genealogy,51 Teitel states, “Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of 
justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to 
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”52 In contrast, the Report of 
the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies (2004) defines Transitional Justice as: 
[. . .] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at 
all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.53 
Similarly, the stocktaking report of the same name Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2011) 
describes Transitional Justice as follows: 
                                                 
51 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” 3. 
52 Ibid 69. 
53 UN Security Council, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary-General” (23 August 2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616, 4. 
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Transitional justice initiatives promote accountability, reinforce respect for 
human rights and are critical to fostering the strong levels of civic trust 
required to bolster rule of law reform, economic development and 
democratic governance. Transitional justice initiatives may encompass 
both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, including individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals.54 
Transitional Justice practitioners may know about and concern themselves with issues 
outside of human rights violations, such as violations of the laws of armed conflict, the 
rights and privileges that spring from the laws of armed conflict, state responsibility 
outside of the realm of human rights, recognition of states and governments, laws and 
norms applicable to peace treaties and peace agreements, occupation, and particularly 
post-conflict peace building. That said, these subjects are not the fundamental concern of 
Transitional Justice properly speaking. They are the fundamental concern of jus post 
bellum. 
While jus post bellum is substantively broader than Transitional Justice in many respects, 
jus post bellum is also clearly inapplicable in certain scenarios where Transitional Justice 
is applicable. Following a peaceful, non-violent revolution or regime change, the 
principles of jus post bellum may apply by analogy, but not directly. 
Similarly, one can imagine a change in regime in which no significant human rights 
violations were perpetrated by the previous regime, deposed by armed conflict. Armed 
conflicts happen without massive human rights violations. (The 1982 conflict in the 
                                                 
54 Ibid 6. 
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Falkland/Malvinas Islands might provide such an example, the involvement of two 17-
year-old armed service members notwithstanding.)55 Additionally, armed conflicts occur 
without regime change. In these instances, Transitional Justice would tend not to apply, 
but jus post bellum would. 
Just as jus post bellum is necessarily connected to an armed conflict, to the degree that jus 
post bellum has an aspirational character, it must relate in part to questions of war and 
peace. One would think that jus post bellum is tied to the contemporary aspirational 
character of jus ad bellum and jus in bello: to constrain the use of armed force. In 
addition to that negative goal of reducing the effects of unfettered armed force, 
practitioners of jus post bellum generally seek to build a “positive peace.”56 This builds 
upon Lauterpacht’s idea that part of the Grotian Tradition is The Idea of Peace.57 Again, 
by The Idea of Peace, Lauterpacht is invoking Grotius’s strong preference for peace, and 
the lack of praise for war as somehow beneficial or strengthening in character.58 
Sustainable peace is a central aspirational norm of jus post bellum, following a long but 
not uncontested tradition in international law. 
                                                 
55 Amnesty International, “United Kingdom: Summary of Concerns Raised with the Human 
Rights Committee” (1 November 2001) available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/128000/eur450242001en.pdf (last accessed 2 
June 2016). 
56 See e.g. Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research” (1969) 6(3) Journal of Peace 
Research 167–91. 
57 Lauterpacht, “Grotian Tradition in International Law”  46. 
58 Ibid. 
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This is not to say that human rights are not central to jus post bellum—they are. As ably 
demonstrated in such works as Transitional Justice in the Twenty-first Century: Beyond 
Truth Versus Justice59 and Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace60 
the supposed tension between different maximands such as peace and justice or truth and 
justice is frequently overblown. Discovering the truth about human rights violations and 
achieving justice for those violations is widely recognized as important in building a 
positive peace. But there will be responses to human rights violations that are not 
properly the concern of jus post bellum. 
b. Substance of Transitional Justice 
Transitional Justice practitioners are interested in the application of a collection of 
responses to human rights violations (sometimes referred to as a “toolbox” or “package” 
of mechanisms)61 including criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations 
programs, gender justice programs, security system reform, memorialization,62 vetting 
                                                 
59 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-first 
Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
60 Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace (July 2009) 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf (accessed 20 
August 2014). 
61 See e.g. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Transitional Justice and Peace Agreements” (2005) Working 
Paper, International Council on Human Rights Policy 3, 5 available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/63/128_-_Transitional_Justice_and_Peace_Agreements_Roht-
Arriaza__Naomi__2005.pdf  (accessed 20 August 2014). 
62 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
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(also known as “lustration,” “screening,” “administrative justice,” and “purging”)63 and 
education.64 These responses will also likely be of interest to scholars and practitioners of 
jus post bellum, particularly during the period after the cessation of armed conflict. The 
emphasis, however, may be different. Those coming from the Transitional Justice 
perspective may share the natural primary concern of responding to human rights 
violations, while those coming from the tradition of emphasizing the importance of 
transitioning to a stable peace may highlight other areas, albeit often through responding 
to human rights violations. The content of what is called Transitional Justice has 
expanded as practitioners have looked for pragmatic problems to the difficult challenges 
inherent in the aftermath of human rights violations by a previous regime. The question 
of what qualifies as “Transitional Justice” is a pragmatic, and in some ways inherently 
political question, as it depends at least in part on what is considered useful in making a 
successful political transition. 
It is not particularly useful to apply the term “Transitional Justice” to efforts that use the 
tools or approaches used in Transitional Justice but which bear no relationship to a 
distinct transition in political regime. If, at the present moment, there was a truth 
commission or memorialization effort for the deaths of more than 12,000 prisoners of war 
housed at the Confederate Andersonville Prisoner of War Camp during the US Civil War, 
                                                 
63 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (eds), Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public 
Employees in Transitional Societies (Social Science Research Council 2007). 
64 See e.g. Elizabeth A. Cole and Judy Barsalou, “Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching 
History in Societies emerging from Violent Conflict” (United States Institute for Peace 2006) 2 
(“History education should be understood as an integral but underutilized part of Transitional 
Justice and social reconstruction”). 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
 
224 
 
it is hard to see how it is helpful to call these “Transitional Justice,” even in light of the 
political changes that occurred as a result of the armed conflict. A truth commission or 
memorial to victims does not necessarily imply a “transition” in the sense that is normally 
implicated by the term “Transitional Justice.” Applying the term to the post-conflict trial 
and execution of Henry Wirz, commander of the Andersonville Prison, as well as the 
1908 monument to Wirz by the United Daughters of the Confederacy and continuing 
memorialization65 would also constitute an unjustified enlargement of the term 
“Transitional Justice.” While both the trial and the monument may have had (conflicting) 
political implications or intents, the trial was hardly looking towards any sort of regime 
change in the US federal government, and the misplaced valorization of Wirz has more to 
do with denial of Confederate crimes than establishment of accountability for human 
rights violation of a previous regime. While some may feel that stretching the term is 
somehow innovative or exciting, overstretching the term tends to lead to the term lacking 
specific meaning and force. As Seneca the Younger noted: Nusquam est qui ubique est 
(roughly translated, “Nowhere is the one who is everywhere” or “to be everywhere is to 
be nowhere”).66 
To take perhaps a more controversial example, it seems unhelpful to use the term 
“Transitional Justice” in application to the serial truth commissions in Uganda, including 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January 
                                                 
65 Glen W. LaForce, “The Trial of Major Henry Wirz—A National Disgrace” (1988) 1988 Army 
Law 3. 
66 Seneca the Younger, Epistula Ad Lucilium II, Book 1, Letter 2, line 2. 
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1971 established by Idi Amin Dada and the 1986 Commission of Inquiry into Violations 
of Human Rights.67 While these Truth Commissions, along with various efforts at 
memorialization and even the International Crimes Division within the High Court of 
Uganda technically fit with the type of broad definition such as “a response to systematic 
or widespread violations of human rights”68 they should not be considered to be 
Transitional Justice mechanisms, properly conceived. These are not the type of 
“conception of justice associated with periods of political change”69 traditionally and 
properly associated with the term Transitional Justice. Discussing these institutions as 
“Transitional Justice” should at a minimum be done critically and cautiously, noting that 
they are not clearly part of a transition to a more democratic and accountable regime. 
They are, in each instance, a one-sided exercise of a regime not clearly moving toward 
ongoing accountability for their own human rights abuses. If the term “Transitional 
Justice” simply means an institutionalized allegation of abuse by the losing party in a 
conflict, even an allegation by a regime not in the process of transitioning to a superior 
approach toward human rights, it is unclear why “Transitional Justice” should retain its 
widespread support, or why the term would endure. 
This is not to say that Transitional Justice efforts have to be without flaw or criticism to 
merit the title of “Transitional Justice.” As a phenomenon associated with political 
                                                 
67 Joanna R. Quinn, “Chicken and Egg? Sequencing in Transitional Justice: The Case of Uganda” 
(Autumn/Winter 2009) 14(2) International Journal of Peace Studies 35–53. 
68 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
69 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” 69. 
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change, carried out by fallible humans, any instance of Transitional Justice will inevitably 
be flawed. Rather, calling an effort “Transitional Justice” should necessarily be an 
assertion that the substance of that effort contains the aspiration of transition to a new 
regime of accountability for human rights abuses. 
Noémie Turgis in What is Transitional Justice? begins and ends with a warning 
regarding broadening the scope of transitional justice.70 As she puts it: 
The risk of broadening the meaning of the concept is to dilute it and 
turning it into something meaningless. [. . .] The core element of 
transitional justice is here: offering a “toolbox” filled with elements 
designed to deal with the violations of human rights from a predecessor 
regime to form the basis of an order to prevent their reoccurrence.71 
This is well put, although some might object to the “toolbox” metaphor given that it may 
tend to reduce complex problems to simpler plumbing analogues. The content of 
Transitional Justice is rooted in a transformative response to a predecessor regime’s 
human rights violations in order to prevent further violations. 
c. More substantive in nature 
Contemporary international law specifically outlaws many acts that may be (and 
historically have been) carried out during the transition from armed conflict to peace. 
                                                 
70 Noémie Turgis, “What is Transitional Justice?” (2010) 1 International Journal of Law, 
Transitional Justice and Human Rights 9, 14. 
71 Turgis, “What is Transitional Justice?” 14. 
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Christine Bell provides a helpful table in Peace Agreements and Human Rights72 with 
respect to “political strategies for dealing with minorities.” The table can usefully be 
generalized with application to the international law prescription for a variety of acts that 
are regulated by jus post bellum. 
A party to the conflict may frame the conflict as caused by the existence or power of 
another group, and wish to act upon that second group in prohibited ways. For instance, a 
party to the conflict may adopt a strategy of eliminating the second group, through 
genocide, expulsion, or voluntary expatriation. The first two are specifically outlawed 
under international law,73 the third is unclear but likely suspect if attached to the goal of 
elimination, as the “voluntary” nature will be in doubt in light of the potential crime of 
persecution. If the strategy of domination is adopted, the likely method of implementing 
of that strategy discrimination against a minority is specifically outlawed. This, of course, 
includes the prohibition of slavery. 
A party to the conflict may also frame the cause of the conflict as caused by the 
relationship of another group to others, and choose to act upon that second group in ways 
that are regulated but not necessarily prohibited by international law. If the strategy of 
                                                 
72 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 17. 
73 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 17; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 
1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion 
in Modern International Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
 
228 
 
assimilation is adopted, the increased recognition of minority rights in international law74 
may constrain any attempt to eliminate communal differences. Separate treatment may 
depend upon the particular provisions and the balance between individual rights and 
collective rights, including whether the treatment is more in the form of recognition and 
accommodation for vulnerable minorities or discrimination against minority groups.75 
Many conflicts are framed in terms of self-determination, whether it is a demand for 
internal autonomy or outright secession. The question of the legality of self-determination 
is inextricably tied to the rights of territorial integrity and the rights of minorities and 
individuals within the new framework.76 
All of the substantive legal norms listed thus far are binding directly as part of non-
derogable international human rights regimes that apply in times of peace, armed conflict, 
and periods that could be described as status mixtus,77 but may have special and 
distinctive characteristics during the transition from armed conflict to peace. Most 
particularly, these norms bind those crafting peace agreements and those who enjoy 
transitional governmental authority. Bell suggests that international law applying to peace 
processes (including the crafting of peace agreements) should reflect the distinctive 
                                                 
74 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 17; see 
also Nātān Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
2003). 
75 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 17. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See Georg Schwarzenberger, “Jus Pacis Ac Belli? Prolegomena to a Sociology of International 
Law” (1943) 37 American Journal of International Law 460, 470. 
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nature of these acts, including: a distinctive self-determination role bound to questions of 
state legitimacy and human rights protections; hybrid international/domestic legal status 
based on a distinctive mix of state and non-state categories; obligations that may need to 
be interpreted from both a treaty or contract law framework and a constitutional law 
framework; and distinctive types of third-party delegation.78 
Certain areas of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are also heavily implicated in a body of 
law governing the transition from armed conflict to peace. The prohibition of annexation 
as the result of armed conflict is tied to the prohibition of acts of aggression, a clear jus 
ad bellum concern. Acts of aggression also raise the question of response in the transition 
to peace, including the question of reparations—an issue that implicates the law of state 
responsibility. United Nations Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII authority 
frequently provide specific binding law that applies to particular transitions from armed 
conflict to peace. 
All of the limits of the law of armed conflict applying to belligerent occupation under the 
law of armed conflict are traditionally classified as jus in bello (including Geneva 
Convention IV, Additional Protocol I, and Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations79). 
The reality and legal restraints of “transformative occupation” requires a complementary 
                                                 
78 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 407; see 
also Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
79 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 
26 January 1910), 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, 205 Consol TS 277, Art. 42. 
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understanding of jus post bellum to reconcile current practice (including the endorsement 
of some practitioners of transitional justice) and the Conservation Principle of jus in bello 
(prohibiting major changes in the institutions of the occupied territory). The tradition of 
jus post bellum covering occupation goes back to Immanuel Kant’s exception to the 
Conservation Principle when it comes to the constitution of warlike states.80 Arguably, if 
a legitimate new government is established and widely recognized, belligerent occupation 
(where a foreign state exercises effective control over another state’s territory without the 
latter state’s consent) may become pacific occupation (occupation with the latter state’s 
consent) or international territorial administration,81 such as the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia.82 This is, of course, a highly problematic, charged, 
and contested issue, but one that cannot be ignored. Merely placing a compliant puppet or 
satellite state should not remove the obligations of the occupier under jus in bello. The 
legitimacy of post-belligerent occupation is clearly tied to the validity of consent free 
from the threat of use of force as guaranteed by the Article 52 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties—jus post bellum law that is more procedural in nature, to which 
we shall turn shortly. 
                                                 
80 See e.g. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (The Philosophy of 
Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, 
originally published 1887, tr. W. Hastie, The Lawbook Exchange 2002) 
81 See e.g. Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: 
Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge University Press 2008); Ralph Wilde, International 
Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away 
(Oxford University Press 2010). 
82 See e.g. Steven R. Ratner, “The Cambodia Settlement Agreements” (1993) 87 American 
Journal of International Law 1. 
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The international law applicable to state responsibility,83 particularly with regards to new 
states created through conflict, is also an area of law that must be referenced by a body of 
law applicable to the transition from armed conflict to peace. State responsibilities also 
can provide the framework for considering the responsibility of international 
organizations and institutions. 
The international law applicable to peacekeeping operations in the aftermath of armed 
conflict must also be considered in a comprehensive body of law applicable to the 
transition to peace. Similarly, status of armed forces on foreign territory agreements 
(SOFAs) are implicated by a jus post bellum regime. 
Criminal law, both international and domestic, as well as laws regarding reparations 
(whether included as part of a criminal law regime or not) are also an important part of 
jus post bellum, if those laws have application to the transition from armed conflict to 
peace. The important criterion for their inclusion is not the venue (international or 
domestic) nor the source, but their applicability to the transition to peace. 
Environmental law, particularly with respect to the rights and obligations relating to 
repairing and rebuilding the environmental damage from the conflict, but also resolving 
any resource disputes related to the conflict, may be implicated in the transition to a 
sustainable peace. 
                                                 
83 See International Law Commission (ILC), “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts” in ILC, “Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Fifty-third Session” (2001) UN GAOR 56th Session Supplement 10, 43; UN Doc. 
A/56/10. 
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The Responsibility to Protect doctrine84 includes the Responsibility to Prevent, 
Responsibility to Respond, and the Responsibility to Rebuild. Of the three norms within 
the Responsibility to Protection doctrine, the Responsibility to Respond has received the 
most attention and has the most bearing on questions related to jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, as it seeks to replace the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention with guidelines of 
responses short of the use of armed force and constraints on the resort to armed force and 
how it is used. The Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild are more 
tightly tied to jus post bellum. 
d. More procedural in nature 
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states in full: “A treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”85 This is a 
particular area of concern for jus post bellum. First a note on terminology: use of the term 
“peace treaty” indicates an agreement exclusively between states, unlike the term “peace 
agreement,” which is used for agreements not exclusively between states. Consider a 
                                                 
84 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(International Development Research Centre 2001) 39–45; see also United Nations Secretary 
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 
65–7; United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (15 
September 2005) paras 138–9; United Nations General Assembly, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 (12 January 2009) 
para. 48. 
85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 52. 
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generic, hypothetical peace treaty. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties implies that the validity of that peace treaty, the foundation of a transition from 
interstate armed conflict to peace, depends on whether there has been an illegal threat or 
use of force to procure that treaty. In other words, the legal validity of the foundation of 
the transition to peace depends on what is typically considered a question of jus ad 
bellum, the legality of the use or threat of force. This connection between jus ad bellum 
and jus post bellum emerges not through an analysis of substantive rights and restrictions 
during the transition to peace, but through an analysis of the legitimate procedure for 
creating a peace treaty. 
Recognition is also a critical question in jus post bellum. In order to apply jus post 
bellum, practitioners must be able to identify states and governments. This can be a 
contested issue, particularly for states in the case of secession (e.g. Bangladesh) and for 
governments in the case of contested legitimacy of a new regime (e.g. post-Democratic 
Kampuchea Cambodia). The law regarding recognition of states and recognition of 
governments is clearly implicated in the transition to peace. 
The procedural law applicable to substantive criminal and civil law are also part of the 
transition to peace. This is not only with respect to the high profile, highly contested 
issues such as amnesties for the perpetration of alleged crimes related to the armed 
conflict. It includes questions of jurisdiction, immunities, statutes of limitation, and other 
questions of admissibility. 
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e. Mixed substantive and procedural in nature 
Some subjects are very difficult to characterize as mostly substantive or procedural, or at 
least require further analysis to distinguish particular aspects that are more substantive or 
procedural. For example, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 132586 
enunciates both procedural norms for the resolution of armed conflict87 and norms for the 
substance of peace agreements.88 
f. Summarizing the contrast in content 
Transitional Justice has evolved into a robust body of law and practice involving a wide 
variety of tools to respond to the challenges of responding to widespread or systematic 
human rights abuses in the context of a political transition to a new regime. Jus post 
bellum implicates a rich variety of legal traditions and regimes, applied to the particular 
situation of the transition from an armed conflict to a sustainable peace. 
                                                 
86 UNSC Res. 1325 (31 October 2000) UN Doc. S/RES/1325. 
87 “1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making 
levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflict[.]”. 
88 “8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt 
a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during 
repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; 
(b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict 
resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace 
agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women 
and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the 
judiciary[.]” 
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5. Temporal Contrast – the dynamics 
a. Introduction: Time Within the Concepts 
This section analyses the dynamics of Transitional Justice, jus post bellum, and 
International Criminal Law, that is, how each concept operates over time.  As stated 
earlier, “Transitional Justice” has been redefined by some to include not only “the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes”89 but also 
“transition from conflict,” which is a fundamentally different concept.  This threatens to 
confuse Transitional Justice with jus post bellum, particularly if the contrast in temporal 
aspects remains unexamined.  Discussing how time operates within a concept provides a 
more granular approach than a broad historical analysis—allowing for a discussion of the 
internal functioning of a concept.    
What role each concept can play depends in part on when one asks the question.  
Transitional Justice comes to the fore in consolidating a transition to a new, human-
rights-centered regime or political order.  Jus post bellum applies throughout the 
transition to peace, but will focus on different questions at different times.  International 
Criminal Law on principle takes an unchanging stance with respect to determining 
criminal culpability regardless of domestic regime or a state of war—but is particularly 
constrained with respect to ex post facto application of the law.  Understanding the 
                                                 
89 Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, p. 69  (internal citations omitted). 
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dynamics of each concept, how it works and orients itself over time, provides a more 
comprehensive guide to the role each concept can play and how they can be integrated in 
particular situations. 
b. Dynamics of Transitional Justice 
i. The double beginning of Transitional Justice 
Due to the emphasis on responding to human right violations of repressive predecessor 
regimes, Transitional Justice in practice largely begins after a change in regime and 
responds to the actions of a previous regime, which may or may not correspond to a 
period of armed conflict.  That is, the practice of Transitional Justice tends to begin after 
a change in regime, or at least a dramatic political shift.  The subject of that practice, 
however, is largely focused on responding to the acts taken in the previous regime.  
Transitional Justice thus tends to have a double beginning – the subject matter (or 
referent) and the response to the subject matter.  The first beginning occurs during the 
repressive predecessor regime, the second begins during the succeeding, presumably non-
repressive, regime. 
There are, of course, potential complications with the working guideline above.  One 
critical complication is the ever-present, heated question of amnesty for violations of 
human rights committed before the peace agreement is signed.  Transitional Justice 
practitioners, whether they are external or domestic, are certainly interested in whether 
such amnesties are included in these peace agreements.  Whether or not that interest 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
 
237 
 
makes the negotiation of peace agreements part of an intellectually coherent phenomenon 
called “Transitional Justice” is somewhat doubtful, however.  Including this within the 
ambit of “Transitional Justice” deviates from the definition given by its practitioners 
“conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” 90   
It is important to emphasize that despite the blanketing rhetoric against “amnesty” and a 
“culture of impunity,” a rhetoric driven by valid human rights concerns, certain amnesties 
are not only permitted, but also suggested by the laws of armed conflict.  The most 
obvious case is when someone has participated in the conflict as a legal combatant under 
international humanitarian law, but his or her participation is considered illegal under 
domestic law (either directly or through criminalizing activities such as carrying arms.)  
Article 10.1 of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, to take a more specific 
example, forbids punishment of ethical medical care even if it supports an insurgency: 
“Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out medical 
activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.” 
An amnesty provision covering such activities may well be necessary, given the 
increasingly overbroad domestic legislation covering aiding or abetting administratively 
determined terrorist groups, for example.  The virtues of certain forms of amnesty are 
perhaps more likely to be emphasized by those focusing on jus post bellum than those 
                                                 
90  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Geneology, 16 Harvard Human Rights J., Spring 2003, 
p. 69  (internal citations omitted). 
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focusing on Transitional Justice, again underlining the need for both terms to be focused 
and both areas of practice to be further developed. 
One might inquire if peace agreement negotiation was part of Transitional Justice despite 
the “predecessor regime” not yet being a predecessor regime, whether all human rights 
activism during a repressive regime is also part of Transitional Justice.  In fact, it may 
become difficult to differentiate Transitional Justice from anything touching upon human 
rights once the definition begins to expand.  That is not to say that such concerns are not 
of interest, in the same way that someone interested in human rights might not also be 
interested in the specific rights flowing from an individual’s nationality.   
Similarly, one might point to international criminal law efforts that begin before a change 
in regime, and are not necessarily predicated on a regime change.  The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court have 
not necessarily waited for a change in regime to proceed, although such regime changes 
or at changes in government have proven helpful. One might ask if this does not 
complicate the temporal definition of Transitional Justice.  But again, if one does not 
provide a clear definition that follows coherently from the definition given by 
practitioners, Transitional Justice may end up including all of International Criminal 
Law.  This is, at a minimum, not helpful.  
When determining the temporal limits of Transitional Justice in terms of when it begins, 
it is important to specify whether the human rights violations or the reactions to those 
violations are being discussed.  The human rights violations of the preceding regime may 
4.  Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage  
    B. Contrasting Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
 
239 
 
(or may not) stretch to the beginning of that regime.  The reactions, as part of Transitional 
Justice, may begin with the new succeeding regime, or they may begin substantially later. 
ii. Immediacy and Sequencing  
Once an iniquitous regime has fallen, one would expect that the subject matter of 
Transitional Justice (the human rights violations of the previous regime) would be over.  
There is, however, a complication to the idea of a double beginning of Transitional 
Justice that deserves mention, one that highlights the questions of immediacy and 
sequencing.  Some patterns of human rights violations are considered ongoing as long as 
the information about the crime is withheld.  This complicates the analysis of transitional 
justice because the work of Transitional Justice is entangled in the subject matter of 
Transitional Justice—disclosing the truth about the initial act becomes a matter of 
immediate and pressing obligation for the successor regime to avoid participating in an 
ongoing human rights violation. In general, a successor regime using a model of 
Transitional Justice premised on political change will wish to maximize the perceived 
distance between it and the previous regime, but with a “composite act” such as forced 
disappearance, the successor regime may be considered responsible even if it did not 
initiate the wrongful act.91 
                                                 
91 See Art. 15.1 of International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, 
Adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, corrected by 
a/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr. 4.):  “The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of 
actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs 
which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.”  
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Some crimes themselves are not concluded until the disclosure of certain information is 
complete. 92  The crime most often referenced in this context is the crime of “forced” or 
“enforced” 93 disappearance. 94  The basic idea is that as long as the fate or whereabouts 
of the victim has not been established, the crime has a continuous character.95  This 
temporal framing may allow procedural or jurisdictional limits (such as statutes of 
limitations, amnesties tied to a time period, or the entry into force of the Rome Statute) to 
be circumvented.  More generally, it points to the difficulty of drawing clean temporal 
lines when applying a variety of laws to a variety of factual situations. 
Sequencing is often discussed more prospectively than historically, with specialists 
suggesting, for example, that a country might try a truth commission, followed by 
criminal prosecution, followed by memorialisation efforts.  What may be recommended 
by for one situation may differ for another.  The critical theoretical point when analyzing 
                                                 
92 See La Fontaine, Fannie, No Amnesty or Statute of Limitation for Enforced Disappearances: 
the Sandoval Case before the Supreme Court of Chile, 3 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 469 (2005). 
93 See ibid., p. 470.  La Fontaine reports that the Supreme Court of Chile has said that the 
domestic crime of “aggravated abduction” (secuestro calificado) is the equivalent of forced 
disappearance.  
94 The definition of“Enforced disappearance of persons” given by Art. 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute 
is “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with 
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
See also e.g.  Inter-American Convention On Forced Disappearance Of Persons available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.html . For more on the historical basis of the 
crime, see Finucane, Brian, Enforced Disappearance as a Crime Under International Law: A 
Neglected Origin in the Laws of War Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, 171, 2010. 
95 Ibid. 
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the temporal dimension of Transitional Justice is that different tools may have different 
timelines, both by design and because of historical and social forces.  Because of the 
various “tools in the toolbox,” determining the overall timeline in any particular instance 
of Transitional Justice can be very difficult.  In practice, the timeline may not be a one-
direction narrative of progress, but instead involve reversals and pauses, sometimes 
repeatedly. 
The question of the timeline in Transitional Justice is inherently tied to the question of 
political change, as is appropriate for a field focused on responses to past abuses in the 
context of political change.  In The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional 
Justice,96 Teitel discusses the sequencing and immediacy in situations of diminished 
legitimacy, such as the responses to the Saddam Hussein regime after the change of 
regime in Iraq.97  She characterizes the application of criminal law as aimed at promoting 
political transition,98 a process complicated by certain deficiencies of both the trials99 and 
the political transition itself.100  She suggests that the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) offers a cautionary tale of Transitional Justice causing a 
                                                 
96 Teitel, Ruti, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, Cornell Int. Law 
Journal 38 (2005), 837. 
97 Ibid 846. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid 848. 
100 Ibid 849. 
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nationalist backlash, which may have hindered, in her view, political change.101  While 
Teitel’s evaluation of the ICTY may be qualified in light of subsequent political change, 
the fundamental point of linking the understanding of the timeline of Transitional Justice, 
particularly with respect to sequencing and immediacy, must be viewed in light of the 
political realities at the heart of the conception of Transitional Justice. 
One phenomenon that also must be noted in order to understand the dynamics of 
Transitional Justice is what has been called a “justice cascade.”102 A justice cascade 
refers more generally to how one legal proceeding, often abroad, can trigger subsequent 
domestic proceedings, and how the creation of a critical mass of efforts to prosecute can 
reach a tipping point so that prosecution is the norm, rather than impunity. 103 
Regardless of whether some of the crimes allegedly perpetrated under the previous 
regime are of an ongoing nature, the practice of Transitional Justice may not begin 
immediately.  The mode of transition matters.  An overthrow or complete military victory 
over the previous regime (e.g. Post-World War II France) may create the possibility for 
unfettered and immediate criminal prosecutions.104  In other circumstances those who had 
power within the previous regime may retain significant power even after the transition to 
                                                 
101 Ibid 846. 
102 See Lutz, Ellen and Sikkink, Kathryn, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of 
Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 1 (2001); Sikkink, Kathryn, The 
Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (2011). 
103 Ibid 2. 
104  See Kritz, Neil J., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With 
Former Regimes, US Institute of Peace Press (1995), p. 114. 
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a new regime is well under way105 or pressure for Transitional Justice mechanisms may 
be weak.106  It can take years, even decades, for the practice of Transitional Justice to 
begin.  One contemporary example is the controversy rather regarding the response to 
human rights violations during the 1936-1975 Francisco Franco dictatorship in Spain.  
Decades later, it is unclear whether the proper beginning of Transitional Justice in Spain 
is still effectively in the future.   
Another, arguably more complex example is in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia.  Between 
1975 and 1979, the Democratic Kampuchea regime murdered millions through forced 
labor, starvation and execution.  Among many others, the jurists of Cambodia were 
killed.  An estimated six to ten legal professionals survived.107  The Democratic 
Kampuchea regime’s crimes eradicated the institutions and people who could normally 
attempt to address those injustices through criminal law.  In 1979 Vietnam reacted to a 
pattern of atrocities by the Khmer Rouge in Vietnam along the border and occupied the 
country.  The new regime held a trial in absentia for the top Khmer Rouge leaders, Pol 
Pot and Ieng Sary.  A new government was set up by 1981, but the international 
community largely refused to recognize it.  Cambodia remained plagued by guerrilla 
warfare.  Hundreds of thousands of people became refugees.  The mass movement 
represented by the “National Front” (“Renakse”) included mass membership 
                                                 
105  Ibid 
106  Ibid. 
107  Rebuilding Cambodia: human resources, human rights, and law: three essays by Dolores 
A. Donovan, Sidney Jones and Dinah PoKempner, Robert J. Muscat; editor, (1993), p. 69.   
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organizations of Buddhist monks, nuns, women, youth, workers, and other categories.  
Renakse organized the “petitions” or “million documents” which remains the only 
nationwide opportunity for survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime to describe atrocities 
they suffered.  The million documents were the result of the Renakse research committee 
that interviewed survivors throughout the country.  Various efforts at memorialisation 
occurred, including famously at Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and the annual May 20th 
activities often known as the “Day of Hatred”.  In 1990, Vietnam left and the United 
Nations entered.  The Paris Peace Accords were signed between the government and 
Khmer Rouge, amongst others, in 1991.  In 1993 the United Nations mandate ended with 
first general elections.   
Where does the timeline for Transitional Justice begin for Cambodia?  In 1979, with the 
occupation of the country?  The Khmer Rouge had been driven from Phnom Penh, but 
the Khmer Rouge endured on the Thai border, and the conflict continued through the 
1980s.  In 1979, with the trial in absentia, and various efforts at memorialization?  The 
years 1981, 1991, 1993, also present themselves, as well as the 2003 agreement between 
the United Nations and the Cambodian government to establish the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to try Khmer Rouge officials.  Analyzing the 
question of where the timeline for Transitional Justice begins highlights the need to keep 
in mind the dual beginnings of Transitional Justice, as described above.  Clearly the 
referent or substance of Transitional Justice has a different beginning than the practice of 
Transitional Justice.  Analyzing the timeline also highlights the issues of immediacy and 
sequencing.  Does the occupying forces’ show trial in absentia qualify as immediate 
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response, or was Cambodia an instance where efforts were made too late, allowing most 
alleged perpetrators to die of old age?  Did the sequencing of memorialisation help to 
make the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia possible, or did it make the 
evidence unreliable, or both? 
iii. The unclear ending of the transition in Transitional Justice 
Even in the case of seemingly immediate and unfettered instances of Transitional Justice, 
such as in post-World War II France, determining when Transitional Justice ends can be 
difficult.  France has long wrestled with the issue of collaboration, producing an early 
wave of executions and humiliations, stretching and repeating through the relatively 
recent trial (1995-1998) of Maurice Papon.108  Given Papon’s alleged crimes in Algeria, 
was a trial for Vichy era crimes Transitional Justice for Vichy or a proxy for Transitional 
Justice for the Fourth Republic?  As with Cambodia, when the practice of Transitional 
Justice has a referent of arguably more than one regime in the past (e.g., the post-United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Cambodian government holding 
trials not with respect to what happened under the current regime, nor UNTAC, nor the 
period of post-occupation, nor the period of occupation, but for the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime before the occupation), the question of what political change is 
involved gets considerably more complex.  In Cambodia, given that the current Prime 
                                                 
108 See e.g. Curran, Vivian, The Politics of Memory/Errinerungspolitik and the Use and Propriety 
of Law in the Process of Memory Construction, Law and Critique, 19 October 2003, Springer, 
316. 
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Minister Hun Sen has retained power through multiple putative regime changes, the 
particular political goal of a transition to democracy is made more problematic.   
Whether the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia or trials for crimes 
under the Vichy regime in the 1990s count as Transitional Justice or not depend in part 
on whether the political change implicated in the referent material is complete, or at least 
complete enough that there is a consensus that the new political system is seen as normal.  
As this a matter of debate and political self-definition within each polity, the temporal 
dimension of Transitional Justice is once again as much a political determination as a 
legal one.  Unlike International Criminal Law, Transitional Justice must look to an 
analysis of the society and political system in transition to determine if Transitional 
Justice must look to an analysis of the society and political system in transition to 
determine if Transitional Justice is “over”––to see if the needed transition has actually 
occurred.    
c. Dynamics of Jus Post Bellum 
i. Beginning with the effort to end conflict, not the end of conflict 
Despite the most facile reading of its name, jus post bellum should not be overly defined 
by reference to the time a conflict ends.  The term jus post bellum may naturally lead to 
an emphasis on the temporal boundaries of the armed conflict—as though the question of 
whether the norms of jus post bellum can be applied can always be clearly demarcated by 
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an event.109  The proper study of jus post bellum should complicate and enrich this 
overly-neat temporal picture by emphasising the links between the areas of jus post 
bellum and jus ad bellum as well as between jus post bellum and jus in bello.   
The question of whether demands for unconditional surrender are permissible,110 for 
example, is a query asked of a period well before the guns are silenced—and is an issue 
that links the traditional criteria of jus ad bellum (e.g. just cause) to traditional concerns 
of jus post bellum or jus victoriae111 as to the rights and responsibilities of the victors. 
Increased attention to jus post bellum should highlight that demarcating when a conflict 
terminates is frequently difficult, particularly when non-state actors may splinter, 
transform, or lie temporarily dormant. Jus post bellum should not be marked off and 
isolated from other bodies of legal norms on the basis of time, but rather seen as part of a 
comprehensive framework for managing an interconnected set of problems related to 
armed conflict.112 
                                                 
109 See e.g. Österdahl, Inger and Esther van Zadel, What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New 
Wine and Old Bottles, Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2009), Vol. 14 No. 2, 185, 176. 
110 See Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective” in Jus Post Bellum: 
Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 39-40.  See also Orend, Brian, Jus Post Bellum: The 
Perspective of a Just-War Theorist, Leiden Journal of International Law, 20 (2007), 579-580.  
Orend suggests that demands for surrender and the terms of those demands must be linked to the 
original just cause of those making the demand. 
111 See Stephen C. Neff, “Conflict Termination and Peace-Making in the Law of Nations: A 
Historical Perspective” in Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, 
ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 77-91. 
112 See Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective” in Jus Post Bellum: 
Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 36. 
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Not all contemporary scholars agree on the definition.  David Rodin, for example, defines 
jus post bellum narrowly (limited to the obligations of combatants after war) as a separate 
subject from what he describes as termination law or jus terminatio (covering the 
transition from war to peace).113  Rodin’s terminology conflicts with the definition 
previously adopted for this Chapter, where jus post bellum legitimately defines norms 
applicable to the transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.  The more 
comprehensive approach with respect to terminology is more similar to Carsten Stahn’s, 
who suggests that jus post bellum must be understood in a holistic sense.114  He decries 
the frequent fragmented approach in which practitioners of international humanitarian 
law, criminal law, human rights law, and those supporting specific agendas such as the 
“responsibility to protect” speak past each other.115  Christine Bell’s conception of a lex 
                                                 
113  See David Rodin, “Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post Bellum: War Termination and the 
Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression” in Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition 
from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 
2008), 53-62. 
114  See Carsten Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum, Mapping the Discipline(s)” in Jus Post Bellum: 
Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 105.  See also Stahn, Carsten, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Discipline(s), 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., 332, 2007-2008; Stahn, Carsten “Jus Ad Bellum,” “Jus 
In Bello,” “Jus Post Bellum?” Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, ASIL 
Proceedings, 2006, 159; Österdahl, Inger and Esther van Zadel, What Will Jus Post Bellum 
Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles, Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2009), Vol. 14 No. 2, 
178. 
115  See Carsten Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum, Mapping the Discipline(s)” in Jus Post Bellum: 
Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 105.  See also Stahn, Carsten, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Discipline(s), 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., 332, 2007-2008; Stahn, Carsten “Jus Ad Bellum,” “Jus 
In Bello,” “Jus Post Bellum?” Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, ASIL 
Proceedings, 2006, 159. 
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pacificatoria116 or law of peacemakers (echoing lex mercatoria for merchants) which 
bridges the various types of peace agreements, including post-conflict implementation 
agreements, clashes with Rodin’s lex terminatio, which would presumably stop in the 
midst of the lex pacificatoria, with a different framework for different peace agreements.  
While the definition used in this Chapter may differ from Rodin’s, the division between 
norms focusing on the process of termination of conflict and the norms involved focusing 
on the process of building a sustainable peace is useful.   
ii. Peace Agreement as a Process 
A peace agreement is usually seen as a noun, a document created at a specific point that 
marks the temporal division between “wartime” and “peacetime.”117 This division 
between periods of war and peace is extremely important, but it can be overstated.  There 
are often periods that could be described as status mixtus,118 where the status and 
durability of a hoped for peace is uncertain, particularly without at the benefit of 
hindsight.  What is of increased interest at those moments from a jus post bellum 
perspective is not whether or not a status of post bellum has technically been achieved, 
but rather whether legal norms are being applied with post bellum as the goal.  It is this 
                                                 
116  Bell, Christine, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, p. 407. 
117 For a fascinating, in-depth analysis of the idea of “wartime” as a legal and cultural construct, 
particularly with respect to the United States, see Dudziak, Mary L. War time: An idea, its 
history, its consequences, (2013) Oxford University Press.  See also Dudziak, Mary L., Law, War, 
and the History of Time, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1669 (2010). 
118 See Schwarzenberger, Georg, Jus pacis ac belli? Prolegomena to a sociology of International 
Law, 37 Am. J. Int’l L. 460 (1943), 470. 
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orientation towards the creation of a just and sustainable peace that separates jus post 
bellum from other strands of just war theory.  The law of making peace agreements or 
“law of peacemakers”, what Christine Bell has called lex pacificatoria119 is a crucial part 
of jus post bellum.  In operation it often spans periods of armed conflict and peace, 
because modern peace agreements often come in series, with preliminary agreements 
paving the way for “comprehensive” peace agreements that often need to be followed by 
implementing steps.  Other crucial subject areas of jus post bellum, including 
environmental law and resource allocation issues during the transition to peace, 
regulation of state responsibility, recognition of states and governments, and occupation 
law are often tightly tied to the successful coming to the agreements necessary to build a 
just and sustainable peace.   Coming to lasting agreements about peace is better 
understood as a dynamic process rather than an equation that is solved a particular 
moment. 
iii. Temporal Relation to jus ad bellum and jus in bello: Two examples of complications 
It may be helpful, when confronting the temporal expectations surrounding the terms jus 
ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum to reflect further on the perhaps surprisingly 
complex temporal dimensions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in certain instances.  
These examples are not intended to be exhaustive, merely illustrative.  
                                                 
119 See inter alia, Bell, Christine, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’, (2006) 100 
American Journal of International Law 373. 
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The contemporary difference between an armistice and a peace treaty supplies an 
example of an apparent oddity in the neat timeline of jus ad bellum followed by jus in 
bello, and concluded by jus post bellum.  The simple narrative puts jus ad bellum at the 
beginning of the story of a state of peace turning to a state of war.  An armistice, under 
contemporary usage, ends a conflict between belligerent states, but does not establish 
peace in the sense that a full peace treaty provides—a full normalization of relations.120 
Once an armistice has been agreed to, the author would suggest that considerations of jus 
ad bellum come into play when considering whether there is any restriction in 
international law or just war theory on either side breaking the armistice.  This means that 
in every instance where an armistice leads to a peace treaty, jus ad bellum considerations 
apply both at the beginning and the end of the full story of the conflict, stretching from 
peace to peace.  Jus ad bellum considerations, in these instances, are intimately connected 
to the transition to peace.  One cannot understand a body of law that covers the transition 
from armed conflict to peace without understanding jus ad bellum.   One cannot 
understand jus post bellum without jus ad bellum.   
Belligerent occupation provides another example of a situation where the overly neat 
timeline of temporally self-contained areas of ad bellum, in bello, post bellum must be 
reconsidered.  Belligerent occupation does not require active resistance, and may lead to 
a sustained peace without shots being fired.  Nonetheless, at least since the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 belligerent occupation is included as a time period and circumstance 
                                                 
120  Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (3rd ed.) Cambridge (2001), pp.  
39-43. 
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in which what has been termed jus in bello applies.  Geneva Convention IV and 
Additional Protocol I are particularly important for determining the law of armed conflict 
in a belligerent occupation.  (While the term jus in bello may not have been applied at the 
time, the modern understanding of occupation is rooted in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations121 and the identical text in the 1874 Brussels Declaration.122)  Should the 
transition to peace via preliminary peace negotiations occur during belligerent 
occupation, should this period be considered jus in bello or jus post bellum?  It makes 
more sense to consider that both regimes apply during the same time period than to try to 
determine a fine line between the two. 
iv. The Endpoint of Jus post bellum 
As with Transitional Justice, the endpoint of jus post bellum defined as regulating a 
transition to a just and sustainable peace can be difficult to identify.  While a situation 
may be analysed retrospectively to determine whether a peace is sustained, the law must 
be applied without the benefit of future hindsight.  The question of whether the current 
situation is sustainable at a particular moment (as opposed to sustained as a matter of 
historical fact) is a matter of political science and other areas of social science besides 
law.  The question of whether a peace is just may lie more in an normative analysis, 
likely grounded in human rights and the Just War Tradition, as much as positive law.  
                                                 
121  Hague Convention (Date signed: 18th October 1907), IV (Convention Relating to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land), Annex (Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land), Section III (Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State), Art. 42. 
122  Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
((signed 27 August 1874) (1873-74) 65 BFSP 1005 (1907) 1 AJIL 96) 
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While the focus of Transitional Justice is on the accomplishment of a particular 
conception of justice more than the realization of a sustainable peace, the experience of 
Transitional Justice practitioners may be helpful in using various social sciences to 
analyse the result of applying an area of law or legal approach to a particular instance.   
d.  Summarizing the Contrast in Temporal Aspects 
Many of the differences in the temporal aspects of each concept have been highlighted 
above.  International Criminal Law may in general serve the purposes of Transitional 
Justice and jus post bellum, but because of the inherent importance of the human rights of 
the accused and the fallibility of state power, the actual practice of International Criminal 
Law should as far as possible not be instrumentalized to secure a new domestic human 
rights-protective regime or sustainable peace.  
The importance placed by Transitional Justice practitioners on looking to the past and 
establishing the historical truth of past human rights abuses provides a useful reminder 
that those applying jus post bellum should keep in mind the perceived causes of the 
armed conflict.  Resource conflicts may require particular concern for environmental law, 
context-specific reparation including access to natural resources, and environmental 
remediation and concern for the environment in post-conflict rebuilding.  Conflicts based 
primarily on perceptions of human rights violations may require an extra emphasis on the 
application of human rights norms during the closing of the armed conflict and during the 
post-conflict phase.  Successful application of jus post bellum norms requires specific 
understanding of the local views of history. 
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The need to pay attention to the sequence of responses in Transitional Justice and 
sometimes not-so-immediate application of the law also holds lessons for jus post bellum.  
Application of the law regarding to the recognition of states or governments may need to 
precede the application of laws regarding foreign or international efforts in post-conflict 
rebuilding, for the very practical reason and evident need of identifying legitimate local 
authorities to work with.  Bell’s framework123 for identifying different stages of peace 
making including the implementation of peace agreements also emphasises the 
sequencing of agreements in order for the peace-making process to work. 
 
6. Specific to Global Contrast 
a. The national and international dimensions of transitional 
justice 
One phenomenon that must be addressed with respect to the national and international 
dimensions of Transitional Justice is what has been called a “justice cascade.”124 This 
term was coined to describe the dynamics behind the transnational effort to try Augusto 
Pinochet for alleged crimes under his regime, specifically “what changed between 1982 
                                                 
123 Bell, Christine, Peace Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus Post 
Bellum (May 17, 2012). Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/16. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061706 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061706 
124 See Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of 
Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America” (2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 
1; see also Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are 
Changing World Politics (W.W. Norton & Co. 2011). 
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and 1999 that made Pinochet’s arrest in Britain possible,”125 and refers more generally to 
how one legal proceeding, often abroad, can trigger domestic proceedings. It is clear that 
to understand how and why Transitional Justice works, one must keep in mind the 
sequence of Transitional Justice efforts, not only in terms of domestic application of 
Transitional Justice tools, but in terms of steps taken internationally and in domestic fora. 
While there are international tools of transitional justice, notably international fact-
finding missions and particular investigations and criminal prosecutions in international 
fora, there could also be international criminal prosecutions that should not be considered 
transitional justice. Such prosecutions could take place in a time that had effectively no 
particular reference to the transition in regime, such as a prosecution for crimes that 
happened several regimes ago, as well as international criminal prosecutions that do not 
implicate human rights violations (for example a prosecution purely for the crime of 
aggression or a war crime that did not implicate a human rights violation) or a change in 
political regime (such as a failed coup or election-related violence). 
To return to the “justice cascade” phenomenon, it is clear that while transitional justice 
has historically been largely focused on domestic responses to crimes of previous 
regimes, the picture of modern transitional justice is not complete without awareness of 
how the geographic scope of Transitional Justice may cross national borders. Tightly 
linked to the idea of a “justice cascade” in which judicial action in one (foreign) forum 
                                                 
125 Lutz and Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade” 2. 
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can result in judicial action in another forum is the idea of the “Pinochet Effect.”126 The 
Pinochet Effect emphasizes the transnational change in tone across Latin America and the 
world due to the effective fight against impunity by leaders of previous regimes. This 
idea of the international climate or zeitgeist influencing transitional justice is helpful in 
order to understand the interplay between the domestic, regional, and international 
arenas. 
b. Plotting the content of jus post bellum: specific to global 
The idea of jus post bellum as international law may lead one to believe that local context 
is largely irrelevant to the law; that it is a universal standard that applies to varied local 
and specific facts, but that the law itself does not change. In other words, while the 
assumption of Transitional Justice may be local actors working locally, the assumption 
with respect to jus post bellum may be that international norms, international fora, and the 
international perspective is all that fundamentally matters. This is not the case. In 
addition to the global or international level, it is also helpful to consider regional or mid-
range level and local or specific levels of analysis. 
On the regional or mid-range level, a few examples may be helpful. Substantively, in 
addition to UN peacekeeping efforts, there exist regional peacekeeping efforts that may 
be subject to specific regional guidelines and governance. To take an example of what 
may be a mid-level rather than a regional set of jus post bellum problems, the particular 
                                                 
126 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human 
Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press 2006). 
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problems of resolving such atypical and contested armed conflicts such as the so-called 
“war on terror” (spanning multiple, non-contiguous countries) or the “war on drugs” 
(involving massive loss of life in northern Mexico, civil wars in Colombia and 
Afghanistan, etc.)—conflicts which often cross national borders or exist transnationally 
in disparate networks with little reference to national borders. Of course, traditional 
conflicts also have important specific regional contexts, whether in the great lakes region 
of Africa or the central-south Asian context of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Procedurally, 
regional international organizations are also faced with the question of recognition of 
states and governments after conflicts. Multilateral negotiations to end armed conflict and 
build a sustainable peace are often regional (rather than global or bilateral) in scope. 
Regional positions regarding procedural issues such as immunity, for example the 
African Union positions on Sudanese President al Bashir, are obviously neither global 
nor local in scope. Mixed procedural and substantive regional or mid-level applications 
of jus post bellum include the jurisprudence of regional judicial bodies and multilateral 
treaties regarding disarmament, including procedures for verification. On the specific or 
local level, more substantive examples of jus post bellum in practice might include 
particular instances of reparation; post-conflict resolution of a particular res or just cause 
under just war theory; particular instances of state practice regarding state responsibility, 
occupation, and peacekeeping. Instances of local more procedural jus post bellum might 
include bilateral or purely domestic/intrastate agreements, specific amnesties, and 
specific state and government recognition. Mixed substantive and procedural local jus 
post bellum can be found in specific disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration 
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efforts, including verification; and jurisprudence from domestic judicial bodies relating to 
jus post bellum.  The astute reader will note that this analysis of geographic scope builds 
upon the dimension of “more substantive” or “more procedural” used in the analysis of 
the content of jus post bellum. Together, these analyses allow a two-dimensional plotting 
of jus post bellum. 
7. Legal Contrast 
Jus post bellum, like jus gentium or jus civile, is best understood as by definition 
primarily a system or body of law and related principles. The term “jus,” used in this 
context, dates back to Roman law. A jus is “one particular system or body of particular 
law.”127 While jus post bellum in practice always exists in a particular political context, 
the thing in itself is fundamentally legal in nature, not political. It is a primarily legal 
concept (of the existence of a body of law) with political implications. Jus post bellum 
can also legitimately be used to reference the aspects of just war theory that apply to the 
transition from armed conflict to peace that are philosophical in nature, as is the case with 
its sister terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
Transitional Justice weds a legal idea—human rights—to the political change that makes 
human rights enforcement possible and necessary. Transitional Justice is tied to the 
change in regime and a change in enforcement. For Transitional Justice to work, it is 
necessary to create a distinction between the old culture of impunity and the new norms 
                                                 
127 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edn, West Group, 1991). The alternative definition of jus as “a 
right,” that is, “a power, privilege, faculty, or demand inherent in one person and incident upon 
another” is not applicable in this instance. 
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of justice. Transitional Justice is political in the sense of bringing a full political 
awareness to the project of securing political-legal system that respects and enforces 
human rights norms. The International Center for Transitional Justice takes pains to 
emphasize that Transitional Justice “is not a ‘special’ kind of justice, but an approach to 
achieving justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression.”128 
Contrasting jus post bellum and Transitional Justice with respect to how political or legal 
in nature each concept is may suggest—contra Lauterpacht—that some actions, from a 
political perspective, are impossible to call legal or illegal, but are instead out of the 
realm of law and into the realm of politics, in the manner espoused by Morgenthau and 
Kelsen. This suggestion is not the intent of the author. Identifying the political nature or 
political implications of a concept should not imply that any act cannot be analyzed from 
a legal perspective. Transitional Justice practitioners are rooted in a specific legal 
regime—International Human Rights Law. 
One concept that deserves mention in this context is the idea of “meta-conflict,”129 or 
“the conflict about what the conflict is about.” Different narrative frames to understand 
an armed conflict will often be political in nature. This has implications for the 
politicization of jus post bellum. Because the true causes of the conflict are almost 
inevitably contested, the steps that need to be taken to resolve those causes and create a 
sustainable peace are also likely to be contested. 
                                                 
128 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
129 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000) 15. 
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8. Historical Foundations 
The value of placing an idea within a specific historical context is at least twofold.  First, 
knowing the environment in which a concept emerged helps understand the idea.  
Second, the fact that an idea crystalized and grew at a particular time allows reasonable 
inferences to be made about the wider international system at that time.  For jus post 
bellum and Transitional Justice particularly, these are concepts with time and a dynamic 
view of events at their core.  Their relatively recent emergence and popularity allows the 
inference that recent periods are more receptive to the idea of dynamic change.  The 
emergence and development in content of these concepts should change how the 
international system is regarded, from a more static to a more dynamic entity.  That 
dynamism, with inherent emphasis on change over time, means that time has become a 
more critical factor in understanding how the international system works.   
A comparative analysis of the historical foundations of Transitional Justice, jus post 
bellum, and International Criminal Law demonstrates the particularities of each 
concept—how each concept is separately rooted in a particular context.  International 
Criminal Law is helpful to include in a comparative study because the concept of post-
conflict criminal justice is often confused with jus post bellum.  The fact that 
International Criminal Law strictu sensu was not institutionalized from the Treaties of 
Westphalia to World War II, but has flowered since the end of the Cold War, suggests an 
incompatibility between a conception of International Law that directly addresses the 
criminal culpability of natural persons and the dominant conception of International Law 
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during the aforementioned period.  The idea that International Law can reach down to the 
individual, potentially including governmental officials, did not reach a receptive 
audience until the period after World War II.   
Similarly, the historical foundation of Transitional Justice in contemporary transitions to 
democracy reveals why the concept did not take root earlier.  The idea of bias towards 
transitions to democracy or at least human rights protective regimes would have been 
anathema to an international order that was protective of the status quo and dominated by 
non-democracies.   
Finally, it is true that particularly in the aftermath of the conflicts of the late 19th Century 
and World War I, sovereign states could consent to limitations to the resort to armed 
force and the methods of warfare encapsulated in the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello.  That said, the idea of restricting a victorious state with normatively-grounded law 
as an armed conflict concludes, a moment typically left entirely to politics and the facts 
on the ground, meant that the normative teachings of the Just War Tradition regarding the 
transition from armed conflict to peace were not fully developed into international law. 
An analysis of the temporal dimensions of each concept assists in understanding the 
systematic effect of the concepts on the international system as a whole.  Transitional 
Justice, with its framework assuming a new political-legal system that can evaluate a 
previous political-legal system, embraces a normative vision that rejects a status quo of 
sovereign supremacy at the expense of accountability for human rights violations.  
Regimes in charge of sovereign states that do not protect human rights are not likely to 
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embrace a concept that suggests that there should be a transition to a new regime that 
would hold previous regime actors accountable for mass human rights violations.  
Jus post bellum seeks to constrain armed groups at the moment they are may be most 
difficult to constrain—emerging victorious, with potential opposition exhausted.  The 
idea that agreements are void “if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of 
force in violation of the principles of international law”130 would have invalidated many 
peace agreements if taken literally during the Westphalian era, and certainly would have 
posed problems with agreements that formed the legal cover for much of the colonial era.    
The systemic effects of International Criminal Law may reach beyond the purposes of 
Transitional Justice and jus post bellum by focusing International Law more on natural 
persons and less on states.  Like Transitional Justice, International Criminal Law can be 
retrospective in evaluation of past events, and prospective in terms of improving the 
future through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, education, and reconciliation.  
Where the purpose of International Criminal Law is not future-oriented, it strikes directly 
at a model of international law that leaves sovereign states as the sole subjects and 
objects, with criminal law reserved for municipal law.  The supremacy of sovereignty is 
left subtly challenged on multiple levels—no longer is a regime expected to go 
unchallenged by internal challenges to its political-legal system, challenges as it 
concludes a conflict and sets up a new legal system to govern the peace, or challenges 
over its monopoly on penal law.   
                                                 
130 Article 52, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
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These challenges to the supremacy of sovereignty may not continue.  International 
Criminal Law may fail to meet its promise if institutional budgets are throttled back by 
the states that the institutions rely upon.  Transitional Justice may lose its focus and 
become in part a tool of abusive regimes.  Jus post bellum may fail to establish itself with 
its sister terms, be depreciated and lose currency.  But the tide of history since World War 
II seems to be flowing towards concepts that reconfigure sovereignty, while still 
depending on sovereign states for operation.  A proper understanding of the historic and 
current role of each concept, and how they work together to change the international 
system, is essential for those who wish these concepts to endure. 
Transitional Justice challenges the bias towards the status quo and against regime change 
arguably inherent in the international system—instead seeking to end a climate of 
impunity and secure durable political and legal systems that protect human rights.   
International Criminal Law challenges a jealous view of sovereignty by suggesting that 
international law directly criminalizes individual conduct.  Jus post bellum challenges 
sovereign authority even up to the supreme moment of sovereignty when one state has 
emerged as victorious in a conflict with another state.   
a. Transitional Justice 
The term is rooted in political transitions of Latin American and Eastern Europe in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, with the term “transition” emphasizing the change from 
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authoritarian rule to democracy.131 Teitel links the withdrawal of support from the USSR 
to guerilla forces in the late 1970s to the eventual end of military rule in South 
America.132 The transitions in Eastern Europe after 1989 were obviously tied to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Transitional Justice, as a concept, cannot be understood 
without reference to the domestic political transition. As a historical phenomenon, it 
cannot be understood without reference to international power politics and foreign 
relations. Teitel suggests that the phase of post-Cold War Transitional Justice has been 
replaced with a new phase associated with globalization and heightened political 
instability.133 A full exposition of the history of Transitional Justice is outside the scope 
of this chapter, but even a brief look at its history emphasizes the point emphasized by 
the International Center for Transitional Justice that Transitional Justice “is not a special 
form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of 
pervasive human rights abuse.”134 
                                                 
131 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016); see also Juan Linz, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press 1996); Guilermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies Vol. 4 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1986). 
132 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” 71. 
133 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” 71. 
134 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
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b. Jus post bellum 
Understanding the historical foundations of jus post bellum requires an analysis of the 
contemporary division between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as well as looking at the 
treatment of the concept of law applying to the transition to peace as well. Robert Kolb 
tentatively credited Josef Kunz with coining the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello in 
their contemporary sense in 1934.135 Stahn has identified the emergence of the terms in 
the 1920s,136 with Guiliano Enriques using the term jus ad bellum in 1928.137 
The interwar period was hardly the first time concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
were in play. Indeed, the reason for the success of these terms was not only because of 
their usefulness in discussing the law as it was at the time, but to discuss the history of 
international law on these issues. 
The traditional division in classical international law between the law of war and the law 
of peace was a sharp one. War, generally speaking, discontinued the application of what 
might be called the “ordinary” international law that occurred during periods of peace. 
Treaties, formed in peacetime between non-belligerents, were abrogated when states 
became belligerents. During the classical positivist era, even the naturalist constraints on 
the power to wage war were downplayed. The pre-First World War Hague Conventions 
                                                 
135 Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello” 561. 
136 Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)” 312. 
137 See Giuliano Enriques, “Considerazioni sulla teoria della Guerra nel diritto Internazionale” 
(Considerations on the Theory of War in International Law) (1928) 7 Rivista Di Diritto 
Internazionale (Journal of International Law) 172. 
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of 1899 and 1907 and the post-First World War efforts such as the League of Nations and 
the Kellogg-Briand pact can be seen as part of an effort to lessen (and ultimately 
eradicate) the possibility of war ceasing the application of the international law of peace. 
Of particular interest is the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) of 18 
October 1907. 
The terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello arose in the context framed by the pre- and post-
First World War efforts to address the question of the power to wage war, and indeed on 
Lauterpacht’s framing of the function of law in the international community as a 
comprehensive system. Those using the terms built on a rich tradition, and in many ways 
surpassed the classical naturalists in establishing rules to constrain armed conflict. Armed 
conflict, regardless of whether it was adorned with the trappings of formal declarations or 
recognitions of a state of war, was increasingly going to be considered less of a reason for 
a suspension of the “ordinary” functions of law in the international community, the 
functions that pertain during peace. 
Robert Kolb, in the “Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello,” leads one to an 
irony in the origins of the creation of a fundamental aspect of jus in bello—that it applies 
regardless of the justness of the cause of either side, generally applying to all belligerents. 
The strength of the idea of the Reason of State depreciated the question of the justness of 
a war during the nineteenth century.138 Kolb suggests, following Peter Haggenmacher,139 
                                                 
138 Kolb, “Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello” 556. 
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that the idea of the Reason of State allowed a focus on the de facto and de jure conduct of 
hostilities, regardless of the justness of the resort to armed force. A critical function of the 
emergence of these two terms is the emphasis on the separate operation of these two 
terms—underlining the idea that one can (and should) objectively evaluate the rights and 
duties pertaining to the conduct of armed force separately from the legality of resorting to 
armed force, and vice versa. 
In the context of the Grotian tradition as identified by Lauterpacht, there is an irony that 
the apparent failure of one aspect of the Grotian tradition enabled the success of another 
aspect of the Grotian tradition. Namely, the failure of the Rejection of “Reason of 
State”140 with respect to the resort to armed force enabled The Subjection of the Totality 
of International Relations to the Rule of Law141 with respect to what might be seen as one 
of the most difficult areas to apply the Rule of Law—the rights and duties durante bello, 
when international relations between the belligerents has been reduced to armed conflict. 
This, in a sense, is an important part of the story Kolb tells about the emergence of the 
terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
It is also the story that needs to be told of jus post bellum—the subjection of the totality 
of international relations to the rule of law, even at the moment when a victorious state 
would be expected to leave law and normative principles behind and follow only the 
                                                                                                                                                 
139 Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Presses Universitaires de 
France 1983) 599. 
140 Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” 30. 
141 Ibid 19. 
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mandates of politics and force.  Seen historically, jus post bellum represents the last 
frontier of subjecting relations between states to the rule of law, not only in times of 
established peace or established armed conflict but during the difficult status mixtus 
periods when new states and new political-legal structures are born.   
As Randall Lesaffer notes, interest in the history of international law has waxed and 
waned, with an increase during the First and Second World Wars followed by a 
subsequent decline.142 This last peak in interest generally coincides with the coining of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello, in addition to Lauterpacht’s framing of the Grotian 
Tradition. Lesaffer suggests that we are in the midst of a new surge of interest in 
international history, perhaps preparing the ground for adoption and development of a 
new term, jus post bellum. 
9. Going Forward – Continuing the Grotian Tradition 
Those interested in jus post bellum would be well served to pay attention to Transitional 
Justice for a variety of reasons. Transitional Justice will often be applied simultaneously 
with jus post bellum. The area of law at the heart of Transitional Justice, International 
Human Rights Law, is critical to understanding the law applicable to the ending of 
conflict and the building of peace—from the treatment of amnesties in peace agreements 
to the protection of human rights in constitutional documents. The success of Transitional 
Justice advocates in placing human rights and the fight against impunity at the center of 
                                                 
142 Randall Lesaffer, Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late 
Middle Ages to World War One (Cambridge University Press 2004) 2. 
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global governance should be lauded and emulated. At the same time, those interested in 
jus post bellum may wish to take note of the danger in definitional creep, particularly 
using a relatively new term such as “Transitional Justice” and applying it without a 
change in regime, particularly in a one-sided manner by a human rights-abusing regime. 
Whether Transitional Justice and jus post bellum continue to grow and endure as useful 
concepts depends in part on whether these terms are defined with sufficient rigor.  
Because both terms deal with complex phenomena and benefit from scholarly interest 
from disparate fields and traditions, coming closer to a consensus on the definition of 
these terms is difficult.  Since Transitional Justice and jus post bellum will often (but not 
always) apply simultaneously, it is all the more important to attempt this difficult task—
to define both terms clearly and develop them in accordance with contemporary realities.  
It is important to recognize that multiple maximands will co-exist, rooted in the separate 
but related traditions, sometimes in tension, but hopefully almost always carried forward 
with good will.  
The observant reader may have noted that, in contrast with other scholars, the definition 
of Transitional Justice embraced by this chapter is narrower than the increasingly broad 
definitions commonly used, while the definition of jus post bellum is broader. I do not see 
this as a contradiction, but rather a reflection of the separate problems each concept is 
designed to address. 
Transitional Justice, as a specific conception of justice responding to the particular 
problems of political change and confronting the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
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regimes, allows for establishing a new political compact that pledges an end to impunity 
for human rights abuses, including by new elites. Focusing on that specific problem and 
specific concept makes the term more useful than a general euphemism for anything 
alleging human rights abuses, regardless of political circumstance. 
Jus post bellum recognizes the problem of systematically applying international law to 
the difficult area of transitioning from armed conflict to a sustainable peace. A narrow 
focus on one aspect of the transition to a sustainable peace misses the challenge implied 
by the term “jus,” that the effort of those involved must be to find the connections 
between various legal obligations and discover what is systematic about the law that 
applies to the process of achieving a sustainable peace. 
There is, perhaps, an irony in suggesting that the Grotian Tradition as identified by 
Lauterpacht is “continuing” with the development of jus post bellum as a system of law 
pertaining to the transition from armed conflict to a sustainable peace. Lauterpacht did 
not portray international law as an inkspot that had spread to some areas but not others. 
Should disputes have arisen in his era as to the legality of acts taken during the transition 
to a sustainable peace, he surely would have felt those disputes could have arisen. 
Yet embracing the concept that there should be no judicial non liquet in international law 
permits the idea that international law changes and develops, clarifies and matures. In a 
sense, uncovering the normative and historical foundations of jus post bellum is a project 
of construction as much as genealogy or archaeology. Application of international law in 
the transition to sustainable peace may be more or less part of a coherent and integrated 
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system. The vision of Transitional Justice practitioners of their field as not a “special” 
field of law but a “holistic” practice of judicial and non-judicial approaches to a particular 
circumstance143 surely provides some guidance and reassurance to those approaching the 
definitional questions of jus post bellum. 
While I maintain that jus post bellum is best viewed primarily as a system of law, it is not 
yet as tightly internally integrated as its sister systems of law, jus ad bellum, and jus in 
bello. Conversely, jus post bellum is probably more tightly connected to diverse fields of 
law that operate during times of transition from armed conflict and during other 
circumstances. This is not a threat to the legitimacy of the concept of studying the 
international law that exists during the circumstance of transition to a sustainable peace, 
rather it is an opportunity and a challenge to discern the operations of law in this complex 
and varied environment. 
                                                 
143 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “What is Transitional Justice” available at  
http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed 27 May 2016). 
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5.  Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed 
Conflict    
A. Introduction 
One important dimension that needs explicit exploration is the differences and 
commonalities between jus post bellum in two types of armed conflict: international 
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.  “Armed conflict” as a standard 
replacement for the term “war” originates with the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 
Pictet Commentary to the First Geneva Convention of 1949 is clear that substituting 
“armed conflict” in place of “war” was intentionally done to ensure that States do not 
attempt to deny the applicability of the law by, for example, claiming that they are 
engaged only in a police action, rather than a war.
1   
These two categories, international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, 
are the two dominant concepts that structure thinking about armed conflict.  The concepts 
are well-understood in the field of international humanitarian law, but can cause 
confusion without precise definition.  The clearest term used in the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 are, for non-international armed conflicts: “armed conflict not of an international 
                                                 
1 The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary (Vol.I) - Geneva Convention For the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field by Pictet, 
Jean S. (1952), Chapter I General Provisions, p.27 Article 2 - Application of the Convention, 
p.32. 
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character.”2  The explanation of armed conflicts of an international character (that is, 
international armed conflict) is as follows: 
[a]ll cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to 
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.3 
The actual wording of above suggests a distinction not normally drawn between 
international armed conflict (“[a]ll cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them”) and occupation (“shall also apply”).  It is clear 
that the Geneva Conventions, and thus International Humanitarian Law, apply to declared 
war or any other armed conflict as well as occupation.  Further, Additional Protocol II 
explains that what is normally described as “International Armed Conflict” “include[s] 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination[.]”4  The following sections will first discuss the traditional area of 
distinguishing International Armed Conflict from Non-International Armed Conflict for 
jus in bello, then for jus ad bellum, before turning to jus post bellum. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Common Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
3 Common Article 2 of each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
4 APII, Article 1. 
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B. Jus in bello in IAC and NIAC 
This section does not intend to outline international humanitarian law/jus in bello in 
general—this has been done in an introductory manner in Chapter 2.A.  The focus of this 
section is to emphasize that in contemporary law, it is clear that both International Armed 
Conflicts and Non-International Armed Conflicts are regulated by jus in bello.   
The purported origins of jus in bello purely in International Armed Conflict, as opposed 
to Non-International Armed Conflict, is based in the early positivist stance that 
international law regulates only states.  The longer Just War Tradition was not so limited.  
One need merely look at the writings of Francisco de Victoria’s De Indis et De Jure 
Belli5 regarding the law of nations or the trial of King Charles I of England for violations 
of the law of war during the two civil wars during his reign to complicate the overly-neat 
picture of progression from jus in bello only applying to International Armed Conflict 
before it was purportedly extended for the first time to Non-International Armed Conflict 
in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  Hugo Grotius discusses the 
idea of private and mercenary wars. Emer de Vattel argued that a sovereign must observe 
the laws of war in the case of open rebellion. Francis Lieber’s codification of the laws of 
war occurred during the U.S. Civil War.  Nonetheless, given the dominant positivist 
stance of international law and the primitive state of human rights law, Common Article 
3 is rightly celebrated as a turning point in the formalization and universalization of the 
regulation of the conduct of Non-International Armed Conflict (i.e., NIAC jus in bello).   
                                                 
5 De Vitoria, Francisco. Francisci de Victoria De Indis et De ivre belli relectiones. No. 7. 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917. 
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Common Article 3 is often described as a mini-convention, meant to provide a baseline 
standard for all armed conflict.6 Literally read, it applies only to “armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” 
not all armed conflict, but given the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 there is no real territorial bar and it has been generally recognized as customary 
international law for all armed conflicts.  It protects “Persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities” and obliges each party to the conflict to treat such persons humanely, 
specifically prohibiting a short list of inhumane conduct.7  
In order to establish the existence of an International Armed Conflict, the threshold of 
violence is thus very low—the first shot fired downrange can suffice, or no shots at all in 
the case of occupation or declared war.8  The critical element is that the armed conflict 
                                                 
6 For more on the history leading to the creation of Common Article 3, see Elder, David A. 
"Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, The." Case w. 
Res. J. Int'l L. 11 (1979): 37. 
7 (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
8 But see Nicaragua v. United States of America [1986] ICJ Rep 14, [195] regarding “mere 
frontier incidents”: (“The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of 
armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another 
State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an 
armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed 
forces.”) 
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must be between two or more states.  For a Non-International Armed Conflict, differing 
thresholds apply depending upon whether Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II 
applies.  Common Article 3 has a lower threshold, requiring a minimum level of 
intensity, and requiring the non-state armed groups to possess organized armed forces, for 
example command structure and ability to sustain military operations.9  The protections 
of Common Article 3 were substantially extended for a certain set of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts with Additional Protocol II.  Additional Protocol II requires the 
thresholds of intensity and organization required by Common Article 3, and additionally: 
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 10 
Unlike Common Article 3, the threshold for Additional Protocol II also requires that it is 
not of the character of the armed conflicts described in Article 1 Additional Protocol I, 
that a state’s armed forces are party to the conflict, and that the non-state party’s armed 
group exercise control over territory in a manner than enables them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement Additional Protocol II. 
                                                 
9 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Tadic, 2 October 1995 
10 AP I, Art. 1.1. 
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In addition to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 
1977, there are a host of additional treaties, many detailed in Section Introduction, 
Exploration of Sister Terms, Jus in bello above.  The two Additional Protocols of 1977 
continue not only the Geneva Conventions of 1949 but the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 in restricting the means and methods of warfare, including specific rules that 
apply to demilitarized zones and non-defended areas.   
There are also treaties that restrict weapons that are part of jus in bello both with respect 
to non-international armed conflict and international armed conflict.  These treaties have 
already also been examined to some extent in Section Introduction, Exploration of Sister 
Terms, Jus in bello above.  The trend is to make clear or provide means by which these 
treaties apply to non-international armed conflicts as well as international armed 
conflicts.  Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices (Protocol II), adopted 10 October 1980, explicitly applied to non-
international armed conflicts: 
2.This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in Article I 
of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being 
armed conflicts. 
3.In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the 
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conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this 
Protocol.11 
Similarly, under the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)12 non-
international armed conflict were covered, and ultimately the 1980 Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects13 was amended in 
2001 to cover non-international armed conflicts.14 
In addition, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict specifically applies to non-international armed conflict with regards to “respect 
for cultural property.”15  This means the bulk of the convention on its own terms is 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts.  The Second Protocol to the Hague 
                                                 
11 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effect (United Nations 
[UN]) 1342 UNTS 137, UN Reg No I-22495, Protocol II Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. 
12 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV; adopted 13 October 1995, entered into 
force 30 July 1998; 2024 UNTS 163). 
13 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effect (United Nations 
[UN]) 1342 UNTS 137, UN Reg No I-22495, Art.1. 
14 Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects - Final Document, Part II Final 
Declaration. 
15 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]) 249 UNTS 240, UN Reg 
No I-3511, Ch.VI Scope of Application of the Convention, Art.19. 
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Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict extends the entire Convention to non-international armed conflicts.16 
International Humanitarian Law has mostly been described in this section with reference 
to treaty law, but of course it also exists as customary international law.  Customary 
International Humanitarian Law with respect to non-international armed conflict is 
somewhat controversial, particularly with respect to the role of role and status of 
combatants.  Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, and the 
efforts of jurists such as Theodor Meron17 and notably the International Committee of the 
Red Cross’s customary international humanitarian law study18 have developed the basic 
argument with respect to application of jus in bello in international armed conflicts to jus 
in bello in non-international armed conflicts: 
Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it 
preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed 
conflicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down 
rebellion by their own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, 
and consequently proscribed, in international wars cannot but be inhumane 
and inadmissible in civil strife. 19 
                                                 
16 Second Protocol to The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
[UNESCO]) 2253 UNTS 172, UN Reg No A-3511. 
17 Meron, Theodor. "The continuing role of custom in the formation of international humanitarian 
law." American Journal of International Law (1996): 238-249. 
18 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Louise Doswald-Beck, and Carolin Alvermann, eds.Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, Rules. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
19 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka “Dule”, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, § 119. 
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C. Jus ad bellum in IAC and NIAC 
“Jus ad bellum” is a phrase normally used only with respect to international armed 
conflict.  There is no prohibition of rebellion (nor of putting down rebellion) as such in 
international law.  In contrast, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter famously 
commands: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 20  
Thus, jus ad bellum is sometimes now declared to be jus contra bellum, restricting resort 
to force in international armed conflict to self-defence or United Nations-authorized use 
of force. That said, a broader view of jus ad bellum has implications for the treatment of 
non-international armed conflict.   
International law is not simply mute on the issue of the (jus ad bellum) issue of resort to 
the use of force amounting to an armed conflict when both parties are not states, 
particularly in the context of decolonization and self-determination.  Indeed, the context 
of decolonization has helped to redraw the boundaries of international armed conflict and 
non-international armed conflict.  The concept of self-determination can be found at least 
as far back as the late 18th century, with the United States of America proclaiming the 
                                                 
20 Charter of the United Nations (done at San Francisco, United States, on 26 June 1945) (United 
Nations [UN]) 1 UNTS XVI, 892 UNTS 119, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 145 BSP 
805, Ch.I Purposes and Principles, Art.2(4). 
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principle in the Declaration of Independence21 and was further promoted by the leaders 
of the (First) French Republic.  The concept was further developed after the First World 
War, and found truly modern expression in the United Nations Charter and subsequent 
practice.  Three chapters of the United Nations Charter are of particular interest: Chapter 
XI: Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories; Chapter XII: International 
Trusteeship System; and Chapter XIII: The Trusteeship Council.   
Self-determination is a right enjoyed by, at a minimum, people under colonial rule.  
There is a legal obligation not to use force to frustrate that right.  The keystone for this 
clarification of this area of law is the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
2625, widely known as the “Friendly Relations Declaration” of 1970.22  Similarly, the 
1973 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3103 on the Basic Principles of the 
Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and 
Racist Regimes: 
[t]he armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and 
alien domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international 
armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 
legal status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and other international instruments is to apply to the persons 
                                                 
21 Declaration of Independence of the United States of America (United States) 51 BSP 847. 
22 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations [UN]) UN 
Doc A/RES/2625(XXV), Annex. 
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engaged in armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist 
regimes  23 
This was given additional weight by Additional Protocol I, as previously described.24  It 
says in Article 1, paragraphs 3 and 4: 
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations 
referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions. 
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations.25 
While Additional Protocol I governs jus in bello concerns, its emphasis on the right of 
self-determination again complicates the jus ad bellum concerns regarding the right to 
enter into armed conflict, and the recharacterization of certain armed conflicts as 
international armed conflicts rather than non-international armed conflicts.  
While this section focuses on the contemporary jus ad bellum in international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict, later sections will discuss the long history 
                                                 
23 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) on the basic principles of the 
legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes 
(United Nations General Assembly [UNGA]) UN Doc A/RES/3103(XXVIII), para. 3. 
24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. 
25 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977). 
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of jus ad bellum.  There was nothing like the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2 
of the United Nations Charter in the time of Hugo Grotius, but there were still clear jus 
ad bellum limits.  Grotius wrote that it was not “right to take up arms in order to weaken 
a power which, if it becomes too great, may be a source of danger” for example.26  
It is also worth looking at domestic law approaches to armed conflict.  In the United 
States, in theory, native tribes were protected from attack, except when Congress 
authorized a just and lawful war against them. 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their 
land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; 
and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or 
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws 
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for 
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and 
friendship with them. 27  
Whether armed conflict with native groups would constitute an international armed 
conflict or non-international armed conflict is somewhat anachronistic, although the issue 
of an international legal personality and legitimacy for national liberation movement has 
20th century echoes. 
This section was not intended to exhaust the issue of jus ad bellum, but rather to 
introduce jus ad bellum with respect to international armed conflict and non-international 
                                                 
26 H Grotius De iure belli ac pacis, vol II, ch l, sec XVII 
27 An Act to provide for the government of the territory northwest of the river Ohio.  The 
Ordinance of July 13, 1787 (1 Stat. 52).  Available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp last visited 24 March 2015.   
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armed conflict and set the stage for a discussion of jus post bellum in the context of 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.    
D. Jus post bellum in IAC and NIAC 
What jus post bellum looks like in an international armed conflict and non-international 
armed conflict depends on what one means by jus post bellum.  As described above, there 
are two major ways to approach jus post bellum and its relationship to its sister terms, as 
well as a hybrid approach.  With the temporal approach, jus ad bellum, governs the 
beginning of an armed conflict, jus in bello governs the armed conflict from beginning to 
end, and jus post bellum governs directly after armed conflict is terminated, in effect 
restricted to early peace.  With the functional approach, jus post bellum applies to the 
entire function of transition from armed conflict to peace, even if some of that function 
occurs during armed conflict.  Taken together, there is also the possibility of a hybrid 
approach, which is defined both by time and function, rooted temporally in the period of 
transition from conflict and the achievement of a positive peace, and functionally 
restricted to the construction of positive peace.   
1. Complications 
Addressing jus post bellum with respect to international and non-international armed 
conflict is complicated by at least three factors, which will be described before looking at 
the subject matter placed within a general schematic representation of the subject matter 
of jus post bellum.  Each complication will be addressed now in turn. 
5.  Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed Conflict  
    Jus post bellum in IAC and NIAC 
 
287 
 
First, the status of an armed conflict as a non-international armed conflict or international 
armed conflict is not static.  An international armed conflict can be transformed into a 
non-international armed conflict in practice.  The reverse is also true.  Afghanistan’s 
recent history provides a good example of this.  In Afghanistan, there was arguably a 
non-international armed conflict between the forces later characterized as the “Northern 
Alliance” and the Taliban government, although one could argue with requirement of 
sufficient ongoing intensity.  The best understanding is that this then became an 
“internationalized” international armed conflict between the United States/NATO conflict 
with Afghanistan until the Taliban were overthrown.  Once a new government was 
established and widely recognized, the armed conflict between the government and the 
Taliban (as well as other organized armed groups), the armed conflict is best 
characterized as a non-international armed conflict.  One could argue whether Pakistan’s 
alleged support for organized armed groups “internationalizes” the conflict again.  
Similarly, the long civil war in Sudan was a non-international armed conflict until South 
Sudan seceded, any further armed conflict between Sudan and those who now constitute 
the government of South Sudan would then be characterized as an international armed 
conflict.   
Second, non-international armed conflicts and international armed conflicts can co-exist 
at the same time and place (a “mixed conflict”) or in ways that influence each other.  
Pakistan arguably provides an example of this.  The United States asserts it is in a non-
international armed conflict with organized armed groups based at least in part in 
Pakistan.  Formally, the repeated use of force by the United States in the territory of 
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Pakistan may satisfy the requirements for an international armed conflict, if the 
government of Pakistan has not consented to the use of force.  While related, and in fact 
springing from the same use of force, as a legal matter the (potential) non-international 
armed conflict and international armed conflict must be analysed separately. 
Third, non-international armed conflict may be increasingly less limited to one state 
territory per conflict, and non-international armed conflicts may be more difficult to 
separate than previously.  Organized armed groups party to non-international armed 
conflicts may have no inherent need to remain in a single territory, and indeed crossing 
territories or being based across territories can provide advantages or be necessary for the 
survival of organized armed groups.  The Taliban and the Haqqani Network are examples 
of organized armed groups straddling the Afghani-Pakistan border.  The Islamic State is 
operating in both Iraqi and Syrian territory.  The various armed groups in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa do not have a great respect for national boundaries. 
2. Prohibitions and facilitations 
As a general note, while jus ad bellum and jus in bello generally but not exclusively 
consist of prohibitions, jus post bellum has both prohibitions and facilitative functions.  
Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum will now be briefly examined with respect 
to prohibitions, obligations, facilitative opportunities. 
The general rule of contemporary jus ad bellum is prohibition, with limited exceptions for 
the use of force in international affairs for self-defence and United Nations Security 
Council authorized actions.  Arguably the inclusion of the option for collective security 
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mechanisms and Security Council resolutions are facilitative, but the general tendency is 
prohibition.  Those agreements themselves can create specific obligations dependent on 
the particular situation. 
Jus in bello is usually phrased in the form of prohibition regarding the particular uses of 
force, such as prohibiting attacks against civilians, indiscriminate attacks, 
disproportionate attacks, attacks that create unnecessary suffering, or prohibited means 
and methods.  Jus in bello/international humanitarian law/law of armed conflict does, 
however, include affirmative obligations, such as care for those rendered hors de combat 
and for prisoners of war, and obligations on occupiers.  Interestingly, while these 
affirmative obligations are normally squarely placed as part of jus in bello, they often 
involve obligations that extend beyond active combat—occupations have no inherent 
time limit, and obligations to prisoners of war can take years to discharge.  While not 
obligatory, the possibility of jus in bello facilitative activity like exchanges of prisoners 
of war is certainly possible. 
3. More procedural aspects 
a) Treaty and agreement law 
As discussed above, this author finds the hybrid functional approach the better reading of 
jus post bellum, allowing a full incorporation of jus terminatio and lex pacificatoria into 
the concept and keeping the focus on the function of the law and noting the important but 
sometimes arbitrary temporal delimitation between the end of an armed conflict and early 
peace.  Using this approach, one formal distinction that can be made is the distinction 
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between an armed conflict terminating through a peace treaty (or series of peace treaties) 
in the case of an international armed conflict, and a peace agreement (or series of peace 
agreements) in the case of a non-international armed conflict.  The term “peace treaty” is 
generally reserved for agreements not signed by non-state organized armed groups, 
whereas the more general term “peace agreement” can include peace treaties but is used 
more frequently for agreements that are not technically treaties because they include non-
state groups (other than inter-governmental organizations) in the agreement.   
In an international armed conflict, during lex pacificatoria or jus terminatio, the 
application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties28 and associated customary 
international law of treaties is a critical facilitative law that is a key part of jus post 
bellum.  The customary international law of state recognition may come into play if there 
has been an attempted or successful secession or annexation, although secession may be 
more likely in (what started as) a non-international armed conflict.  The customary 
international law of state recognition is also important if a government has been 
overthrown or if an occupying power attempts to install a puppet government.  The 
recognition of states and governments applies to states, but can also come into play for 
intergovernmental organizations as well. 
b) Amnesty and aut dedere aut judicare 
One tension that may come into play in the transition from armed conflict to peace, 
perhaps particularly in international armed conflict, is the obligation that exists to 
                                                 
28 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, (Entry into force: 27 
January 1980) United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 
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prosecute or extradite for prosecution the alleged perpetration of certain crimes.  The 
fight against impunity that creates this tension, often at the heart of the “peace vs. justice” 
debate, may complicate the short-term transition to peace but is often helpful to make the 
transition to peace successful in the long run.29  This is often described using the Latin 
term aut dedere aut judicare, although it is common now to tamp down the demand to 
prosecute to merely “submit for prosecution” because of varied responsibilities and 
procedures at the domestic level and the presumption of innocence in criminal law.  
Given actual state practice and demonstrated opinio juris, one cannot generally assert 
there is a yet a general customary duty to prosecute or extradite for all alleged 
international criminal law violations.  This is explored in greater detail in Chapter 6.b.2.b 
infra. 
c) The Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine30 is one of general application as a matter of 
international law and policy.  It does not require armed conflict of any sort for its 
                                                 
29 See e.g. Darehshori, Sara. Selling justice short: why accountability matters for peace. Human 
Rights Watch, 2009. 
30 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(International Development Research Centre 2001) 39–45; see also United Nations Secretary 
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 
65–7; United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (15 
September 2005) paras 138–9; United Nations General Assembly, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 (12 January 2009) 
para. 48. 
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application.  Rather, as part of the “just cause” it requires either large-scale loss of life or 
“ethnic cleansing.”31 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine includes the Responsibility to Prevent, 
Responsibility to Respond, and the Responsibility to Rebuild.  The Responsibility to 
Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild are more tightly tied to jus post bellum.  In 
comparison with the Responsibility to Respond, these aspects of the Responsibility to 
Protect (Prevent and Rebuild) apply more generally to international armed conflict and 
non-international armed conflict, but are probably still envisaged to apply more to non-
international armed conflict.  This subject is treated in more detail in chapter 6.B.2.b 
infra. 
4. Mixed procedural and substantive aspects 
Reviewing the schematic depiction of examples of law and norms regarding the transition 
to peace reproduced above, most of the material under the first column, titled 
“Procedural” has been addressed in this section (Jus post bellum in IAC and NIAC).  The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the customary law of treaties has been 
briefly examined (a very general/global law), as opposed to intrastate/domestic peace 
negotiations (which can be very specific/local).  Both are part of the lex pacificatoria or 
jus terminatio.  Similarly, the general laws and norms regarding the recognition of states 
and government apply as a general matter, and the specific case-by-case state recognition 
                                                 
31 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International 
Development Research Centre 2001) p. XII. 
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and government recognition on the local matter also makes law and norms that apply to 
the transition to peace.  Also discussed above—the treaty and customary international 
law regarding the prosecution or extradition of individuals accused of certain 
international crimes, in tension with local amnesty laws.  Finally on the procedural end of 
law and norms regarding the transition to peace, the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine 
was discussed. 
Moving to law and norms that are a mixture of procedural and substance, several issues 
are worth particular consideration in distinguishing between international armed conflict 
and non-international armed conflict.  These include United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, customary international law on post-conflict administration, the existence of 
global judicial bodies with jurisprudence relating to jus post bellum, regional judicial 
bodies jurisprudence relating to jus post bellum, multilateral disarmament treaties, 
specific disarmament/demobilization reintegration efforts, and domestic judicial bodies 
jurisprudence relating to jus post bellum. 
The authority of United Nations Security Council resolutions derives from the United 
Nations Charter, particularly Chapters VI and VII.32  The Charter itself derives its legal 
status not only from the general force of treaty law as an almost universally ratified 
treaty, but from Article 103 of the Charter, which states “In the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
                                                 
32 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  Chapters that 
pertain to the powers of the Security Council  (V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII), with Chapters VI and 
VII of the most relevance for resolutions. 
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and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.” 33 Article 25 obliges Members of the United Nations to 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council.34  While the United Nations Security 
Council was not intended to function as a legislative body, it has wide powers on matters 
touching upon peace and security, and the retraints on its acting in a tailored fashion and 
to avoid ultra vires action are more practical and political than through a formal 
institutional check.     
The United Nations Security Council has issued a number of resolutions of relevance 
regarding the transition from armed conflict to peace, including resolutions that have 
applicability outside a particular territorial situation..  United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 132535 and 188936 are of particular note.  In general terms, United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325 enunciates both procedural norms for the resolution of 
armed conflict and norms for the substance of peace agreements.  With respect to 
procedural norms, see for example paragraph 1: “1. Urges Member States to ensure 
increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and 
                                                 
33 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
34 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 25. 
35 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and 
security] , 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 (2000). 
36 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1889 (2009) [on women and peace and 
security], 5 October 2009, S/RES/1889 (2009). 
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international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution 
of conflict[.]”37  With respect to substantive norms, see for example paragraph 8: 
8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace 
agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The 
special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and 
for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) 
Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous 
processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the 
implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that 
ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, 
particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the 
police and the judiciary[.]38 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 also enunciates procedural norms for 
the resolution of armed conflict as well as substantive requirements in the post-conflict 
phase.  With respect to procedural aspects of United Nations Security Council 1889, see 
for example, from the preambular language: 
Reiterating the need for the full, equal and effective participation of 
women at all stages of peace processes given their vital role in the 
prevention and resolution of conflict and peacebuilding, reaffirming the 
key role women can play in re-establishing the fabric of recovering society 
and stressing the need for their involvement in the development and 
implementation of post-conflict strategies in order to take into account 
their perspectives and needs, Expressing deep concern about the under-
representation of women at all stages of peace processes, particularly the 
very low numbers of women in formal roles in mediation processes and 
stressing the need to ensure that women are appropriately appointed at 
                                                 
37 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and 
security] , 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 (2000). 
38 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and 
security] , 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 (2000). 
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decision-making levels, as high level mediators, and within the 
composition of the mediators’ teams, Remaining deeply concerned about 
the persistent obstacles to women’s full involvement in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and participation in postconflict public life, as a 
result of violence and intimidation, lack of security and lack of rule of law, 
cultural discrimination and stigmatization, including the rise of extremist 
or fanatical views on women, and socio-economic factors including the 
lack of access to education, and in this respect, recognizing that the 
marginalization of women can delay or undermine the achievement of 
durable peace, security and reconciliation[.]39 
Further, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 states: 
1. Urges Member States, international and regional organisations to take 
further measures to improve women’s participation during all stages of 
peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning 
and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political 
and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, 
through inter alia promoting women’s leadership and capacity to engage in 
aid management and planning, supporting women’s organizations, and 
countering negative societal attitudes about women’s capacity to 
participate equally; 
[…] 
8.  Urges Member States to ensure gender mainstreaming in all post-
conflict peacebuilding and recovery processes and sectors[.]40 
With respect to substantive aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889, 
see the language in the preamble and paragraph 10: 
Expresses its intention, when establishing and renewing the mandates of 
United Nations missions, to include provisions on the promotion of gender 
equality and the empowerment of women in post-conflict situations, and 
                                                 
39 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1889 (2009) [on women and peace and 
security], 5 October 2009, S/RES/1889 (2009). 
40 Ibid. 
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requests the Secretary-General to continue, as appropriate, to appoint 
gender advisors and/or women-protection advisors to United Nations 
missions and asks them, in cooperation with United Nations Country 
Teams, to render technical assistance and improved coordination efforts to 
address recovery needs of women and girls in postconflict situations; 
[…] 
10. Encourages Member States in post-conflict situations, in consultation 
with civil society, including women’s organizations, to specify in detail 
women and girls’ needs and priorities and design concrete strategies, in 
accordance with their legal systems, to address those needs and priorities, 
which cover inter alia support for greater physical security and better 
socio-economic conditions, through education, income generating 
activities, access to basic services, in particular health services, including 
sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights and mental health, 
gender-responsive law enforcement and access to justice, as well as 
enhancing capacity to engage in public decision-making at all levels[.]41 
In addition to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1889, there are 
international standards for peace agreements emerging from the United Nations.42  The 
Secretaries-General of the United Nations have taken particular interest in this subject in 
recent decades.   
Of course, in addition to United Nations Security Council resolutions and United Nations 
guidelines of general application, United Nations Security Council resolutions also can 
regulate specific transitions to peace.  Rather than simply putting an end to conflict, they 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 See, e.g., UN Press Release SG/SM/7257, Secretary-General Comments on Guidelines Given 
to Envoys (10 December 1999) (guidelines on human rights and peace negotiations); The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary 
General, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (including recommendations for negotiations, peace agreements, 
and Security Council mandates); Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
[Brahimi Report], UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 158 (mandating the UN’s capacity to put 
conditions on peace agreements) 
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often attempt to establish future good governance—part of the transition to a just and 
sustainable peace.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 124443 drew upon the 
Rambouillet Accords44 to regulate the transition to peace in Kosovo.  One can see similar 
regulation with the transition to peace in, for example, Cambodia,45 elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia,46 Liberia,47 East Timor,48 Afghanistan,49 and Iraq.50  Most of these 
examples cannot always be neatly categorized into international armed conflict or non-
international armed conflict—Cambodia was largely a non-international armed conflict 
but had significant foreign involvement that may have internationalized it; the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia included organized armed groups, states, and organized armed 
conflict under some degree of control of states; Liberia’s conflict was a non-international 
                                                 
43 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) [on the deployment of 
international civil and security presences in Kosovo], 10 June 1999, S/RES/1244 (1999). 
44 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 
1999, UN Doc. S/1999/648, annex. 
45 E.g. UN Security Council, Resolution 745 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3057th 
meeting, on 28 February 1992, 28 February 1992, S/RES/745 (1992) 
46 E.g. UN Security Council, On Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja 
and Western Sirmium between the Government of Croatia and the local Serb representatives 
Resolution 1023 (1995) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3596th meeting, on 22 November 
1995, 22 November 1995, S/RES/1023 (1995). 
47 E.g. UN Security Council, Resolution 788 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3138th 
meeting, on 19 November 1992, 19 November 1992, S/RES/788 (1992). 
48 E.g. UN Security Council, Resolution 1277 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 
4074th meeting, on 30 November 1999, 30 November 1999, S/RES/1277 (1999). 
49 E.g. UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1378 (2001) on the situation in 
Afghanistan, 14 November 2001, S/RES/1378 (2001). 
50 E.g. UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) on the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait, 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 (2003). 
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armed conflict with significant foreign involvement, East Timor may have amounted to a 
non-international armed conflict before independence, at which point any armed conflict 
would be an international armed conflict; and Afghanistan’s history of conflict (as 
already detailed) is remarkably baroque.   
The Security Council’s role in the transition to peace in Liberia exemplifies the emphasis 
on future-oriented goals of good-governance; not simply focused on the cessation of 
armed conflict.  The Security Council has passed a great number of resolutions on the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the situation in Liberia between 2002 and 2016.  These 
included Preliminary matters;51 establishment of UNMIL;52 continuing its mandate;53 
                                                 
51 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1408 (2002) [on the situation in Liberia], 6 
May 2002, S/RES/1408 (2002); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1458 (2003) 
[on the situation in Liberia], 28 January 2003, S/RES/1458 (2003); UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) [on the situation in Sierra Leone], 7 March 
2001, S/RES/1343 (2001); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) [on the 
situation in Liberia], 6 May 2003, S/RES/1478 (2003); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1497 (2003) [on the situation in Liberia], 1 August 2003, S/RES/1497 (2003); UN 
Security Council, Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) [on dissolution of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia], 22 December 
2003, S/RES/1521 (2003). 
52 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) [on establishment of the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)], 19 September 2003, S/RES/1509 (2003). 
53 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1836 (2008) [on extension of the mandate of 
the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)], 29 September 2008, S/RES/1836 (2008); UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 1938 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL)], 15 September 2010, S/RES/1938 (2010); UN Security Council, Security 
Council resolution 1885 (2009) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL)], 15 September 2009, S/RES/1885 (2009); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2008 (2011) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 
30 Sept. 2012], 16 September 2011, S/RES/2008(2011); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2066 (2012) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 
30 Sept. 2013], 17 September 2012, S/RES/2066 (2012); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2176 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 
31 Dec. 2014], 15 September 2014, S/RES/2176 (2014); UN Security Council, Security Council 
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other matters, including targeted sanctions against Liberian President Charles Taylor and 
others.54 
                                                                                                                                                 
resolution 2190 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 
30 Sept. 2015], 15 December 2014, S/RES/2190 (2014); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2215 (2015) [on the drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)], 2 April 
2015, S/RES/2215 (2015); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2239 (2015) [on 
extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 Sept. 2016], 17 
September 2015; UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2308 (2016) [on extension of 
the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 31 Dec. 2016], 17 September 
2015, S/RES/2308 (2016). 
54 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1532 (2004) [on preventing former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor, his immediate family members and senior officials of the former Taylor 
regime from using misappropriated funds and property], 12 March 2004, S/RES/1532 (2004); 
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1549 (2004) [on re-establishment of the Panel 
of Experts to monitor fulfilling the conditions for the lifting of sanctions], 17 June 
2004, S/RES/1549 (2004); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1561 (2004) [on 
UNMIL], 17 September 2004, S/RES/1561 (2004); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1579 (2004) [on the Situation in Liberia and West Africa], 21 December 
2004, S/RES/1579 (2004); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1607 (2005) [on the 
Situation in Liberia and West Africa], 21 June 2005, S/RES/1607 (2005); UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 1626 (2005) [The situation in Liberia], 19 September 
2005, S/RES/1626 (2005); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1638 (2005) [The 
situation in Liberia], 11 November 2005, S/RES/1638 (2005); UN Security Council, Security 
Council resolution 1647 (2005) [Liberia renews the measures on arms and travel imposed by 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 1521 (2003) for a further period of 12 months], 20 December 
2005, S/RES/1647 (2005); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1667 (2006) [The 
situation in Liberia], 31 March 2006, S/RES/1667 (2006); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1683 (2006) [The Situation in Liberia], 13 June 2006, S/RES/1683 (2006); UN 
Security Council, Security Council resolution 1688 (2006) [Sierra Leone], 16 June 
2006, S/RES/1688 (2006); UN Security Council, Resolution 1689 (2006) The Situation in 
Liberia, 20 June 2006, S/RES/1689 (2006); UN Security Council, Resolution 1694 (2006) The 
Situation in Liberia, 13 July 2006, S/RES/1694 (2006); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1712 (2006) [Liberia], 29 September 2006, S/RES/1712 (2006); UN Security 
Council, Resolution 1731 (2006) The Situation in Liberia, 20 December 2006, S/RES/1731 
(2006); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1750 (2007) [Liberia], 30 March 
2007, S/RES/1750 (2007); UN Security Council, Resolution 1753 (2007) The Situation in 
Liberia, 27 April 2007, S/RES/1753(2007); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 
1777 (2007) [Liberia], 20 September 2007, S/RES/1777 (2007); UN Security Council, Security 
Council resolution 1792 (2007) [on renewal of measures on arms and travel imposed by 
resolution 1521 (2003) and on extension of the mandate of the current Panel of Experts on 
Liberia], 19 December 2007, S/RES/1792 (2007); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1819 (2008) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia], 18 
January 2008, S/RES/1819 (2008); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1854 
5.  Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed Conflict  
    Jus post bellum in IAC and NIAC 
 
301 
 
It is worth noting that a strictly temporal approach to jus post bellum would necessarily 
cut off early United Nations Security Council resolutions that occurred during armed 
conflict.55  Similarly, a definition of jus post bellum that focused on backwards-looking 
criminal justice measures and not forward-looking establishment of a just and sustainable 
peace (particularly good governance) would overlook some of the most important 
regulation in the transition from armed conflict in Liberia.  
As Aboagye and Rupiya note in their 2005 work on democratic governance and security 
sector reform in Liberia, in the previous 15 years more than half of the armed conflicts 
“ended” by peace agreements restarted.56  They evaluate the early implementation of the 
2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement57 by the national transitional government of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2008) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia], 19 December 
2008, S/RES/1854 (2008); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2025 (2011) 
[Liberia], 14 December 2011, S/RES/2025(2011); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 2079 (2012) [on the situation in Liberia], 12 December 2012, S/RES/2079 (2012); UN 
Security Council, Security Council resolution 2116 (2013) [on Liberia], 18 September 
2013, S/RES/2116 (2013); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2128 (2013) [on the 
situation in Liberia and West Africa], 10 December 2013, S/RES/2128 (2013); UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 2188 (2014) [on the situation in Liberia], 9 December 
2014, S/RES/2188 (2014). 
55 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1408 (2002) [on the situation in Liberia], 6 
May 2002, S/RES/1408 (2002); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1458 (2003) 
[on the situation in Liberia], 28 January 2003, S/RES/1458 (2003); UN Security 
Council, Security Council resolution 1343 (2001) [on the situation in Sierra Leone], 7 March 
2001, S/RES/1343 (2001); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) [on the 
situation in Liberia], 6 May 2003, S/RES/1478 (2003); UN Security Council, Security Council 
resolution 1497 (2003) [on the situation in Liberia], 1 August 2003, S/RES/1497 (2003). 
56 Aboagye, Festus B., and Martin R. Rupiya. "Enhancing post-conflict democratic governance 
through effective security sector reform in Liberia." A tortuous road to peace. The dynamics of 
regional, UN and international humanitarian interventions in Liberia, Festus Aboagye and Alhaji 
M. S. Bah eds (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2005): 249-280, 249. 
57 Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political 
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Liberia with the support of UNMIL.58  They note that United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1509 (2003)59 mandated UNMIL to focus not only on traditional 
peacekeeping but on supporting the institutionalization of human rights and the rule of 
law in Liberia, giving UNMIL wide-ranging responsibilities including humanitarian 
assistance, establishing security conditions, human rights monitoring, restructuring the 
security sector, legal reform, judicial reform, and correctional reform.60  UNMIL 
established a Human Rights and Protection Unit with a role in child protection, rule of 
law, gender and trafficking advisors, as well as the institutionalisation and 
operationalisation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an Independent 
National Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.61  While Aboagye and Rupiya’s critiques of the state of democratic 
governance and security sector reform in 2005 are warranted, the United Nations Security 
Council and ECOWAS’s efforts in combination with local efforts in the subsequent 
decade are not without merit, providing some indication of the benefits of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parties, 18 August 2003, Annexed to Letter dated 27 August 2003 from the Permanent 
Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2003/850 (2003). 
58 Aboagye, Festus B., and Martin R. Rupiya. "Enhancing post-conflict democratic governance 
through effective security sector reform in Liberia." A tortuous road to peace. The dynamics of 
regional, UN and international humanitarian interventions in Liberia, Festus Aboagye and Alhaji 
M. S. Bah eds (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2005): 249-280, 251. 
59 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) [on establishment of the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)], 19 September 2003, S/RES/1509 (2003). 
60 Aboagye, Festus B., and Martin R. Rupiya. "Enhancing post-conflict democratic governance 
through effective security sector reform in Liberia." A tortuous road to peace. The dynamics of 
regional, UN and international humanitarian interventions in Liberia, Festus Aboagye and Alhaji 
M. S. Bah eds (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2005): 249-280, 256-7. 
61 Ibid 257. 
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comprehensive, future-oriented approach.  United Nations Security Council resolutions 
regulating the transition to peace are increasingly oriented towards building a positive 
peace, not merely putting an end to past conflict. 
The customary and treaty law as well as regulation coming from the United Nations 
regarding post-conflict/transitional administration are also part of jus post bellum.  As 
pointed out by Carsten Stahn, criminal justice under transitional administration does not 
neatly fall within domestic, international, or hybrid criminal justice.62  It is unique for 
two reasons.  First, there is a particular emphasis on restoring public order and safety, not 
simply safeguarding the interests of victims or the other typical goals of criminal law.63 
Second, there is often an emphasis on justifying any intervention (often post-hoc justified 
on the basis of human rights) that made the transitional administration possible.64  It is 
unclear that the distinction between an international armed conflict and non-international 
armed conflict makes a great deal of inherent, generalizable difference in terms of the 
practice of transitional administration.  Transitional administrations of course have a 
much wider role in jus post bellum  
It is also important to note that courts and tribunals at every level play an important role 
in developing and effectuating jus post bellum.  At the global level, institutions such as 
                                                 
62 Stahn, Carsten. "Justice under transitional administration: contours and critique of a 
paradigm." Hous. J. Int'l L. 27 (2004): 311. 
63 See ibid 315. 
64 See ibid 315-6. 
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the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (and other arbitral 
bodies), and the International Criminal Court are not specialized jus post bellum 
institutions, but they can play an important role in establishing the general rules for 
transitions to peace and can perform specific functions in particular transitions to peace.  
The International Court of Justice’s decision on Kosovo,65 for example, clarified that 
declaring independence was not itself a violation of international law—a helpful, if 
limited, general rule that also probably helped to move the situation in Kosovo towards a 
sustainable peace.  Of the ten situations before the International Criminal Court as of this 
writing66 (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Darfur 
(Sudan), Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Comoros (Situation on Registered Vessels of 
the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia), and 
Georgia),67 all except for perhaps the cases of post-election violence (Kenya and Cote 
d’Ivoire) involve an armed conflict, generally one that is dormant, although not 
necessarily truly finished.  The International Criminal Court does not have inherent 
global jurisdiction.  That said, with the potential of new accessions, ad hoc Article 12.3 
referrals from non-member states, jurisdiction on the basis of nationality of the alleged 
perpetrator, and referrals by the United Nations Security Council, the International 
Criminal Court has no inherent territorial limit to its jurisdiction, and can be considered 
                                                 
65 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Int’l Ct. Justice July 22, 2010).  
66 3 May 2016 
67 See https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx last 
visited 3 May 2016 
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in a certain sense a global court.  While its norms and development of law with an impact 
on the transition to peace are of wide and general application, the development of each 
investigation, case, and charge can have particular effects on local transitions to peace.  
The situations before the International Criminal Court are generally non-international 
armed conflict (with the possible exception of the Comoros referral68) although many 
have international involvement.  That said, the norms emerging from the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisprudence are likely to have general application to international 
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. 
Regional judicial bodies also can play an important role in establishing regional norms 
and influencing local transitions to peace.  The Inter-American and European systems of 
human rights courts are perhaps best known, but other regional courts are also potentially 
useful sources of jurisprudence and dispute resolution with respect to both transitions out 
of international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.  In Africa, such 
regional judicial bodies that are likely to have potential impacts on transitions to peace 
include the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Community Court of 
Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, and the East African Court 
of Justice.  In the Americas, there is not only the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(with its feeder institution the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) but also 
the Central American Court of Justice, the Caribbean Court of Justice, and the East 
                                                 
68 Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of 
the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, 
Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, 6 November 2015, Appeals Chamber 
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Caribbean Supreme Court.  In Europe, the leading institutions are the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. 
Multilateral disarmament and weapons control treaties are typically categorized under jus 
in bello if they are categorized under the jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum 
trichotomy (or the jus ad bellum/jus in bello dichotomy) at all.  For treaties that focus on 
the use of weapons, that seems the most appropriate choice.  So, for example, the use of 
exploding projectiles weighing less than 400 grams;69 bullets that flatten upon entering 
the human body;70 poison and poisoned weapons;71 chemical weapons and 
bacteriological methods;72 biological weapons;73 certain conventional weapons74 
                                                 
69 Short title: Declaration of Saint Petersburg (1868); Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of 
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg, adopted 11 
December 1868, D.Schindler and J.Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nihjoff 
Publisher, 1988, p.102. 
70 Short title: Hague Declaration (1899); International Peace Conference 1899,  Declaration 
(IV,3) concerning Expanding Bullets. The Hague, adopted 29 July 1899, (entry into force 4 
September 1900). 
71 Short title: Hague Regulations (1907); International Conferences (The Hague), Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
72 Short title: Geneva Protocol (1925); United Nations, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 
June 1925 (Entry into force: 8 February 1928); Short title: Convention on the prohibition of 
chemical weapons (1993); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 3 September 1992 (Entry 
into force: 29 April 1997); see also UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 17 December 2003, 
A/RES/58/52. 
73 Short title: 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons  
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including incendiary weapons,75 mines,76 booby traps,77 blinding laser weapons,78 
explosive remnants of war,79 and munitions that create fragments not detectable by X-
ray;80 anti-personnel mines;81 and cluster munitions82—are all functionally part of jus in 
bello. Many of these treaties, particularly the more modern treaties, are also potentially 
                                                                                                                                                 
and on their Destruction, 1015 UNTS 163 / [1977] ATS 23 / 11 ILM 309 (1972) , 10 April 1972 
(Entry into force: 26 March 1975). 
74 Short title: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; United Nations, Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983; 
Registered No. 22495). 
75 Short title: Protocol III (1980) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). Geneva, 10 
October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983). 
76 Short title: Protocol II, as amended (1996), to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons; Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices. Geneva, 10 October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983). 
77 Short title: Protocol II, as amended (1996), to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons; Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices. Geneva, 10 October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983). 
78 Short title: Protocol IV (1995) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 1995 (Entry into 
force: 30 July 1998). 
79 Short title: Protocol V (2003) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol 
on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention), 28 November 2003 
(Entry into force: 12 November.2006). 
80 Short title: Protocol I (1980) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Protocol on 
Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I). Geneva, 10 October 1980 (Entry into force: 2 December 
1983). 
81 Short title: Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) (1997); 
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Entry into force: 1 March 1999). 
82 Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 30 
May 2008 (Entry into force: 1 August 2010) 
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important in the transition from armed conflict to peace.  New regimes can be “joiners” 
and joining well-regarded treaties such as human rights treaties and weapons treaties can 
signal their status.  Many weapons treaties do not only bar use of weapons, but also bar 
their stockpiling, production and transfer and require their destruction.  Examples of such 
Treaties include the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention,83 the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention,84 the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW)85 and its Protocols ,the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction86 
and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.87  The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty88 
                                                 
83 Short title: 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons  
and on their Destruction, 1015 UNTS 163 / [1977] ATS 23 / 11 ILM 309 (1972) , 10 April 1972 
(Entry into force: 26 March 1975). 
84 Short title: Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (1993); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction, 3 September 1992 (Entry into force: 29 April 1997); see also UN General 
Assembly, Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction: Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly, 17 December 2003, A/RES/58/52.  
85 Short title: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; United Nations, Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (Entry into force: 2 December 1983; 
Registered No. 22495). 
86 Short title: Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) (1997); 
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Entry into force: 1 March 1999). 
87 Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 30 
May 2008 (Entry into force: 1 August 2010) 
88 United Nations, Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April 2013 (Entry into force: 24 December 2014). 
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regulating the international trade in conventional weapons also may aid in the transition 
to peace not only by limiting stockpiles but by reinforcing the norm against arming 
entities engaged in international criminal law violations.  Of particular importance is the 
emphasis on removing the explosive remnants of war in the 1997 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction89 and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.90  Generally, these 
treaties are more relevant in international armed conflict than non-international armed 
conflict, although that may be less true for the Landmine Treaty and the Arms Control 
Treaty.  Destruction of landmines can be an enduring post-conflict concern in non-
international armed conflicts such as in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Colombia, as well as 
in the technically ongoing international armed conflict between the  Democratic Republic 
of Korea and the Republic of Korea.  The Arms Control Treaty helps to address the 
inflows and outflows of small arms that can determine the outcome of transitions to 
peace. 
Not all law restricting arms in the transition from armed conflict to peace takes the form 
of multilateral treaties.  After international armed conflict, victors or the international 
community may demand disarmament from defeated states, as happened after the First 
and Second World War (imposed by victorious states) or during and after the first Gulf 
                                                 
89 Short title: Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) (1997); 
The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Entry into force: 1 March 1999). 
90 Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 30 
May 2008 (Entry into force: 1 August 2010) 
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War.91  These international efforts to impose disarmament may result in enduring 
domestic law mandating restrictions on armament and militarization, as with the Second 
World War, or less enduring, as with the First.  More widespread is the common 
domestic law practice after non-international armed conflicts involving programs to 
mandate and facilitate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of 
organized armed groups—so-called “DDR” programs.  These disarmament programs are 
usually framed as part of “transitional justice” and, alongside “security sector reform” are 
widely considered vital for a successful transition from non-international armed conflict 
to peace.  Disarmament is inherently a process-driven process, not merely a simple 
prohibition, so it inevitably inhabits a middle ground between purely procedural and 
purely substantive law. 
5. More substantive aspects 
Again using the schematic depiction above as a guide, it is possible to examine a variety 
of more substantive jus post bellum law and norms with respect to international armed 
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.  The substantive elements of jus post 
bellum are more thoroughly examined in Part III, Section B.5 Contrasting the Content of 
Transitional Justice and Jus Post Bellum below, but are briefly explored here with an 
emphasis on the difference between International Armed Conflict and Non-International 
Armed Conflict. 
                                                 
91 See e.g. UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution S/RES/689 (1991) Resolution 689 
(1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2983rd meeting on 9 March 1991, 9 April 
1991, S/RES/689 (1991). 
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Such law and norms include resolving the res/just cause in traditional just war thinking, 
treaty and customary law on occupation and post-occupation, the customary international 
law of state responsibility (particularly with regards to new states and reparations), 
peacekeeping norms, down to particular implementations of the above.  These are 
generally issues of international armed conflict, although they may be present by analogy 
with non-international armed conflict.  For example, while successfully transitioning 
from armed conflict to peace in international armed conflict may require resolving the 
res, in non-international armed conflict the complaints that led to armed conflict may 
need to be substantively resolved on the domestic level for the successful transition from 
armed conflict to peace.  For International Armed Conflicts, the prohibition of annexation 
as the res92 of armed conflict is tied to the prohibition of acts of aggression, a jus ad 
bellum concern with jus post bellum implications.  International armed conflict has 
implications with respect to occupation and post-occupation obligations and prohibitions. 
Regardless of the international or non-international nature of the conflict, there are a 
variety of substantive prohibitions that take on particular importance in jus post bellum.  
Genocide, expulsion, persecution, slavery are prohibited and are non-derogable in times 
of armed conflict or national emergency, and are binding on those crafting peace 
agreements, those who enjoy transitional governmental authority, and new states or 
                                                 
92 The traditional criteria of persona, res, causa, animus and auctoritas dates from the Apparatus 
glossarum Laurentii Hispanii in Compilationem tertiam of Laurentius Hispanus (c. 1180-1248).  
See generally Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, p. 128.  “Res” or “thing” 
was the territory, property, or other object over which the just war was fought, and was intimately 
connected to the idea of causa or justa causa which was the characterization of the res, that is, 
that it was just to pursue the res in war, for example to lawfully recover territory. 
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governments.  United Nations Security Council Chapter VII resolutions frequently 
provide specific binding law that applies to particular transitions from armed conflict to 
peace. 
E. Conclusion 
This section, Jus Post Bellum in the Context of International and Non-International 
Armed Conflict, has focused on the distinguishing the operation of jus post bellum in the 
two canonical types of armed conflict.  It introduces the concept of international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict and how those terms operate with jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum, before providing exploring the subject matter of jus post 
bellum—locating where the type of armed conflict made a substantial difference, and 
where it did not.   
Fundamentally, resolving non-international armed conflicts is primarily an issue of what 
sort of state (or in the case of secession, states) will be built in the aftermath of war, 
whereas international armed conflicts inevitably are not only an issue of the post-war 
nature of the states involved (particularly if there is a clear-cut losing state) but also the 
nature of interstate relations afterwards.  The issues involved can, of course, be largely 
bilateral (for instance, a piece of territory such as Alsace-Lorraine can change hands) but 
there is also inevitably often a question as to the nature of international relations, 
governed by law more generally.  This phenomenon is most powerfully exemplified in 
The Peace of Westphalia (the peace made after the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Eighty Years’ War) and the United Nations Charter—both developments 
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closing terrible armed conflicts and (in different ways) establishing a new foundational 
reference point for international peace.93  This struggle to establish the nature of the 
international order is an old one.  A pessimistic approach goes back to for example 
Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince94, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan95and Baruch Spinoza’s 
Tractatus theologico-politicus96, or even back to Thucydides History of the 
                                                 
93 For a classic work on the importance of the Peace of Westphalia, see Gross, Leo. "The Peace of 
Westphalia 1648-1948." American Journal of International Law 42 (1948): 20.  The author 
agrees with Gross that the peace agreements generally collectively referenced as the “Peace of 
Westphalia” are in some ways comparable to the United Nations Charter (p. 20) and that while in 
many ways simply followed previous practice and was part of a gradual process (p. 27), that by 
increasing the possibility of equality and lasting peace between states of “any particular religious 
background” (“p. 26”)  the Peace of Westphalia has rightly come to be seen as a cornerstone of a 
system of sovereign states. Of course, in reality, there are clear differences between the Peace of 
Westphalia and the (global, multilateral) United Nations Charter.  The mythology has been 
somewhat problematized by e.g. Beaulac, Stéphane. "The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy-Myth or 
Reality?." Journal of the History of International Law 2.2 (2000): 148-177 (focusing on the 
continuing multi-layered authority in Europe); but in the author’s view the problematization can 
be overstated and “miss the forest for the trees”—the fundamental drive for a sovereign state 
system that could be at peace not through a unified Christendom, as symbolized by the Peace of 
Westphalia, generally justifies the shorthand status “Westphalia” has earned.  For additional 
critical approaches, see e.g. Osiander, Andreas. "Sovereignty, international relations, and the 
Westphalian myth." International organization 55.02 (2001): 251-287; Beaulac, Stéphane. "The 
Westphalian model in defining international law: challenging the myth." Austl. J. Legal Hist. 8 
(2004): 181; Beaulac, Stéphane. The power of language in the making of international law: the 
word sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the myth of Westphalia. Vol. 46. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004; De Carvalho, Benjamin, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson. "The big bangs of 
IR: The myths that your teachers still tell you about 1648 and 1919." Millennium 39.3 (2011): 
735-758; Schmidt, Sebastian. "To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of 
Westphalia in International Relations Literature " International Studies Quarterly 55.3 (2011): 
601-623.  These efforts to demythologize “Westphalia” are welcome if they do not cause the 
reader to understate the importance of the developments generally referenced in shorthand as the 
“Peace of Westphalia.” 
94 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1515. The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1985 
95 Hobbes, Thomas, and Edwin Curley. Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 
1668. Vol. 2. Hackett Publishing, 1994. 
96 See e.g. Israel, Jonathan, and Michael Silverthorne, eds. Spinoza: Theological-Political 
Treatise. Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 195: 
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Peloponnesian War97—a tradition that sees the nature of international relations as 
fundamentally and irrevocably lawless.  But there is also a long tradition, that a collective 
effort to construct a peaceful order, as proposed in the various treaties that constituted the 
Peace of Westphalia, can be successful.  Many of these efforts were be detailed in the 
Chapter “Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum.”  Continuing the analysis of the 
substance of jus post bellum, the current tensions within the use of the term jus post 
bellum should be further examined, a problem to which this work now turns.  The next 
chapter will include analysis of odious debt and jus post bellum in the context of 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, building on the 
foundation of this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                 
By the right and order of nature I merely mean the rules determining the nature 
of each individual thing by which we conceive it is determined naturally to exist 
and to behave in a certain way. For example fish are determined by nature to 
swim and big fish to eat little ones, and therefore it is by sovereign natural right 
that fish have possession of the water and that big fish eat small fish. 
97 Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1972. 
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6.  Contemporary Legal Content of Jus Post Bellum 
A. Introduction 
1. Chapter focus 
Jus post bellum  has a particular function in international law, to organize the 
application of law and principles in order to successfully guide the transition 
from armed conflict to a just and sustainable (or “positive”) peace.1  This chapter 
demonstrates the application of the hybrid functional approach described supra 
in core areas of law Stahn asserts (and the author concurs) are central to 
achieving the goals of jus post bellum. 
This work has addressed jus post bellum in a variety of ways: its origins, the 
contemporary debate around its meaning, contrasting it with related concepts and 
bodies of law (such as transitional justice, jus ad bellum, and jus in bello), and 
describing it in both International Armed Conflict and Non-International Armed 
Conflict.  This chapter draws upon and extends what has been discussed earlier, 
to provide a specific thematic focus on the contemporary legal content of jus post 
bellum.  It builds upon and extends the framework earlier laid out by Stahn2 
because, in the author’s view and the view of the many scholars who have used 
                                                 
1 See Part 1 of this work. 
2 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 
(2006): 921-943, p. 937. 
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Stahn’s work as a starting point, the legal components identified by Stahn are 
some of the most crucial for the successful transition from armed conflict to 
peace (with slight modifications such as the inclusion of odious debt as a 
potentially regulated subject).   
These components are usefully considered together as part of jus post bellum 
because they provide legal substance and applied principles to the hybrid 
functional approach already described and propounded in Part I of this work.  
Given the scope of this work, it cannot review the entire scholarship in each of 
these areas, but rather provide a more concrete guide to the legal foundations and 
principles of jus post bellum, building on the theoretical and definitional structure 
of Part I.   
This chapter provides analysis as to how the hybrid functional approach would 
apply in eight substantive areas.  The eight areas discussed are: 1) Procedural 
fairness and peace agreements; 2) The Responsibility to Protect; 3) Territorial 
dispute resolution; 4) Consequences of an act of aggression; 5) International 
territorial administration and the prohibition of ‘trusteeship’; 6) The law 
applicable in a territory in transition; 7) The scope of individual criminal 
responsibility; and 8) The nexus of jus post bellum and odious debt.  Alternative 
frameworks are also examined.  These eight areas are not comprehensive, but 
they are at the core of jus post bellum.  By drawing upon analysis used 
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throughout this work to emphasize the contemporary legal content of jus post 
bellum, the more practical aspects of this work can be brought to the fore. 
What follows then in this chapter is primarily a significant expansion of the 
efforts of one leading scholar, Stahn, to outline the core legal substance of jus 
post bellum, using the hybrid functional approach already described in this 
work.  While Stahn's work is often referenced,3 expanding his framework in this 
manner has never been done properly.   
2. Responses to critical approaches to jus post bellum 
It is worth detailing further what this chapter does and what it will not attempt to 
do.  There is a strain of criticism of jus post bellum that indicates the term should 
be avoided because it is a new term that does not represent a new body of 
laws.  This chapter will not convince such critics that jus post bellum contains 
only laws that apply only within the framework of jus post bellum and in no 
other framework.  It does not follow, however, that the concept of jus post 
bellum should not be used and developed.  Jus post bellum, properly conceived, 
plays a vital function in international law, for the international community, and 
for survivors of armed conflict—to guide the transition from armed conflict to a 
                                                 
3 As best as the author can tell, the referenced work (Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad 
bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the Conception of the Law of 
Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 (2006): 921-943) is the 
most frequently cited legal (as opposed to philosophical) article on the subject. 
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just and sustainable peace.  How these laws and principles can be applied in this 
transition remains worthy of study, regardless of the term applied. 
Many critics of jus post bellum are very specific in the particular norms and 
addressees they address.  Three notable scholars who have taken a skeptical 
approach to jus post bellum are Eric De Brabandere, Antonia Chayes, and Gelijn 
Molier.  Even an unapologetically pro-jus post bellum advocate should recognize 
the value of their contributions and the salience of some their specific points.  
Critical to understanding their approaches is how they define jus post bellum and 
their overall approach to lex lata.  Recognizing certain commonalities in critical 
approaches these scholars have demonstrated with respect to jus post bellum 
allows for an appreciation for the productive role such scholars can play in the 
ongoing discussion on jus post bellum, while respectfully disagreeing with 
certain broader conclusions.  
De Brabandere has authored a number of works on the theme of jus post bellum.4  
In 2010, he argued that “recent cases have shown that there already exists an 
                                                 
4 De Brabandere, Eric. "The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept”(2010)." Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 43: 119; De Brabandere, Eric. "International Territorial 
Administrations and Post-Conflict Reforms: Reflections on the Need of a Jus Post 
Bellum as a Legal Framework." Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht / Revue 
Belge de Droit International 44(1-2): 69-90; Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Concept of Jus 
Post Bellum in International Law: A Normative Critique, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative 
Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); De Brabandere, Eric. "Jus Post 
Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the Debate." The Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 16.4 (2015): 590-603.  See more generally, Eric De Brabandere, 
Post-conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial 
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adequate, flexible, and neutral legal framework to address” the transition from 
armed conflict to peace, but rejects the label jus post bellum for that framework.5   
His later work on the subject, in an area bringing together two areas of his 
expertise (transitions to peace and foreign direct investment), admits the use of 
the term jus post bellum as the “legal regime governing post-conflict 
reconstruction, a use of the concept to which no normative implications should 
be attached.”6  Chayes squarely asks whether there is a freestanding, universally 
applicable post-conflict obligation to rebuild a vanquished society after war and 
answers in the negative.7  Molier8  addresses jus post bellum, primarily through 
criticism of the contributions of Stahn,9 Boon,10 and Orend.11  
                                                                                                                                    
Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, particularly pp. 289–93. 
5 De Brabandere, Eric. "The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept”(2010)." Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 43: 119, 134. 
6 De Brabandere, Eric. "Jus Post Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the 
Debate." The Journal of World Investment & Trade 16.4 (2015): 590-603, 591.   
7 Chayes, Antonia. "Chapter VII½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible?." European Journal of 
International Law 24.1 (2013): 291-305.  For a response, see Verdirame, Guglielmo. 
"What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia Chayes." European Journal 
of International Law 24.1 (2013): 307-313. 
8 Molier, Gelijn. "Rebuilding after Armed Conflict: Towards a Legal Framework of 
“The Responsibility to Rebuild” or a “Ius post Bellum”?." Peace, Security and 
Development in an Era of Globalization: The Integrated Security Approach Viewed 
from a Multidisciplinary Perspective (2009): 317-53; in Dutch see also Molier G. 
(2007), Wederopbouw na gewapend conflict: naar juridificering van 'the responsibility 
to rebuild' of een 'ius post bellum?'. In: Bomert B., Hoogen T. van den (Eds.) Jaarboek 
Vrede en Veiligheid 2007. Nijmegen: Centrum voor Internationaal Conflict-Analyse & 
Management 2007. 1-34. 
9 Stahn, Carsten, and Jann K. Kleffner eds. Jus post bellum: towards a law of transition 
from conflict to peace. TMC Asser Press, 2008; Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in 
bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force." 
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This subsection will not attempt to defend, point by point, the scholarship 
criticised by De Brabandere, Chayes, and Molier.  Many of their specific 
criticisms (e.g. Molier’s objection to Orend’s tearing down the wall between the 
application of jus ad bellum and jus in bello12 or his critique of Orend’s assertion 
that a jus post bellum violation is a just cause for the use of force13) have merit.  
De Brabandere’s documentation of the varied usage of the term is accurate and 
worthy of systematic expansion.14  Other criticism regarding the purported lack 
of utility of the principles identified by Boon and Stahn is less persuasive. While 
useful and worthy of further development elsewhere, there is a risk of “missing 
the forest for the trees” in extending the implications of such arguments too far. 
The underlying question is whether a criticism of a specific assertion as to the 
law and principles of the transition to armed peace has the broader effect of 
overturning the entire field of jus post bellum.  A useful, specific disagreement 
on a particular point or series of points of law does not negate the primary 
                                                                                                                                    
European Journal of International Law 17.5 (2006): 921-943; Stahn, Carsten. "Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Discipline (s)." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 23 (2007): 311. 
10 Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285. 
11 Orend, Brian. "Jus post bellum: The perspective of a just-war theorist." Leiden 
Journal of International Law 20.03 (2007): 571-591. 
12 Molier, Gelijn. "Rebuilding after Armed Conflict: Towards a Legal Framework of 
“The Responsibility to Rebuild” or a “Ius post Bellum”?." Peace, Security and 
Development in an Era of Globalization: The Integrated Security Approach Viewed 
from a Multidisciplinary Perspective (2009): 317-53, 332. 
13 Ibid. 333. 
14 De Brabandere, Eric. "The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept”(2010)." Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 43: 119.  For such a systematic expansion, see Annex A of this work. 
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assertion that jus post bellum exists, nor does it (in this author’s view) undermine 
the argument that jus post bellum functions to guide the transition from armed 
conflict to a just and sustainable peace. One might trace a particular argument 
from, for example, William Martel’s assertion that victory “imposes political, 
economic, human and moral responsibilities — on the victorious state”15 to 
Chayes assertion that such responsibilities cannot amount to a general legal 
requirement,16 to a further response that victories are regulated by certain laws 
and principles (e.g. regarding the prohibition of annexation, the right of self-
determination, the prohibition of aggression, the requirements of human rights 
law, the obligations of occupation law, etc.) that may impose legal requirements 
on the victor in certain particular situations.  This ongoing discussion does not 
disprove jus post bellum, it elucidates and amplifies it. 
As a review of the chapter below demonstrates, the laws and principles involved 
in a hybrid functional approach to jus post bellum, as well as their addressees, are 
diverse, ranging from the international community and the United Nations 
Security Council down to organized armed groups and individuals.  A hybrid 
functional approach to jus post bellum allows for a spectrum of law and 
principles, from global to local, and from the more general to the more specific.   
                                                 
15 Martel, William C. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy. Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, 5. 
16 Chayes, Antonia. "Chapter VII½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible?." European Journal of 
International Law 24.1 (2013): 291-305.   
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The general stance of many critics is not to deny the existence of law that applies 
to the transition from armed conflict to peace,17 but to deny it exists 
independently of other areas of law, and to further suggest that it serves no 
purpose to use the term.  De Brabandere is particularly articulate on these points 
in his early scholarship on the subject.18  Such scepticism has been an important 
part of the further development of scholarship on the subject, underlining the 
need for a richer articulation of a jus post bellum with a clearer telos: one of 
establishing a just and sustainable peace. Dieter Fleck’s scholarship has been 
particularly useful in establishing the utility of partially-independent legal 
frameworks in regulation and norm generation in the transition to peace.19  James 
Gallen has pioneered the utility of jus post bellum as an interpretive 
framework.20  De Brandere consents in his later work to use the term jus post 
bellum to help elucidate the particularities of foreign direct investment in post-
                                                 
17 Verdirame, Guglielmo. "What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia 
Chayes." European Journal of International Law 24.1 (2013): 307-313. 
18 See particularly De Brabandere, Eric. "The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: 
A Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept”(2010)." Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 43: 119, 134. 
19 Fleck, Dieter. "The Responsibility to Rebuild and Its Potential for Law-Creation: 
Good Governance, Accountability and Judicial Control." Journal of International 
Peacekeeping 16.1-2 (2012): 84-98; Fleck, Dieter “Jus post bellum as a partly 
independent legal framework” in Stahn, Carsten, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens 
Iverson, eds. Jus Post Bellum. Oxford University Press, 2014, 43-57.. 
20 Gallen, James “Jus post bellum: an interpretive framework” in Stahn, Carsten, 
Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, eds. Jus Post Bellum. Oxford University Press, 
2014, 43-57 
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conflict rebuilding.21  While jus post bellum is not fully independent as a legal 
regime, that does not mean it lacks utility as a concept—particularly when 
conceptualized as having the function to the international community described 
in this work.  Scholars of jus post bellum should take note of warranted and 
particularized criticism, proceed with caution, but nonetheless proceed. 
Perhaps many with a skeptical but reasoned approach to aspects of jus post 
bellum scholarship can admit that there is a sense in which "the train has left the 
station" or “the genie has left the bottle” in terms of jus post bellum entering 
widespread use in scholarship and playing an increasing role in shaping and 
describing law and practice.  One can imagine scholars with a similar critical 
approach realizing in the early 1900s that-while they may not find the law of 
occupation, weapons law, targeting law, and the law regarding prisoners of war 
new or (in their view) worthy of a specific new term that included those elements 
but excluded the legality of the use of force overall—it was nonetheless worth 
analyzing, unifying, and encouraging the expansion of these areas in order to 
successfully minimize the harm of armed conflict and occupation.  The need for 
a coherent body of laws and principles that guide the transition to peace is 
enduring, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.  If the term is disputed, this need will not 
disappear.  Criticism of particular points is always welcome.  That said, at this 
point in the development of the concept, wholesale critics of jus post bellum 
                                                 
21 De Brabandere, Eric. "Jus Post Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the 
Debate." The Journal of World Investment & Trade 16.4 (2015): 590-603.   
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would be well-served to also propose alternative unifying frameworks that 
comprehensively address this need and describe the varied laws and principles 
that function to guide the transition from armed conflict to peace, or to more 
fully and persuasively explain why such an effort is not worthwhile. 
Some critical insistence on the overweening importance of lex lata, as a general 
matter, is also laudable and a productive part of the overall development of 
scholars’ understanding of the law as it is.  That said, extreme skepticism on 
matters which go beyond clearly settled law can itself pose difficulties.  This is 
particularly true in areas on the frontiers of international law.  C. Wilfred Jenks’ 
dictum regarding the need for thoughtfulness in being over-cautious with respect 
to uncertain lex lata is worth repeating here: 
Certainty and predictability in respect of matters governed by well-
established precedent are an important element in the rule of law, but to 
treat as speculation de lege ferenda, rather than as speculation concerning 
an uncertain lex lata, everything which goes beyond clearly settled law is 
to arrest processes of growth without which the law will be atrophied and 
the rule of law perish.22 
Jus post bellum has ancient roots, but it is not static.  The “processes of growth” 
praised by Jenks are ongoing.  Applying the rule of law to this most difficult area 
of human conduct, building peace from the ruins of war, remains an enormous 
challenge.  The more limited task of clarifying core areas of the contemporary 
legal content of jus post bellum is the work of the remainder of this chapter.  
                                                 
22 Jenks, C. Wilfred. "The challenge of universality." Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969). Vol. 53. American 
Society of International Law, 1959, 85-98, at 95. 
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B. Procedural fairness and peace agreements 
1. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties  
As discussed regarding in sections supra (Chapter 4.B.4.d) regarding procedural 
jus post bellum, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties23 is widely 
ratified and is generally accepted as customary international law.  Article 52 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states in full: “A treaty is void if 
its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”24 
A literal reading of this Article applied to any peace treaty indicates that the 
validity of the peace treaty, the foundation of a transition from international 
armed conflict to peace, depends on whether there has been an illegal threat or 
use of force to procure that treaty.  
                                                 
23 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 (Entry into force: 27 January 1980).  See 
generally, Villiger, M. E. (2009). Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Leiden: Nijhoff; Dörr, O., & Schmalenbach, K. (2012). Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary. (Vienna convention on the law of 
treaties.) Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg; Sinclair, Ian M. T. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984. 
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 52. 
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For international armed conflict, the legal validity of the foundation of the 
transition to peace may formally depend on what is typically considered a 
question of jus ad bellum, the legality of the use or threat of force. This 
connection between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum emerges not through an 
analysis of substantive rights and restrictions during the transition to peace, but 
through an analysis of the legitimate procedure for creating a peace treaty.  The 
difficulty arises, of course, in that each side may believe that the other used not 
merely the threat of force, but actual use of force in violation of the principles of 
international law in order to achieve whatever negotiating position they have 
achieved at the peace table.  Further, the threat of ongoing or renewed force 
almost inevitably forms the backdrop of peace negotiations—otherwise peace 
negotiations would not be required.   
The interpretation of Article 52 in the context of peace agreements thus requires 
special consideration so as not to invalidate peace treaties in general, while 
retaining a disincentive for states to use force or the threat of force to create 
grossly unfair treaties.  This may be done in part through Article 43 
(“Obligations imposed by international law independently of a treaty”), Article 
44.5 (disallowing separation of the treaty in cases governed by Article 52), 
Article 53 (“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international 
law”), Article 71 (“Consequences of the invalidity of a treaty which conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law”), Article 73 (“Cases of 
State succession, State responsibility and outbreak of hostilities”), and Article 75 
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(“Case of an aggressor State”).25  Article 73 and Article 75 in particular limits 
the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding 
questions arising from the outbreak of hostilities between states or treaty 
obligations of an aggressor state.26  These limitations of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, however, raise more questions as to the effect of the use 
or threat of force on the validity and effects of peace treaties.  To fully 
understand the general rule making peace treaties valid despite the context of the 
use of force, it is very helpful to have recourse to the tradition of jus post bellum 
avant la lettre, particularly with respect to Gentili, Wolff, and Vattel.27  There 
seems little doubt that state practice and opinio juris dating back to the 16th 
century indicate peace treaties are binding, despite the fact that the conclusion of 
most peace treaties are procured by, or at least in the context of, the threat or use 
of force. 
Again, one formal distinction that can be made is the distinction between an 
armed conflict terminating through a peace treaty (or series of peace treaties) in 
the case of an international armed conflict, and a peace agreement (or series of 
                                                 
25 Article 75 states in whole: “The provisions of the present Convention are without 
prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State 
in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations 
with reference to that State’s aggression.” 
26 For more on the interaction of Article 75 and 52, see e.g. Villiger, M. E. 
(2009). Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Leiden: 
Nijhoff, p. 915; Dörr, O., & Schmalenbach, K. (2012). Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary. (Vienna convention on the law of treaties.) Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, p. 1284; Sinclair, Ian M. T. The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 178. 
27 See Chapter 1 of this work. 
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peace agreements) in the case of a non-international armed conflict.  The term 
“peace treaty” is generally reserved for agreements not signed by non-state 
organized armed groups, whereas the more general term “peace agreement” can 
include peace treaties but is used more frequently for agreements that are not 
technically treaties because they include non-state groups (other than inter-
governmental organizations) in the agreement.   
One could argue that peace agreements that are not peace treaties (binding non-
state actors) are guided by similar considerations of procedural fairness, but only 
by analogy, as the VCLT and the customary law it represents does not apply 
directly.  In terms of lex lata, this argument by analogy is not terribly persuasive.  
As a prudential matter, however, the warning for the party to the potential peace 
agreement not to rely entirely on the threat of future force and demand an 
entirely one-sided agreement is sensible, lest the peace created be unjust or 
unsustainable. 
2. Other Considerations of procedural fairness 
a) Treaty and agreement law 
Several other articles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are 
specifically relevant for the formation of peace treaties with respect to procedural 
fairness.  Article 47 reads as follows: 
If the authority of a representative to express the consent of a 
State to be bound by a particular treaty has been made subject to a 
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specific restriction, his omission to observe that restriction may 
not be invoked as invalidating the consent expressed by him 
unless the restriction was notified to the other negotiating States 
prior to his expressing such consent. 28 
This is straightforward as it goes, although there is a long tradition stating that 
there are limits to what a state representative may alienate (see above), ultimately 
culminating in the prohibition on annexation (see below). 
Article 48 reads as follows: 
1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its 
consent to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or 
situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time 
when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its 
consent to be bound by the treaty.  
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed 
by its own conduct to the error or if the circumstances were such 
as to put that State on notice of a possible error.  
3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does 
not affect its validity; article 79 then applies. 29 
This presumably is not meant to invalidate peace treaties due to the notoriously 
difficult to ascertain battlefield facts or strategic position.  Use of this Article 
with respect to peace treaties, or by analogy to peace agreements, should be 
depreciated.  Article 49 covers fraud.  Article 50 addresses corruption of a 
representative of a state.  These are likewise unlikely to affect the validity of a 
                                                 
28 Ibid, Art. 47. 
29 Ibid, Art. 48. 
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peace treaty or agreement.  Of more potential impact is Article 51, which deals 
with coercion of a representative of a state: 
The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which 
has been procured by the coercion of its representative through 
acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal 
effect. 
This mirrors Article 52, but instead of the threat of the use of force against a 
state, it concerns coercion of a state’s representative.  While normal diplomatic 
immunity and IHL protections for those seeking to negotiate a ceasefire or peace 
treaty (inviolability of parlementaires)30 should shield representatives from harm, 
but should those not be respected, and should representatives be coerced into 
signing a peace treaty, that treaty would be void. 
b) Amnesty and aut dedere aut judicare 
This section amplifies what this work has previously described with respect to 
amnesty and aut dedere aut judicare (Latin for “extradite or prosecute.”) This is 
a modern implementation of the legal principle coined by Grotius, “aut dedere 
aut punire” (either extradite or punish).31 The section below on individual 
criminal responsibility also touches on this point.  The procedural law applicable 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Article 32 1899 Hague Regulations, Article 32 International Conferences 
(The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 
October 1907, Article 43 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration, International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law , 2005, Volume I: 
Rules, Rules 66 and 67. 
31 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, chap. XXI, paras. 3-4. 
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to substantive criminal law is part of the transition to peace. This is not only with 
respect to the high profile, highly contested issues such as amnesties for the 
perpetration of alleged crimes related to the armed conflict. It includes questions 
of jurisdiction, immunities, statutes of limitation, and other questions of 
admissibility.  How these laws are interpreted can influence the formation of 
peace agreements, and conversely, peace agreements may mandate procedural 
law changes to criminal and civil law.  This section will focus on amnesty and 
aut dedere aut judicare. 
The obligation to prosecute or extradite for prosecution the alleged perpetration 
of certain crimes is well-established, but can create tensions.  The fight against 
impunity that creates this tension, often at the heart of the “peace vs. justice” 
debate, may complicate the short-term transition to peace but is often helpful to 
make the transition to peace successful in the long run.32  This is often described 
using the Latin term aut dedere aut judicare, although it is common now to tamp 
down the demand to prosecute to merely “submit for prosecution” because of 
varied responsibilities and procedures at the domestic level and the presumption 
of innocence in criminal law.  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide,33 for example, requires the state on whose territory a 
                                                 
32 See e.g. Darehshori, Sara. Selling justice short: why accountability matters for peace. 
Human Rights Watch, 2009. 
33 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, (Entry into force: 12 January 1951) United Nations Treaty 
Series, vol. 78, p. 277.  Article 6 states:  
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genocide allegedly occurred to prosecute the genocide.  The Geneva Conventions 
of 194934 likewise require prosecution (or extradition for prosecution) of alleged 
grave breaches.  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment35 likewise requires prosecution or 
extradition, as does the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict.36  This set of obligations also extends to issues 
less central although potentially relevant to jus post bellum, such as terrorism,37 
                                                                                                                                    
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the 
act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted 
its jurisdiction. 
34 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
(First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (“GCI”); International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (“GCII”); International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (“GCIII”); 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287 (“GCIV”). 
35 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, (Entry into force 26 June 
1987) United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. 
36 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954 (Entry into 
force: 7 August 1956). 
37 United Nations, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 
December 1970, (Entry into force: 14 October 1971) UN Treaty Series 1973; UN 
General Assembly, International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17 
November 1979, (Entry into force: 3 June 1983) No. 21931; UN General 
Assembly, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 
December 1997, (Entry into force: 23 May 2001) No. 37517; UN General 
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apartheid,38 crimes against internationally protected persons,39 and corruption.40  
Aside from direct treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute, indirect treaty 
obligations, such as human rights law obligations, also often create the duty to 
prosecute or extradite.  Particularly in the Inter-American system41 the duty to 
respect and ensure rights, as explained in the Barrios Altos case.42  In certain 
cases, such as with genocide, there also exists a customary international law 
norm with respect to the duty to prosecute or extradite.43  All of that said, given 
actual state practice and demonstrated opinio juris, one cannot generally assert 
                                                                                                                                    
Assembly, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
9 December 1999, (Entry into force: 10 April 2002) No. 38349. 
38 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, 30 November 1973, (Entry into force: 18 July 1976) 
A/RES/3068(XXVIII). 
39 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 
1973, (Entry into force: 20 February 1977) No. 15410. 
40 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 
2003, (Entry into force: 14 December 2005) A/58/422. 
41 See generally Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on 
Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Entry into force: 18 
July 1978. 
42 Barrios Altos Case, Judgment of November 30, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
87 (2001).  See particularly para. 19, citing Article 63(1) of the American Convention: 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom 
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party 
be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. 
43 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 191. 
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there is a yet a general customary duty to prosecute or extradite for all alleged 
international criminal law violations. 
C. The Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect, including (and perhaps in particular) the 
Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild44 are at best 
emerging legal norms rather than hard lex lata.45  That said the norms described 
by this doctrine are worth noting in the context of jus post bellum.  Fleck in 
particular makes a compelling case that the Responsibility to Rebuild, while not 
lex lata, is likely to be productive norm in terms of additional rule generation in 
the future.46 
                                                 
44 For a particular focus on the Responsibility to Rebuild and jus post bellum, arguing 
that the Responsibility to Rebuild in particular is phrased in terms of policy rather than 
legal principle, see Molier, Gelijn. "Rebuilding after Armed Conflict: Towards a Legal 
Framework of “The Responsibility to Rebuild” or a “Ius post Bellum”?." Peace, 
Security and Development in an Era of Globalization: The Integrated Security Approach 
Viewed from a Multidisciplinary Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2009): 317-53.  For a 
highly critical approach, see Robinson, Paul. "Is There an Obligation to 
Rebuild?." Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict. Springer 
Netherlands, 2013. 105-116. 
45 See Stahn, Carsten. "Responsibility to protect: political rhetoric or emerging legal 
norm." Am. J. Int'l L. 101 (2007): 99; Jovanović, Miodrag A. "Responsibility to Protect 
and the International Rule of Law." Chinese Journal of International Law 14.4 (2015): 
757-776. 
46 Fleck, Dieter. "The Responsibility to Rebuild and Its Potential for Law-Creation: 
Good Governance, Accountability and Judicial Control." Journal of International 
Peacekeeping 16.1-2 (2012): 84-98. 
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The Responsibility to Protect doctrine47 does not require armed conflict of any 
sort for its application.  Rather, as part of the “just cause” it requires either large-
scale loss of life or “ethnic cleansing”: 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal 
intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, 
or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or  
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.48 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine includes the Responsibility to Prevent, 
Responsibility to React, and the Responsibility to Rebuild. Of these three 
components, the Responsibility to React (particularly the section dealing with 
military intervention) has the most bearing on questions related to jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello, as it seeks to replace the rhetoric and framework of humanitarian 
intervention with guidelines of responses short of the use of armed force and 
constraints on the resort to armed force and how it is used. While the 
Responsibility to React could apply both to international armed conflict and non-
                                                 
47 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre 2001) 39–45; see also 
United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) 65–7; UN General Assembly, 2005 
World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 
2005, A/RES/60/1, paras 138–9; United Nations General Assembly, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677 (12 
January 2009) para. 48. 
48 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre 2001) p. XII. 
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international armed conflict, it is more likely to come into play in a non-
international armed conflict that becomes internationalized (and thus becomes an 
international armed conflict), or a situation that did not amount to an armed 
conflict (either international or non-international) that becomes an international 
armed conflict once foreign military intervention occurs.  Even a cursory reading 
of this doctrine with someone with a passing familiarity of just war doctrine will 
recognize the debt the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty owes to the authors referenced in Chapter 1 of this work, requiring 
just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable 
prospects as criteria for military intervention. 49    
The Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild are more tightly 
tied to jus post bellum.  In comparison with the Responsibility to Respond, these 
aspects of the Responsibility to Protect (Prevent and Rebuild) apply more 
generally to international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, 
but are probably still envisaged to apply more to non-international armed 
conflict. 
The norms contained in The Responsibility to Prevent come into play 
with respect to jus post bellum  given the goal of jus post bellum to create a 
sustainable peace, thus one that prevents future armed conflict.  As described in 
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
                                                 
49 Ibid 32-7. 
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Intervention and State Sovereignty,50 the emphasis of the Responsibility to 
Prevent is the “[p]revention of deadly conflict and other forms of man-made 
catastrophe” 51 which is the responsibility of sovereign states52 but is also within 
the portfolio of international mechanisms such as the Organization of African 
Unity’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Settlement and 
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. 53  Early warning efforts by 
non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the Fédération international des ligues 
des droits de l’homme, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General play an 
important role. 54  Root cause prevention efforts should be undertaken not only by 
states but by the United Nations, given that “the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being […] are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations.”55  Direct prevention measures from fact-finding missions, 
                                                 
50 Ibid 19. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid 20. 
54 Ibid 21-2. 
55 United Nations Charter, Article 55.  Those conditions are listed in Article 55 as “a. 
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
  b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
  c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 
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mediation, arbitration, adjudication, legal sanction, the creation of international 
criminal law institutions, and even preventative measures of a military nature 
such as the UN Preventative Deployment Force in Macedonia are all 
referenced. 56   
With respect to the Responsibility to Rebuild, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty emphasized first and foremost post-
intervention obligations—that is, if military intervention is pursued (under the 
rubric of Responsibility to React) that necessarily implies the “genuine 
commitment to helping to build a durable peace.”57  Much of the “Peace 
Building” subcomponent of post-intervention obligations are squarely in line 
with jus post bellum approaches found elsewhere. 58 This section relies heavily 
on previous efforts such as the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to 
the Security Council, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable 
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.59   The Secretary-General’s report 
describes post-conflict peacebuilding as follows: 
                                                 
56 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre 2001) pp. 23-5. 
57 Ibid 39. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council, The Causes 
of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, 
A/52/871 – S/1998/318 (New York: United Nations, 13 April 1998). 
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By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the 
end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of 
armed confrontation. Experience has shown that the consolidation 
of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely 
diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace 
building effort is needed to address the various factors which have 
caused or are threatening a conflict. Peace building may involve 
the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring 
elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and 
rehabilitation programmes, as well as creating conditions for 
resumed development. 60 
The Secretary-General’s report continues: 
A smooth and early transition to post-conflict peace-building is 
critical, and I urge the Security Council to look favourably on the 
establishment of post-conflict peace-building support structures 
similar to the one in Liberia. Even prior to the end of the conflict, 
there must be a clear assessment of key post-conflict peace-
building needs and of ways to meet them. 61 
 
As to the priorities of post-conflict peacebuilding, the Secretary-General’s report 
emphasizes the interconnectedness of a diverse set of priorities: 
Societies which have emerged from conflict have special needs. 
To avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid foundation for 
development, emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such 
as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for 
human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting 
national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation 
and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating 
ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the 
availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and 
international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. 
Each priority is linked to every other, and success will require a 
concerted and coordinated effort on all fronts. 62 
                                                 
60 Ibid, p. 13, para. 63. 
61 Ibid,  p. 14, para 65 (emphasis supplied).  For more on Liberia, see Chapter 5.D supra. 
62 Ibid,  p. 14, para 66.   
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One aspect emphasized by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty as part of post-conflict peacebuilding after an intervention is 
the provision of basic security, both in the form of avoiding revenge killings and 
in disbarment, demobilization and reintegration of former members of armed 
groups. 63  Criminal justice and administrative reform to ensure non-
discrimination, particularly for returning refugees and internally displaced 
persons is emphasized. 64  The International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty concludes by accentuating the limits to occupation and the 
need for local ownership, both legally (given the underlying norm of 
sovereignty) and practically (given the treats of dependency and economic 
distortion).65 
Ultimately the main impact of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been to 
shift the rhetoric around “humanitarian intervention” to a different vocabulary, 
but has not fully changed the shared understanding of the norm of sovereignty in 
the way many hoped,66 despite being referenced in the 2005 World Summit 
                                                 
63 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre 2001) pp. 40-41. 
64 Ibid. 41-42. 
65 Ibid. 44-45. 
66 Jovanović, Miodrag A. "Responsibility to Protect and the International Rule of 
Law." Chinese Journal of International Law 14.4 (2015): 757-776. 
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Outcome Document.67 In the heat of the discussion over military intervention, 
some broader pragmatic points regarding the need to prevent and to rebuild have 
been underemphasized.  By including these points as part of a hybrid functional 
concept of jus post bellum, the effort to establish a system of laws and norms that 
function together to help establish a just and sustainable peace should be 
strengthened. 
D. Territorial dispute resolution 
1. Prohibition of annexation 
The prohibition on the annexation of territory is central not only in determining 
the legality of particular post-conflict settlement, but also in underpinning the 
entire order of stable and pacific interstate relations.  The prohibition on 
transformative occupation takes its ultimate form in the prohibition of 
annexation—the customary international law norm against any right of 
annexation by an occupier is reflected in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970) and the prohibition 
against aggression.   
                                                 
67 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, particularly paras. 138-9. 
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The prohibition of annexation as the result of armed conflict is tied to the 
prohibition of acts of aggression, a clear jus ad bellum concern.  For International 
Armed Conflicts, the prohibition of annexation as the res68 of armed conflict is 
tied to the prohibition of acts of aggression, a jus ad bellum concern with jus post 
bellum implications.  While annexation could be agreed upon in the text of a 
peace treaty, such an agreement would be void on that point.  Were that not the 
case, little would remain of the prohibition of annexation.  Further, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, reflecting customary international law on this 
point, clearly states in Article 53: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.69 
A good list of peremptory norms (jus cogens norms) can be found in the 
commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts:  “Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and 
                                                 
68 The traditional criteria of persona, res, causa, animus and auctoritas dates from the 
Apparatus glossarum Laurentii Hispanii in Compilationem tertiam of Laurentius 
Hispanus (c. 1180-1248).  See generally Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the 
Middle Ages, p. 128.  “Res” or “thing” was the territory, property, or other object over 
which the just war was fought, and was intimately connected to the idea of causa or 
justa causa which was the characterization of the res, that is, that it was just to pursue 
the res in war, for example to lawfully recover territory. 
69 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, art. 53. 
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recognized include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial 
discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-
determination.” 70 
Annexation may often be the result of prohibited acts of aggression, and more to 
the point, will almost always violate the right to self-determination, being the 
imposition of a new territorial arrangement from the outside.   Following the 
principle ex injuria jus non oritur (“law does not arise from injustice"), Meron 
has put forward the view that unilateral State action can have no legal effect 
when it is in contravention of jus cogens.71  While the typical remedy for 
annexation subsequent to aggression is non-recognition,72 it is unclear how the 
international community will handle cases of annexation in the truly long term.73  
Forbidding this result as a general matter, however, should provide a disincentive 
to begin armed conflicts in the first place. 
                                                 
70 International Law Commission. "Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries." Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its 53rd session (2001), Commentary on Article 26, 
paragraph 5, p. 85.   
71 T. Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’, 80 AJIL 1, 19-21 (1986). 
72 UN General Assembly, Definition of Aggression, 14 December 1974, A/RES/3314, at 
123.  
73 Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Cambridge University Press, 
2011, pp. 182-3.  
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2. Self-determination 
Additional Protocol II explains that what is normally described as “International 
Armed Conflict” “include[s] armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination[.]”74  International law is not 
simply mute on the issue of the issue of resort to the use of force amounting to an 
armed conflict when both parties are not states, particularly in the context of 
decolonization and self-determination.  Indeed, the context of decolonization has 
helped to redraw the boundaries of international armed conflict and non-
international armed conflict.  The concept of self-determination can be found at 
least as far back as the late 18th century, with the United States of America 
proclaiming the principle in the Declaration of Independence75 and was further 
promoted by the leaders of the (First) French Republic.  The concept was further 
developed after the First World War, and found truly modern expression in the 
United Nations Charter and subsequent practice.  Three chapters of the United 
Nations Charter are of particular interest: Chapter XI: Declaration regarding 
Non-Self-Governing Territories; Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System; 
and Chapter XIII: The Trusteeship Council.   
                                                 
74 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Article 1. 
75 Declaration of Independence of the United States of America (United States) 51 BSP 
847. 
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Self-determination is a right enjoyed by, at a minimum, people under colonial 
rule.  There is a legal obligation not to use force to frustrate that right.  The 
keystone for this clarification of this area of law is the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625, widely known as the “Friendly 
Relations Declaration” of 1970.76  Similarly, the 1973 United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3103 on the Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the 
Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist 
Regimes: 
[t]he armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against 
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are to be 
regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged to apply to the 
combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other 
international instruments is to apply to the persons engaged in 
armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist 
regimes  77 
                                                 
76 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (United 
Nations [UN]) UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV), Annex. 
77 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) on the basic principles 
of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and 
racist regimes (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA]) UN Doc 
A/RES/3103(XXVIII), para. 3. 
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This was given additional weight by Additional Protocol I, as previously 
described.78  It says in Article 1, paragraphs 3 and 4: 
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in 
the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those 
Conventions. 
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.79 
As expressed by many authors, protection of minorities is the necessary corollary 
of self-determination, two sides of the same coin.80  While international 
protection of minorities was an intense focus after the First World War (but even 
then of limited application), after the second interest in the subject dropped 
markedly, replaced to some degree by a focus on human rights.81 
                                                 
78 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. 
79 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977). 
80 Kunz, Josef L. "The future of the international law for the protection of national 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1945): 89-95; Thornberry, Patrick. 
"Self-determination, minorities, human rights: a review of international instruments." 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38.04 (1989): 867-889. 
81 Kunz, Josef L. "The present status of the international law for the protection of 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1954): 282-287, pp. 282-3. 
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E. Consequences of an act of aggression 
The prohibition of annexation as the result of armed conflict is tied to the 
prohibition of acts of aggression, a clear jus ad bellum concern. Acts of 
aggression also raise the question of response in the transition to peace, including 
the question of reparations—an issue that implicates the law of state 
responsibility. United Nations Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII 
authority frequently provide specific binding law that applies to particular 
transitions from armed conflict to peace.82 
The prohibition on transformative occupation takes its ultimate form in the 
prohibition of annexation—the customary international law norm against any 
right of annexation by an occupier is reflected in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970) and the prohibition 
                                                 
82 The United Nations Charter does not limit its application to jus post bellum to 
providing for the authority of the Security Council to act under Chapter VI or Chapter 
VII to restore peace. Article 78 of the United Nations Charter states in full: “The 
trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the 
United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of 
sovereign equality.” The trusteeship system, like the mandate system before it, was in 
part an effort to realize the principle of self-determination and to move away from 
colonialism and empire as a post-war norm. While the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council is moribund and widely considered obsolete, the history of colonization and 
decolonization must inform an analysis of the normative and historical foundations of 
jus post bellum. 
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against aggression.  Section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 194983 
imposes substantial restrictions on the conduct of occupations, and Article 47 in 
particular notes:  The prohibition of annexation as the result of armed conflict is 
tied to the prohibition of acts of aggression, a clear jus ad bellum concern. 
This section focuses on the consequences of an act of aggression, a state act, as 
opposed to the crime of aggression.  The general matter of individual criminal 
responsibility is addressed in Chapter 6.G (“The scope of individual criminal 
responsibility”) and elsewhere in the work.84 
F. International territorial administration and trusteeship 
It is important to distinguish at the outset between the principle of trusteeship (as 
opposed to a formal trusteeship through the UN trusteeship system).  This section 
will first discuss the formal prohibition of trusteeship for UN Members, then turn 
to the principle of trusteeship as it applies to international territorial 
administration.  Finally, it will turn to the principles of accountability and 
proportionality as they apply to jus post bellum as described by Boon.85   
                                                 
83 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 
84 For more on this definitional issue, see e.g. O’Connell, Mary Ellen, and Mirakmal 
Niyazmatov. "What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum and the ICC 
Statute." Journal of International Criminal Justice 10.1 (2012): 189-207. 
85 See particularly Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post 
bellum and the contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 
285. 
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Article 78 of the UN Charter reads as follows: “The trusteeship system shall not 
apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, 
relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign 
equality.”86  The prohibition of ‘trusteeship’ (over UN members) under Article 
78 of the Charter limits the options in the transition from armed conflict to peace.  
It has implications for occupation law under the Fourth Geneva Convention, as 
well as the powers of the Security Council under the Charter.  Given near 
universal membership in the United Nations, trusteeship in its original sense is 
essentially prohibited.  The reincarnation of the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council to address such issues as failing states does not seem realistic, given the 
legal and political difficulties surrounding the issue.87 
The principles of trusteeship may nonetheless be helpful for instances of 
international territorial administration.88  As described by Article 76 of the UN 
Charter: 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with 
the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the 
present Charter, shall be: 
a. to further international peace and security; 
                                                 
86 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
87 Stahn, Carsten. The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: 
Versailles to Iraq and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2008), p. 440. 
88 Ibid.. 422. 
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b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their 
progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be 
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; 
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of 
the peoples of the world; and 
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial 
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, 
and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of 
justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing 
objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.89 
A series of International Court of Justice cases have a direct bearing on the 
obligations and principles governing an administering authority.  These 
obligations and principles governing administering authority demand that the 
authority act in the interest of the inhabitants of the administered territory,90 
including self-governance.91  The authority should bear responsibility for 
unlawful acts it commits.92 
                                                 
89 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
90 See International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, 
132. 
91 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
(Advisory Opinion) ([1971] ICJ Rep 16, 31. 
92 See Northern Cameroons Case [Preliminary Objections] (1963) ICJ Rep 15, 26, 35. 
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International territorial administration is no longer done through the trusteeship 
system but through the United Nations Security Council.  There are essentially 
two types, those with the consent of the sovereign or former sovereign pursuant 
to Chapter VI (operations such as those in El Salvador (“UNOSAL”) and 
Cambodia (“UNTAC”)) and those without such consent pursuant to Chapter VII 
(operations such as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) and the 
United Nations Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”)).  One principle 
emerging from the United Nations Security Council itself it that the authority 
should provide regular reports to the international community.93 
Boon emphasizes that trusteeship is implicit in what she calls multilateral interim 
administrations or functional occupants. 94  While international humanitarian law 
binds belligerent occupants to an usufructuary or trusteeship role (see infra), one 
must look elsewhere for this principle to be applied to multilateral interim 
administrations.  Boon also finds trusteeship obligations for international 
financial institutions involved in post-conflict economic reform, although the 
                                                 
93 See UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1511 (2003) on authorizing a 
multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute 
to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, 16 October 2003, S/RES/1511 
(2003). 
94 Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285, 311. 
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contours of those obligations beyond avoiding self-dealing are could be further 
developed.95  
Where then to find the regulations of such administrations?  Boon identifies at 
least three sources.  First, there are the limits imposed by the United Nations 
Charter.96  , there exist the baseline jus cogens restrictions.97  Again, a good list 
of peremptory norms (jus cogens norms) can be found in the commentary to the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:  
“Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the 
prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes 
against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.”98  Aside from 
hopefully rare, rogue instances of racial discrimination, attacks on a civilian 
population, or torture, the main norm at play in such administrations is likely to 
be self-determination—an area that raises the question of trusteeship.  (For more 
on self-determination, see Chapter 6.D.2 supra.)  Rather than trusteeship for a 
                                                 
95 Boon, Kristen E. "Open for Business: International Financial Institutions, Post-
Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law." NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 39 (2006): 513, 
572 et seq. 
96 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
particularly the chapters pertaining to the powers of the Security Council  (V, VI, VII, 
VIII, and XII). 
97 Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285, 312. 
98 International Law Commission. "Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries." Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its 53rd session (2001), Commentary on Article 26, 
paragraph 5, p. 85.   
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displaced sovereign, trusteeship in an instance of these administrations is likely 
to be for the population within the administered territory, particularly a 
population engaged in a struggle for self-determination. Third, United Nations 
missions established by Security Council resolutions are of course regulated by 
the resolutions themselves.99   
The jus post bellum principles identified by Boon extend beyond trusteeship to 
also include accountability (to the population of the administered territory) and 
proportionality. 100  With respect to accountability, both UNMIK and UNTAET 
included consultative mechanisms with local representatives. 101  This limited 
practice is not a strong evidentiary basis for this principle, although local-
ownership as a prudential mantra has become widespread for any sort of external 
intervention in post-conflict justice.  A stronger theoretical and legal basis for the 
principle of accountability is likely found in the peremptory norm of self-
determination and the aforementioned evidence of a duty towards trusteeship as 
applied to accountability to the people in the administered territory.  If self-
determination applies, it limits the degree to which an administration can be 
unaccountable to the local population.  The words of Article 73 of the United 
                                                 
99 Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285, 318. 
100 Ibid. 294-5. 
101 Ibid. 320-1. 
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Nations Charter, while not directly applicable to such administration, are worthy 
of note.  They read in pertinent part: 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume 
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples 
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize 
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories 
are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace 
and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of 
the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: 
  a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples 
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against 
abuses; 
  b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions, 
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and their varying stages of advancement; 
  c. to further international peace and security;102 
As a matter of guiding principle, it would be odd if these obligations bound 
member states individually but not collectively.  The language in Article 73 
require not only the trusteeship values (promoting the interests of the inhabitants, 
respecting their culture, advancing them, treating them justly, and protecting 
them from abuses), but also to develop self-government.  Again, while not a 
strong argument for a lex lata obligation of accountability to the local population 
for international territorial administrations (let alone a clear determination of the 
                                                 
102 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, 
Article 73. 
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operationalizations of such an obligation), the overall thrust of the obligations 
inherent in the peremptory norm of self-determination and the trusteeship 
obligations described in Article 73 are orthogonal with existing practice requiring 
some accountability mechanisms between the international territorial 
administration and the populations of the administered territory.  As argued by 
Gordon, there is a strong case to be made that the right of self-determination 
applies to non-self governing people in general.103  The shorter the period of 
administration and the greater the accountability, the less tension there is with the 
principle of self-determination.   
Boon suggests a tension between the obligations of trusteeship (what inhabitants 
“should” want) and the obligations of accountability (what inhabitants do or do 
not want in fact) that can be resolved with the principle of proportionality. 104  
While helpful, this general term could be further operationalized.  In general, 
there is a potential for paternalism in any exercise of trusteeship—in assuming 
that the administrators are better placed to determine the obligations of 
trusteeship (what inhabitants “should want) better than the inhabitants 
themselves.  Ideally, there should be no tension between the two, and the 
administrator should, unless there is a compelling not to do so, be led by the 
                                                 
103 Gordon, Ruth E. "Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship." Cornell Int'l LJ 28 
(1995): 301. 
104 Boon, Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285, 323-5. 
6.  Contemporary Legal Content of Jus Post Bellum  
    The law applicable in a territory in transition 
 
356 
 
expressed will of the inhabitants of the territory.105  One notable exception to this 
general rule would be when the will of the majority of inhabitants is at odds with 
the rights or interests of a minority.  Ethnic Serbs in Kosovo or Ethnic 
Indonesians in East Timor are pertinent examples.  Then, presumably, one way 
to operationalize the norm of proportionality between trusteeship and 
accountability as introduced by Boon is to tie it to the overall telos of jus post 
bellum: taking the rights and interest of minorities into account not only for their 
own sake but to serve the overall goals of societal reconciliation and a just, 
sustainable, positive peace. 
G. The law applicable in a territory in transition 
1. The law of state succession 
State succession is the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility 
for the international relations of territory.106  It occurs in situations when 
                                                 
105 For more on subjective and objective public reasoning on collective goods, the 
foremost scholar on the subject may be Amartya Sen.  See e.g. Sen, Amartya 
Kumar. Collective choice and social welfare. Vol. 11. Elsevier, 2014; Sen, Amartya. The 
Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press, 2011 (particularly Part IV); Sen, 
Amartya. Development as freedom. Oxford Paperbacks, 2001.  The concept of a “right 
to development” has faded from scholarly and United Nations discourse, but if given 
credence would also have bearing on the obligations of an administrator, particularly a 
long-term administrator or one that radically changed regulations in terms of investment, 
property, and resource exploitation. 
106 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (United 
Nations [UN]) 1946 UNTS 3, UN Reg No I-33356, Part I General Provisions, Art.2, (1), 
(b); Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts (United Nations [UN]) UN Doc A/CONF.117/14, Part I General Provisions, 
Art.2, (1), (a); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Guinea-Bissau v Senegal, Judgment, 
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territorial change occurs, such as decolonization, cession of territory, secession, 
dismemberment of a state, incorporation of one state into another, or merger of 
multiple states into a new state.  These can all be the result of an armed conflict.  
It has to be distinguished from situations where no territorial changes occur, such 
as military occupation, a change in government, or a failed state.   
With respect to the law of state succession with respect to treaties, two 
dichotomous approaches collectively dominate.107  The first approach uses the 
principle of universal succession, upholding past treaty obligations.  The second 
tabula rasa approach emphasizes sovereignty at the expense of prior obligations.  
The dominance of these approaches varies with the type of succession. 
In decolonization, the newly independent state is not bound to maintain in force a 
treaty of the predecessor state, but may establish its status as a party to such a 
treaty through unilateral declaration. 108  Decolonization frequently happened as a 
result of armed conflict, so this practice is particularly relevant for jus post 
bellum historically, although likely lacks contemporary relevance.   
                                                                                                                                    
[1991] ICJ Rep 53, ICGJ 90 (ICJ 1991), (1992) 31 ILM 32, 12th November 1991, 
International Court of Justice [ICJ]. 
107 See Craven, Matthew CR. "The problem of state succession and the identity of states 
under international law." European Journal of International Law 9.1 (1998): 142-162. 
108 UN General Assembly, Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties, 6 November 1996, (Entry into force 6 November 1996, United Nations, Treaty 
Series , vol. 1946, p. 3), Article 16. 
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With cession of territory from one sovereign to another (e.g. Hong Kong) the 
general rule is the moving treaty frontiers principle:  
When part of the territory of a State, or when any territory for the 
international relations of which a State is responsible, not being 
part of the territory to that State, becomes part of the territory of 
another State: (a) treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in 
force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States 
relates from the date of the succession of States and (b) treaties of 
the successor State are in force in respect of the territory to which 
the succession of States relates from the date of the succession of 
States, unless It appears from the treaty or Is otherwise established 
that the application of the treaty to that territory would be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would 
radically change the conditions for its operation. 109 
This scenario, however, should be inoperative in an ordinary contemporary post-
conflict scenario, as annexation of territory through conquest is prohibited under 
international law (see e.g. Chapter 6.E “Prohibition of an act of annexation” 
supra.)  That said, contested borders may be resolved during peace treaties, so 
this law may theoretically be operative. 
If one state is voluntarily incorporated into another (e.g. German Democratic 
Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany), the obligations of the absorbed 
state would not normally be taken on be the incorporating state unless the parties 
decide otherwise, while the obligations of the incorporating state would be 
extended to the territory of the absorbed state, excepting localized treaties.  
                                                 
109 Ibid, Article 15. 
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Again, this scenario is problematic in a post-conflict context, as one would 
question the voluntary nature of the incorporation. 
To the degree that the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties is applied, if two or more states merge to form a new state (e.g. Yemen), 
all treaties continue to be enforced on the previous with their previous territorial 
scope unless further action is taken:  “Any treaty continuing in force […] shall 
apply only in respect of the part of the territory of the successor State in respect 
of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of States[.]”110 
In the case of a complete dissolution of a state into multiple states (Yugoslavia), 
the treaties of the predecessor state continue in force for each successor state. 111  
In contrast, when one of the entities on the territory continues the legal 
personality of the predecessor state (USSR, Russian Federation) the continuing 
state continues all treaty relations (excepting localized treaties). 112  These 
scenarios can come into play in the post-conflict environment, and can thus be 
important components of jus post bellum. 
Of course, not all issues in the law of state succession regard treaty law.  Some 
issues include property, archives and debts, for example.  The Vienna Convention 
                                                 
110 Ibid, Art. 31. 
111 Ibid, Art. 34. 
112 Ibid, Art. 35. 
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on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts113 has 
not yet entered into force, and currently114 has only seven state parties.  
Customary law seems governed mostly by equitable, negotiated settlements (e.g. 
USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia).    Again, these examples are not post 
bellum, so the law in that context is likely unsettled.  This area is further 
explored in the section on odious debt, infra. 
 
2. Human rights law and the rights and interests of minorities 
Human rights law generally applies in times of war and peace, and so would 
apply during the transition from armed conflict to peace. The full spectrum of 
applicable human rights law is beyond the scope of this work.  Three aspects of 
human rights law merit particular attention with respect to the application of 
human rights law in the context of transition from armed conflict to peace: states 
of emergency; the simultaneous application of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law; and the rights and interests of miniorities in the transition 
to peace. 
                                                 
113 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts (United Nations [UN]) UN Doc A/CONF.117/14, 8 April 1983. 
114 9 April 2017. 
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Human rights conventions limit the general doctrine of necessity by proclaiming 
non-derogable human rights guarantees115 and allowing measures derogating 
from their obligations only (e.g.): 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin. 116 
While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European 
Convention on Human Rights, and American Convention on Human Rights have 
differing non-derogable rights, they all protect the right to life; the right not to be 
free from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the right to be free from slavery and servitude, and the right to be 
free from retroactive punishment. 
Derogation in states of emergency is only potentially applicable in situations of 
“public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”117  The Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No 29 (Derogations from Provisions of the 
                                                 
115 E.g. “No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may 
be made under this provision.” UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, 
Article 4.2. 
116 E.g. “No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may 
be made under this provision.” Ibid, Article 4.1. 
117 Ibid 
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Covenant during a State of Emergency)’118 makes clear that such states are 
exceptional.  The American Convention on Human Rights phrases the 
suspension of guarantees: 
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens 
the independence or security of a State Party, it may take 
measures derogating from its obligations under the present 
Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground 
of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.119 
The possibility of a state of emergency may change over the course of the 
transition from armed conflict to peace, depending on whether conditions exist 
that meet the required standard.  The European Commission of Human Rights 
described the criteria justifying a declaration of a state of emergency as follows: 
a)  the emergency must already exist or be imminent; 
 
b)  it must affect the whole of the nation; 
 
c)  the organized life of the community must be threatened; 
 
                                                 
118 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 
4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).  See also Lawless v Ireland, 
Admissibility, App No 332/57, B/1, (1958-59) 2 YB Eur Conv HR 324, 30th August 
1959, European Commission on Human Rights. 
119 American Convention on Human Rights (Organization of American States [OAS]) 
OASTS No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, B-32, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, 25, Part I State 
Obligations and Rights Protected, Chapter IV Suspension of Guarantees, Interpretation 
and Application, Art.27. 
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d)  the situation must be such that normal measures permitted 
under the Convention will not be adequate to address that 
situation.120 
 
With respect to the application of human rights alongside international 
humanitarian law, a critical case is the recent Hassan v. United Kingdom.121  The 
particular concern was the application of the right to liberty, enshrined in Article 
5 of the ECHR, was violated by the United Kingdom’s detention of an individual 
in accordance with the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions in an international 
armed conflict.  The European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument that 
international humanitarian law was lex specialis that precluded jurisdiction.122  
Instead, the Court rejected complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR 
(failure to investigate detention, ill-treatment and death) for lack of evidence, and 
found that deprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under international law 
could be lawful and not arbitrary.  The Court relied on the principle that the 
ECHR can be modified by a consistent practice by High Contracting Parties.123  
Of particular importance is the application of human rights law extraterritorially, 
                                                 
120 Greek Case, Denmark v Greece, Report of the Commission, App No 3321/67, (1969) 
12 YB Eur Conv Hum Rts 1, (1972) 12 YB Eur Conv Hum Rts 186, 5th November 
1969, European Commission on Human Rights. 
121 Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i001- 146501 (9 December 2015). 
122 Ibid.,  para. 77). 
123 Ibid.,  para. 101.  See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 
May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, Article 31(3)(c) 
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even if read in light of international humanitarian law.  This also has implications 
for the laws of occupation, which this work addresses infra. 
There is a robust ongoing discussion as to how, for example, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law operate during periods of armed 
conflict.124  William Schabas contrasts the approach taken by the International 
Court of Justice (in which international humanitarian law is the lex specialis 
through which the human rights concept of “arbitrary deprivation of life” is to be 
understood during armed conflict) with the approach taken by the Human Rights 
Committee in which the individual benefits from both bodies of law.125  For 
Schabas, the tension between these two approaches to international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law cannot be understood without 
understanding the relationship with a third body of law, jus ad bellum.  
International humanitarian law is built on neutrality with respect to the legality of 
the war itself and human rights law tends to view war itself as a violation of the 
                                                 
124 See e.g., Schabas, William A. "Lex Specialis-Belt and Suspenders-the Parallel 
Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of 
Jus Ad Bellum." Isr. L. Rev. 40 (2007): 592; Droege, Cordula. "Interplay between 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of 
Armed Conflict, The." Isr. L. Rev. 40 (2007): 310; Orakhelashvili, Alexander. "The 
interaction between human rights and humanitarian law: fragmentation, conflict, 
parallelism, or convergence?." European Journal of International Law 19.1 (2008): 161-
182; Cassimatis, Anthony E. "International humanitarian law, international human rights 
law, and fragmentation of international law." International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 56.03 (2007): 623-639. 
125 Schabas, William A. "Lex Specialis-Belt and Suspenders-the Parallel Operation of 
Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad 
Bellum." Isr. L. Rev. 40 (2007): 592. 
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human right to peace.  This analysis regarding the choice of approach may be 
useful with respect to jus post bellum as well.  If one attempts to find a neat and 
seamless relationship between potentially conflicting areas of law, one is likely 
to compromise essential aspects of at least one body of law.  
It is worth noting that a number of international treaties and instruments since 
1989 include both human rights and international humanitarian law provisions.  
These include the Convention on the Rights of the Child,126 the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court,127 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,128 the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law129 and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.130 
                                                 
126 Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
127 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
128 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000 (Entered into 
force 12 February 2002, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000). 
129 G.A. Res. 60/147, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
130 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities : 
resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, see 
especially Article 11: States Parties shall take, in accordance with their obligations under 
international law, including international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with 
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International law and international organizations have long been concerned with 
the venerable problem of “national minorities.”  As far back as the Peace of 
Westphalia, religious minorities were a central concern.  The fate of minorities 
was at issue in the 1814 Congress of Vienna, the 1856 Congress of Paris, and the 
1878 Congress of Berlin.  The Paris Minority Treaties that emerged after World 
War I were the result of distrust of municipal law’s treatment of minorities.131 
The Paris Minority Treaties were an innovative regulation of a state’s treatment 
of its own citizens based on international law pertaining to minority groups.132  
As expressed by many authors, protection of minorities is the necessary corollary 
of self-determination, two sides of the same coin.133  While international 
protection of minorities was an intense focus after the First World War (but even 
then of limited application), after the second interest in the subject dropped 
                                                                                                                                    
disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian 
emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters. See 40 Isr. L. Rev. 317 (2007)  
Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
in Situations of Armed Conflict, The; Droege, Cordula.   
131 Kunz, Josef L. "The future of the international law for the protection of national 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1945): 89-95, p. 91. 
132 Kunz, Josef L. "The future of the international law for the protection of national 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1945): 89-95, p. 91; Kunz, Josef L. 
"The present status of the international law for the protection of minorities." American 
Journal of International Law (1954): 282-287, pp. 282-3. 
133 Kunz, Josef L. "The future of the international law for the protection of national 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1945): 89-95; Thornberry, Patrick. 
"Self-determination, minorities, human rights: a review of international instruments." 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38.04 (1989): 867-889. 
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markedly, replaced to some degree by a focus on human rights.134  Increasingly, 
protection of minorities was not seen as a separate area, but a mere subset of 
human rights.135  Human rights, with its focus on the individual as its natural 
unit, can be limited with respect to providing special protection from the 
majority; limited to general statements such as Article 27 of the ICCPR:   
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language.136 
Again, in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,137 what is protected is the “rights” of 
“persons” not protecting the broader interests of groups (beyond mere existence).  
At the United Nations, the body with the primary responsibility for protecting 
minorities is the Human Rights Council.138  Similarly, the Lisbon Treaty refers to 
                                                 
134 Kunz, Josef L. "The present status of the international law for the protection of 
minorities." American Journal of International Law (1954): 282-287, pp. 282-3. 
135 See e.g. Brownlie, Ian. "Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, The." Bull. 
Austl. Soc. Leg. Phil. 9 (1985): 104. 
136 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.  See also e.g. e.g. the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
U.K.T.S. 77 (1969), Cmnd.41088; The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education (1960) 156 U.N.T.S. 93. 
137 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135. 
138 See e.g. UN Human Rights Council, Rights of persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities : report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights , 17 December 2012, A/HRC/22/27.  The Sub-
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the rights of persons belonging to minorities139 including the right to be free from 
discrimination.140  The strongest protection of national minority groups qua 
groups remains in Europe (specifically the Council of Europe), with instruments 
such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages141 and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.142  While 
laudable, these efforts within the Council of Europe lack universality and specific 
application in the jus post bellum context.   
One of the most interesting offices with respect to minorities and jus post bellum 
is likely the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, which gets involved in a situation if, in 
her judgement, there are tensions involving national minorities which could 
develop into a conflict.  The portfolio of this office is more conflict prevention 
than peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, however.  Human rights can 
sometimes trump and override arrangements meant to keep a sustainable peace 
                                                                                                                                    
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities under the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights was renamed the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1999 and then ended in 2006. 
139 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, Art. 
2. 
140 Ibid, Art. 21. 
141 Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, The European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages, 21 October 2010, Doc. 12422. 
142 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
1 February 1995, ETS 157. 
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between various national groups—see for example Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in which the human rights of the applicants overrode the power 
sharing arrangements between national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.143 
When groups are recognized in laws applied during transitions to peace, they are 
typically rather limited, such as organized armed groups in international 
humanitarian law as applied to non-international armed conflicts, or a “people” 
fighting for self-determination.  The right of certain groups not to be destroyed 
under the concept of Genocide is an extremely limited protection, not applicable 
to all groups and not protective of all of the interests of listed groups.  The 
collective political interests of, for example, women, children, the poor, or 
indigenous populations are poorly served by the traditional bases of international 
law (particularly) during the transition to peace, when the urgent demands of 
ending organized violence may tend to trump all other concerns. 
Jus post bellum, as part of a venerable legal and normative tradition, is well 
placed to fill the gap between states and individuals with respect to the interests 
of groups during the transition to peace.  It could be a useful tool to create or 
recreate a sense of a social contract necessary for successful counterinsurgency 
and democracy-building, even in the midst of occupation or in post-occupation.  
                                                 
143 ECtHR 22 Dec. 2009, Case No. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  For more on this case, see Milanovic, Marko. "Sejdic and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina." American Journal of International Law104 (2010); 
Bardutzky, Samo. "The Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution: Judgment in the 
case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 December 2009." European 
Constitutional Law Review 6.02 (2010): 309-333. 
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After all, armed conflicts are often fought due to the political interests of groups 
being underserved by the pre-war political structure.  A case study in how jus 
post bellum principles can be used to structure the transition to peace relates to 
the question of whether there should be any bias towards a more democratic, 
equitable distribution of political power in the aftermath of war. 
3. The laws of occupation 
The modern understanding of occupation is rooted in Article 42 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations144 and the identical text in the 1874 Brussels Declaration.145  
That text simply reads: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army.  The occupation extends only to 
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” 146   
The test as to whether or not territory is occupied or not is thus factual, with two 
conditions: the sovereign power has cannot exercise authority and the occupying 
                                                 
144  Hague Convention (Date signed: 18th October 1907), IV (Convention Relating 
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land), Annex (Regulations respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land), Section III (Military Authority over the Territory of the 
Hostile State), Art. 42. 
145  Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War ((signed 27 August 1874) (1873-74) 65 BFSP 1005 (1907) 1 AJIL 96) 
146  Hague Convention (Date signed: 18th October 1907), IV (Convention Relating 
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land), Annex (Regulations respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land), Section III (Military Authority over the Territory of the 
Hostile State), Art. 42.  The authentic (French) text reads: “Un territoire est considéré 
comme occupé lorsqu'il se trouve placé de fait sous l'autorité de l'armée ennemie. 
L'occupation ne s'étend qu'aux territoires où cette autorité est établie et en mesure de 
s'exercer.” 
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power can.  With respect to the second condition, he International Court of 
Justice has clarified that the hostile army has actual, not potential control.147  
Belligerent occupation does not require active resistance, and may lead to a 
sustained peace without shots being fired.148  Common Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 explains their applicability with the following language: 
[a]ll cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The 
Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance.149 
This was extended to Additional Protocol I.150  As described in Article 1, 
paragraph 3: 
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in 
the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those 
Conventions. 
 
                                                 
147 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
v Uganda, Merits, ICJ GL No 116, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ 31 (ICJ 2005), (2006) 45 
ILM 271, 19th December 2005, International Court of Justice [ICJ]. 
148 See generally, Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd ed 2012 OUP); 
Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP 2009). 
149 Common Article 2 of each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
150 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. 
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The Hague Regulations, Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol I are the 
main sources for determining the law of armed conflict in a belligerent 
occupation.  Also of note is the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.151. 
Traditionally, occupation was treated as a difficult exception under public 
international law.152  Occupation was seen as an extraordinary situation, where 
the identity between the sovereign state and its territory was ruptured, and the 
occupying force in effect held the territory in trust or at most as a usufructuary, 
until control would be restored to the sovereign.  Radical transformation of the 
occupied territory and its laws was thus traditionally prohibited.  This was 
eventually reflected in Article 43 of the Hague Convention of 1907.   
Human rights law can also apply in occupied territories.  This is the case for at 
least three reasons: the finding that human rights protections continue during 
international armed conflict,153 the obligations of governments for areas under 
                                                 
151 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]) 249 
UNTS 240, UN Reg No I-3511 
152 See generally Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd ed 2012 
OUP). 
153 See Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 
2004Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 226, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996. 
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their effective control154, and the obligation for the occupying power to respect 
the laws in force in the country under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.155 
The literature on jus post bellum and occupation demonstrates the need for 
understanding the laws applicable to occupation with an eye towards a successful 
transition to a just and sustainable peace.  Stahn156 points out the demands for a 
substantive jus post bellum to manage the difficulties of occupation and post-
occupation, citing the legal dilemmas posed by interventions in Kuwait and 
Iraq157 (and indeed Japan and Germany158), specifically referencing the practice 
of the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1483, which combined 
continued application of the law of occupation alongside the principles of state-
building.159 Boon states “Yet with the exception of the law of belligerent 
                                                 
154  See Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004, 
para. 112. 
155 Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land between the 
Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Montenegro, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, El 
Salvador, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, Annex Regulations respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section III Military Authority over the Territory of 
the Hostile State, Art.43 
156 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 
(2006): 921-943. 
157 Ibid 926-29. 
158 Ibid 928-29. 
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occupation, neither jus ad bellum nor jus in bello provide much guidance on 
temporary interventions after war and before peace.”160   
For the sake of concision, the analysis on trusteeship, accountability, and 
proportionality contained in the section on international territorial administration 
and trusteeship supra is not repeated here, although much of it applies with equal 
or greater force to belligerent occupation.  Boon’s work on jus post bellum, 
occupation and trusteeship referenced earlier161  should be read alongside 
Walzer,162 Cohen,163 Benvenisti,164 and Roberts165 as well as classics such as von 
Glahn.166 
                                                                                                                                    
159 Ibid 929. 
160 Boon, Kristen E., Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post 
Bellum (June, 29 2009). Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2008, p. 102.  
161 Boon, Kristen E., Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post 
Bellum (June, 29 2009). Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2008, p. 102; Boon, Kristen E. "The Future of the Law of 
Occupation." The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 46 (2008): 107-142; Boon, 
Kristen. "Legislative reform in post-conflict zones: Jus post bellum and the 
contemporary occupant's law-making powers." McGill LJ 50 (2005): 285. 
162 Walzer, Michael. "The Aftermath of War." in  Ethics beyond war's end. Patterson, 
Eric. Ed. Georgetown University Press, 2012.: 35-46 (obligation to create social justice); 
Walzer, Michael. Arguing about war. Yale University Press, 2008. 
163 Cohen, Jean L. "The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making 
toward a Jus Post Bellum for Interim Occupations." NYL Sch. L. Rev. 51 (2006): 497. 
164 Benvenisti, Eyal. "Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 1483 on 
Iraq in Historical Perspective, The." IDF LR 1 (2003): 19; Benvenisti, Eyal. The 
International Law of Occupation. 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012 
165 Roberts, Adam. "What is a military occupation?." British Yearbook of International 
Law 55.1 (1985): 249-305; Roberts, Adam. "Transformative military occupation: 
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Why is transformative occupation a problem under occupation law? 167  To 
briefly review Articles 43 and 46 of the Hague Convention of 1907,168 Article 43 
states: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country. 
Article 46 states:  “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private 
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.  
Private property cannot be confiscated.” 
                                                                                                                                    
applying the laws of war and human rights."American Journal of International Law 
(2006): 580-622. 
166 Von Glahn, Gerhard. The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A commentary on the law 
and practice of belligerent occupation. University of Minnesota Press, 1957, 6. 
167 For more on the heated discussion regarding transformative occupation, see e.g. 
Österdahl, Inger, and Esther Van Zadel. "What will jus post bellum mean? Of new wine 
and old bottles." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 14.2 (2009): 175-207; Boon, 
Kristen. "Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum." Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 31.2 (2008); Zahawi, 
Hamada. "Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom": California Law Review (2007): 2295-2352; Roberts, Adam. "Transformative 
military occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights." American Journal of 
International Law (2006): 580-622; Cohen, Jean L. "Role of International Law in Post-
Conflict Constitution-Making toward a Jus Post Bellum for Interim Occupations, 
The." NYL Sch. L. Rev. 51 (2006): 497; 580-622; Bhuta, Nehal. "The antinomies of 
transformative occupation." European Journal of International Law 16.4 (2005): 721-
740; Yoo, John. "Iraqi Reconstruction and the Law of Occupation." UC Davis J. Int'l L. 
& Pol'y 11 (2004): 7. 
168 International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
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The prohibition on transformative occupation takes its ultimate form in the 
prohibition of annexation—the customary international law norm against any 
right of annexation by an occupier is reflected in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970) and the prohibition 
against aggression.  Section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949169 
imposes substantial restrictions on the conduct of occupations, and Article 47 in 
particular notes: 
Art. 47. Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not 
be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the 
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as 
the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or 
government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the 
Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the 
whole or part of the occupied territory. 
Pictet’s commentary notes that the traditional concept of occupation puts the 
occupying Authority to be considered merely as a de facto administrator.170  The 
Public Trust Doctrine provided the occupier by analogy with usufructory 
obligations during occupation.   
                                                 
169 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 
170 International Committee Of The Red Cross, Commentary On The Geneva 
Convention (IV) Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In Time Of War 273 ( 
Jean Pictet gen. ed., 1958), Article 47. 
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The Fourth Geneva Convention171  continues in Article 64: 
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, 
with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the 
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its 
security or an obstacle to the application of the present 
Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the 
necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the 
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in 
respect of all offences covered by the said laws. 
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of 
the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable 
the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present 
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, 
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the 
members and property of the occupying forces or administration, 
and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication 
used by them. 
In short, under this article, the Occupying Party may only do what is necessary 
for order and security, not radical transformation of the penal code—even if, 
presumably, the penal code is inequitable.  With that as the traditional basis for 
the restriction of transformative occupation, it must be noted that transformative 
occupation nonetheless has a long history, and has been particularly challenged 
since World War II, first with the axis powers, with Czechoslovakia after 1968, 
northern Cyprus after 1974, Cambodia after 1978, Grenada in 1983, and with 
United States policy in Iraq after 2003.172 The occupation of Iraq, including the 
                                                 
171 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 
172 For more on this subject see e.g. Roberts, Adam. "Transformative military 
occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights."American Journal of 
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import of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483173 is primarily 
responsible for the current heated debate on the subject. 
H. The scope of individual criminal responsibility  
The section regarding amnesty and aut dedere aut judicare (Chapter 6.B.2.b 
supra) has already touched upon the scope of individual criminal responsibility.  
This section also amplifies the material covered in Chapter 3 (“Present – An 
Exploration of Contemporary Usage”) Of the ten situations before the 
International Criminal Court as of this writing174 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Darfur (Sudan), Kenya, Libya, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Georgia),175 all except for perhaps the cases of post-election 
violence (Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire) involve an armed conflict, generally one that 
is dormant, although not necessarily truly finished.   
                                                                                                                                    
International Law (2006): 580-622; Bhuta, Nehal. "The antinomies of transformative 
occupation." European Journal of International Law16.4 (2005): 721-740; Fox, Gregory 
H. "Transformative occupation and the unilateralist impulse." International Review of 
the Red Cross 94.885 (2012): 237-266. 
173 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) on the situation 
between Iraq and Kuwait, 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 (2003).  For more on this subject, 
see Benvenisti, Eyal. "Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 1483 on 
Iraq in Historical Perspective, The." IDF LR 1 (2003): 19; Orakhelashvili, Alexander. 
"Post-War Settlement in Iraq: The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and 
General International Law, The." J. Conflict & Sec. L. 8 (2003): 307. 
174 24 March 2017. 
175 See https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.asp
x last visited 3 May 2016 
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While its norms and development of law with an impact on the transition to 
peace are of wide and general application, the development of each investigation, 
case, and charge can have particular effects on local transitions to peace.  The 
situations before the International Criminal Court are generally non-international 
armed conflict (with the possible exception of the Comoros referral) although 
many have international involvement.  That said, the norms emerging from the 
International Criminal Court’s jurisprudence are likely to have general 
application to international armed conflicts and non-international armed 
conflicts. 
In its current usage, International Criminal Law involves the application of 
international law to determine the individual criminal responsibility of 
defendants under that law while protecting the rights of the accused against the 
power of the state, regardless of how that power is institutionalized.  The critical 
aspect of International Criminal Law is not the forum, whether that forum is 
international, domestic, or hybrid.  The central hypothesis of International 
Criminal Law is the existence of international law that creates individual 
criminal responsibility for prohibited conduct.   
The modern touchstone for the substantive content of International Criminal Law 
may be the four categories of crimes identified in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, 
and Aggression.  A historical approach might tease out the criminalization of 
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separate crimes (such as slavery, torture, or forced marriage) now lumped 
together under general headings such as Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes.  The substantive portfolio of International Criminal Law is likely to 
continue to expand.  For example, should the controversial Draft Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights be adopted, pursuant to Article 28A “International Criminal 
Jurisdiction of the Court,” the International Criminal Law Section of the Court 
would have power to try persons for fourteen crimes, not four.176  Influences on 
international criminal law may have influences from unlikely places.  The 2013 
Arms Trade Treaty177 regulating the international trade in conventional weapons 
also may aid in the transition to peace not only by limiting stockpiles but by 
reinforcing the norm against arming entities engaged in international criminal 
law violations.   
The substance of International Criminal Law continues to change over time.  
Some developments, like the attempted criminalization as a matter of 
international law of “The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government” 
may tend to reinforce the status quo, putting it potentially at odds with other 
                                                 
176 First Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee  on Justice and Legal Affairs, 
15-16 May 2014, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1, Draft Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Article 28A. 
177 United Nations, Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April 2013 (Entry into force: 24 December 
2014). 
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dynamics such as the original conception of Transitional Justice that might tend 
to oppose any status quo not sufficiently protective of human rights. 
I. Odious Debt 
The section supra regarding the law applicable to state succession with respect to 
a territory in transition naturally leads to the question as to whether there are laws 
of state and governmental succession in matters other than territory that relate to 
jus post bellum.  In particular, the idea of “odious debt” as a species of “odious 
finance” may raise important legal and normative questions in the transition from 
armed conflict to peace.  The key work in this area is James Gallen’s article 
Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum,178 which addresses the issue directly.   
The idea of “odious debt” dates primarily from the work of Alexander Sack from 
the 1920s onwards179 and has reemerged since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.180 
Sack defines the principle of “odious debt” as follows: 
                                                 
178 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694. 
179 Alexander N Sack, Les effets de transformations des États sur leur dettes publiques et 
autres obligations financières (Recueil Sirey 1927); Alexander N Sack, ‘The Judicial 
Nature of the Public Debt of States’ (1932) 10 NYU L Q 341; Alexander N Sack, 
‘Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918–1938)’ (1938) 15 NYU Review of Law 
507–35. 
180 Patricia Adams, ‘Iraq’s Odious Debts’ Policy Analysis No 526 (28 September 2004); 
Justin Alexander and Colin Rowat, ‘A Clean Slate in Iraq: From Debt to Development’ 
(2003) 33 Middle East Report No 228, 32–36; Jürgen Kaiser and Antje Queck, ‘Odious 
Debts – Odious Creditors? – International Claims in Iraq’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: 
Occasional Paper No 2 (March 2004) <http://library .fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/02018.pdf> accessed 2 May 2016; Nehru, Vikram. "The concept of 
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 The new Government would have to prove and an international 
tribunal would have to ascertain the following:  
a. That the needs which the former Government claimed in order 
to contract the debt in question, were odious and clearly in 
contradiction to the interests of the people of the entirety of the 
former State or a part thereof  
b. That the creditors at the moment of paying out the loan were 
aware of its odious purpose.  
2. Upon establishment of these two points, the creditors must then 
prove that the funds for this loan were not utilized for odious 
purposes – harming the people of the entire State or part of it – but 
for general or specific purposes of the State, which do not have 
the character of being odious.181 
   
The concept of “odious debt” is consistently associated with Sack’s definition.182  
An alternative definition of “odious debt” can be found in the reports of 
Mohammed Bedjaoui , UN Special Rapporteur on the succession of States for the 
International Law Commission.183  He proposed the definition: 
(a) All debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to attaining 
objectives contrary to the major interests of the successor State or the 
transferred territory: 
                                                                                                                                    
odious debt: some considerations." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 
Vol (2008). 
181 Alexander N Sack, Les effets de transformations des États sur leur dettes publiques et 
autres obligations financières (Recueil Sirey 1927), p. 163. 
182 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, 670. 
183 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, ‘Ninth Report on Succession of States in 
Respect of Matters other than Treaties’ (1977) UN Doc A/CN.4/301 and Add.1, 67. 
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(b) All debts contracted by the predecessor State with an aim and for a 
purpose not in conformity with international law and, in particular, the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations. 184   
 
Anupam Chander has usefully and compellingly clarified that the concept of 
odious debt should not be restricted to traditional forms of indebtedness, but also 
other “long-term obligations invented by modem finance.”185  For the purposes 
of this section, “odious debt” should be read to include such long-term 
obligations more generally, without devolving unnecessarily into a discussion of 
“odious finance.”186 
Of particular note for the purposes of jus post bellum, “war debts” (debts raised 
for the purpose of war but possibly passed to the successor/victor state) were not 
passed in a number of cases,187 while they were in others. 188  Similarly, Bedjaoui 
in his role as Special Rapporteur identified a number of cases of the non-passing 
                                                 
184 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, ‘Ninth Report on Succession of States in 
Respect of Matters other than Treaties’ (1977) UN Doc A/CN.4/301, 66. 
185 Anupam Chander, ‘Odious Securitization’ (2004) 53 Emory L J 923,  924. 
186 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, 677.. 
187 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, ‘Ninth Report on Succession of States in 
Respect of Matters other than Treaties’ (1977) UN Doc A/CN.4/301,  fn 276. 
188 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, ‘Ninth Report on Succession of States in 
Respect of Matters other than Treaties’ (1977) UN Doc A/CN.4/301. 
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to a successor state of “subjugation debts”.189   Despite these reports, the text of 
the treaty that might have dealt with odious debt, Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,190 does 
not mention odious debt.  The idea of odious debt as a blanket exception to the 
obligation to repay probably does not yet reflect customary international law.191    
What is more intriguing is the possibility that through the application of 
principles of jus post bellum, the specific contours of odious debt may be made 
more specific and compelling as law and equitable principles that may form the 
basis of renegotiation during the transition from armed conflict to peace.  
Mohammed Bedjaoui, in his role as Special Rapporteur of the International Law 
Commission, viewed “odious debt” as an umbrella concept covering a range of 
specific debt categories,192 including the two classical and most common types of 
odious debt: “hostile debt” and “war debt.”193  “Hostile debts” are debts incurred 
to suppress secessionist movements,194 wars of liberation,195 (implicating 
                                                 
189 Ibid, fn 278. 
190 UN General Assembly, Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
State Property, Archives and Debts, 8 April 1983, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3961c.html [accessed 2 May 2016] 
191 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694. 
192 Ninth Report on the Succession of States in Respect of Matters other than Treaties, 
1977 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2 (Part 1): 68 and 70. 
193 Robert Howse, ‘The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law’ UNCTAD 
Discussion Paper No 185 (2007) UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4, p. 3. 
194 Ibid. 
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primarily non-international armed conflict) or wars to conquer peoples196 
(implicating in contemporary terms primarily international armed conflicts).  
Examples include the repudiation of Tsarist debts by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and the refusal of the United States to repay formerly 
Spanish debt associated with Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other 
territories.197  “War debts” are debts contracted by the State for the purpose of 
funding a war which the State eventually loses and whereby the victor is not 
obliged to repay the debt.198  The majority of examples of war debt as odious 
debt seem to be antiquated from a contemporary perspective where the victor in a 
war might assume debt from the loser due to annexation of territory in an 
international armed conflict, but the term may also be applied to a non-
international armed conflict that results in a regime overthrow.  An example of 
this is the refusal of the new government in Costa Rica to pay back loans made 
by the Royal Bank of Canada after the overthrow of a dictator.199 The application 
                                                                                                                                    
195 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, p. 671. 
196 Robert Howse, ‘The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law’ UNCTAD 
Discussion Paper No 185 (2007) UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4, p. 3. 
197 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, p. 672. 
198 Robert Howse, ‘The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law’ UNCTAD 
Discussion Paper No 185 (2007) UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4, p. 3. 
199 Great Britain v Costa Rica (1923) 2 Annual Digest 34, 176; See Odette Lienau, 
‘Who Is the “Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework 
from the Early Twentieth Century’ (2008) 33(1) Yale J Intl L 63–111; Gallen, James. 
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of Additional Protocol I, Article 1.4 (defining “armed conflicts in which people 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” as international 
armed conflict)200 may complicate the division between non-international armed 
conflict and international armed conflict—should AP 1 apply, the debt would be 
associated with international armed conflict. 
Beyond war debt and hostile debt, Jeff King categorizes illegal occupation debts 
and fraudulent, illegal and corruption debts as species of odious debt.201  As 
Gallen notes, these varieties of odious debt covers most of the scenarios in which 
a debt may be repudiated after a conflict.202  Regardless of the type of odious 
debt, the application of the principles informing jus post bellum should assist in 
the resolution of the issue of repayment of obligations in the transition to peace. 
Gallen focuses on equity as a general principle of law that informs the resolution 
of odious debt in the transition from armed conflict to peace.  Other scholars 
such as Jure Zrilič and Merryl Lawry-White focus on equity in the application of 
                                                                                                                                    
"Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment & Trade 16.4 
(2015): 666-694, pp. 672-3. 
200 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
201 Jeff King, ‘Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate’ (2007) 32 NC J Intl L & Comm 
Reg 605–67. 
202 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, pp. 673. 
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investment claims in the transition to peace.203  While equity is a system rooted 
in a variety of legal traditions204 its generality is both a strength and a 
weakness—flexible but potentially over-flexible.  Focusing the principle of 
equity (or related principles such as meionexia205 and proportionality206) on the 
particular goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace may help guide the 
application of these principles to make sure that the repudiation is not done to the 
level that actually degrades the post-conflict government’s access to credit, nor 
cripples them with unsustainable or unjust debt.  This may also allow a varied 
application depending on whether the creditors are private, sovereign, or 
international financial institutions.207 
                                                 
203 Jure Zrilič, ‘International Investment Law in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: Are 
Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to Peace?’ (2015)  16 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade 604; Merryl Lawry-White, ‘A Context 
Specific and Holistic Approach to Post-Conflict International Investment Claims’ (2015) 
16 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 633. 
204 Akehurst, Michael. "Equity and general principles of law." International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 25.04 (1976): 801-825; Justice Margaret White, ‘Equity – 
A General Principle of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations?’ (2004) 4(1) Queensland 
University of Technology Law Journal 103, 106–07. 
205 See Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (CUP 2012), 6-10; 
Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S 
Easterday and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations 
(OUP 2014) 15–25, 21. 
206 See Jure Zrilič, ‘International Investment Law in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: Are 
Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to Peace?’ (2015)  16 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade 604; Larry May and Michael Newton, 
Proportionality in International Law (OUP 2014); Emiliou, Nicholas. The principle of 
proportionality in European law: a comparative study. Vol. 10. Kluwer Law Intl, 1996. 
207 Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 16.4 (2015): 666-694, pp. 686. 
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J. Alternative structuring of Jus Post Bellum 
It is also helpful to look at other leading authors and their approach to the 
substance of jus post bellum.  In Carsten Stahn’s classic Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in 
bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed 
Force 208 points out the demands for a substantive jus post bellum, citing the 
legal dilemmas posed by interventions in Kuwait and Iraq209 (and indeed Japan 
and Germany210), specifically referencing the practice of the United Nations 
Security Council in Resolution 1483, which combined continued application of 
the law of occupation alongside the principles of state-building.211  He points to 
the Responsibility to Rebuild pillar of The Responsibility to Protect, as reflected 
not only in the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty212 but also the High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and 
Change,213 the Report of the Secretary-General entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: 
                                                 
208 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 
(2006): 921-943. 
209 Ibid 926-29. 
210 Ibid 928-29. 
211 Ibid 929. 
212 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001), para. 5.1 
213 UN General Assembly, Note [transmitting report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, entitled "A more secure world : our shared responsibility"], 2 
December 2004, A/59/565. 
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Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’214 and in the 
Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit.215  One can also look to the 
work of the Peacebuilding Commission.216  He points specifically to 
requirements that may exist for liberal interventions in order to restore human 
rights and standards of good governance during the transition to peace.217  For 
concrete examples, Stahn notes that the formation of peace agreements is 
governed by  
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
considerations of procedural fairness; the limits of territorial 
dispute resolution are defined by the prohibition of annexation 
and the law of self-determination; the consequences of an act of 
aggression are inter alia determined by parameters of the law of 
state responsibility, Charter-based considerations of 
proportionality and human rights-based limitations on reparations; 
the exercise of foreign governance over territory is limited by the 
principle of territorial sovereignty, the prohibition of ‘trusteeship’ 
(over UN members) under Article 78 of the Charter limits 
occupation law under the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as 
the powers of the Security Council under the Charter; the law 
applicable in a territory in transition is determined by the law of 
state succession as well as certain provisions of human rights law 
(for instance, non-derogable human rights guarantees) and the 
laws of occupation; finally, the scope of individual criminal 
                                                 
214 The Report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004), at paras 201–203. 
215 GA Res. 60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome) of 24 Oct. 2005. 
216 Ibid, paras 97-105. 
217 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 
(2006): 921-943, p. 932. 
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responsibility is defined by treaty-based and customary law-based 
prohibitions of international criminal law.218 
To help organize this substance, Stahn lists six principles of jus post bellum, 
namely Fairness and Inclusiveness of Peace Settlements,219 The Demise of the 
Concept of (Territorial) Punishment for Aggression,220 The Humanization of 
Reparations and Sanctions,221 The Move from Collective Responsibility to 
Individual Responsibility,222 A Combined Justice and Reconciliation Model,223 
and People-Centred Governance.224   
Similarly, in the concluding chapter of Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of 
Transition from Conflict to Peace Stahn lists seven substantive areas of jus post 
bellum, namely 1) Treaty obligations, 2) Institutional frameworks for the 
management of transition from conflict to peace, 3) Definition of the law 
applicable in transitions from conflict to peace, 4) Management of individual 
responsibility, 5) Management of collective responsibility, 6) Structural 
                                                 
218 Ibid 937 (internal citations omitted). 
219 Ibid 938. 
220 Ibid 939 (“Territorial” added). 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid 940. 
223 Ibid (“Towards” omitted). 
224 Ibid 941. 
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principles for institution-building, and 7) Parameters of economic 
reconstruction.225 
Guglielmo Verdirame points out that it is obvious that post-conflict situations are 
not exempt from the application of international law.226  There are important law 
of armed conflict rules which extend to post bellum, including the rules 
applicable to ‘protected persons’ who remain in the hands of the detaining 
state,227 a duty to repatriate prisoners of war after the cessation of active 
hostilities,228 duties under the law of occupation that continue after the cessation 
of hostilities,229 and in non-international armed conflicts a duty to “endeavour to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed 
                                                 
225 Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn and Jann K Kleffner 
(eds), Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace 
(T·M·C·Asser Press 2008) 231-237, p. 236-37. 
226 Verdirame, Guglielmo. "What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia 
Chayes." European Journal of International Law 24.1 (2013): 307-313. 
227 I.e. Art. 5 of Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(signed 12 Aug. 1949, entered into force 21 Oct. 1950), 75 UNTS 135, and Art. 6 of 
Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(signed 12 Aug. 1949, entered into force 21 Oct. 1950) 75 UNTS 287, Art. 3 of Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
228 Art. 118 of Geneva Convention III. 
229 Art. 6 of Geneva Convention IV. 
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conflict, whether they are interned or detained.”230  An expanding body of human 
rights case law in post-conflict situations is also available.231  He also points to a 
growing body of state and international institutional practice on post war 
situations, at least since the 1992 Agenda for Peace.232  Since that 1992 Agenda 
for Peace, the four main elements of post-conflict peacebuilding from the 
perspective of the United Nations are 1) Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR); Security Sector Reform (SSR), reestablishment of the rule 
of law, and democratization.  Verdirame points out that 
Key aspects of the legal relationship between the victors and the 
defeated are already governed by rules of international law. On 
the front of prohibitions, in particular, it is noteworthy that 
outcomes of war previously treated as lawful are unlawful under 
modern international law. For example, war can no longer result 
in the dissolution or annexation of the vanquished state through 
debellatio or conquest.233 
Veridame concludes with a delightful modification of the so-called “Pottery Barn 
rule” that reflects the combination of onus on the intervenor and the need for 
                                                 
230 Art. 6(5) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
(signed 12 Dec. 1977, entered into force 7 Dec. 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. 
231 App. No. 27021/08, Al-Jedda v.  United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment (2011); App. 
Nos. 71412/01  & 78166/01, Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, 
Germany and Norway, ECHR, Decision on Admissibility (2007). 
232 UN SG Report, ‘An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-Keeping’, UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111 (June 1992). See also UN SG Report, 
‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’, UN Doc A/50/60 -S/1995/1 
(Jan. 1995). 
233 Verdirame, Guglielmo. "What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia 
Chayes." European Journal of International Law 24.1 (2013): 307-313, p. 309. 
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local ownership: “if you break it, you have a duty to help fix it but you still do 
not own it.”234 
Similarly, as Vincent Chetail has argued, post-conflict peacebuilding alone 
includes  
[I]nternational humanitarian law; international human rights law; 
international criminal law; international refugee law; international 
development law; international economic law; the law of 
international organizations; the law of international responsibility; 
the law relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes; treaty law 
which governs in particular ceasefire agreements; and the law 
relating to the succession of states in the case of territorial 
dismemberment due to conflict.235  
Similarly, Larry May’s discussion of jus post bellum focuses only on “the moral 
principles after a transition from war to peace has been achieved,”236 following 
David Rodin’s definitional lead.237   Even within that limited definition, May 
isolates six normative principles of jus post bellum: rebuilding, retribution, 
                                                 
234 Ibid. 312. 
235 Vincent Chetail, “Introduction: Post-conflict Peacebuilding – Ambiguity and 
Identity” in Vincent Chetail (ed), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (OUP 2009) 
1-33, 18. 
236 See e.g. May, Larry. "Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War." European 
Journal of International Law 24.1 (2013): 315-333, p. 317. 
237 Rodin, David. "Two emerging issues of jus post bellum: War termination and the 
liability of soldiers for crimes of aggression." Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of 
Transition from Conflict to Peace (2008): 123-36. 
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reconciliation, restitution, reparation, and proportionality.238 He insists that the 
addressee of these principles are not only political leaders but average citizens.239  
The ultimate goal of May’s jus post bellum is the same as the hybrid functional 
approach outlined in this work, a just and lasting peace.240  (In the end, May 
essentially rejects the main thrust of Just War thinking, opting instead for 
contingent pacifism.)241 
Dieter Fleck likewise outlines three areas of jus post bellum that deviate from jus 
in bello on the one hand and peacetime international law on the other: 1) 
assistance in performing regime change, 2) robust law enforcement post-conflict, 
and 3) international territorial administration.242  Fleck’s watchword is 
cooperation, with jus post bellum operating primarily as an enabling framework 
more than a restrictive series of regulations.  Similarly, James Gallen’s 
conception of jus post bellum as an interpretive framework more than a series of 
                                                 
238 See e.g. May, Larry. "Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War." European 
Journal of International Law 24.1 (2013): 315-333, p. 316. 
239 Ibid 318-9. 
240 Ibid 320. 
241 Ibid 328-31. 
242 Fleck, Dieter “Jus post bellum as a partly independent legal framework” in Stahn, 
Carsten, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, eds. Jus Post Bellum. Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 43-57. 
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restrictions is useful, although a hybrid functional conception of jus post bellum 
clearly extends beyond this limited role.243 
The substance of jus post bellum also includes specialist areas of international 
law, such as investment law.  A special 2015 edition of The Journal of World 
Investment and Trade focuses on jus post bellum provides a series of ground-
breaking treatments of this issue.  Gallen provides an analysis of “odious 
debt” 244—an idea with significant potential for clarifying the legitimate 
expectations of foreign investors in the aftermath of conflict, while at the same 
time potentially freeing a post-conflict society from an unsustainable post-
conflict debt burden.  Merryl Lawry-White245 and Jure Zrilič246 provide an 
exploration of bilateral investment treaties and investment arbitration in the 
context of the transition from armed conflict.  These are potentially critical issues 
not only in terms of resolving claims from foreign investors but for attracting 
investment critical to a sustainable post bellum future.   Eric de Brabandere 
                                                 
243 Gallen, James “Jus post bellum: an interpretive framework” in Stahn, Carsten, 
Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, eds. Jus Post Bellum. Oxford University Press, 
2014, 43-57. 
244 Gallen, James. 2015. Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum. The Journal Of World 
Investment And Trade  
245 Lawry-White Merryl. 2015. International Arbitration in a Jus Post Bellum 
Framework. The Journal Of World Investment And Trade  
246 Zrilič Jure. 2015. International Investment Law in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: 
Are Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to Peace?  The 
Journal Of World Investment And Trade  
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highlights the tension between the potential backlash from protecting foreign 
investors and the need to attract them.247 
K. Conclusion 
Building on the Stahn’s 2006 framework for the substantive content of jus post 
bellum,248 this chapter  drew upon and extends what has been discussed earlier, 
to provide a specific focus on the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum.  
Seven basic areas were discussed: 1) Procedural fairness and peace agreements; 
2) The Responsibility to Protect; 3) Territorial dispute resolution; 4) 
Consequences of an act of aggression; 5) International territorial administration 
and trusteeship; 6) The law applicable in a territory in transition; 7) The scope of 
individual criminal responsibility; and 8) The nexus of jus post bellum and 
odious debt. These areas are not comprehensive, and other frameworks could be 
used, as described in the alternative structuring section of this work supra —but 
it does highlight some of the major categories of legal content of jus post bellum.   
 
 
                                                 
247 De Brabandere, Eric. "Jus Post Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the 
Debate." The Journal of World Investment & Trade 16.4 (2015): 590-603. 
248 Stahn, Carsten. "‘Jus ad bellum’,‘jus in bello’...‘jus post bellum’?–Rethinking the 
Conception of the Law of Armed Force." European Journal of International Law 17.5 
(2006): 921-943, p. 937. 
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Conclusions  
 
 
Transitions to peace frequently fail.  The pause in violence following the cessation of 
armed conflict often collapses into renewed armed conflict, or continues as a mere 
“negative” peace,1 without a just resolution of the causes of the war or accountability for 
conduct within the conflict.  While the international community’s approach to restricting 
the use of force and regulating conduct within armed conflict has matured and 
consolidated considerably since the Second World War, efforts to systematize and 
regulate transitions out of armed conflict remain very much a work-in-progress.  
Restoring jus post bellum to the twentieth century framework dominated by jus in bello 
and jus ad bellum is difficult and complex.  Nonetheless, accomplishments in this field 
should be recognized, and further efforts are merited.  This conclusion will provide a few 
final remarks on the relative importance of various areas of debate, appraise the research 
aims of this work, revisit the propositions put forth in the introduction, and offer last 
thoughts on the subject of the transition to peace. 
                                                 
1 The concepts of “negative” and “positive” peace were developed by Johan Galtung in his 
seminal 1964 article: Galtung, J. (1965).  An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4.  For 
more on Galtung’s work on structural analysis of peace, see also Galtung, J. (1969).  Violence, 
Peace and Peace Research.  Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167-191.  Galtung, J. (1981).  
Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace.  Journal of Peace Research, 17 (2), 183-199.  
Galtung, J. (1985).  Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses.  
Journal of Peace Research, 22 (2), 141-158.  Galtung, J. (1990).  Cultural Violence. Journal of 
Peace Research, 27 (3), 291-305. 
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Before analyzing the research aims and propositions of this work, a comment on the 
relative importance of certain issues is merited.  Many scholars, familiar with the term 
“jus post bellum” or less familiar, may reasonably reject the author’s contention that jus 
post bellum is best understood through a hybrid functional approach.  The definitional 
debate is ongoing, and this thesis will not be the last word for all readers.  Certain 
scholars may wish for the term to be abandoned and replaced with another term, perhaps 
based out of the inherent artificiality of Latin neoterisms in a post-Latin era, or out of a 
desire to protect the perceived clarity of a bipartite approach; defending jus post bellum’s 
sister terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello from any confusion introduced by adding 
another member to the family.  Others may wish to keep the term jus post bellum but 
limit it to, for example, post-conflict criminal justice efforts, referring to each of the areas 
discussed in Chapter 6 by separate terms with no (or an alternate) unifying framework. 
What is important to the author, in the final accounting, is not what term is used, but 
whether laws and principles that can be used to guide the successful transition from 
armed conflict to peace are used.  Ultimately, the highest priority should be the quality 
and nature of the lives of those who live through the transition from armed conflict and 
may spend their days in the peace constructed thereafter.  Unless there is an increasingly 
shared understanding of how laws and principles can be synthesized and synchronized to 
facilitate the successful and permanent cessation of armed conflict and the construction of 
a robust, positive peace, opportunities will be lost.   
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There is a need for what has been described as “jus post bellum” in this work.  The need 
for a shared commitment by local actors to the most powerful sovereign forces in the 
international community to work for a just and sustainable peace, and an understanding 
that one cannot wait until the armed conflict is finished to apply the laws and principles 
needed to prevent its return—this commitment and understanding is far more significant 
than whether one chooses to describe this commitment and understanding as “jus post 
bellum” or any other plausible alternative that facilitates the organization, development, 
and application of laws and principles to the same end, be it “peacebuilding that begins in 
war” or “transitional justice as it applies to armed conflict” or “an expanded notion of lex 
pacificatoria.”   
The debate over the correct terminology can occasionally give the reader a sense that they 
have stepped through the looking glass, and lost sight of what is actually significant in the 
real world.  This famous passage may spring to mind: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s 
all.’2 
With respect to all of the philosophers of language and reference that have more or less 
taken Humpty Dumpty’s side of the argument, “the question” in the sense of the 
normative question for those who value a just and sustainable peace, is how and whether 
                                                 
2 C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), Through the Looking-Glass, in The Complete Works of Lewis 
Carroll (New York, 1936), pp. 213-214. 
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such a peace can best be achieved in any particular instance.  The author believes that the 
phenomenal growth in scholarship in jus post bellum itself provides evidence that the 
concept of jus post bellum may be a good vehicle to organize laws and principles towards 
a shared and laudable aim, but that the varied use of the term may lead to lost 
opportunities.   
This thesis had three broad aims.  First, the thesis evaluated the history of jus post bellum 
avant la lettre, tracing important writings on the transition to peace from Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Kant to more modern jurists and scholars.  Second, it explored definitional 
aspects of jus post bellum, including current its relationship to sister terms and related 
fields.  Third, it explored the current state and possibilities for future development of the 
law and normative principles that apply to the transition to peace.   
In addition to these positive research aims, this work argued against certain ideas.  
Throughout the thesis, the erroneous suggestion that jus post bellum does not exist was 
rebuffed, as is the idea that it has no content.  It situated jus post bellum with its sister 
terms, jus in bello and jus ad bellum and explored the content and contours of jus post 
bellum.  It specifically rejected the idea that transitional justice, post-conflict international 
criminal law and jus post bellum are interchangeable ideas.  The claim that the just war 
tradition is devoid of discussion of the subject matter of jus post bellum or that discussing 
the just war tradition is meritless was specifically rejected.  The thrust of this work is not 
to argue for the use of the term jus post bellum, although there are reasons to do so, but 
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rather to examine the law and principles of the transition to peace regardless of the 
terminology used. 
Often, the term “jus post bellum” is used by different authors without a common 
definition or theoretical approach.  Throughout this thesis, this definitional problem has 
been addressed.  This work argues for a hybrid functional (rather than purely temporal) 
approach to jus post bellum, that is, to define an approach to this area of law that focuses 
on the goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace rather than a mere discussion of law 
that applies during early peace.   
The problems underlying armed conflict cannot be resolved, nor can a positive peace be 
constructed, without a sustainable foundation of justice and law.  This research has 
clarified the moral and legal framework that applies during the transition from armed 
conflict to peace, termed by contemporary scholars and practitioners “jus post bellum.”  
The need for jus post bellum is widely recognized, but given the complexity of the issues, 
it is unsurprising that there remains a certain lack of consensus about how to approach the 
principles and law regarding ending armed conflict in a just and sustainable manner.  
There is a distinct risk that until an enduring consensus emerges that frames and directs 
scholarship and practice in this area, communities will needlessly suffer the horrors of 
preventable war. 
In order to light the way forward, it is worth considering the works of past jurists who 
have dedicated themselves to understanding the normative and practical difficulties of 
war and peace.  A review of the works of Augustine and his peers, the Institutes of 
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Justinian, the Decretals of Gregory IX, Thomas Aquinas, Baldus de Ubaldis, Francisco de 
Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, Petrus Gudelinus, Hugo Grotius, Emer de 
Vattel, Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant provides a rich heritage to guide, but not 
necessarily constrain, contemporary and future jurists.  Perhaps the strongest practical 
lesson that can be learned is the importance of keeping the goal of a just and sustainable 
peace at the center of policy-makers’ concerns not only after the guns fall silent but 
whenever war is threatened and throughout the armed conflict itself. 
Contemporary jus post bellum is rooted in a well-rooted normative and scholarly 
tradition, and also upon the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello that remain the core 
underpinnings of international order.  Jus post bellum operates within a specific context 
and foundation regarding the regulation of armed force, and benefits from the power of 
the general prohibition on recourse to the use of force and the richness and depth of 
contemporary international humanitarian law.  Jus post bellum builds upon an extensive 
body of contemporary law and practice, including procedural fairness, territorial dispute 
resolution, regulating the consequences of an act of aggression, international territorial 
administration, territorial transition, state responsibility, responsibility of international 
organizations, human rights instruments, international criminal law, and odious debt.   
The ambition of jus post bellum is worth celebrating, but also worth noting with some 
caution.  While jus ad bellum primarily seeks to preserve a negative peace between states, 
and jus in bello hopes to preserve a modicum of humanity during hostilities, jus post 
bellum dares to set a difficult additional goal.  It demands prioritization of a robust and 
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desirable solution to the problems that create armed conflict—even when humanitarian 
concerns are most pressing and the power imbalance between victor and vanquished are 
at their most extreme.  This prioritization can take a variety of legal forms described 
throughout this work, from the prohibition of annexation, to respect for human rights, to 
limits on domestic amnesties.  The dangers here should be obvious—by pushing too hard 
for an ideal long-term solution, an unwise or unlucky application of jus post bellum 
principles may risk overlooking the importance of short-term incremental gains, or may 
risk politicizing approaches that are better left neutral.  The answer to these concerns 
should not be to reject the project of developing jus post bellum, but to further ground it 
in the practical wisdom of those involved in peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace 
operations generally.   
Shortly before his death, Tony Judt, the great historian and essayist, shared a few 
thoughts on learning from the history of war in an essay simply titled, “What have we 
learned, if anything?” 
War was not just a catastrophe in its own right; it brought other horrors in 
its wake. World War I led to an unprecedented militarization of society, 
the worship of violence, and a cult of death that long outlasted the war 
itself and prepared the ground for the political disasters that followed. 
States and societies seized during and after World War II by Hitler or 
Stalin (or by both, in sequence) experienced not just occupation and 
exploitation but degradation and corrosion of the laws and norms of civil 
society. The very structures of civilized life—regulations, laws, teachers, 
policemen, judges—disappeared or else took on sinister significance: far 
from guaranteeing security, the state itself became the leading source of 
insecurity. Reciprocity and trust, whether in neighbors, colleagues, 
community, or leaders, collapsed. Behavior that would be aberrant in 
conventional circumstances—theft, dishonesty, dissemblance, indifference 
to the misfortune of others, and the opportunistic exploitation of their 
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suffering—became not just normal but sometimes the only way to save 
your family and yourself. Dissent or opposition was stifled by universal 
fear. 
War, in short, prompted behavior that would have been unthinkable as 
well as dysfunctional in peacetime. It is war, not racism or ethnic 
antagonism or religious fervor, that leads to atrocity. War—total war—has 
been the crucial antecedent condition for mass criminality in the modern 
era. The first primitive concentration camps were set up by the British 
during the Boer War of 1899–1902. Without World War I there would 
have been no Armenian genocide and it is highly unlikely that either 
communism or fascism would have seized hold of modern states. Without 
World War II there would have been no Holocaust. Absent the forcible 
involvement of Cambodia in the Vietnam War, we would never have 
heard of Pol Pot. As for the brutalizing effect of war on ordinary soldiers 
themselves, this of course has been copiously documented.3 
The challenge of building peace goes well beyond the cessation of violence.  Judt’s 
reminder of the horrific effects of war on individuals and society is helpful, particularly 
for those temporarily lost in legal abstraction.  At the same time, Judt moves the focus 
beyond the immediate kinetic effect of war to the social devastation it causes.  Beyond 
death and destruction, armed conflict fundamentally replaces trust with fear.  This fear in 
time fuels atrocity beyond war itself, and can cause armed conflict to reoccur.  
Rebuilding communities and institutions at a core level means restoring trust in a better 
future and ameliorating fears of a failed peace.   This is not done merely through legal 
prohibition of war, nor through post-conflict justice alone, but rather with Galtung’s 
conception of a positive peace squarely in mind—even before the conflict ends.4 
                                                 
3 Judt, Tony. "What have we learned, if anything?." New York Review of Books 55.7 (2008): 16. 
4 Galtung, Johan. “An Editorial.” Journal of Peace Research 1(1) (1965):1-4. 
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Jus post bellum should be further developed to help all participants manage the complex 
process of ending armed conflict and developing early peace.  No peace will be perfect.  
Some relapse into armed conflict is perhaps close to inevitable.  But addressing the 
problem of transitions to peace as systematically and thoughtfully as possible remains 
one of the most pressing challenges in contemporary international law and practice.  It 
demands our attention.  It compels our effort.  While the horrors of past failures should be 
kept in mind, so should the triumphs.  The peace that is enjoyed simply, invisibly, and 
often thoughtlessly, is in fact the quiet victory of a vision that has inspired society for 
millennia—that wars must end, and that a just peace must be built to endure. 
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Annex A 
A. Introduction 
This Annex expands upon the empirical analysis of research on jus post bellum analysed 
in Section 3.A. supra.  No publicly available database of jus post bellum scholarship 
existed when the author began his research.  The database of jus post bellum scholarship 
created by the author serves as the basis of the following findings.   
B. Method 
Datasets  were created in stages.  The initial, proof-of-concept data set was created by 
finding all articles available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) that 
mention jus post bellum.  The Social Science Research Network has over 207,000 authors 
and more than 1.3 million users.1    
The database was created with one record for each article.  The Microsoft Word or 
Portable Document Format (PDF) version of the article was uploaded into the database, 
and the available metadata regarding each article was entered in the appropriate field.  
The fields were created from the Document Center template in the Microsoft SharePoint 
Server 2010, with the addition of customized fields where appropriate.  This was hosted 
and supported by the Living Lab at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, 
                                                 
1  See Social Science Research Network Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/update/general/ssrn_faq.html#what_is. (Last accessed 5 October 2012.) 
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University of Leiden and the Jus Post Bellum Project under the Virtual Research 
Environment framework.2  
Once the database was created and populated with this initial dataset of 13 articles from 
SSRN, a series of potential datasets was evaluated.  Westlaw, being a leading, widely 
available and widely used legal search engine, was one potential source for an additional 
data set.  Of the potential searches within Westlaw, the best option seemed to be a 
collection of all articles from Westlaw, specifically all articles that were received from a 
“terms and connectors” search in the world-jlr database (Combined World Journals and 
Law Reviews) for the term “jus post bellum.”  This search would yield 89 documents at 
the time of the search.  Google Scholar was additional option, widely available but 
arguably less widely accepted.  A general Google Scholar search for the term would 
return 819 hits, which could be further narrowed to 759 hits if the “no citations” option 
was used.  Further narrowing the Google Scholar search to filter for only what Google 
Scholar considered “legal documents” narrowed the search to 95 results.  Searching in the 
                                                 
2 The relevant fields describing each article are as follows: Name, Title, Rating (0-5), Number of 
Ratings, WorkCitation, PublicationYear, Volume, Issue, Pages, JPBDefinition, Abstract, Tags, 
Keywords, ArXiv ID, DOI, JPBDefinitionPointCite, ScholarlyField, Author, Publisher, 
DefinitionQuote, Collection, Date, JournalName, Language, Note, Westlaw Subjects, and 
MinimalJusPostBellumReference.  Some fields, like Rating and Number of Ratings, are reserved 
for future use.  Most fields are text fields, although some have restricted inputs such as a 
checkbox for indicating that the ScholarlyField is “law.”  The Collection field indicates the 
dataset, such as SSRN or Westlaw.  MinimalJusPostBellumReference is a Boolean variable 
indicating whether the reference to jus post bellum is truly a mere passing reference.  Of 
particular note are the JPBDefinitionPointCite and DefinitionQuote fields.  Together, they allow 
an export of the metadata allowing external evaluation of the analysis of definitions, specifically 
into a linked Microsoft Excel file. 
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same catalogue with “jus post bellum” in any field revealed 126 results, with 111 peer-
reviewed articles and 124 with the full text online.  These search results were re-verified 
on 15 August 2012. 
Many other possible datasets are possible—for example, HeinOnline or WestLaw for 
international researchers.  The current point of this research, however, is not to be 
comprehensive but instead to be reasonably representative while still functional.  
Additional research options are addressed in the sections in the Conclusion that deal with 
further avenues of research and implementing further research. 
Of these candidate datasets, the Westlaw dataset was picked for the main body of the 
empirical analysis presented here.  In part, this was a matter of a reasonable sample size 
and the scope of research, as a full evaluation of 819 references from Google Scholar 
might prove difficult on a practical level, particularly when providing a consistent 
evaluation of each article throughout.  In addition, Google Scholar has unique problems 
as a primary data set for analysis.  Google Scholar is broad, but unreliable, relying on 
automated entry without human checks.  This required the author to make an additional 
level of subjective evaluations as to the suitability of the results, which in turn potentially 
undermines the reliability of the empirical results derived from the dataset.  These 
limitations of existing datasets are discussed in “Areas for Further Research” in the 
conclusion of this section. 
In an effort to increase transparency, it is important to note that the author leans towards 
the functional approach.  When evaluating the articles as more functional or temporal the 
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author tried to be objective as possible, with no known expectations as to the trends in 
scholarship.  The main point of this chapter is not to argue for one approach or the other 
(although the comparative analysis should demonstrate the coherence of the functional 
approach).  Rather, this article seeks to highlight that these two separate approaches exist 
and that consolidating around one approach would be useful. 
Once the articles were analyzed and the data entered, the metadata was exported to 
Microsoft Excel format and further analyzed, including the creation of the graphs 
included below. 
C. Findings 
1. Introduction 
The findings below will be presented first according to the analysis of the SSRN dataset, 
then the analysis of the contemporary scholarship as analyzed overall (including 
disaggregation when appropriate).  The overall findings could legitimately be 
summarized as follows: There has been a steady expansion of references to jus post 
bellum in a variety of journals.  (See figs. 1, 2, infra.)  With the expansion of references, 
there has been an increase of ambiguity, not a consolidation around a consensus 
definition.  The trend is generally an increase in trivial references to jus post bellum, in 
addition to a trend towards a simple, literal temporal definition.  Whether a consensus 
focus will be achieved, and what that consensus might be, is as yet unclear. 
The overall year-by-year pattern of publication mentioning jus post bellum in the 
analyzed datasets can be visualized using the following chart. 
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Figure 1 
 
The data in the chart above is explained in more detail in the Westlaw and SSRN 
Analysis section infra. 
The widespread nature of the publishing can be seen here.  While there are a few 
noteworthy leading journals on the subject, overall the scholarship is spread over a large 
number of journals. 
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With this overall picture established, we can turn to the particular subject of interest, 
trends with respect to the temporal-functional dichotomy. 
2. SSRN Analysis 
a) Summary Findings 
For articles in SSRN, the general trend is towards a generally temporal definition and 
away from a generally functional definition of jus post bellum.  This is summarized by 
the graph below.  This graph covers the period in which articles mentioning jus post 
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bellum (2002-2012).  Please note that in all of the charts in this article, there are overlaps 
in data points, but the line shows the general trend. 
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Figure 3 
 
The SSRN articles are described below, first with respect two unclassifiable articles, then 
with respect to articles with a primarily functional definition and then with respect to 
articles with a primarily temporal definition.  This close analysis, article by article, is 
intended to help evaluate not only the articles in question, but also the meaning of 
“primarily functional definition” and “primarily temporal definition” in practice. 
b) Unclassifiable 
Two SSRN articles discussing jus post bellum have proved quite difficult to reasonably 
classify: Grandeur et déclin de l’idée de résistance à l’occupation : Réflexions à propos 
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de la légitimité des « insurgés » by Frederic Megret3 and Legislative Reform in Post-
Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers 
by Kristen Boon.4   
Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant's Law-Making Powers by Kristen Boon5 defines jus post bellum as follows: 
"Jus post bellum, or the justice of post-war settlements and reconstruction, is assumed to 
draw on similar principles as jus ad bellum (law of war) and jus in bello (law in war)."6  
This could be read with an emphasis on the clear “post-war” temporal definition, but it is 
also clearly tied to particular goals and qualities (settlement and reconstruction).  It is 
interesting to note that Boon’s subsequent work on jus post bellum in SSRN emphasise 
the functional aspects more clearly. 
One SSRN article, Grandeur et déclin de l’idée de résistance à l’occupation : Réflexions 
à propos de la légitimité des « insurgés »7 by Frederic Megret did not have a definition of 
                                                 
3  Megret, Frederic, On the Legitimacy of 'Insurgency': Rise and Fall of the Idea of 
Resistance to Occupation (Grandeur Et Declin De L'Idee De Resistance a L'Occupation: 
Reflexions a Propos de la Legitimite des 'Insurges') (November 5, 2008). Revue Belge de Droit 
International, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296060 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296060 
4  Boon, Kristen E., Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the 
Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers. McGill Law Journal, Vol. 50, 2005; Seton Hall 
Public Law Research Paper No. 962094. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962094 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid 7. 
7  Megret, Frederic, On the Legitimacy of 'Insurgency': Rise and Fall of the Idea of 
Resistance to Occupation (Grandeur Et Declin De L'Idee De Resistance a L'Occupation: 
Reflexions a Propos de la Legitimite des 'Insurges') (November 5, 2008). Revue Belge de Droit 
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jus post bellum that could clearly be categorized as functional or temporal.  It recognizes 
that the definition of the term is not entirely fixed (“Bien entendu, la définition exacte du 
jus post bellum demeure une question amplement débattue.”)8 
c) Functional Definitions 
The following SSRN articles use a generally functional definition of jus post bellum: On 
War as Hell by Roger Paul Alford (2002),9 Obligations of the New Occupier: The 
Contours of a Jus Post Bellum by Kristen E. Boon (2009),10 The Future of the Law of 
Occupation by Kristen E. Boon (2009),11 New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a 
Jus Post Bellum of Constitutional Transformation by Nehal Bhuta (2010)12 and 
Corporate Legitimacy by Laszlo Zasolnai (2011)13.  
                                                                                                                                                 
International, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296060 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296060 
8  Roughly translated: “Of course, the exact definition of jus post bellum remains a widely 
debated question.”  Megret, Frederic, On the Legitimacy of 'Insurgency': Rise and Fall of the Idea 
of Resistance to Occupation (Grandeur Et Declin De L'Idee De Resistance a L'Occupation: 
Reflexions a Propos de la Legitimite des 'Insurges') (November 5, 2008). Revue Belge de Droit 
International, 2009, p. 18. 
9  Alford, Roger Paul, On War as Hell. Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 
1, Spring 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=867208 
10  Boon, Kristen E., Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum 
(June, 29 2009). Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 
2, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427355 
11  Boon, Kristen E., The Future of the Law of Occupation (June 30, 2009). Kristen E. 
Boon, THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, 2009 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1464443 
12  Bhuta, Nehal, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of 
Constitutional Transformation (March 1, 2010). New York University International Law and 
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On War as Hell by Roger Paul Alford (2002)14 indicates clearly that jus post bellum 
includes principles not only for the period after war ends, but for the process of war 
termination and the transition to peace.  Alford states: “International relations scholars 
have recently begun articulating principles of jus post bellum, modernizing and 
expanding just war theory to address principles for the termination of war and the 
transition to peace.”15  The focus of the article is on war reparations.  This subject, 
perhaps, lends itself to the terms and processes of peace negotiations that occur as part of 
war termination and the implementation of the peace agreements in the transition to 
peace. 
Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum by Kristen E. Boon 
(2009)16 indicates that there is no clear temporal division between war and peace.  Boon 
states “Yet with the exception of the law of belligerent occupation, neither jus ad bellum 
nor jus in bello provide much guidance on temporary interventions after war and before 
peace.”17  This understanding pushes against a simple temporal definition, starting with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice Working Paper No. 2010/1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1574329 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574329 
13  Zsolnai, Laszlo, Corporate Legitimacy (March 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789884 
14  Alford, Roger Paul, On War as Hell. Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 
1, Spring 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=867208 
15  Ibid 217, fn. 29. 
16  Boon, Kristen E., Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum 
(June, 29 2009). Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 
2, 2008.  
17  Ibid. 102.  
Annex A  
    Findings 
 
416 
 
the end of armed conflict.  The focus is on the process of transitioning out of armed 
conflict into peace.  One could argue that this is simply a different temporal definition, 
starting earlier and covering the period of “transition.”  This argument, however, misses 
the principal point of the distinction—that a functional definition emphasizes whether a 
process is going on (the termination of armed conflict and transition to peace) rather than 
whether an event has happened (war ending).  This article falls into the former category, 
and was thus classified as “functional.” 
The Future of the Law of Occupation by Kristen E. Boon (2009)18 clearly emphasizes the 
function of transition from law to peace.  Boon states, “While the scope and content of 
jus post bellum are only developing, a significant contribution of a jus post bellum would 
be to fill existing gaps and establish a uniform legal regime applicable to the exercise of 
public authority during transitions.”19 Again, like in Obligations of the New Occupier: 
The Contours of a Jus Post Bellum, Boon is emphasizing the action of transition 
(particularly the action of the exercise of public authority) rather than a temporal 
definition. 
Corporate Legitimacy by Laszlo Zsolnai (2011)20, which mirrors a chapter in Business 
Ethics and Corporate Sustainability edited by Antonio Tencati and Francesco Perrini.21 
                                                 
18  Boon, Kristen E., The Future of the Law of Occupation (June 30, 2009). Kristen E. 
Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 2009.  
19  Ibid 23. 
20  Zsolnai, Laszlo, Corporate Legitimacy (March 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789884 
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Zsolnai defines jus post bellum as follows: “In more recent years, a third category — “jus 
post bellum” — has been added, which governs the justice of war termination and peace 
agreements, as well as the trying of war criminals.”  This definition is largely functional 
in nature.  It is perhaps not the most legally precise definition, but that may be expected 
in a work that is using just war theory as an analogy for business ethics.  Including this 
work raises the question of the “interpretive community” or “discourse community” of 
jus post bellum.  It clearly extends beyond law, and may extend in surprising ways.  This 
may be an instance where an idea is spreading out (to business ethics in this instance) 
rather than true dialogue across disciplines.  In any case, for methodological consistency, 
as this was article appears in a search for jus post bellum in SSRN, this article must be 
included. 
In New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of Constitutional 
Transformation,22 Nehal Bhuta defines jus post bellum as a project of legal codification 
“that would provide a set of standards governing the relationship between occupier or 
administrator and the population of a territory, in order to ensure that constitutional 
change is indeed a product of the internal sovereignty of the people.”23  This does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
21  Tencati, Antonio and Francesco Perrini, Business Ethics and Corporate Sustainability, 
2011, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
22  Bhuta, Nehal, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of 
Constitutional Transformation (March 1, 2010). New York University International Law and 
Justice Working Paper No. 2010/1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1574329 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574329 
23  Bhuta, Nehal, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of a Jus Post Bellum of 
Constitutional Transformation (March 1, 2010). New York University International Law and 
Justice Working Paper No. 2010/1, p. 5. 
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necessarily include the norms that are included in many functional definitions, including 
peace negotiations and peace agreements, but it does not  exclude them either.  The 
emphasis is clearly on function, in any case, not time, even if the function specified is 
narrower than many definitions. 
d) Temporal Definitions 
The following SSRN articles use a generally temporal definition of jus post bellum:  
Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability of International 
Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum by Matteo 
Tondini (2008),24 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and Identity by Vincent 
Chetail (2009),25 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, by Vincent Chetail in Lexique de la 
Consolidation de la Paix26 (2009), The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A 
Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept by Eric de Brabandere 
(2009),27 Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for Economic 
                                                 
24  Tondini, Matteo, Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability 
of International Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum (2008). 
C. Stahn and J. Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to 
Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008, pp. 187 - 212. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2100944 
25  Chetail, Vincent, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and Identity (March 16, 
2009). POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A LEXICON, pp. 1-33, Vincent Chetail, ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641243 
26  Chetail, Vincent, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (July 19, 2009). LEXIQUE DE LA 
CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX, Vincent Chetail, ed., Bruylant, pp. 29-70, 2009. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645183 
27  De Brabandere, Eric, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept (October 1, 2009). Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569990 
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Reform in Post Conflict Countries by Christina Benson (2012),28 and Peace Settlements 
and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus Post Bellum by Christine Bell 
(2012).29 
Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability of International 
Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum by Matteo 
Tondini (2008) was a chapter in Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From 
Conflict to Peace edited by Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner.30  Tondini defines jus post 
bellum as peace-making “Moreover, the call for accountability in post-conflict situations 
coincides with a broader systemic challenge which is at the heart of jus post bellum, 
namely a ‘normative gap’ in the law governing peace-making after conflict.”31 
                                                 
28  Benson, Christina C., Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries (April 10, 2012). Forthcoming in: Richmond 
Journal of Global Law and Business, Issue 4, Vol. 11 (Fall 2012). . Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037561 
29  Bell, Christine, Peace Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus 
Post Bellum (May 17, 2012). Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/16. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061706 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061706 
30  Tondini, Matteo, Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability 
of International Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum (2008). 
C. Stahn and J. Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to 
Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008, pp. 187 - 212. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2100944 
31 Ibid 188. 
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Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and Identity by Vincent Chetail is a chapter in 
Post-Conflict Peace-Building: A Lexicon edited by the same Vincent Chetail.32  It states: 
“Following this perspective, jus post bellum can be generally defined as the set of norms 
applicable at the end of an armed conflict—whether internal or international—with a 
view to establishing a sustainable peace.”33  This is arguably a mixed temporal and 
functional definition, because the clear temporal definition—norms applicable at a 
particular time, at the end of an armed conflict—is qualified with a particular goal for the 
norms in question—establishing a sustainable peace.  It could have been coded as a .5 (as 
a midpoint between a “0” coding for “functional” definitions and a “1” coding for 
“temporal” definitions), between temporal and functional.  But a natural reading of the 
sentence, as well as the article as a whole, indicates that peace agreements are not 
included in the definition.  The function of transition from armed conflict to peace is thus 
incomplete.  Accordingly, it has been coded as temporal, rather than functional. 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, by Vincent Chetail in Lexique de la Consolidation de la 
Paix34 is similar, and likely identical, to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and 
                                                 
32  Chetail, Vincent, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and Identity (March 16, 
2009). POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A LEXICON, pp. 1-33, Vincent Chetail, ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641243 
33  Ibid 18. 
34  Chetail, Vincent, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (July 19, 2009). LEXIQUE DE LA 
CONSOLIDATION DE LA PAIX, Vincent Chetail, ed., Bruylant, pp. 29-70, 2009. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645183 
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Identity described supra.35  The definition, “Suivant cette, optique, le jus post bellum peut 
etre defini dans un sens large comme l'ensemble des regles applicables a la sortie d'un 
conflit arme - interne ou international - en vue d'instaurer une paix durable” is 
functionally identical.  One might exclude it from the coding, but as it is published twice 
and presumably reaches a different audience, it was coded as two separate works. 
The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum 
as a Legal Concept by Eric de Brabandere36 defines jus post bellum in the following 
sentence: “Several scholars have drawn attention to the need to move toward a distinct 
discipline on the law after conflict—jus post bellum—a systemic adaptation of the 
current division between the ‘law of war’ and the ‘law of peace.’”37  The emphasis is on 
the temporal—law after conflict.  The substantive emphasis in the article is rather limited, 
mostly to reconstruction and occupation. 
Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for Economic Reform in 
Post Conflict Countries by Christina Benson38 defines jus post bellum using temporal 
                                                 
35  Chetail, Vincent, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - Ambiguity and Identity (March 16, 
2009). POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A LEXICON, pp. 1-33, Vincent Chetail, ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641243 
36  De Brabandere, Eric, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept (October 1, 2009). Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569990 
37  De Brabandere, Eric, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept (October 1, 2009). Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2010, 121. 
38  Benson, Christina C., Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries (April 10, 2012). Forthcoming in: Richmond 
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markers: “Rather, the focus of this paper is on the justice of developments during the 
post-war period of occupation (“jus post bellum”), after the CPA took control of the 
country and up until such time as a nominally representative sovereign government could 
be elected.”39  Jus post bellum as the justice that applies from one point to another, 
specifically during occupation, is clearly a temporal definition.  
Peace Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus Post Bellum by 
Christine Bell40 appears to define jus post bellum temporally.  Bell states “From this 
dislike derives an instinct to codify a jus post bellum that would regulate post-conflict 
dilemmas more clearly and more appropriately. If international law is now a law of 
regimes, and the post-conflict environment has no specific or appropriate regime, then, 
the argument runs, it now needs one.”41 The emphasis seems to be on the post-conflict 
period, rather than any particular function.  This contrasts with Bell’s lex pacificatoria, 
which emerges from peace settlements and is alternatively called the “law of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Global Law and Business, Issue 4, Vol. 11 (Fall 2012). . Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037561 
39  Benson, Christina C., Jus Post Bellum in Iraq: The Development of Emerging Norms for 
Economic Reform in Post Conflict Countries (April 10, 2012). Forthcoming in: Richmond 
Journal of Global Law and Business, Issue 4, Vol. 11 (Fall 2012), p. 5. 
40  Bell, Christine, Peace Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus 
Post Bellum (May 17, 2012). Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/16. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061706 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061706 
41  Bell, Christine, Peace Settlements and International Law: From Lex Pacificatoria to Jus 
Post Bellum (May 17, 2012). Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2012/16, p. 51. 
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peacemakers.”42  The research paper is self-reflective with respect to definitions and quite 
nuanced, but is best coded as classifying jus post bellum through a temporal lens. 
3. Westlaw and SSRN Analysis 
Adding the SSRN and Westlaw searches together, overall the references look like this. 
Jus Post Bellum References
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Figure 4 
 
                                                 
42  Ibid 1. 
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Many of the references, however, are trivial.  Graphing only the non-trivial references to 
jus post bellum looks like this: 
Non-trivial Jus Post Bellum References
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Figure 5 
 
Putting the two together, one can visualize the data as follows: 
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Figure 6 
This dataset simplifies works that give two-year spans as their publication year as the first 
publication year, so for example, if there were 6 articles with 2006 as the publication 
year, 2 articles (etc.) with 2007 as the publication year, and 1 work with 2006-2007 as the 
publication year, the totals used would be 7 works with 2006 as the publication year and 
2 works with 2007 as the publication year. 
It is interesting to note the high percentage (32%) of works with only trivial reference to 
jus post bellum.   
All works with essentially trivial references to jus post bellum were coded as “Non-
Defined” in the JPBDefinition variable.  The JPBDefinition variable can thus only be 
meaningfully analyzed with non-trivial references.   
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One way to visualize this data is as follows: 
Functional or Temporal Definitions over Time from Westlaw
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Figure 7 
 
This indicates, using a second-degree polynomial trend line, that there was an uptick in 
ambiguous or temporal definitions of jus post bellum in works listed in Westlaw during 
the mid-2000s, but that the understanding is returning to the original functional 
understanding of the phrase.  
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As indicated above, the SSRN data can be visualized as follows: 
Functional or Temporal Definitions over Time from SSRN
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Figure 8  
 
As above, this is a second-degree polynomial trend line, indicating a steady trend towards 
a more temporal framework in the more general social science audience of SSRN. 
 
Adding the SSRN information back in, the overall trend line looks like this: 
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Functional or Temporal Definitions over Time from Westlaw and SSRN
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Figure 9 
 
However, forcing a trend line is possibly unjustified given the limits of the dataset.  A 
clearer visualization might be the following summation of the combined SSRN and 
Westlaw data, excluding trivial references: 
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Figure 10 
The graph shows the early use of functional definition, an intermediate period of 
indeterminate definition, and increasing use of temporal references compared to 
functional approaches in 2012.  In absolute terms, the publications can be represented as 
follows: 
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Figure 11 
One interpretation of this data could be that the term “jus post bellum” is gaining at least 
a superficial currency and “mindshare,” as seen by the number of glancing references to 
the term.  There have been an increasing number of references overall.  This can be 
illustrated in the following chart showing usage of each phrase in a large corpus of 
printed work.43 
                                                 
43  Source:  Google Books Ngram Viewer, dataset 20090715, available at: 
http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=jus+post+bellum&year_start=1990&year_end=2
008&corpus=0&smoothing=0 last visited 10 October 2012.  This represents the usage of  “jus 
post bellum” over time within millions of printed books.   
 For more on the use of bigram analysis of a large corpus of scanned materials, see 
Michel, Jean-Baptiste, et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 
Science, 16 December 2010, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6014/176. 
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Figure 12 
 
Indeed, the increasing number of references overall as well as the increasing number of 
substantive references indicate that jus post bellum’s utility for legal scholars is more 
than superficial.  There is a risk, however, that with increased usage there will be an 
increased lack of clarity and consistency as to the meaning of the term.  There are a 
number of works which are at least ambiguous as to the nature of the phrase.   
D. Conclusion 
There has been a steady expansion of references to jus post bellum in a variety of 
journals.  With the expansion of references, there has been an increase of ambiguity, not a 
consolidation around a consensus definition.  The trend in the less-legally focused dataset 
(SSRN articles) is away from an emphasis on functional aspects and towards temporal 
aspects.  The overall trend is hard to discern, but for articles with more than a glancing 
reference to jus post bellum there seems to be an arc that went from a functional 
definition, towards, a temporal definition, and with a renewed legal interest back towards 
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a more functional definition.  Whether a consensus will be achieved, and what that 
consensus might be, is as yet unclear. 
1. Areas for Further Research 
The body of scholarship analyzed in this work does not cover all existing works, nor of 
course future works.  There are, of course, various options for further research available 
now, and in the future. 
For a researcher wishing to pursue a similar methodology but use a more comprehensive 
analysis, the datasets identified, researched, and evaluated but not uploaded into the 
database from Google Scholar could be gathered, included in the same database used for 
this work or a similar work, and further analyzed.  Broadening the data analyzed would 
result in a more reliable analysis and allow the researcher to draw more robust 
conclusions.  The Google Scholar material would broaden the amount of material 
considerably.  Greater analysis of material within monographs, edited volumes, and other 
published work would be valuable.  On the other end, analysis of material outside the 
scholarly sphere, such as news reports or communications for practitioners attempting to 
apply law to guide a situation from armed conflict to peace would also be extremely 
interesting.  The material analyzed could also be expanded by following the relevant 
citations within the materials already analyzed.   
To keep the data fresh, the existing datasets or additional datasets could be updated, 
either periodically or an ongoing basis.  Many research tools allow the automatic 
Annex A  
    Conclusion 
 
433 
 
notification of new works which match a particular search.  It will be valuable to see if 
current trends continue. 
In addition, it would be very interesting to get a better map of the importance of different 
works, and weight the empirical analysis accordingly.  For example, the number of times 
an SSRN article is viewed or downloaded could be incorporated.  The impact of 
particular journals could be evaluated.44  Alternatively, the weight given to various 
articles could be qualitatively (if perhaps subjectively) analyzed, either by a single 
scholar or through an open model with online input. 
The Jus Post Bellum Virtual Research Environment45 (hereinafter “Jus Post Bellum 
VRE,”) is the online database which served as a central research tool and scholarship 
repository for this work.  The Jus Post Bellum VRE could be the foundation of a 
published critical bibliography of jus post bellum, as well as an ongoing, interactive jus 
post bellum critical bibliography—continually updated for the use of scholars. 
Finally, more generally, similar research (on terms other than jus post bellum) could build 
upon the research recorded in this work, potentially even using the Jus Post Bellum VRE 
as a template.  Research on jus post bellum would be furthered by doing analysis of the 
                                                 
44  See e.g. the Impact Factor of the Washington and Lee University School of Law Most-
Cited Legal Periodicals, available at http://law.wlu.edu/library/mostcited/method.asp (last visited 
10 October 2012) or the Journal Citation Reports, available at 
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-
z/journal_citation_reports/ (last visited 10 October 2012). 
45  This online database or “virtual research environment” is currently hosted at 
https://vre.leidenuniv.nl/vre/jpb/definitions/default.aspx. 
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contemporary literature on related terms.  More generally, this sort of empirical analysis 
of contemporary literature could be used more frequently in scholarship to evaluate 
definitional ambiguity. 
2. Implementing Further Research 
Many of the areas for further research described above could be implemented through 
extending the Jus Post Bellum VRE.  As can be seen in the screenshot below, articles can 
be checked in and checked out for the purposes of editing the associated metadata.  
Additionally, it is possible for multiple users to rate the individual articles. 
 
 
Figure 13 
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The author hopes that others will find the Jus Post Bellum VRE useful.  He would greatly 
welcome the collaboration of scholars and practitioners interested in jus post bellum, with 
feedback on the research thus far, with respect to the Jus Post Bellum VRE’s design for 
research going forward, and with respect to extending and repurposing the Jus Post 
Bellum VRE for additional research projects. 
This work has posed answers to the questions “what is ‘jus post bellum’” and “why use 
the term ‘jus post bellum’” in a manner that opens further avenues for research rather 
than close the questions with a “definitive” answer.  There is no consensus definition for 
jus post bellum with respect to the emphasis on functional or temporal aspects.  
Accordingly, the reasons why scholars and practitioners use the term ‘jus post bellum’ 
varies.   
The author suggests that a jus post bellum solution that explicitly focuses on the goal of 
the transition to sustainable peace is preferable going forward, given the opportunity cost 
of not focusing on that goal and adopting what might be called a simply nominal 
approach to categorizing law.  Regardless of whether those using the term agree with this 
suggestion, it is imperative for the term to be explicitly defined with respect to functional 
or temporal emphasis.  This should clarify the debate going forward, and assist the 
community using the term arrive at a consensus. 
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Summary 
 
This study focuses on legal and normative principles of the transition from armed conflict 
to peace, often called jus post bellum.  Jus post bellum is self-consciously named in 
relation to its sister terms, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, terms that have been 
exhaustively developed and theorized.  Jus post bellum, in contrast, is comparatively 
under-developed.  It is a phrase frequently used without definition, or with little 
understanding that others may use the term to mean something else.  It is almost never 
used with anything approaching a full exposition of the intellectual history upon which it 
is built.  Before the scholarship in recent years, the laws and principles that constitute the 
jus post bellum were rarely expounded.  This study helps to consolidate a firmer 
theoretical grounding for the term, as well as a clearer intellectual history and analysis of 
its content.  Jus post bellum, like jus gentium or jus civile, is best understood as by 
definition primarily a system or body of law and related principles. 
This thesis has three overarching objectives.  First, the thesis will evaluate the history of 
jus post bellum avant la lettre, tracing important writings on the transition to peace from 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant to more modern jurists and scholars.  Second, it explores 
definitional aspects of jus post bellum, including current its relationship to sister terms 
and related fields.  Third, it will explore the current state and possibilities for future 
development of the law and normative principles that apply to the transition to peace.  Jus 
post bellum has received an increasing amount of attention in recent years, but remains 
comparatively under-theorized, and frequently referenced without realizing that many 
authors be talking past each other, meaning different things while using the same term.  
The author’s hope for the thesis is not only to help clarify the debate over the term, but 
also to move the consensus towards a hybrid functional (rather than temporal) approach 
to jus post bellum, that is, to define an approach to this area of law that focuses on the 
goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace (with an awareness of temporal context) 
rather than a mere discussion of law that applies during early peace.   
In addition to the positive objectives identified above, it may be helpful to identify what 
this work argues against.  Throughout the thesis, explicitly or implicitly, the suggestion 
that jus post bellum does not exist is rebuffed, as is the idea that it has no content.  In the 
introduction and conclusion to Chapter 1 (Past – The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum) the 
claim that the just war tradition is devoid of discussion of the subject matter of jus post 
bellum or that discussing the just war tradition is meritless is specifically rejected.  
Chapter 2 situates jus post bellum with its sister terms, jus in bello and jus ad bellum.  
The particular content and contours of jus post bellum are explored in Chapter 3 (Three 
theories of Jus Post Bellum) and Chapter 4 (Present – An Exploration of Contemporary 
Usage).  Chapter 4 also specifically rejects the idea that transitional justice, post-conflict 
international criminal law and jus post bellum are interchangeable ideas.  Chapter 5 
provides a closer examination of jus post bellum in international and non-international 
armed conflict.  Chapter 6 examines the contemporary legal content of jus post bellum.  
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Samenvatting: De functie van Jus Post Bellum in internationale wetgeving  
Deze studie richt zich op de wettelijke en normatieve principes die gelden tijdens de 
overgangsperiode tussen een gewapend conflict en vrede, ook wel jus post bellum 
genoemd. Jus post bellum is, vanwege de zustertermen jus ad bellum en jus in bello, 
weloverwogen zo genoemd. Jus ad bellum en jus in bello zijn echter termen die 
uitgebreid zijn ontwikkeld en getheoretiseerd. Jus post bellum is daarentegen relatief 
onderontwikkeld en wordt vaak zonder enige definitie gebruikt. Men realiseert zich ook 
niet dat niet iedereen de term dezelfde betekenis toekent. Het komt slechts sporadisch 
voor dat men bij de uitleg van de term de gehele intellectuele geschiedenis ervan betrekt. 
De wetten en principes die de jus post bellum vormen, waren voorafgaand aan de beurs 
van afgelopen jaren zelden uiteengezet. Deze studie helpt bij het versterken van een 
theoretische grondslag van de term, evenals het verduidelijken van de intellectuele 
geschiedenis en het analyseren van de inhoud ervan. Jus post bellum, zoals jus gentium of 
jus civile, kan het best worden beschouwd als per definitie hoofdzakelijk een wettelijk 
systeem of wetgeving, en de aanverwante principes. 
Dit proefschrift heeft drie overkoepelende doelstellingen. Ten eerste zal het proefschrift 
de geschiedenis van jus post bellum avant la lettre evalueren. Daarbij zullen belangrijke 
documenten met betrekking tot de transitie naar vrede van Augustinus, Aquino, Kant en 
meer moderne juristen en geleerden worden bekeken. In de tweede plaats verkent het 
proefschrift aspecten van de definitie van jus post bellum, inclusief de huidige relatie tot 
de zustertermen en aanverwante velden. Ten derde zal het de huidige toestand en 
mogelijkheden voor toekomstige ontwikkeling van de wet en normatieve principes die 
van toepassing zijn op de transitieperiode naar vrede onderzoeken. Jus post bellum heeft 
de laatste jaren steeds meer aandacht gekregen, maar deze aandacht blijft op het 
theoretisch vlak toch achter. Er wordt naar de term gerefereerd zonder dat men door heeft 
dat verschillende auteurs de term een andere betekenis toedichten. De auteur hoopt dat 
het proefschrift niet alleen het debat omtrent de term verduidelijkt, maar ook de 
consensus verlegt naar een hybride functionele (in plaats van temporele) benadering van 
jus post bellum. Dat wil zeggen, het binnen dit rechtsgebied definiëren van een aanpak 
die gericht is op het bereiken van een rechtvaardige en duurzame vrede (met een 
bewustzijn van een temporele context) in plaats van slechts een discussie van de tijdens 
beginnende vrede van toepassing zijnde wetgeving. 
Naast de hierboven genoemde positieve doelstellingen, kan het nuttig zijn om vanaf het 
begin te identificeren waar dit werk tegen argumenteert. Gedurende dit proefschrift 
wordt, uitdrukkelijk of impliciet, de suggestie afgewezen dat jus post bellum niet bestaat 
of dat het idee geen inhoud heeft. In de inleiding en conclusie van hoofdstuk 1 (Het 
verleden - De diepe wortels van Jus Post Bellum) wordt met name de bewering dat de 
traditie van een rechtvaardige oorlog is verstoken  van discussie omtrent het onderwerp 
van jus post bellum, of dat de discussie omtrent de traditie van een rechtvaardige oorlog, 
niet zinvol is, afgewezen . Hoofdstuk 2 plaatst jus post bellum naast haar zustertermen, 
jus in bello en jus ad bellum. De specifieke inhoud en contouren van jus post bellum 
worden onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 3 (Drie theorieën over Jus Post Bellum) en Hoofdstuk 4 
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(Het heden - Een onderzoek naar het hedendaagse gebruik). Hoofdstuk 4 verwerpt ook 
specifiek het idee dat overgangsrecht, post-conflict internationaal strafrecht en jus post 
bellum uitwisselbare ideeën zijn. Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een diepgaand onderzoek weer naar 
jus post bellum tijdens een internationaal- en niet-internationaal gewapend conflict. 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de hedendaagse juridische inhoud van jus post bellum.  
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